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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is meant to replicate research by O’Toole (1997), investigating the 
effectiveness of  Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT), and REBT combined 
with REST, in reducing and treating social anxiety disorder (SAD). The present study 
used a counselling programme grounded in REBT and/or REST to re-examine the 
effects of REBT and/or REST on treating SAD in college students in a Saudi Arabian 
university. An experimental pre-test, post-test, control group design was utilised, and 
quantitative and content analysis data were collected and analysed using O’Toole’s 
measures after being ‘Arabicised’ and standardised. Social anxiety was measured using 
the Interaction Anxiousness Scale and the Shyness Scale. Seventy-five volunteers, who 
were undergraduate students at King Abdul Aziz University, participated in the study. 
The measures were used in placing the clients in their respective groups in the empirical 
study and for comparing pre-testing data with post-testing and follow-up results. 
Findings indicated that both treatments of REBT-only and REST plus REBT proved 
effective in the reduction of prior irrational beliefs, considering their reduced irrational 
thinking scores at the advanced stages of the study. That notwithstanding, follow-up 
post-comparison analyses confirmed that REST plus REBT therapy is more effective 
than REBT only. Content analysis data derived from the reflections and cognitions of the 
participants yielded findings that support and integrate with the results obtained from the 
quantitative study, which involved the use of numerical scales. The findings were later 
compared and contrasted with the basal study findings and in congruence with prior 
research reviewed. Finally, the present study recommended that REBT should be 
supported by REST to gain more effective psychotherapeutic results with SAD patients 
by efficaciously reducing their irrational beliefs. The study also recommended 
conducting future research to tap into the relationship between religiosity and REBT, 
harnessing REBT/REST counselling programmes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Introductory Note 
It may be important to start the introduction of this research with the following 
important facts: (1) mental disorders have greater negative effects on people’s abilities 
and functioning than many serious chronic physical illnesses (Kessler et al. 2001; Ormel 
et al. 1994; wells et al 1989 & Kessler et al. 2004), (2) most mental disorders in the 
world go unnoticed or untreated and, consequently are not represented in the results of 
surveys or studies particularly in the world’s developing countries (Alegria, et al. 2000;  
Bijl et al. 2003 & Kessler et al. 2004), and (3) more than one third of those surveyed met 
criteria for a lifetime disorder according to the Composite International Diagnostic 
Interview (CIDI) of  the World Health Organization (Kessler et al., 2004).  These facts 
illustrate the seriousness and prevalence of mental disorders worldwide and demonstrate 
the importance of making the efforts to combat them at all levels including prevention 
and treatment. In addition, surveying fourteen countries in the Americas (Colombia, 
Mexico and the United States), Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands and Ukraine), the Middle East (Lebanon) and Africa (Nigeria) and China 
(Beijing and Hong Kong) on the prevalence and severity of mental health disorders 
revealed that: (1) the Anxiety disorders including (agoraphobia, generalized anxiety 
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, 
social phobia, and specific phobia) are the most common disorders in all but one country 
which is Ukraine, (2) between one third and two third of these surveyed cases received 
no treatment, and (3) developed and rich countries could not afford to treat all people 
with mental disorders (Kessler at al., 2004). 
Prevalence of Mental Health Disorders in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi college students are no exception, and many are beset with social and 
psychological malaises such as depression, anxiety disorders, obsessive compulsive 
disorders and phobias (Bassiony, 2005; El-Rufaie, Albar & Al-Dabal, 2007; Quest 
Consulting, 2004).  Before describing the prevalence of mental health disorders in Saudi 
Arabia, the researcher should declare that such disorders are likely to be underreported 
and understudied. The reasons for such lack of reporting include the stigma that 
surrounds mental illness in the Arab world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular 
(Tanios et al 2009). Furthermore, Saudi Arabian women may feel unable to reveal their 
own personal vulnerabilities to males who dominate the mental health professions, 
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which could be ascribed to cultural and religious reasons (Tanios et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, the presence of strong family ties and large extended family members 
living in the same dwellings may help lessen the severity of anxiety, hide its active 
symptoms or limit its impairing effects through the presence of safe family members 
(Ghubash et al., 1992). 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is very common among the various 
psychopathologies (Jaber, 1995; Al-Jusmani & Mohammed, 1989). It is the second most 
prevalent among neurotic disorders which accounts for 3–13% of all cases of 
psychopathology. It has spread to 2–5% of human communities around the globe 
(Kaplan, Thompson & Searson, 1995). The effects of SAD cover a wide range of the 
afflicted individuals’ lives such as academic achievement, employment, social 
relationships, physical health and their overall wellbeing. 
In Saudi Arabia, although there are no comprehensive national studies that reflect 
the status of SAD in the whole country, the researcher seeks to provide a picture of the 
current situation through the limited number of region or area specific studies available 
in the Country. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2008), 
neuropsychiatric disorders in Saudi Arabia are estimated to contribute to 14% of the 
global burden of disease (Mental Health Atlas, 2011). In a review of studies on the 
epidemiology of anxiety disorder in the Arab world (Tanios et al, 2009).   
Al-Rufaie et al. (1988) used the Hospital anxiety and depression scale among 100 
patients of ages between 15-34 and found that 7% were having anxiety and depressive 
disorders at the comorbidity level. Qureshi et al. (2001), surveying 540 patients at 
primary health centres and general hospitals and using a circumscribed clinical interview 
in a primary health clinic and found that 7% had some sort of “anxiety disorder” 
comorbid with depression. Using the International Classification of Diseases 10 (ISD 
10), Qureshi et al (2001) also found that 13.8 % of the patients interviewed were having 
anxiety and depressive disorders from among patients referred by a general hospital, 
while it was 17.4 from among patients referred to by primary health care.  
Chaleby (1987), for example, indicated that SAD afflicts 13% of the total 
outpatient population of the King Faisal Specialised Hospital who are diagnosed with a 
psychopathology. In university clinics, however, the percentage seems higher as 
concluded by Chaleby & Raslan (1990) and Al-Ashgar (2004). By the same token, 
Chaleby (1987) and Saleh, (1985) assert that a significant percentage of Saudi youth 
suffers from debilitating social anxiety.  
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Social relationships are of major importance to adolescents and young adults as 
they move away from home for the first time and establish their independence and 
autonomy in early college life. 
O’Toole (1997) observed that social anxiety is critically pervasive in the college 
student’s life.  Anderson (2000), Chamberlain et al. (2008),  Grimes & Jensen, (2008), 
Jensen et al. (2008) & Moriarty (2002) contend that social anxiety explains the aetiology 
of depression, feelings of guilt and negative self-concept, irrationality, burnout and 
sluggish academic performance found among students, and, therefore, it does not only 
affect the students’ social lives but also their academic performance. SAD is, therefore, a 
very prevalent disorder to the extent that it affects approximately 70% of young men in 
mental health facilities who are from the student population (Gonzalez et al. (2004). 
In Saudi Arabia, Quest Consulting utilised qualitative research techniques and 
ethnography to focus on a cross-section of Saudi teenagers in the three main urban areas 
of Jeddah, Dammam and Riyadh. It found that more young men than women in Saudi 
Arabia tend to feel powerless, socially anxious and alienated from society (Quest 
Consulting, 2004). According to several researchers (Clark & Wells, 1995; McManus, 
Grey & Shfran, 2008; Melfsen et al., 2011; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), cognition plays a 
significant role in the aetiology of social phobias, as increased self-focused attention and 
misleading internal information is used to make excessively negative inferences about 
how one appears to others.  
Al Shammari and Al-Subaie (1999) used a 30-item scale to assess depressive 
symptoms among Saudis’ age 60 or older. Among 8000 families identified and surveyed, 
39% reported significant depressive symptoms. Among those 39%,  with women  
represented 49% compared to men (33%), the divorced or widowed (51%), the illiterate 
(43%), those in remote or rural areas (45%), those not working (45%) and individuals 
over 80 years old (52%).  
As for young people, local studies have also high prevalence of emotional 
disorders. In a sample of 490 secondary school students in Taif whose average age was 
17 and 38 % of whom were females, Abdel Fatah and Asal (2007) assessed depressive 
symptoms using the 21 –item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The results revealed 
that one third scored moderate to severe depression range (19 or more on the Scale) and 
11% scored in the severe to very severe range. In multivariate analysis, females were one 
third more likely (40 % vs. 29 %) to score 19 or higher.  
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Several researchers (e.g. Meleis, 1982; Racy, 1980; Saleh, 1987 & Zahran, 
2000). have also indicated that Arab college students seem to lack the ability and/or 
desire to participate in independent, unstructured learning or to make bold decisions on 
their own. As a result, their morale is often low, which is further exacerbated by high 
degrees of loneliness and shyness. This common state of low morale seems to manifest 
itself in psychological diseases, especially social disorder, phobias, anxiety, depression 
and other related disorders Meleis (1982) suggests that psychological and social 
malaises, including social anxiety, with their somatic symptoms, ‘may be due to an 
interplay between cultural exhaustion, culture shock, and the relationship between the 
mind and the body’ (p. 445). That is to say, social anxiety may be engendered by the 
stress on the body of the conflict between a strong need for affiliation and the actual state 
of loneliness and shyness of these college students, as well as the stressful requirements 
of college life, whether studying in their home country or abroad.  
Psychosocial disorders may also be precipitated by the effects of the mass media, 
such as TV, open satellite channels, mobile telephones, and more importantly, the 
Internet, where people can surf it anonymously. A relationship has also been detected 
between luxury and unhappiness. In this respect, Diener (2000) found that despite 
Americans having far more luxuries than in the 1950s, they are still unhappy, suggesting 
that happiness is not dependent on the materialistic aspect of life. Pertinently, Myers 
(2000) contended that people “are twice as rich and no happier. At the same time, the 
divorce rate has doubled, teen suicide tripled and depression rates have soared up, 
especially among teens and young adults.” (p.61)  
These words about the American society can also be applicable to the situation of 
the average society in the Gulf region, where people have an abundance of luxury, yet 
still lack this subtle feeling of happiness that cannot be bought with money.  
Further, open satellite channels and modern information and communication 
technologies (ICT) have made it easier for youngsters to connect and influence each 
other, often negatively. Although this observation is not well documented in empirical 
research in Saudi Arabia as far as the researcher is aware, it is widely acknowledged that 
youngsters misuse the Internet and other communication technologies to engage in 
practices that are strictly prohibited by the rigid ethico-religious system in Saudi Arabia, 
such as accessing pornography, sex-chatting to members of the opposite sex, obtaining 
narcotics, etc. Such practices of Internet and other technologies’ abuse, in one’s view, 
can be conducive to ambivalent  behaviour, which can be harmful to the self. While the 
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revolution in ICT has brought about virtual freedom, the strong ethical and religious 
restrictions can lead to internal conflict within the individual.  
The ‘self-enclosed’ nature of Saudi society, which is deeply rooted in traditional 
social mores, often contrasts with the values spread and generated by interaction with the 
electronic media. In other words, young Saudi people experience conflict between 
openness to the diverse world cultures entering every home via the media and the strict 
traditions and behavioural mores imposed by tribalism and the religious institution, 
particularly the religious police that this institution keeps, whose repressive role is still 
prevalent in the kingdom. As a result, young men and women feel a need to behave like 
other young people in Egypt, Syria, the UK or the USA, but Saudi tradition and the 
social system preclude this. This conflict generates an environment for non-adapters to 
develop psychological disorders such as anxiety or social anxiety. This raises the need to 
discuss what makes Saudi Arabia’s higher educational system a place where 
psychosocial problems are likely to be induced or generated.  
In a study on the perceptions of and concerns about sociocultural changes and 
psychopathology in Saudi Arabia, with special reference to personality-related 
psychopathological disorders and symptoms, Ibrahim (1990) found that many young 
Saudis had high awareness of sociocultural transformations conducive to depressive and 
psychopathological symptoms. Ibrahim also indicated that the educational system is 
challenged by an array of factors that contribute to the mental health issues of college 
students. Prominent among such factors are the value systems disseminated by the 
media, which contrast with the old religious values and traditions maintained and 
imposed by the religious police. This ambivalence is conducive to psychological 
problems for those who cannot adapt to the requirements of the social environment. 
Fakhr El-Islam (1983) earlier intimated that too-rigid application and imposition of 
Sharia law could contribute to behavioural disturbances among Saudi youth and lead to 
restlessness, free-floating anxiety and phobias.   
As a result, young people highly cherish privacy and confidentiality as a shield 
against the invasiveness and pervasiveness of the religious police. Youngsters are always 
afraid of carrying out any socially unacceptable conduct or indecent behaviour such as 
debauchery, alcohol-taking or drug use, etc. In public because if they are caught by 
religious police in Saudi Arabia, they are usually subjected to imprisonment and 
scandalising in the most bitter way. It has been suggested that fear of the religious police 
and the need to hide socially unacceptable behaviour contribute to the emergence of 
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social anxiety, depression, fear, panic, phobias and other psychological maladies among 
Saudi college students (Chaleby & Raslan, 1990).  
College and University Counselling Centres  
The presence of counselling centres in colleges and universities is very essential 
to their academic functioning as well as to the surrounding communities.  Such centres 
are expanding both in numbers and functions.  Ceyhan and Ceyhan (2011) indicate that 
university counselling centres play a significant role in higher educational institutions by 
providing psychological counselling to both college students and members of the 
community who seek counselling help with these educational institutions. In fact, the 
role of university counselling centres should not be limited to providing psychological 
counselling only as stipulated by the International Association of Counselling Services 
[IACS], the agency that provides accreditation to university counselling centres. In its 
publication that outlines the standards for university and college counselling services 
(2010), it declares that such centres should provide more services such as crisis 
intervention and emergency services, outreach interventions, consultation interventions 
and referral services. From the researcher’s personal experience in both Saudi Arabia 
and the United Kingdom, career counselling, relationships, preventive counselling and 
programmes are also among the various functions that counselling centres feel 
compelled to provide in order to meet the demands and inquiries of their constituencies 
and to their surrounding communities as more universities are beginning to connect their 
scholarship to the needs of their communities.  
In a very direct and specific way, these centres assist students to cope with 
psychosocial and developmental issues, knowing that this age represents a critical period 
upon which their future and entire lives could be determined (Sharkin, 1997; Sharkin & 
Coulter, 2005). University students are mostly adolescents who are undergoing both 
developmental and environmental changes. Such changes include the biological 
developments and the departure from likely restrictive homes to a more liberal university 
environment with the freedom to choose almost for every aspect in the student’s life.  In 
this new milieu, students are prone to developing psychopathologies due to societal 
constraints (Meleis, 1982), as will be discussed later.  
In the researcher’s opinion, providing psychological counselling to college 
students suffering from emotional or psychological disturbances that may have 
pathological manifestation can be both therapeutic and educational which means 
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producing more and better graduates and help in making better family and community 
members. 
College students, especially new students, have to deal with multiple stressors, 
such as being away from home, adapting to university life, living with others in 
dormitories or private lodgings (independently or sharing with others), and the demands 
to manage their time, organize their studies, etc. Such stressors, if not well managed, can 
lead to psychosocial problems. In addition, college students may have to become 
involved in social activities with new people and establish new relationships, develop 
intimate friendships and seek to avoid isolation (Ceyhan & Ceyhan, 2011; Erikson, 
1963; Sharkin, 1997).  In Saudi Arabia, where intimate relations are forbidden, both 
religiously and culturally, outside the bond of marriage, Saudi students may not have to 
deal with that aspect, or in case they do develop intimacy, may not be able to reveal it to 
even counsellors or therapists. 
These stressful conditions or situations have the potential to threaten students’ 
well-being during their particular phase of socio-cognitive and psychological 
development. Such stressors may account for the increased prevalence of 
psychopathology among students.  
Psychological workers and counsellors in university counselling centres believe, 
based on anecdotal evidence and personal experience, that the severity of students’ 
psychological problems has increased in recent years (Ceyhan, Kızıltaş, Dönmezel & 
Yemenici, 2008; Sharkin, 1997; Sharkin & Coulter, 2005). It is also thought that most 
university students are at risk for psychopathology, including personality disorders and 
problems involved in psychosocial encounters, yet most do not seek adequate preventive 
mental health services (İnanç, Savaş, Tutkun, Herken & Savaş, 2004). 
Researchers (e.g. Ceyhan et al., 2008; Ceyhan & Ceyhan, 2011; McWhirter, 
1990; Yerin-Güneri, 2006) have also shown that college students only turn to 
counselling or medico-social centres available at universities when they experience 
severe communication problems, academic adjustment issues, troubled romantic 
relationships, depression, anxiety disorders, test anxiety, study skill difficulties, shyness 
and loneliness, low self-esteem or troubled relationships with parents or teachers.  
  
The attention in counselling has shifted from focusing on the analysis of past 
actions as the main source of psychopathology to a focus on thinking, action and 
outcome. In other words, on the interaction between cognitive, emotional and 
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behavioural factors when examining a patient (Orlans & van Scoyo, 2009). Orlans & van 
Scoyo (2009) state:  
“This shift is based on the principal assumption that human beings are inclined to 
be constructivists in their perceptions, which colours the meanings individuals assign to 
life situations and events. Accordingly, ‘if a person’s perceptions of a given situation or 
event could be changed, then emotional and behavioural consequences would follow” (p. 
47).  
Ellis (1976) sees that irrational thinking results from people becoming disturbed 
because of their failure to achieve happiness. In other words, irrational belief structures 
contribute significantly to the initiation of social phobias, particularly among the male 
population of college students (Chaleby & Raslan, 1990; Levin, 1996; O’Toole, 1997; 
Quest Consulting, 2004; Schultz & Moore, 1986). The Researcher contends that if not 
appropriately and thoroughly treated, social anxiety can be a disturbing emotional 
problem for college students, and may prevent them from pursuing academic endeavours 
and their personal life in a normal manner. The failure to achieve academically can lead 
to unemployment, and other problems in life. 
 Thorough treatment requires systematic investigation into its origins, 
ramifications and therapy at therapeutic and counselling level as well as at the social 
level. This study is, therefore, a seminal work in Saudi research, as it explores SAD in 
college students and endeavours for treatment from the perspective of rational therapy, 
using a combination of rational emotive behavioural therapy (REBT) and restricted 
environmental stimulation technique (REST).  
While this study replicates previous research by O’Toole (1997), it focuses on 
subjects in a totally different environment and under different circumstances. O’Toole’s 
study tested the effects of REBT combined with REST on reducing and treating social 
phobias and irrational beliefs among college students. Analysis of data obtained using 
pre-, post,  and one-month follow-up administration of an Irrational Beliefs Test and an 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale together with a Shyness Scale, using ANOVA, indicated 
that a social anxiety counselling programme grounded in REBT and supported by REST 
is effective in treating irrationality in college students, and thereby, reducing social 
anxiety.  
However, a literature review of Arab counselling psychology programmes and 
their effectiveness suggests that an amalgam of REBT and REST has never been 
undertaken in the Arab world. In addition, while some empirical research has been 
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conducted in the area and reported in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the 
literature on REBT is very sparse. This confirms the importance of replicating O’Toole’s 
study on the Saudi population using the same hypotheses. In the countries of the Arabian 
Gulf, recent affluence from high oil revenues is evident on all members of the society. 
However and as Meleis, (1982) stated:   
“although the younger generation has grown up with free education and 
more health care, nearly free housing and freedom from undesirable 
work, which is done by foreign labour, young Arabian people continue 
to suffer from psychological disorders such as SAD” (p. 440).  
College students beset with social anxiety and social withdrawal may often not 
be aware of their problems. Gonzalez et al. (2004) indicated that ‘children and 
adolescents seldom perceive themselves as ‘disturbed’ or in need of therapeutic 
treatment’ (p. 223). Thus, adolescent treatment referrals at college level are made by 
parents, teachers or other caretakers who often determine the desired goal of the therapy 
and provide the information required by the therapist (Weisz, Weiss, Han, Granger & 
Morton, 1995). This justifies interventions aimed at prevention or early treatment 
focused on youth to prevent nascent problems from developing into full-blown disorders 
(Schneider, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz and Weissman, 1992; Schneider, Blanco, Antia 
& Liebowitz, 2002).  
The Problem Addressed in the Study 
The problem addressed in this study has two main aspects. Firstly, there is a 
practical need to address this growing psychological problem in Saudi college 
communities which is SAD. Previous research in the Saudi environment (Al-Ashgar, 
2004; Chaleby, 1987; Chaleby & Raslan, 1990; Ibrahim, 1987; Saleh, 1985), though 
scarce, indicates that social anxiety is pervasive in Saudi college populations among both 
genders, yet with a slight variation in prevalence. Secondly, the theoretical and 
conceptual foundation of this study relates to the examination of the effectiveness of 
combining two intervention modalities, namely REBT and REST, versus REBT only, 
which has been proven effective in a different environment by Patrick O’Toole (1997). 
The present study, thus, addresses the following research question: What is the 
effectiveness of a counselling programme using REBT and REST in relieving and 
treating social anxiety related to irrational thinking among Saudi college students? 
Broadly speaking, this replication of O’Toole’s (1997) study can be considered an 
important contribution to Arabian literature on the theme of social anxiety and irrational 
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beliefs as well as on the use of REBT for the treatment of these problems – an area that 
is under-researched in the Arab world.  
As indicated earlier, O’Toole’s research suggested that the use of REBT plus 
REST is more effective than using REBT alone. Further, although studies into the 
effectiveness of REBT or REST, separately or in combination, at that time were scarce, 
from 1997 to 2008 more research and theoretical synthesis studies were carried out on 
the effectiveness of REBT (Anderson, 2000; Aumann, 2004; Banks, 2006; Cornwall, 
2008; Ford, 2009; Gonzalez et al, 2004; Gregas, 2009; Jensen, 2008; Jensen et al., 2008; 
Koffler, 2005; Moore, 2006; Pace, 2006; Sharp, 2003; Sias, 2006; Weisz, Weiss, Alicke, 
& Klotz, 1987). 
REBT is a trend in psychotherapy that helps individuals to combat irrational 
thinking, a basic culprit behind psychopathology, both with and without the assistance of 
psychological counsellors or psychotherapists; as Orlans and van Scoyo (2009) 
proclaimed, Ellis’s REBT framework does not necessarily need a therapeutic setting, but 
can help engender therapeutic change by offering a self-help approach initiated by the 
psychotherapist and completed at home and in the mind of the patient by self-search 
psychotherapy.  
The present study includes a theoretical study to update the conceptual 
framework since O’Toole’s study, and a thorough review of the literature on social 
anxiety, irrationality, REBT and REST. For the fieldwork, which entailed examining the 
effectiveness of the REBT/REST counselling programme, O’Toole’s research 
instruments were Arabicised and standardised. The instruments were applied to a 
random sample of students to assess reliability and validity using statistically appropriate 
methods. The fieldwork was initiated to test the effectiveness of an amalgam of REBT 
and REST as an improvement over REBT therapy alone. This has helped, in part, to test 
the widely claimed benefits of REBT, enrich the REBT research literature and also fill 
the gap in Arabian literature on the subject.  
Why This Study Was Conducted to Replicate Old Research 
Some preliminary research evidence gleaned in the literature review of this study, 
and earlier surveyed by the present researcher, indicated that REBT theory of social 
anxiety and irrational beliefs was ambiguous, for two reasons. First, early irrational 
beliefs measures lacked discriminate validity, as will be demonstrated in the literature 
review and methodology chapters, being confounded with emotional distress and 
phobias or different types of anxiety. Hence, studies showing positive correlations 
 11 
 
between social anxiety and/or shyness measures and irrational beliefs measures could be 
criticised as merely revealing a convergence of two indicators of the same variable, 
generalised negative affectivity (social phobia produced by a morbid state of 
irrationality, which is primarily generated by irrational thoughts – unobtrusive, morbid 
disruptive and dysfunctional beliefs) as affecting social maladaptation in social contexts 
(Smith, 1989). Second, some of these studies lacked control groups, soundly developed 
instruments or a thorough review of pertinent literature. In other words, prior research 
showed that socially anxious people differed from non-socially anxious people in the 
level of irrationality; that is, irrational thinking is proven culpable for producing or 
triggering social anxiety. However, there were few studies that could prove the efficacy 
of REBT treatments in alleviating social anxiety through reducing or eradicating 
irrational beliefs in SAD patients. Definitely put, there were very few empirical studies 
tapping into the effects of REBT-only counselling treatment, and REBT plus REST in 
intervention treatments to prove how effective each type of intervention could be. Prior 
research findings showed that the evidence in support of the effectiveness of both REBT 
plus REST treatment is only statistical, as claimed by O’Toole (1997). According to 
O'Toole (1997), the evidence being only statistical means that any significant reduction 
reported the the subjects' social anxiety and irrational belief test scores may have simply 
been due to a statistical regression towards the mean.The reason for this statistical 
regression is that "the participants were more sensitized to and aware of their feelings of 
social anxiety, and thus tended to express these feelings more in the pretest scales they 
filled out." (O'Toole, 1997, p. 91) 
In some prior research, measures of irrational beliefs were criticised for such 
limitations as validity and reliability; in addition, prior research (e.g., McDermut, Haaga, 
& Bilek, 1997; Malouff & Schutte, 1986) further garnered favourable evidence of 
discriminate validity for some of these measures (e.g., the Belief Scale by Malouff & 
Schutte, 1986 and the Irrational Beliefs Test by Jones, 1969) to measure irrational 
beliefs. Results were consistent with the REBT model; only the clinically identified 
subjects as having SAD significantly exceeded controls on irrational beliefs at pre-
testing. With REBT and REBT plus REST treatments, favourable results were gleaned to 
the good of the interventions on pre-test/post-test comparisons, but not on post-test and 
follow-up post-comparisons (e.g., O’Toole, 1997).  
Thus, the REBT prediction that irrationality would characterise SAD was not 
empirically upheld, though statistically the results of O’Toole showed that ‘the 
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significant reduction in the participants' social anxiety and irrational belief test scores 
may simply be evidence of a statistical regression towards the mean’(O’Toole, 1997, p. 
91). 
Findings of the original study of O'Toole (1997) are, in his own words, ‘difficult 
to interpret’; he explains: 
‘On the one hand, since there was a significant reduction in the irrational 
belief and social anxiety test scores for all three treatment groups from 
pre-test to post-test and follow-up, they seem to support the theory that 
there is a link between a person's irrational beliefs … and their social 
anxiety. … However, there was no significant difference between the 
groups at post-test or follow-up. This fails to support the hypothesis that 
both REBT and REST treatments would enhance participants’ receptivity 
to changing their irrational beliefs compared to control participants.’ 
(O’Toole, 1997, p. 90) 
Furthermore, prior research by McDermut et al. (1997) extends earlier work in 
supporting the REBT model but remains limited in at least two ways. First, positive 
validity data concerning irrationality scales in some studies were, however, collected 
despite methodologists’ question whether irrational beliefs can be validly assessed with 
questionnaires or endorsement measures (Kendall & Southam-Gerow, 1996). 
A few researchers think that irrational beliefs may be influencing patients' 
inclination towards psychopathology at the unconscious level. These beliefs can rightly 
and appropriately be detected and measured by inference from the informants’ thoughts 
(Bernard, 1998); crudely put, patients need to have their irrational beliefs, which are sub-
consciously triggered off, to be consciously detected by patients themselves through 
introspective tools, such as introspective questionnaires or thought logs. O’Toole (1997) 
explains that statistical regression towards the mean scores on pre-test/post-test scores 
was the potentially responsible factor for the more significant reduction in social anxiety 
and irrational thinking scores, given that the participants were aware of their social 
anxiety and irrationality before they were given any experimental treatment for the 
reduction and alleviation of irrational beliefs and social anxiety. 
In order to circumvent earlier defects in the validation process of the Irrational 
Beliefs Test for the Arabic version, the researcher sought the advice and erudition of 
different Arab psychologists in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who have had previous 
experience in the Arabian environment. Inter-rater validation was conducted using 
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multiple psychometric methods through (1) assessing the face validity of the scales; and 
(2) measuring the content validity. Content validity is based on the extent to which a 
measurement reflects the specific intended domain of content. Inter-rater validation 
using experts in the field made the Arabic version valid enough to measure irrational 
thinking in the Saudi context. Furthermore, internal consistency estimates of the 
Irrational Beliefs scale were based on a test/retest assessment of a pilot sample made up 
of 500 male students in the Department of Psychology Faculty of the Arts and 
Humanities at the University of King Abdu-Aziz, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This scale 
yielded Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.77, a Spearman-Brown Coefficient of 0.71, and 
a Guttmann Split-Half Coefficient of 0.69, which indicate moderately high reliability 
coefficients. 
One more concern was that the SAD participants in O’Toole’s study were indeed 
currently socially phobic, even in the absence of irrational beliefs. Thus, it is possible 
that their social phobia is what caused irrational beliefs to be developed rather than the 
other way around. 
The research presented in this doctoral work took a first step toward 
circumventing these limitations. The researcher measured irrational beliefs in two ways: 
with the Jones’ Irrational Beliefs Test Arabicised and the translation was juryed by 
experts in the field. They were also assessed by inferential coding of participants' 
articulated thoughts in simulated situations as Educational messages in their diary 
entries, which have been quantified according to the procedures described in the 
Methodology chapter. Therefore, comparisons between people with social phobia in the 
two treatment conditions and their peers who also suffer from social phobias in the non-
treatment control group, both on pre-testing and post-testing measures, could be 
potentially useful in determining whether irrational beliefs are a risk factor for social 
anxiety or a non-causal correlate of SAD. If, by the same token, irrational beliefs were a 
non-causal correlate, waxing and waning with the social anxiety levels determined on 
pre-and-post assessments, participants should have been equivalent on pre-testing 
scaling. On the other hand, if irrational beliefs are a risk factor, they should be eliminated 
in the treatment conditions, but not in the control condition, at least on average, among 
socially anxious people; if not, then the REBT theory would be hard-pressed to account 
for the increased risk of future SAD among those with a history of social phobia.  
One aim of this study, then, was to compare the REBT only and REBT plus 
REST groups on irrational beliefs, shyness, and social anxiety. In the original study, one 
 14 
 
group of comparison was added, the REST condition, which added to the complexity and 
sophistication of the interpretation of statistical analyses. In the present replicated 
investigation, these two groups (REBT only and REBT plus REST) showed statistically 
significant differences on posttesting, but it was not practical to equate the groups as the 
participants were already allocated to their respective groups.  
One more difference between O'Toole's research and the present study is that the 
present researcher ignored the use of hypnosis – a cooperative interaction in which the 
participants respond to the suggestions of the hypnotist. This technique was used in the 
original study in order to reduce the incoming stimuli in the flotation environment to the 
barest minimum during a short period in order to prepare the participants for accepting 
suggestions and educational messages in the REBT and REST conditions and for 
moderating social anxiety in order for the treatment to be more effective. An example of 
educational messages is given below as was used in the counselling programme 
grounding this study: 
Day-by-day you will increasingly do what you enjoy doing rather than what 
other people think you ought to do in life. It would be nice if other people 
approved of what you do, but it is not necessary to your happiness for 
you to be loved and approved of by almost everyone for almost 
everything you do.  
You know what it is that makes you happy, that makes life enjoyable, and this 
is what you should do.  
In fact, hypnosis or what Ellis (2004b) has termed as Couéism has been deeply 
used and investigated in O'Toole's study, though not elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, 
Koe and Oldridge (1987) were the first to experimentally investigate the interaction 
between hypnotic responsiveness or imaginative involvements and esteem-raising 
suggestions on self-concept. The rationale for using this technique in the original study 
as a support to REST has been to produce 'two beneficial effects' for ‘the enhancement of 
hypnotic susceptibility along with increased imaginative involvement.’ (p.37).  In 
O’Toole's study, the hypnotisability of the participants was measured through the 12-
point Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS: C). Participants were 
blocked on hypnotisability level, and then distributed among treatment groups to ensure 
that each group was equivalent on hypnotisability levels of participants. A score of 
between 9 and 12 was used for inclusion in the high group; a score of between 4 and 8 
for inclusion into the medium group; and a score of between 1 and 3 for inclusion into 
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the low group. The administration of hypnotic susceptibility measures was done by the 
primary experimenter or by research assistants. Research assistants had at least 60 hours 
of hypnosis training and had been cleared for participation in experimental procedures by 
Professor Arreed Barabasz. In both the REST condition and the REBT plus REST 
condition of O'Toole's study, hypnotisable participants were spontaneously dissociating 
into a hypnotic state while undergoing REST. (Barabasz, 1978a; b; Barabasz, 1980a; b; 
c; d; Barabasz, A. & Barabasz, M., 2006; 2010). 
In this replicated study, hypnosis effects were alternatively replaced by the 
psychotherapists’ use of a suggestive, relaxing, and desensitizing environment in the 
REBT plus REST condition only, where desensitisation tasks, involving self-directed in 
vivo exposure to educational messages in the treatment sessions were used at the 
beginning of the therapy sessions. 
Need for the Study 
The researcher decided to conduct this study as a result of the prevalence rate of 
SAD in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this psycopathology has been under-diagnosed and 
neglected (Crittenden, 2004; Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer & Klein, 1985) and consequently 
undertreated to the extent that it is oftentimes described to be ‘the neglected anxiety 
disorder’ (Albuquerque, J. & Deshauer, 2002; Liebowitz, et al., 1985). The practical 
purpose of this study was thus to devise a counselling programme that can help in the 
reduction and treatment of social anxiety among college students in the Saudi 
environment by repelling irrational thoughts.. The theoretical and conceptual purpose 
was to replicate and re-examine a seminal work by a Western psychotherapist which 
assessed the effectiveness of an intervention of REBT combined with REST versus 
REBT only – an investigation that has yet to be undertaken in the whole Arab world, 
according to an extensive database and bibliographic search conducted by the researcher 
prior to starting the investigation. The present study is expected to add to the body of 
knowledge which is related to counselling psychotherapy based on REBT, particularly in 
the Arab world, which is in dire need of such studies. 
Aims of the Study 
The main purpose of the present study was to explore the effectiveness of a 
counselling therapy programme applied to a sample of college students purposefully 
drawn using appropriate measures. The study also sought to explore the underlying 
perceptual organisation of the belief systems delineated in REBT. REBT distinguishes 
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between rational and irrational thoughts, and proposes that the latter lead to emotional 
distress.  
Expected Outcomes 
On the theoretical level, this study is expected to pool together the different 
writings and theoretical underpinnings of REBT and REST research, and update the 
conceptual framework of O’Toole’s 1997 study. Accordingly, this study will add to the 
pertinent literature on REST and REBT in the Arab world, which suffers from a paucity 
of research on the application of REBT and REST to treat social anxiety.  
On the practical level, this project will help in the development of a counselling 
programme deemed necessary by psychotherapists in the Counselling Unit of the 
Psychology Department, College of Arts and Humanities, King Abdul Aziz University 
(KAU), Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to reduce and treat the social phobias of college students 
who attend the counselling centre of the university. Other college and community 
counselling centres and professionals may follow suit in using such a programme and 
develop it further to perhaps higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Assumptions of the Study 
This study sought to investigate the effects of a programme of rational-emotive 
learning/training on irrational thinking and anxiety in a group of college students 
reported to be suffering from high levels of anxiety and irrational thinking. Based on the 
objective of this study, the following assumptions underlie the research: 
 Treatment requires an environment that promotes psychological health.  
 Both REST and REBT have been proven to be successful treatments that effectively 
supplement other psychotherapies to help individuals suffering from social anxiety in 
making healthy lifestyle changes.  
 Self-efficacy theory1 (perceived social skills and perceived emotional control) 
hypothesises that cognition plays a role in relieving emotional problems. 
 It is expected that the programme will succeed in relieving irrationality-related social 
anxiety in Saudi college students. 
                                                 
1
 Self-efficacy is the belief that one is able to perform in a certain manner to attain certain goals. It is a belief 
that one is capable of the course of action required to manage respective situations. For example, in the 
case of illness, a person with high self-efficacy may engage in more health-related activity compared 
(Omrod, 2006). S Bandura’s social cognitive theory stresses the importance of observational learning and 
social experience in developing personality. With high self-efficacy – the person can view difficult tasks as 
things to be mastered rather than avoided.  
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Rationale for this Research 
Social anxiety is the result of irrational beliefs about a situation and about one’s 
ability to cope with it or with particular aspects of it. Training individuals to control their 
irrational thoughts through rational emotive behavioural training can help to relieve their 
social anxiety. Researchers have corroborated the relationship between people’s 
cognitive structures, irrational beliefs and social anxiety (Davison & Zighelboim, 1987; 
Rohsenhow & Smith, 1982; Sutton-Simon & Goldfried, 1979). In this respect, several 
REBT researchers have also confirmed the effectiveness of cognitive therapies, 
especially REBT, in the treatment of social anxiety (DiGiuseppe, McGowan, & Gardner, 
1990; Watson & Friend, 1969). 
Rationale for Using REBT 
It is widely believed that irrational beliefs are largely responsible for SAD and 
public speaking anxiety at social events. Given that this supposition is valid, it is 
necessary to find psychotherapy for this genre of psychopathological disorders. A review 
of relevant psychotherapy literature has shown that group-based REBT is a well-proven 
intervention for reducing and getting rid of irrational thoughts. This method is 
characteristically an active and direct psychotherapeutic technique, in which both patient 
and psychotherapist are actively involved in group-based psychotherapy. The 
psychotherapist using REBT typically shows patients the sources of their 
psychopathology, and how to effectively combat it and change their irrational beliefs. 
REBT has been described as the most important psychotherapy technique ever created to 
introduce logic and rational thinking into counselling psychology and psychotherapy 
(Patterson, 1980), as it involves accurate empathy, respect, non-possessive warmth and 
genuineness as common elements in all psychotherapy theories and counselling 
perspectives (Patterson, 2000). It is a method of treating the irrational with the rational. It 
uses the cognitive processing of information in a rational fashion to treat 
psychopathology, on the grounds that patients should be involved in rationally and 
cognitively gaining insights into the roots of their problems, namely irrational beliefs 
(Al-Ashgar, 2004). REBT not only helps with current psychopathologies and their 
manifestations and symptoms, but also helps patients to process future problems in a 
rational and practical way. 
The current cognitive models that interpret and seek to treat social anxiety 
disorder assume that social anxiety is triggered and maintained by dysfunctional beliefs 
rooted in irrationality to a greater extent, and these dysfunctional irrational beliefs are 
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based on the individual applying biased information processing strategies (Clark and 
Wells 1995; Rapee and Heimberg 1997). Therefore, to fix these dysfunctional irrational 
beliefs, an effective treatment approach needs to address the modification of such 
cognitive problems. A fundamental aim of REBT is to challenge and alter these 
irrational beliefs through discussing and persuading individuals to change the 
fundamental irrational beliefs that lead to social anxiety. 
Furthermore, there are many reasons why REBT was used in preference to other 
psychotherapy approaches, most importantly as cited in the literature (See for example 
(Ellis, 2001a; 2001b; Dryden, 1995; 2001) is that it has a logical, clear and focused 
practical application, in practice and everyday life. The researcher believed that the 
straightforward, direct and forceful use of logical, rational reasoning would overcome 
the ‘illogical’, 'irrational' and seemingly self-defeating thinking of the clients being 
interviewed. It was felt that the articles on REBT developed by Albert Ellis, like his 
therapy dialogue, were clear and specific. Ellis's writings are well referenced and seem 
particularly scholarly, yet lacking in over-use of sophisticated terminology which 
psychologists and other professionals seem predisposed to use. Ellis’s approach appears 
to weave the ideas and empirical findings of a broad range of individuals into a 
comprehensive, ‘common-sense’ type of approach. In addition, rational thinking 
strategies of coping, like REBT, are common-sense solutions to life’s problems, which 
would work perfectly with people in the researcher's Arabian environment. This supports 
the researcher's own notion of REBT’s common-sense appeal and practicality and its 
non-mystical, non-magical and workable approach to life’s often difficult challenges.  
 Rationale for Using REBT plus REST 
In addition, the rationale for the present investigation into the effectiveness of 
combined REBT and REST versus REBT alone is the substantial prior research evidence 
indicating that both REBT and REST are successful psychotherapeutic techniques. Ellis 
(1998) identified 225 studies suggesting that REBT was effective, which explains why it 
is widely used by clinical psychologists and psychotherapists in controlled clinical 
experiments and in mental health hospitals. Ellis and Dryden (1997) identified more than 
500 studies that found REBT more effective as a group-based approach than in 
individual therapy. This study has therefore taken a group-based approach. Moreover, 
REBT has been proven effective among youths (Albano, Causey & Carter, 2001; 
Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985; Kendall & Southam-Gerow, 1996; Mattick, Peters 
& Clarke, 1989; Mersch, Emmelkamp, Bögels, & der Sleen, 1989). 
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In the Arab communities, REBT has seen little empirical investigation. Hisham 
(2000) applied REBT effectively to treat neurotic depression among students at an 
Egyptian university. Several other studies in various Arab countries have related 
irrational beliefs to the generation of psychopathology, especially depression and social 
phobia, and proposed REBT as an effective psychotherapy (Al-Ghamdi, 1998; Al-
Madkhali, 1995; Al-Rihany, 1987; Al-Shabbanat, 1996; Al-Sheikh, 1986; Emara, 1985). 
Furthermore, a significant number of cognitive-behavioural programmes are 
being conducted in clinics and schools as part of prevention studies for adolescents and 
young adults with symptoms such as shyness, social isolation and loneliness that are not 
acute enough to meet the social anxiety diagnosis. These studies generally take the form 
of group treatment, and are conducted in academic settings according to strict ethical 
codes and with parental approval (Ginsburg & Drake, 2002; Masia, Klein, Storch & 
Corda, 2001). The academic setting seems to be an ideal milieu for launching prevention 
studies, as it permits researchers to select and evaluate students using information from 
teachers, academic counsellors and counselling psychologists, which helps in 
generalising about the therapeutic skills gained by students as reflected in their normal 
environment. Also, conducting such studies in school settings reduces the fear of being 
‘labelled’ and thus reduces resistance to participation (Garcia-Lopez et al., 2008; Masia-
Warner, Fisher, Shrout, Rathor & Klein, 2007). Prior research on the use of reduced 
environmental stimulation therapy was established at Ohio State University where REST 
was utilised to enhance creativity in music, accuracy in rifle shooting and stimulating 
concentration prior to academic examinations and for stress relief (Fine, 1990). When 
combined with REBT, REST can induce a therapeutic effect on stress and pain and 
chronic stress-related ailments in experimental conditions (Bood, 2007; Kjellgren, 2003). 
The application of REST together with REBT can help reduce the hormonal parameters 
responsible for the increase of stress, such as ACTH, epinephrine, norepinephrine, 
cortisol and aldosterone, thus helping make more effective REBT (Turner & Fine, 1983; 
McGrady, Turner, Fine, & Higgins. 1987). These results led us to consider that REST in 
combination with REBT can help make the latter simply more powerful in effect.   
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses, drawn from the main research question, are as follows:   
1. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Irrational Thinking scores on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than 
participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment only and control participants. 
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2. Participants exposed to REBT/REST will show significantly lower Interaction 
Anxiousness scores on post-test and on the one-month follow-up retest than will 
control participants and those exposed to REBT group therapy only. 
3. Participants exposed to REBT/REST will show significantly lower Shyness Scale 
scores on post-test and on the one-month follow-up retest than will control 
participants and those exposed to REBT group therapy only. 
Summary 
There is ample evidence from prior research and the present researcher’s 
observations that SAD has become a prevalent psychopathology worldwide, including in 
Saudi Arabia. Social anxiety is not only a psychological problem, but also has social 
manifestations, as afflicted persons are not fully socially functional.  
People with SAD exert strenuous efforts to cope with their social life, especially 
during social functions and events, and often tend to escape or avoid social functions to 
eschew others’ monitoring of their behaviours. When they attend such functions, they 
may keep silent or demonstrate inappropriate verbal behaviours and other social 
awkwardness. However, the few existing studies undertaken in Saudi Arabia indicate a 
prevalence of SAD.  
In addition, SAD is a major cause of dysfunctional social relations, psychological 
alienation, educational and social maladjustments. Constructive social relationships and 
a satisfactory level of educational attainment are of major importance for students’ social 
adjustment, self-fulfilment and psychosocial security. Hence, the present study has 
examined a combination of REBT and REST compared with REBT only to treat and 
eradicate irrational beliefs in order to alleviate social anxiety in college students.  
The present study replicates a previous study by O’Toole (1997) for a twofold 
purpose: to re-examine the combined effectiveness of REBT plus REST versus REBT 
only in an Arabian university, because prior research was done in foreign environments, 
but no research, to the best knowledge of the reseracher's was done in Saudi Arabia, and 
to enrich the Arab literature on the effects of REBT and REBT plus REST in treating 
psychopathologies in general and SAD in particular. 
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CHAPTER ONE - SOCIAL ANXIETY 
1 Introduction 
 This chapter and the following chapter present the theoretical framework of the present 
study, provide an overview of the literature related to social anxiety theories, social 
anxiety research, shyness and irrational thought research, REBT and REST theories, and 
the effectiveness of REBT and REST in the relief and treatment of social anxiety.  
2 The Construct of Anxiety 
The terms fear and anxiety have been used interchangeably by many people as 
referring to one and the same concept. However, in other contexts, they are not 
synonymous though they share some mutual characteristics. For example, while fear 
refers to excessive distressing emotions in response to eminent danger 
whether the threat is real or imagined, anxiety refers to the feelings resulting from 
anticipated future danger (DSM-5, 2013, pp. 189–195). Furthermore, fear can be 
considered a symptom, cause or a stage of anxiety disorders while anxiety refers to 
multiple types of disorders.  The DSM-5 further elucidates that fear is more often “ 
associated with surges of autonomic arousal necessary for fight of flight, thoughts of 
immediate danger, and escape behaviours, and anxiety more often associated with 
muscle tension and vigilance in preparation for future” in a way that makes people 
follow an avoidance mechanisms (p. 189). To differentiate further between these two, it 
should be noted that fear is innate and may start at birth. As for the anxiety disorders, 
some tend to appear in early childhood or adolescence whereas others don’t appear until 
adulthood (Dozois & Dobson, 2004). The average age of SAD’s onset is around 15.5 
years (Khalid-Khan, Santibanez, McMicken, & Rynn, 2007). 
Furthermore, Hunt (1999, p.509) differentiates anxiety from fear by describing 
anxiety as ‘a psychological condition of heightened sensitivity to some perceived threat, 
risk, peril or danger’. This distinction between anxiety and fear proposed by Hunt 
differentiates fear as a psychological problem and fear as a natural response to danger. 
Barlow and colleagues, in a related context, view anxiety as ‘a future-oriented mood 
state in which one is ready or prepared to attempt to cope with upcoming negative 
events’ (Barlow, Chorpita & Turovsky, 1996, p. 251). This suggests that it is the 
discrimination between present versus future dangers that distinguishes fear from 
anxiety. De Jongh, Groenink, van der Gugten & Olivier (2002, p. 1046) elaborated that 
both fear and anxiety can be adaptive and positive by helping one plan and prepare to 
face a challenge or threat, but that both can also become pathologic and negative. The 
 22 
 
difference is that fear may be situation-dependent and lasts for seconds or minutes, 
whereas pathologic anxiety may continue for a period of at least six months (DSM-IV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
Fear and anxiety can be experienced at minimal levels and can be normal and 
adaptive in many situations. In its adaptive form, anxiety serves a protective function for 
the individual, alerting him or her to danger and motivating certain adaptive behaviours 
to avoid stress or negative experiences (Albano & Kendall, 2002). Certain fear and 
anxiety reactions have been well-documented as normal and expected processes at 
different developmental levels. For example, young children often fear the dark, 
separation and small animals, while adolescents often fear evaluations, such as tests, oral 
presentations and social situations (Albano et al., 2001; Castellanos & Hunter, 1999). 
There are several types of anxiety, which will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
However, before discussing social anxiety as a disorder, it should be noted that 
social anxiety and social phobia are used interchangeably to describe a persistent, 
irrational fear of a specific object, activity or situation that leads to a compelling desire to 
avoid it, although such object, activity or situation does not provoke the same for  most 
people, or at least, not at the same level of intensity or frequency in social environments 
(Nardone, 1996). Furthermore, the intensity of such fear is disproportionate to the peril 
involved in the object, activity or situation that triggers it. This is why social anxiety is 
an irrational phobia disorder and is perceived by its sufferers as such, although they 
cannot help it (Al-Rifa’i, 1987). 
2.1 What is anxiety? 
Anxiety disorder is an umbrella term that covers a wide range involving a type of 
common psychiatric disorder branded by excessive rumination, worrying, discomfort, 
agitation, trepidation and fear about future uncertainties. These characteristics or 
symptoms may be based on real or imagined events, eventually affecting both physical 
and psychological health. This section of the chapter provides an overview of the nature, 
definitions, categories and theories of anxiety disorder, and particularly social anxiety 
disorder. 
2.1.1 General anxiety 
Anxiety is a construct of paramount importance to the study of clinical problems 
and the study of personality. General anxiety is experienced to different degrees by 
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everyone. Anxiety is a psycho-physiological state marked by demonstrable changes in 
cognitive, somatic, emotional and behavioural components (Seligman, Walker & 
Rosenhan, 2001). Such pathological changes, psychologically and physiologically, may 
combine to create the sensations typically recognised as fear, apprehension or worry. 
Anxiety is also often accompanied by physical sensations such as heart palpitations, 
nausea, chest pain, shortness of breath, stomach-ache or headache (Herring, O’Connor & 
Dishman, 2010; Rosen & Schulkin, 1998).  
Yet, there are individual variations in the intensity, frequency and eliciting 
factors of anxiety. Such variations can be measured by personality scales that tap into 
neuroticism. Neuroticism is considered one of three main personality factors (Eysenck, 
Eysenck & Barrett, 1985), and anxiety is a major component of neuroticism. In addition, 
individual variations in anxiety explain many of the theories of temperament (Rothbart 
& Derryberry, 1981; Thomas & Chess, 1977). Consequently, anxiety has been 
recognised as a common clinical problem. Ensuing problems resulting from anxiety can 
manifest in a variety of ways. Anxiety may be the output of a particular anxiety-eliciting 
stimulus, as in the case of a phobia, or of a wider range of situations, as in social phobia. 
It may also be non-specific, as in anxiety disorders like panic disorder or generalised 
anxiety disorder (Last, 1991; 1993). 
2.1.2 General anxiety, neurotic anxiety and social anxiety 
Anxiety has two basic types: general anxiety, which is a natural and healthy 
phenomenon, the absence of which may make one blunt and dull, and neurotic anxiety, 
which is unhealthy and negative. According to Sadek (1988), general anxiety is a factor 
of success and progress, whereas neurotic anxiety may be conducive to self-destruction 
and malfunction; it is considered detrimental to mental health as an irrational morbidity, 
given that “neurotic anxiety is fear of an unknown object, situation or activity” (Sadek, 
1988, p. 59). Earlier, neurotic anxiety has been described by the DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) as a diagnostic criterion for SAD, since the person 
perceives that their anxiety is unjustified and irrational, yet they cannot avoid it. This 
genre of anxiety is characterised by three traits. First, the individual cannot help 
demonstrating extreme symptoms of fear such as dry mouth, heartbeat, trepidation, 
perspiration, nausea, delirium and exhaustion. Second, if it persists, the individual may 
avoid ordinary life activities such as flying a plane, driving a car, travelling by ship, 
getting into a lift, etc. In these cases, individuals may be able to overcome their fears or 
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fail to do so and become chronically anxious. The third trait of neurotic anxiety has to do 
with one’s perception that one’s fears are unjustifiable or irrational, yet one cannot help 
them (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). 
Social anxiety is triggered in social situations and events in which individuals 
experience an irrational and continued state of confusion and fear to the extent that they 
avoid these situations, such as public speaking, and falling into a state of shyness lest 
they should be a target of criticism, sarcasm or even rejection (Freud, 1936). 
2.2 Anxiety as a personality construct 
Many researchers and theorists regard anxiety as a personality construct. The 
relationship between personality and anxious moods has been studied in several models. 
(Beck, Epstein & Harrison, 1983; Clark, Watson & Mineka, 1994; Cloninger, 1986; 
Eysenck, 1957, 1967; Gray, 1981; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Tellegen, 1985). According 
to some researchers (Claridge, 2009; Corr, 2010; Perkins, Kemp & Corr, 2007), people 
with a tendency to experience negative emotions are especially susceptible to psychiatric 
illness (Amin, Foa & Coles, 1998). This tendency is associated with neuroticism. Perkins 
et al. (2007) consider this “one of the most influential theories concerning the causal 
basis of neuroticism” (p. 252). 
By the same token, Gray (1970, 1982) suggested that neuroticism is a surface 
trait generated by the interplay of two more central dimensions of personality – namely, 
sensitivity to reward (labelled trait impulsivity) and sensitivity to punishment (labelled 
trait anxiety). According to this theory, now known as the Reinforcement Sensitivity 
Theory of Personality (Pickering, Diaz & Gray, 1995), a high level of neuroticism 
represents a combination of both high trait impulsivity and high trait anxiety (i.e. high 
sensitivity to both reward and punishment). Of the many personality traits, neuroticism is 
strongly related to lifetime prevalence and severity of anxiety, and individuals with 
higher neuroticism and lower extroversion appear to exhibit higher anxiety (Gershuny & 
Sher, 1992; Gomez & Francis, 2003; Matsudaira & Kitamura, 2006).  
Social anxiety as a personality construct can have a profound yet subtle effect on 
the daily life of the individual (Kelly, 1955). According to Vonture & Curlee (2007), 
Kelly  in 1955 “described a constructivist take on anxiety, defining it as an awareness 
that a person’s constructs are not relevant to the events she or he is experiencing” (p. 
118). As such, a person cannot effectively predict the course of social events (Conture & 
Curlee, 2007). Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate between the construct of social 
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anxiety and other related concepts, using a conceptual framework that outlines the 
history and theory of social anxiety. 
Ibn Hazm, an Arab philosopher in eleventh century Andalusia, claimed that 
anxiety is an eternal fact, a universal human condition that everyone experiences at 
times, but that our goal is to avoid anxiety or to heal from it. In his Tazkiyah (Dispelling 
Anxiety), Ibn Hazm states that the ultimate goal in life is ‘to be free from anxiety’ (Ibn 
Hazm al-Andalusi, 1990, p. 181). 
In this context, social anxiety is characteristic of all people, including the great 
and the powerful, according to Rhazis (1950). This view is not unlike Freud’s argument 
that anxiety is an outcome of unfulfilled desires and emotions, neurotically generated. 
Some recent authors maintain that social anxiety is the result of a genetic predisposition; 
for example, Greist et al. wrote that “The child of two shy parents may inherit a genetic 
code which amplifies shyness into social anxiety disorder” (Greist et al., 2002, p. 11). 
In recent years, researchers and therapists have become interested in the 
possibility that students’ interpersonal skills affect their quality of college life and 
handling of social anxiety (Davidson, Hughes, George & Blazer, 1993; Kessler et al., 
1998; Lecrubier et al., 2000; O’Toole, 1997). The implications are far-reaching for 
educational policy, student counselling and therapy, and quality of life research. One 
aspect of interpersonal competence that has received substantial attention in the literature 
is the notion of social anxiety (Arkowitz, Perl & Himadi., 1978; Curran, 1977). Distress 
in social situations is assessed by specific scales, which are taken to indicate 
interpersonal competence/skills (Heiser, Turner & Beidel, 2003). To better understand 
the construct of social anxiety, it is worth discussing it in the context of the broader 
conception of anxiety per se. Afterwards, more elaboration will be devoted to social 
anxiety. 
Generally, anxiety is a psychological and/or physiological condition with a broad 
spectrum of behavioural, cognitive, emotional and somatic manifestations that result in 
feelings such as nervousness, panic and discomfort (Seligman et al., 2001). Hall (1954, 
p. 43) describes anxiety as  
‘a painful emotional experience produced by excitations in the internal organs 
of the body. These excitations result from internal or external stimulation 
and are governed by the autonomic nervous system.’  
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According to Hall (1954), anxiety is of the utmost significance to psychoanalytic 
theory, as it plays an important role in personality development and ‘the dynamics of 
personality functioning’ (Hall, 1954, p. 61). 
Freud (1926) distinguished three types of anxiety: objective anxiety, moral 
anxiety and neurotic anxiety. While all three are characterised by feelings of 
apprehension and physiological arousal, the difference in neurotic anxiety is that the true 
source of danger is internal rather than external, and not consciously perceived because it 
has been repressed (Freud, 1936). This is what characterises anxiety at large and 
distinguishes it from fear, where the source of danger is known and the threat perceived. 
As Freud suggested, neurotic anxiety is essentially an output of antecedents 
where ‘aversive conditioning’ entailing ‘instinctual impulses and repression’ result from 
memories repressed in early childhood (Fry, 1969, pp. 399–400). Fry (1969) further 
explains that the diagnostic symptoms of neurotic anxiety may include the expression of 
excessive aggression or sexual impulses for which the individual was cruelly and 
continually punished in early childhood. It may also produce objective anxiety in the 
form of fear of punishment when prompts or clues during adolescence or adulthood 
evoke impulses that were punished and forbidden during early childhood (Fernald & 
Grantham-McGregor, 1998). Furthermore, these symptoms may reflect the individual’s 
efforts to alleviate or reduce objective anxiety by repressing stimuli associated with the 
punished impulses that elicit unpleasant reactions. In addition, neurotic maladaptive 
responses may be recalled when a partial breakdown in repression results in ‘derivatives 
of suppressed impulses erupting into awareness’ (Fry, 1969, p. 400). 
Moral anxiety, by contrast, is grounded in a feeling that one’s internalised values 
are about to be compromised. There is a fear of self-punishment (e.g. guilt) for acting 
contrary to one’s values or moral code, which is socially acquired. Thus social anxiety 
can be thought of as developing from an internal perception of inconsistency between the 
moral code acquired during socialisation and the development of the superego. Moral 
anxiety, therefore, is a function of the development of the superego. Whatever the 
anxiety, the ego seeks to reduce it. Operating at the unconscious level, it employs 
defence mechanisms to distort or deny reality (Boeree, 2001). 
Today, Freud’s ‘objective anxiety’ is usually termed fear, the kind of fear that is 
justified by perceivable threats in the immediate environment, and we use the term 
‘anxiety’ to mean general neurotic anxiety, referring to nebulous fears of threats that are 
not actually present in the environment but lurk in the unconscious, and are aroused by a 
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perception of danger from the instincts. This view is supported by an article by Hall 
(1954, p. 44), which explains that Freud distinguished three subcategories of neurotic 
anxiety. The first type Free-floating apprehensiveness is associated with environmental 
circumstances and characterises ‘the nervous person who is always expecting something 
dreadful to happen’. The second type is observed in ‘panic or near-panic’ reactions, 
which appear abruptly, yet apparently with no perceptible provocation. The third type is 
a phobia, an observable anxiety that is intense, unjustifiable, irrational and 
disproportionate to the consequences of the actual peril lurking in the unknown, such as 
an extreme fear of moths, mice, high places, water, rubber, old money, crossing a street, 
public speaking, light bulbs or any other thing that may pose no real danger. In such 
cases, the main cause or trigger lies in the id rather than in the objective world, and the 
object of the phobia epitomises a primary inducement to ‘instinctual gratification or is 
associated in some way with an instinctual object-choice’ (Hall, 1954, pp. 45–46). 
As indicated earlier, moral anxiety results from incongruence between the 
socially acquired moral code and the superego; therefore, it is somewhat related to 
phobias, a form of neurotic anxiety, and both involve irrational thinking. Moral anxiety, 
neurotic anxiety and irrationality are all linked and well explained within the framework 
of psychoanalytic theory. As Hall (1954) suggests, “Phobias may … be augmented by 
moral anxiety when the desired but feared object is one that transgresses an ideal of the 
superego” (p.46). This is likely to occur when the id wishes for a desire that is not 
acceptable morally by the superego or by the external society. This kind of internal war 
between what man wishes and the constraints in the society as well as the internal 
constraints of the id can give a universal explanation for many strong fears as Hall 
(1954) claims.  
Therefore, some psychiatrists and clinical psychologists who accept the 
principles of Freudian psychoanalysis view anxiety as a habit of repressing painful 
complexes into an unconscious region of the mind; “manifestations of maladaptive 
behaviour are thought to be due to discharges from the repressed complex and repressive 
forces” (Fry, 1969, p. 400). 
From another perspective, state anxiety is identified as an unpleasant emotional 
stimulation when a person comes into contact with frightening stressors or dangers. Trait 
anxiety indicates an incessant tendency to react with state anxiety, as the person 
persistently expects bad circumstances. As such, anxiety differs from fear, which only 
transpires in the presence of an observed threat. One more discrimination is that fear 
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instigates specific behaviours of escape and avoidance, whereas anxiety is the result of 
threats that are perceived to be uncontrollable or unavoidable (Ohman, 2000).  
Furthermore, anxiety is related to people’s perceptions of their general health 
status and to their perceptions and reporting of specific symptoms (Gerdes & Guidi, 
1987; Tessler & Mechanic, 1978). Therefore, by the time anxiety becomes excessive, it 
can be classified as a verifiable disorder (NIMH, 2006). Again, borrowing Freud’s term 
‘neurotic anxiety’, it can be maintained that in the case of being a disorder, anxiety can 
be experienced by everyone infrequently and to different degrees. But when anxiety is 
manifested in pathological amounts, ‘it defines the clinical syndrome – anxiety neurosis’ 
(Spielberger, 1966), or in modern terminology, ‘the anxiety disorder’. The DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 411) defines SAD as ‘a marked and 
persistent fear of social or performance situations in which embarrassment may occur’. 
The DSM-IV notes that the anxiety response may take the form of a situationally bound 
or situationally predisposed panic attack. 
The DSM-IV criteria that reflect anxiety if maintained over a four-week period 
are:  
a) having excessive apprehension about a number of events or activities;  
b) having difficulty controlling the worry; 
c) having significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important 
areas of functioning; and  
d) experiencing at least three of the following: feeling restless or keyed up, becoming 
easily fatigued, having difficulty concentrating, being irritable, having muscle tension, 
or experiencing disturbances in sleep (DSM-IV-APA,  1994, p. 411). 
A broad spectrum of research spanning numerous domains has documented 
uniformly negative self-concepts of socially anxious individuals. For instance, people 
suffering from too much social avoidance and subjective distress (a state often 
conceptualised as akin to social anxiety) appraise themselves as less dominant, less 
sociable, lower in well-being, and having less social presence. People suffering from too 
much social avoidance and distress may possibly have poorer social support networks 
(Haemmerlie, Montgomery & Melchers, 1988).  
Pertinent research has also demonstrated that social anxiety in females is 
negatively related to self-perceived sexual (Thomas & Freeman, 1990) and physical 
attractiveness (Cash, Cash & Butters, 1983). Furthermore, men who have high anxiety 
report more negative thoughts (Cacioppo, Glass & Merluzzi, 1979) and fewer positive 
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thoughts (Heimberg et al., 1985) when anticipating interaction with an unfamiliar 
woman than do men who are low in social anxiety.  
In a similar vein, Schmitt and Kurdek (1984) found that social anxiety was 
positively related to trait anxiety and sensitisation, and negatively related to positive self-
concept and internal locus of control. As such, it is clear that the self-images of socially 
anxious individuals are fraught with negative manifestations. 
By their nature, these emotions are disruptive and likely to prevent people from 
reaching their goals and produce self-defeating behaviour. In addition, unhealthy 
negative emotions such as depression, anger, anxiety and guilt are usually coupled with 
irrational beliefs (Dryden & Neenan, 2006). 
Anxiety disorders have been reported to be highly prevalent in sizeable sectors of 
human communities (Bijl, Zessen, van Ravelli, de Rijk & Langendoen, 1998; Davidson 
et al., 1993; Furmark, 2002; Grant et al., 2005; Kessler et al., 1994) and are associated 
with loss in quality of life (Stein, Jacobsen, P., Greenberg, H. & Lyman, 2000; Wittchen, 
Stein & Kessler, 1999), considerable economic costs (Patel, Knapp, Henderson & 
Baldwin, 2002; Smit et al., 2006), high levels of service use (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, 
McGonagle & Kessler, 1996; Stein & Kean, 2000) and serious functional impairment in 
the educational, social and occupational domains (Davidson et al., 1993; Kessler et al., 
1998). Lane (2007) aptly observes that anxiety ‘is one of the few things that never 
deceive’. It can easily be seen in the patient, and thus easily recognised and diagnosed as 
it develops over time, ‘tormenting its sufferers with persistent, sometimes grinding 
dread’ (Lane, 2007, p. 11). 
2.3 Development of the concept of anxiety 
Anxiety disorders – a collection of chronic, debilitating conditions – are the most 
prevalent category of mental illness, according to recent epidemiological surveys 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas & Walters, 2005; Kessler et al., 2007), including in 
some Arab countries (Fakhr El-Islam, 2000). The condition is persistent, disabling and 
common, with a lifetime prevalence of up to 8–10% in primary care samples (Lieb, 
Becker & Altamura, 2005; Wittchen et al., 2002). 
The concept of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) has evolved significantly 
over the last 30 years. The once all-encompassing category of anxiety symptoms, namely 
‘anxiety neurosis’, is now broken down into separate anxiety syndromes (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Within this classification, GAD started as a residual 
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category, but interest in it as an independent (albeit highly comorbid) condition gradually 
grew. This change of attitude was reflected in subsequent versions of classification 
systems. The earlier all-encompassing category of anxiety syndromes considered the 
presence of excessive, uncontrollable worries as the core symptom of the disorder, while 
the more recent view of anxiety as a separate, highly comorbid condition places equal 
emphasis on somatic features of anxiety. Below is a review of the development of 
conceptions of anxiety among the different schools of psychological thinking. 
2.3.1 Behaviourist view of anxiety  
Behaviourists consider that dread is a reflected reaction to fear-provoking events. 
Psychologists found that the simple assessment of information as threatening or unsafe 
can generate and support the feeling of apprehension. 
Behaviourism interprets anxiety as a conditioned response to frustrating 
consequences of real life. Behaviourists believe that anxiety is learned when fears come 
about together with practically indifferent objects or events and are wrongly associated 
with them. 
Behavioural therapy techniques emphasise symptoms of emotional distress. 
Emotional problems are considered to be consequences of faulty acquired behaviour 
patterns or the failure to learn effective responses to one’s environment. The aim of 
behavioural therapy, also known as behaviour modification, is therefore to change 
behaviour patterns. One of the most prominent behaviour techniques, systematic 
desensitisation or counter-conditioning, was invented by the behaviourist Joseph Wolpe 
(1958), and has been used successfully to treat phobias and fears.  
In systematic desensitisation, patients are asked to imagine anxiety-producing 
situations or are presented with actual feared objects. A person with a phobia of spiders, 
for example, would be asked to come up with ten scenarios involving spiders and 
increasing degrees of panic. The first scenario would be very mild, e.g. seeing a small 
spider at a great distance outdoors. The second would be a little more frightening, and 
the tenth would involve maximum terror, e.g. a tarantula climbing on one’s face while 
one is driving a car at 100 miles an hour. The therapist then teaches muscle relaxation, 
which is incompatible with anxiety. After practising this for a few days, the patient and 
the therapist go through these suggested scenarios, one step at a time, making sure the 
patient stays relaxed, backing off if necessary, until the person can finally imagine the 
tarantula while remaining tension-free (Skinner, 1971).  
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Gradually, exposure to the feared object is increased and patients learn to control 
their reactions. Relaxation training is often employed simultaneously in order to reduce 
anxiety further. The theoretical basis of this type of therapy is that once appropriate overt 
expressions of emotions are learned, practised and reinforced, the correlated subjective 
feelings will be felt. 
Early in his work on classical conditioning, Pavlov appreciated that conditioning 
is appetitive (relating to desire or satisfying desire) when the unconditioned stimulus is 
rewarding, but that the same procedure will produce defensive conditioning when the 
unconditioned stimulus is aversive. Later, Pavlov discovered that defensive conditioning 
provides a particularly good experimental model of signal anxiety, a form of learned fear 
that can be advantageous. Pavlov (1927) aptly observed that normal animals respond to 
any stimuli, including those that bring immediate benefit or harm to the animal, as well 
as to other physical, physiological or chemical stimulants that may trigger such stimuli. 
According to Pavlov, “it is not the sight or the sound of the beast of prey which is itself 
harmful to smaller animals, but its teeth and claws” (Pavlov 1927, p. 14). 
A similar proposal was made independently by Freud. Because painful stimuli 
are often associated with neutral stimuli, symbolic or real, Freud postulated that repeated 
pairing of neutral and noxious stimuli can cause a neutral stimulus to be perceived as 
dangerous and thus to elicit anxiety. Placing this argument in a biological context, Freud 
(1926, p. 166) wrote: 
‘The individual will have made an important advance in his capacity for self-
preservation if he can foresee and expect a traumatic situation of this kind 
which entails helplessness, instead of simply waiting for it to happen. … 
It is in this situation that the signal of anxiety is given.’  
Thus, both Pavlov and Freud appreciated that it is biologically adaptive to 
respond defensively to danger signals before the real danger is present. Signals from the 
environment trigger anticipatory anxiety that prepares the individual for fight or flight. 
Freud suggested that in response to internal danger, mental defences substitute for actual 
flight or withdrawal. Signal anxiety, therefore, provides an opportunity for studying how 
mental defences are recruited: how psychic determinism gives rise to psychopathology. 
Biologically, the amygdalae are important for emotionally charged memory, as in 
classical conditioning of fear where a neutral tone is paired with a shock (LeDoux, 
1996). The amygdalae coordinate the flow of information between the areas of the brain 
that process the sensory cues, namely the thalamus and the cerebral cortex, and the areas 
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that process the expression of fear: the hypothalamus, which regulates the autonomic 
response to fear, and the limbic neocortical association areas, namely the cingulate and 
prefrontal cortex, which are thought to be involved in the conscious evaluation of 
emotion. LeDoux has argued that, in anxiety, the patient experiences the autonomic 
arousal mediated by the amygdala as something threatening happening. 
LeDoux attributes the absence of awareness to a shutting down of the 
hippocampus by stress, a mechanism considered below. Psychologists now have 
excellent methods for imaging these structures in both experimental animals and humans 
in order to address the question of how these linkages are established and, once 
established, how they are maintained (Breiter et al., 1996; LeDoux, 1996; Whalen et al., 
2001). 
2.3.2 Psychoanalytical view of anxiety 
The psychoanalytic view of anxiety has already been discussed. But, additionally, 
the component of the early environment considered most important for humans, as for all 
mammals, is the infant’s major caretaker, usually the mother.  
Therefore, anxiety remains a substantial component in the psychoanalytic theory 
of affect. In early schools of psychoanalytic thought, anxiety has been recognised as 
central to an understanding of mental conflicts. 
In accordance with his early discharge model of mental function, Freud brought 
forth what is known as the toxic theory of anxiety, in which he hypothesised that anxiety 
was “uncharged sexual energy” or “transformed libido” (Jones, 1995, p. 118). This 
failure represented by the undischarged sexual energy constitutes the actual neuroses, 
whether they are physiologically realistic or unsatisfactorily incomplete. These neuroses, 
including anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia, can be thought of as neuroses ‘without 
neurotic conflict or symbolic content’ (Jones, 1995, p. 118). The eruption of ‘actual 
neuroses’ or ‘anxiety neuroses’ could, according to this theory, arise from repression as a 
symptom of continued unacceptable desires, which can lead to ‘psychoneuroses’, 
hysterias and obsessions. 
Earlier, three types of anxiety that Freud recognised have been elaborated, 
namely objective, moral and neurotic anxiety. However, in 1926, Freud abandoned the 
distinction between neurotic and objective anxiety, and claimed that repression causes 
anxiety. In this new theory, Freud distinguished two types of anxiety: traumatic, reality-
oriented ‘automatic’ anxiety, in which the system is overwhelmed, and a secondary, 
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‘neurotic’ anxiety, in which anticipated reprisals in these situations set off a defensive 
process. ‘Automatic anxiety’ is an affective reaction to the helplessness experienced 
during a traumatic experience. The prototype for this experience lies in the helplessness 
of the infant during and after birth, in which danger proceeds from outside and floods the 
psychic system, which is unmediated by the (as yet unformed) ego. Psychoanalysis 
argues that the manner in which a mother and her infant interact creates within the 
child’s mind the first internal representation not only of another person but also of 
interaction, of relationship. 
This initial representation of people and relationships is thought to be critical for 
the child’s subsequent psychological development. The interaction goes both ways. The 
infant’s behaviour toward the mother considerably influences the mother’s behaviour. 
Secure attachment between mother and infant is thought to foster the infant’s comfort 
with itself and trust in others, whereas insecure attachment is thought to foster anxiety.  
The second form of anxiety that originates within the psychical system is 
mediated by the ego. This ‘signal anxiety’ presages the emergence of a new ‘danger 
situation’ that will repeat one of several earlier ‘traumatic states.’ These states, whose 
prototype lay in birth, correspond to the central preoccupations of different 
developmental levels, as the infant’s needs become progressively abstracted from the 
original immediate sensory overload to a more sophisticated regulation of needs, capable 
of synthesising the many elements facing it (from the reality and pleasure principles and 
the object world). Traumatic moments that were experienced serially during the 
developmental process – such as loss of an object, loss of the object’s love, the threat of 
castration and the fear of punishment by the internalised objects of the superego – can re-
emerge at any time in a person’s subsequent adult life, typically brought on by some 
conflation of reality and intra-psychic conflict, as a new edition of anxiety. 
2.3.3 Phenomenological view of anxiety 
Phenomenology refers to the exact study and precise description of psychic 
events, which are a primary requirement for understanding psychiatric disorders (Avasthi 
& Kumar, 2004). Diagnostic tools are used to delve deep into man’s perceptions of his 
being versus annihilation, or being versus non-being and the doom of man. A 
phenomenological analysis of anxiety disorders can further enrich our understanding. 
The quality of diagnostic tools used to measure anxiety disorders in children and 
adolescents has improved enormously in the past few years. As a result, “prevalence 
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estimates are less erratic, understanding of comorbidity
2
 is increasing, and the role of 
impairment as a criterion for “caseness” is considered more carefully” (Costello, Egger 
& Angold, 2005, p.631). As such, phenomenological analyses see anxiety as involving 
mortal vulnerability. 
Epidemiological research places social anxiety as the most common anxiety 
disorder and the third most prevalent psychiatric condition in some countries, such as the 
United States (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001; Kashdan & Roberts, 2004) and Saudi Arabia 
(Chaleby & Raslan, 1990). According to Chaleby and Raslan (1990), “social phobia is a 
common disorder among Saudi Arabians, predominantly in young, unmarried males with 
a relatively high level of education and occupation” (p. 324). Kashdan and Herbert 
(2001) found that SAD had a mean onset age of 15.5 years, and could occur even in 
early childhood, unlike other anxiety and mood disorders. Retrospective investigations 
have confirmed this observation, with the majority of adults with SAD failing to recall 
any period in their lives when social anxiety was not present. 
Several studies, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, have indicated that SAD is 
so prevalent that it can be considered a phenomenon, leading to the development of ‘a 
chronic course of the disorder’ (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001, p. 37). Some research has 
also suggested a genetic susceptibility to SAD. 
The phenomenological view of anxiety sees it as a catastrophic response to 
centeredness and mental illness (May, 1961). May, like Kierkegaard, saw the essential 
connection between selfhood and anxiety as a sense of the possibility of non-being and 
even self-destruction. May (1961) called it the tragic nature of human existence, 
something he felt was prematurely denied by Carl Rogers’ optimistic view of human 
nature and belief in the powers of the human self (Rogers, 1951; 1961). 
Social anxiety is a significant comorbidity in first-episode psychosis. It is not 
simply an epiphenomenon of psychotic symptoms and clinical paranoia, and has more 
than one causal pathway (Michail & Birchwood, 2009). 
2.3.4 Existentialist view of anxiety 
Common existentialist questions (e.g., who am I? Who controls my destiny? 
What is the meaning of my existence?) present food for thought about the modern day 
conceptions of anxiety as archetypical evokers of existential neurosis which culminates 
                                                 
2
Comorbidity is either the presence of one or more disorders (or diseases) in addition to a primary disease or 
disorder, or the effect of such additional disorders or diseases. 
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in the pain of death wrapped up in the existentialist’s congenital and innate fear of the 
unknown related to the very fact of being human and alive, yet ambiguous of what is to 
become of one in the afterlife. Maddi (1967) observed that “social and psychological 
workers assertively claim that alienation and the problems of existence form the sickness 
of our times” (p. 311). According to Maddi (1967), alienation and problems of existence 
offer a model for understanding psychopathology, including such problems that he 
termed ‘existential neurosis’ (p. 311).  
The German term for existentialist anxiety, existentielle angst, demonstrates its 
philosophical link, and may explain existential anxiety (Kierkegaard, 1843/2006). Before 
Kierkegaard, two philosophical systems that dealt with anxiety were Epicureanism 
(Epicurus from Samos, 341–270 BC) and existentialism. In the Epicurean view, that the 
purpose of life is to attain happiness and freedom from anxiety and fear, and the state of 
pleasure as the absence of fear is located in the human mind. In the existentialist view, 
by contrast, anxiety is not seen as opposite of happiness (Kierkegaard, 1843/2006), but 
rather as a profoundly spiritual condition of insecurity and fear in a free human being, 
creating possibilities for personal growth and salvation.  
Kierkegaard (1843/2006) described anxiety or dread as associated with the 
‘dizziness of freedom’ and suggested that anxiety could be positively resolved through 
the self-conscious exercise of responsibility and choosing.  
The theologian Paul Tillich (1952) described existential anxiety as “a state of 
mind in which the individual is conscious of his potential ‘nonbeing” (p. 71). Tillich 
proposed three categories of nonbeing that trigger anxiety: ontic (fate and death), moral 
(guilt and condemnation) and spiritual (emptiness and meaninglessness). The last of 
these, spiritual anxiety, predominates in modern times, according to Tillich, while the 
others were predominant in earlier periods. Tillich argues that spiritual anxiety can either 
be accepted as part of the human condition, or resisted with negative consequences. In its 
pathological form, spiritual anxiety may tend to drive the person toward the creation of 
certitude in systems of meaning which are supported by tradition and authority even 
though it is not based in reality.  
2.3.5 Sociocultural view of anxiety 
Current theoretical models of anxiety acknowledge the influence of culture on 
anxiety disorders. Significant work has provided support for the hierarchical structure of 
anxiety (see Kotov, Watson, Robles & Schmidt, 2007; McDonald, Hartman & Vrana, 
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2008; Norton, Sexton, Walker & Norton, 2005; Watson & Friend, 1969). In these 
models, anxiety disorders comprise a heterogeneous collection of syndromes, yet share 
an Aetiological diathesis via a broad genetic–temperamental factor (Barlow, 1991; 
Zinbarg, 1998; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). However, anxiety psychopathology is 
differentiated by the specific perceptions of threat, for example, fear of needles in the 
blood-injection-injury subtype of specific phobia, concerns about a handful of vague 
negative outcomes that cause chronic worry in GAD, or the so-called fear of fear 
(Goldstein & Chambless, 1978) in panic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). It is widely appreciated that an individual’s beliefs and attitudes, including 
specific concerns or threats, may be influenced by a range of social and cultural elements 
(Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003; Good & Kleinman, 1985; Kirmayer, 2001; Mineka 
& Zinbarg, 2006). However, contemporary learning theories of anxiety do not believe 
that the fundamental genetic predisposition to anxiety is affected by psychological 
processes, including beliefs and attitudes
3
 (see Barlow, 1991; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). 
Instead, contextual factors influence what an individual learns to fear, how the distress is 
interpreted, and beliefs about how to go about getting help. By identifying salient 
socioculturally based beliefs and attitudes prominent in one group or another, researchers 
stand to gain a more sophisticated understanding of individual differences in anxiety. 
Wolpe (1958) hypothesised that a patient’s symptoms are learned or conditioned 
habits. In this case, if the therapist can determine an anxiety-inhibiting response that 
would offset the particular symptoms associated with anxiety, and counsel the patient to 
produce this response regularly enough, these symptoms should gradually dissipate.  
This dissertation proposes that providing counselling directed towards helping 
anxiety sufferers overcome their associated symptoms can be very beneficial. The key 
focus of such psychotherapy is to correct their irrational ideas that result from 
misappropriations between their moral code and superego.  
                                                 
3
This term is associated with the diathesis–stress model, which explains behaviour as a result of biological and 
genetic factors (nature) as well as life experiences (nurture). This theory assumes that a disposition 
towards a certain disorder may result from a combination of genetics and early learning. The term 
‘diathesis’ refers to a genetic predisposition towards an abnormal or diseased condition, which, in 
combination with environmental stressors, may trigger abnormal behaviour (Monroe & Simons, 1991). 
This theory originated as a means to explain schizophrenia as the interaction of a vulnerable hereditary 
predisposition with precipitating environmental events (Zubin & Spring, 1977: 103) 
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2.3.6 Cognitive view of anxiety 
Anxiety disorders arise from a recurrent perception of the world as a perilous 
place, in a way that induces habitual maladaptive interactions into cognitive, behavioural 
and physiological response systems. These habitual maladaptive interactions include a 
pre-attentive bias to threat cues (Mathews, 1990), which may be adversely perceived in 
the form of discomforting images and irritating irrational thinking (Borkovec & Inz, 
1990), and can be conducive to cognitive avoidance of some specific aspects of anxious 
experience (Borkovec, Shadick & Hopkins, 1991).  
Researchers, over a long period of time, have detected a clear relationship 
between psychopathology and cognitive processes from a cognitive-behavioural 
perspective (Silverman & DiGueseppe, 2001). This view takes a cognitive approach to 
the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathologies such as social phobia, and emphasises 
the effect of non-functional cognitions in the disorder. Individuals with social anxiety 
often focus on deficiencies in their social performance, which further increases their 
anxiety symptoms (Aydin, Tekinsav-Sütçü & Sorias, 2010). Given that anxiety is a 
manifestation of an inexplicable or irrational fear induced by negative cognitions or 
beliefs, social settings become menacing, and individuals thus irrationally fear being 
criticised by others (Rheingold, Herbert & Franklin, 2003). 
In such a case, habitual maladaptive behavioural responses to anxiety-provoking 
events and situations include subtle behavioural avoidance (Butler, Fennel, Robson & 
Gelder, 1991) and slowed decision-making (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka & Borkovec, 
1990). Yet, physiological responses may involve excessive muscle tension and an 
autonomous inflexibility derived from a deficiency in parasympathetic tone (Thayer, 
Friedman & Borkovec, 1996). The interaction of these maladaptive behavioural response 
systems can be conducive to a growth of intensified of anxiety. 
3 The Construct of Social Anxiety 
Although the concept of social anxiety has probably been recognised for 
centuries, it was only in 1970 that Marks first described the features and symptoms of 
this disorder (Lecrubier et al., 2000). Social anxiety, or social phobia as it was first 
termed, was described in the psychiatric taxonomy of the 1980 DSM-III. Later, in DSM-
IIIR in 1987 and ICD-10 in 1992, it assumed a distinct diagnostic identity of its own, 
separate from other phobias such as agoraphobia and simple phobia. Of late, the 
descriptors social phobia and SAD have been ascribed to the same psychopathological 
condition, and are thus used interchangeably in DSM-IV.  
 38 
 
3.1 Defining social anxiety 
The difficulty in defining the term ‘anxiety’ arises from difficulty in measuring 
the construct. Like many psychological disturbances, anxiety is multifaceted with 
multiple symptoms, and ‘definitions typically appear either overly simplistic or too 
detailed for measurement’ (Dammeyer & Nunez, 1999, p. 57). The DSM-IV identifies a 
host of specific disorders under the general category of anxiety disorders, and provides a 
good illustration of these disorders, including specific phobias, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, acute stress disorder and generalised anxiety 
disorders. According to the DSM-IV, adjustment disorders can also be considered 
manifestations of anxiety, and the broad range of manifestations and symptoms 
classified under anxiety makes it hard to give an overarching definition (Dammeyer & 
Nunez, 1999). 
Social anxiety involves such symptoms as apprehensiveness, self-consciousness 
and emotional distress in anticipated or actual social-evaluative situations (Leitenberg, 
1990). According to Lecrubier et al. (2000), the most significant manifestation of social 
anxiety is a noticeable and persistent fear of social performance, activities or events, 
especially in the presence of unfamiliar people or when critically observed by others in 
the surrounding community. Such situations and activities may trigger immediate 
anxiety, manifested mostly as avoidance behaviours. Lecrubier et al. (2000, p. 5–6) 
encapsulated the features and symptoms of SAD as ‘poor social skills, hypersensitivity 
to criticism and negative evaluation, and difficulty being assertive, as well as low self-
esteem and feelings of inferiority’.  
The most distinct feature of SAD is that it is triggered and manifested in social 
situations – social interactions that entail conversation or participation in a social event, 
e.g. performing in public, eating or drinking in public or even using public toilets. 
According to Schlenker and Leary (1982), social anxiety involves a tendency to become 
apprehensive in a social setting where the person wishes to make a particular impression 
on others but seriously doubts being able to do so. According to Freud, ‘the problem of 
anxiety is a nodal point, linking up all kinds of most important questions; a riddle, of 
which the solution must cast a flood of light upon our whole mental life’ (1975, p. 401). 
Darwin (1872) ascribes anxiety to lack of control over the will. However, both Freud and 
Darwin assume that anxiety is a product of unfulfilled emotions that lead to 
‘reproductions of earlier events of vital importance, possibly pre-individual’ (Freud, 
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1926, p. 75). Anxiety is seen as an adaptation to ‘fulfil the biologically essential function 
of reacting to a state of danger’ (Freud, 1926, p. 75).  
Freud sought to define and identify social anxiety. Freud decided that the human 
unconscious was not the location of complex, evolved emotions, as these involve the 
working of the ego. The repression of emotions may therefore lead to emotional 
inhibition, resulting in damage to emotional development and functioning. Freud 
claimed that three types of factor lead to this state: biological, phylogenetic and 
psychological, and Freud maintained that the quantitative issue is of paramount 
importance to the genesis of the disorder. Freud wrote cautiously: 
‘We have once more come unawares upon the riddle which has so often 
confronted us – what is its ultimate, its own peculiar raison d’être? After 
tens of years of psycho-analytic labours, we are as much in the dark 
about this problem as we were at the start.’ (Freud, 1926, pp. 148–149) 
Freud drew links between social phobia, obsessional neurosis and the fears of the 
superego. The link between anxiety and neurosis meshes well with the structural theory 
of the mind and also, as Freud maintained, makes better sense of available 
psychoanalytical evidence that suggests anxiety is a transformation of unfulfilled desires 
and emotions. In this way, Freud believed, anxiety is concomitant to neurosis, and when 
the symptoms of a neurosis are suppressed, anxiety appears. There will be further 
consideration of the Freudian theory of neurosis later in this chapter. 
Aetiological and epidemiological data from empirical research and surveys 
among the general population in primary care two decades ago indicated the prevalence 
and clinical severity of SAD, as well as its effects on quality of life and functioning of 
patients, especially among youth (Lecrubier et al., 2000). Antony and Rowa (2005) 
advocated targeting a wide range of symptom dimensions when assessing anxiety, and 
presented a long list of assessment domains based on the key features of anxiety 
described by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV Criteria, 1994).  
Prior research (e.g., Weissman, 1985) indicated a relationship between previous 
traumatic experiences and dissociation with pre-treatment psychopathology and rates of 
recovery, relapse and maintenance for patients receiving cognitive-behavioural 
treatments for certain phobias and disorders, such as panic disorder with agoraphobia.  
Some researchers (e.g., Michelson, June, Vives, Testa & Marchione, 1998) 
indicated that a variety of trauma-related variables (e.g. history of traumatic experience, 
type of trauma, age at which the trauma first occurred, perceived responsibility, social 
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support, self-perceived severity, level of violence, and whether or not the traumatic event 
was followed by self-injurious or suicidal thoughts and/or behaviours) and dissociative 
symptomatology would be predictive of (1) greater psychopathology at pre-treatment, 
(2) poorer treatment response and (3) higher relapse rates and poorer maintenance over a 
one-year longitudinal follow-up.  
Crudely put, previous research on psychopathology has revealed that targeting 
certain types of constructs and beliefs that patients may entertain before psychotherapy 
may greatly affect the psychopathology, its symptoms and the patients’ responsiveness 
to psychotherapy (Shear & Maser, 1994). Other research on the comorbidity of anxiety 
and depression (Antony & Rowa, 2005) identified the following symptom dimensions: 
diagnostic features, anxiety cues and triggers (i.e. situational, interceptive and cognitive 
cues), avoidance behaviours, compulsions and overprotective behaviours, physical 
symptoms and responses, skill deficits, associated distress and impairment, and 
associated problems and comorbidity.  
In addition, clinical symptoms of SAD identified in both adults and children 
include a wide range of somatic symptoms typical of anxiety, such as palpitations, 
trembling/shaking and blushing and sweating (Turner, Fine, Ewy & Sershon, 1989). 
Therefore, Antony and Rowa (2005) recommended that several related constructs be 
assessed, including treatment history, environmental and family factors, and medical and 
health issues. 
However, social anxiety can become an overwhelming problem that interferes 
significantly with people’s daily lives, leading to dread and avoidance of social 
interaction to the detriment of work, friendships, and their lives (Davidson, Hughes, 
George, & Blazer, 1994). 
An overview of the literature to date suggests that social anxiety comprises 
several underlying symptom-specific dimensions. However, more research is needed to 
investigate the nature of social anxiety and its dimensional structure. More specifically, a 
broad model of social anxiety, including both disorder-specific as well as more general 
symptom dimensions, needs to be developed and tested in order to identify and validate 
the underlying structure of social anxiety. 
3.2 Social anxiety versus social panic 
Social anxiety and social panic are distinct anxiety disorders that are commonly 
confused, even by trained clinicians and therapists (Richards, 2012). Furthermore, some 
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clinicians misdiagnose these two types of anxiety disorder as depression when 
individuals with SAD show signs of panic disorder and social anxiety in their daily lives. 
As Richards (2012) explains, 
‘Technically, it may be more accurate to diagnose people with anxiety 
disorders as “dysthymic”. The main point, however, is that it is the 
anxiety that causes the depression (dysthymia) and not the other way 
around. Once the anxiety shrinks and is overcome, the depression goes 
away with it.’ 
Panic disorder is triggered by a physical, objective stimulus, causing individuals 
to have rapid heart palpitations or feel they are about to lose control, or that they are 
going “crazy”. These feelings are not real: they show that sufferers may wrongly believe 
they have physical health problems, a belief termed hypochondria. 
On the other hand, people with SAD do not confuse their problem with 
physiological illness or disease. Rather, they find normal social activity or situations too 
demanding to cope with, especially when they feel they are at the centre of attention or 
required to perform. Richards (2012) explains that SAD people find it a terrifying 
experience to interact socially with unfamiliar people or to publicly speak or present in 
front of strangers. 
3.3 Prevalence rates 
Anxiety disorders in youth are common and disruptive, causing complex, chronic 
and severe complications, which indicate a need for effective treatments for this age 
group (Sauter, Heyne & Westenberg, 2009). There is some evidence that social anxiety 
may contribute to the onset of other major psychiatric disorders such as mood disorders, 
substance abuse disorders and other anxiety disorders (Hirschfeld, 1995). In the United 
States, SAD is the third most prevalent psychiatric disorder after depression and alcohol 
dependence (Kessler et al., 1994).  
In Saudi Arabia, Bassiony (2005) found that social anxiety was very common, 
and also showed a high rate of comorbidity, with 59% of SAD patients in his study 
having another concurrent psychiatric disorder. Depression was common among patients 
with SAD, particularly those with the severe subtype, who were four times more likely 
to have depression than were those with mild or moderate SAD after controlling for 
sociodemographic and clinical factors. 
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The prevalence of anxiety disorders is higher during adolescence and later life 
than in childhood (Roberts, Roberts & Chan, 2009). Newman et al. (1996) found that 
anxiety disorders during adolescence increased among a birth cohort from 7.5% at 11 
years of age to 20.3% at 21 years of age. Essau, Conradt and Petermann (2000) also 
reported an increase during adolescence from 14.7% at 12–13 years to 22.0% at 16–17 
years of age.  
In the UK, the Mental Health Foundation (2005) suggested that one in ten people 
experiences a ‘disabling anxiety disorder’ at some point in their lives. Social anxiety is 
deemed to impact 1–2% of the British population, with men and women demonstrating 
similar rates (SANE, 2004). In the US, however, the social anxiety rate is approximately 
3.7% of the population aged 18–54 (NIMH [National Institute for Mental Health], 2005). 
This frequency of 1 in 27 is higher than the prevalence of 1 in 51 (1.95%), which 
suggests that there may have been a sudden increase in the rate of diagnosis in recent 
years. These statistics are based on officially recorded diagnoses of SAD. 
Other reasons psychologists have proposed for this rise in prevalence rates are 
related to the rise of Internet-based communication, which is presumed to be a poor 
substitute for face-to-face interaction and to reduce opportunities to practise social skills 
(Shotton, 1988; Sussman, 1996).  
In Saudi Arabia, use of the Internet is increasing rapidly and exponentially. Some 
psychologists have ascribed prevalent mental symptoms such as phobic anxiety, 
psychoticism, social anxiety, depression, paranoid ideation and interpersonal sensitivity 
and somatisation related to these symptoms and disorders to several socio-environmental 
reasons, one of which is the widespread use of the Internet, which is both a cause and an 
effect of these disorders (Lisak, Truong, Carroll & Bhidayasiri, 2009; Khoja & Farid, 
2000). It is a cause in the sense that it reinforces the absence of face-to-face interactions 
in social milieus, and an effect because it provides escape and withdrawal from stressful 
social situations and activities that people with social phobia suffer from. 
Some epidemiological research reports lifetime prevalence rates of SAD in 
different age strata in Western countries as ranging between 7% and 12% of the 
population (Furmark, 2002; Kessler et al., 2005). Research has further indicated that 
SAD is more common in adolescence, and continues to develop incrementally if 
untreated (Blote, Kint & Westenberg, 2007). Furthermore, community evaluation studies 
have indicated that the disorder affects men and women relatively equally (Hofmann & 
DiBartolo, 2010, p. 1041). Others report that anxiety disorders, including social phobias, 
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are more than twice as prevalent as affective disorders and four to seven times as 
prevalent as major depressive disorder (Regier et al., 1988; Weissman, Leckman, 
Merikangas, Gammon & Prusoff, 1984). Investigating data on the predominance of 
specific anxiety disorders, prior research indicates that social phobias characterise the 
most common anxiety disorders among the elderly (Stanley & Beck, 2000).  
On the other hand, Beidel et al. (2007, p. 47) indicate that the ‘prevalence of 
social phobia among adolescents is 5 to 16% of the general population’. Despite the 
observation that SAD can transpire in children, recent research indicates that SAD is 
more common among adolescents, with lifetime prevalence rates of 5 to 15% among 
adolescents in the USA and Europe (Heimberg, Stein, Hiripi & Kessler, 2000; 
Lewinsohn, Hops, Roberts, Seeley & Andrews, 1993; Wittchen et al., 1999). Social 
anxiety in adolescents and adults is associated with significantly lower levels of 
attainment in work, education, romantic relationships (Davidson et al., 1994; Schneider 
et al., 1994) and subjective well-being (Safren, Heimberg, Brown & Holle, 1997).  
In the Arab world and particularly in Saudi Arabia, there are no comprehensive 
survey studies on the prevalence of SAD, but some studies have shown that social 
anxiety is more prevalent in Saudi Arabian men than women, especially among young, 
educated men (Al-Maleh & Al-Zarrad, 2005). Clinical data from a survey by Al-Maleh 
& Al-Zarrad (2005) indicated that 13–15% of psychotherapy seekers suffered from SAD. 
Similar results have been reported in Syria (Al-Subaie & Alhamad, 2000), Kuwait 
(Abdel-Khalek & El-Yahfoufi, 2004), Egypt (Al-Shirbini, 1999) and Jordan (Sarhan, Al-
Khateeb & Habashna, 2001). In a recent comprehensive study by Al-Ansari (2007), 
which was conducted to tap into the prevalence rates of SAD in the Arab world (Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), the 
researcher sampled 2620 college students from seven universities. The results showed 
that college students in these countries suffer from general SADs, but prevalence rates 
are higher in Jordanian students, followed by Palestinians, then Egyptians, Syrians, 
Omanis, Kuwaitis, Saudis, Lebanese and finally UAE students. 
Findings from these prevalence surveys indicate that the range in prevalence 
estimates that still remains can be accounted for by variations in sampling procedure and 
by the use of slightly different diagnostic criteria, e.g. DSM-IIIR versus DSM-IV 
criteria. Furthermore, most epidemiologic survey studies have a representative age range 
of 18–65 years. As the onset of SAD is known to occur most commonly in adolescence 
prior to the age of 20, it is not surprising that survey investigations conducted in samples 
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with a higher proportion of young adults and adolescents have reported significantly 
higher prevalence rates (the National Comorbidity Survey recruited subjects aged 15–54 
years). In contrast, samples that include a sizeable proportion of people aged over 50 
years have, in general, demonstrated lower prevalence rates (Eaton, Dryman & 
Weissman, 1991; Lecrubier et al., 2000). 
Variables that may explain differences in prevalence rates include the fact that 
there are no clear cut-off points for establishing when social anxiety becomes 
pathological, and the threshold selected for a full diagnosis that varies across 
epidemiologic surveys: some researchers have adopted a high threshold level that 
accounts for the reported lifetime prevalence rate of 4.0% (Faravelli et al., 2000).  
In addition, diagnostic criteria including the interference with social functioning 
can be a subjective measure heavily dependent on the individual’s occupation or 
lifestyle. In this respect, Hofmann & DiBartolo (2010, p. 1041), relying on a survey of 
relevant research, adeptly noticed that prior research on SADs, both generalised and non-
generalised subtypes, has indicated that ‘approximately 52% to 80% of social phobia 
patients have a lifetime diagnosis of at least another concomitant psychiatric disorder’. 
Further, they added that around one third to three quarters of these patients with the 
generalised subtype of SAD are typically classifiable as having another concomitant 
lifetime disorder, such as depression, in accordance with the diagnostic criteria of DMS-
IV. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of SAD was explored in primary care populations, 
and lifetime prevalence appraisals were estimated using small-scale studies in some of 
the countries referred to, either in Europe (e.g. Bisserbe, Weiller, Boyer, Lepine & 
Lecrubier, 1996; Szadoczky, Rı´hmer, Papp & Furedi, 1997; Weiller, Bisserbe, Boyer, 
Lepine & Lecrubier, 1996, Tomás-Sabádo & Gomez-Bénito, 2004)  or in the Arab world 
(e.g. Abdel-Khalek, Al-Maleh & Al-Zarrad, 2005; Al-Shirbini, 1999). Notwithstanding 
the variations in lifetime prevalence estimates, epidemiologic surveys conducted across 
Europe, and to a lesser degree in some Arab countries, given their paucity, present a less 
coherent picture; however, these surveys suggest that SADs are among the most 
frequently encountered anxiety disorders, with a conservative lifetime prevalence 
estimate in the general population of close to 7%.  
In addition, Lecrubier et al. (2000, p. 9), comparing prevalence estimates 
determined in the studies from the United States and those done in some European 
studies, indicated that the latter ‘employed more experienced survey staff, comprising 
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clinical interviewers and/or clinical supervisors, resulting in slightly more detailed 
findings’. 
In this respect, Hidalgo, Barnett, and Davidson (2001) explicate that SAD has 
become excessively common amongst adolescents and adults for unrealistic purposes as 
it appears in social malfunctioning and observable stress demonstrated by people with 
social phobia. They also indicate that the case is different with the child populations, 
which may be less severe and more apt to be cured. In adolescents and teenagers, to be 
characteristically diagnosed as having social phobia, one must show the relevant 
symptoms for a period of more than six months.  
It should also be noted, as Hidalgo et al. (2001) indicated, that SADs are not the 
result of other medical illnesses or the by-product of addiction to drugs and substances. 
These reasons cannot account for social phobia: ‘the diagnosis of SAD is not better 
explained by another psychiatric disorder [e.g. panic disorder (PD)] with or without 
agoraphobia, separation anxiety disorder, etc.’ (Hidalgo et al., 2001, p. 280). This means, 
in one's view, that typical manifestations as defined by the DSM-IV criteria vary by age. 
Researchers should, therefore, be cautious with findings from these studies, as some of 
them were conducted on small samples often described as ‘shy’, ‘rejected’ or ‘socially 
withdrawn’, but are not distinctly diagnosed as socially phobic.  
Furthermore, some of the research was conducted on adolescents, and it would be 
naive to accept their findings outright uncritically; as we know, adolescence is a critical 
developmental phase in which individuals have already started developing their identity 
and social skills, paying attentive consideration to their self-image before others as well 
as peer-acceptance – processes in which adolescents may falsely report themselves as 
socially anxious on SAD scales. Some of the problems associated with identity 
formation and self-concept as well as body-image, which are, in essence, commensurate 
with or esoteric to the developmental stage of adolescence and the concomitant disorders 
of the phase, can be similar with SAD; this is specifically true if we know that social 
anxiety is frequently linked with two basic aspects of self-evaluation, or self-concept, 
that might tend to produce an abnormal investment in questions of self-worth: fear of 
disapproval (Arkin, 1981; Watson & Friend, 1969) and self-doubts about social 
competence (Schlenker & Leary, 1982).  
In several relevant research projects, SAD patients were found to be 
inconsistently receptive to positive and/or negative evaluations from others (Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979); they may be affected by their own reactions to appraisals from others 
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(Jones, 1973), and the individual’s self-evaluation or self-concept has been seen as a 
likely mediator of reactions to social evaluation (Shrauger, 1982). This, as mentioned 
earlier, can be similar to early adolescence self-concept problems. However, in a 
classical study by Izard (1972), it was found that high social-anxiety patients 
significantly accepted positive experiences less, and negative experiences more, than did 
their low social-anxiety counterparts. Implicit in this finding is the observation that SAD 
patients suffer from a self-esteem predicament: they can feel delighted with positive 
interpersonal evaluation, but they entertain suspicions about people who create this 
positive feedback. In this respect, some researchers indicated that SAD patients have 
already learned to use coping strategies appropriate to tackling their irrational beliefs 
related to the need for social approval or to fulfilment of high self-expectations, or even 
to deal with anxious over-concern which results in problem avoidance. Even though 
patients with SAD might realise that their beliefs are irrational and this may be the cause 
of their social incompetence, still ‘their personal theories of their social competence 
might have less impact’ (Lake & Arkin, 1985, p. 159). 
Still, we have to be cautious with interpretations of research findings in which 
participants are not well defined as SAD patients. The researcher means by well-defined 
that participants in social anxiety studies should be really SAD patients, not those who 
might be shy, lonely or exhibiting social withdrawal syndromes rather than SAD. In this 
vein, the DSM-IV criteria for SAD diagnosis should be accurately applied and matched 
to sampling procedures with consideration of age factors. 
3.4 Types and sub-types of social anxiety 
According to Stein and Kean (2000), social anxiety or social phobia disorders are 
the most pervasive class of mental disorders. SAD has been described as a phobic 
(anxiety) disorder, along with agoraphobia and specific phobias, from which it was first 
distinguished only 40 years ago. SAD is an excessive, unwarranted fear of social 
situations, such as eating or speaking in public. Social anxiety is typically 
operationalised as a fear of being negatively evaluated or appraised in social situations. It 
is so common that many people experience social anxiety in many daily life situations; 
that is to say, they feel uncomfortable or even anxious in social situations, such as 
talking with strangers (or even friends) or speaking in front of a group of people. In the 
general population, levels of social anxiety exist on a continuum from mild to severe 
(Book & Randall, 2002). 
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A specific feature that characterises SAD is extreme and persistent fear of 
embarrassment and humiliation (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Patients 
suffering from this disorder (also known as social phobia disorder) often shun social and 
public activities, such as public speaking or social meetings. While normative social 
anxiety serves to preclude inappropriate behaviour in social gatherings, the intense 
symptoms of SAD, by definition, interfere with social functioning, thereby causing 
manifest distress. Differentiation of SAD from other phobic disorders is validated by its 
characteristic age of onset in the mid-teens and among more men than women (Marks & 
Gelder, 1966). 
3.5 Social anxiety/social phobia 
In his book Finding Serenity in an Age of Anxiety, Robert Gerzon (1998) 
generalises that we are living in an unprecedented Age of Anxiety. Our individual lives, 
our families, our neighbourhoods – all float upon a vast, rolling sea of deep cultural 
anxiety. Victims of social anxiety develop a series of problematic assumptions about 
themselves and their social world (e.g. ‘I must always sound intelligent and fluent’; ‘I 
am unworthy’), which lead them to appraise social situations as dangerous, which in turn 
generates anxiety (Clark, 1999, 2000; Clark & Wells, 1995). Social anxiety as generated 
by negative appraisals and irrationalities can be ‘maintained by a series of vicious 
circles.’ (Vassilopoulos, 2004, p. 303). Anxiety in this case becomes impairment, 
ultimately tantamount to social phobia disorder (Vassilopoulos, 2009; Vertue, 2003). 
Therefore, it is not unexpected that SAD can potentially induce significant distress and 
impairment (Lecrubier et al., 2000).  
In this vein, the DSM-IV has provided current definitions for mental disorders. 
Within each DSM definition, specific symptoms are described that have been found to 
be necessary to diagnose the specified disorder category. Four key symptoms are listed 
for social phobia disorder: fear, avoidance, functional impairment associated with one’s 
anxiety, and avoidance and insight or recognition that one’s fear and avoidance is 
excessive and unreasonable. According to the DSM-IV Criteria, social phobia disorder is 
‘a marked and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which 
the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others. The 
individual fears that he or she will act in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing’ 
(APA, 2000, p. 456). Thus, distorted cognitions or maladaptive schemata have been a 
primary theoretical focus in the anxiety literature generally (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 
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1985; Foa, Franklin & Kozak, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; for a comprehensive 
review, see Hirsch & Clark, 2004).  
SAD is also known as social phobia, being a common anxiety disorder branded 
by intense fear of embarrassment, humiliation and negative evaluation by others in social 
situations, cases which generate a predisposition to avoid social situations and events 
that are likely to create these psychopathological states, as mentioned earlier. The terms 
social phobia and SAD are both mentioned in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as synonymous (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 1994), but there is a tendency to prefer the SAD designation 
(Liebowitz, Heimberg, Fresco, Travers & Stein, 2000). Furthermore, the term social 
phobia may implicitly categorise SAD as a form of specific phobia, thereby taking 
lightly ‘the chronic course and severe impairment associated with SAD’ (Kashdan & 
Herbert, 2001, p. 37).  
In this context, Vertue (2003), however, aptly noticed that there is a state of 
vagueness and discordance among scholars as to the provision of a clear-cut definition of 
social anxiety and social phobia; there is no clear-cut distinction between social anxiety 
and social phobia disorder. Therefore, the two terms are often used interchangeably, 
though there are occasional references in the relevant literature to the fact that ‘the 
difference between the two terms is quantitative rather than qualitative … and the terms 
social anxiety disorder and social phobia disorder are used interchangeably’ in the 
DSMD-III of 1994 (Vertue, 2003, p. 170). 
Despite the various attempts by scholars in the field to subtype SAD, such as the 
delineation of speaking fears from non-speaking fears (Stein & Chavira, 1998), there is 
only one form of sub-typing that has been universally acknowledged across almost all 
types of situations to be characteristic of the disorder: i.e. one is the generalised SAD in 
which the patient manifests several social fears, and the other is the non-generalised 
SAD in which only one or two social situations are the focus of and cause for the 
disorder. This latter sub-type covers patients with performance and test phobias, a 
subtype frequently diagnosed in adolescence and often termed stage-fright phobia 
(Wittchen et al., 1999), as noted elsewhere in this chapter. The foundation of both 
subtypes of the SAD already outlined is the fear of speaking in front of or with others, 
even in a small group or in a one-to-one situation.  
Premature descriptions of SAD started early in history dating back to Greek 
scholars (e.g., Hippocrates), Arab and Muslim scholars (e.g., Ibn Hazm) and modern 
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scholars (e.g., Marks, 1970). The aetiology and pathogenesis of social phobia are very 
much sophisticated that they have caused a pervasive confusion in related literature, 
affecting the nosology and taxonomy of the disorder. Therefore, it was widely noted in 
relevant literature that a as many as 90% of subjects with SAD may manifest speaking 
fears (Faravelli et al., 2000; Faravelli, Guerrini Degl’Innocenti & Giardinelli, 1989; 
Marks, 1970; Weiller et al., 1996). Extra fears amass to this core feature in the more 
generalised form of the disorder, where patients fear a wide range of social and 
performance situations. Having revised the diagnostic criteria for SAD with reference to 
the DSM-IV and the ICD-10, Table 1 below sums up the comparison, which highlights 
the differences between such sub-types of the SAD as below: 
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Table 1:  Differences between sub-types of social anxiety 
DSM-IV ICD-10 
A marked and persistent fear of one or more 
social or performance situations in 
which the person is exposed to 
unfamiliar people or possible scrutiny by 
others. 
Often starts in adolescence and centred 
around a fear of scrutiny by other people 
in comparatively small groups (as 
opposed to crowds), usually leading to 
avoidance of social situations. 
The individual fears that he or she will act in 
a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that 
will be humiliating or embarrassing. 
May be discrete (i.e., restricted to eating in 
public, to public speaking, or to 
encounters with the opposite sex) or 
diffuse, involving almost all social 
situations outside the family circle. A 
fear of vomiting in public may be 
important. Direct eye-to-eye 
confrontation may be particularly 
stressful in some cultures. 
Exposure to the feared social situation almost 
invariably provokes anxiety, which may 
take the form of a situationally bound or 
situationally predisposed panic attack. 
Usually associated with low self-esteem and 
fear of criticism. 
 
The avoidance, anxious anticipation or 
distress in the feared social or 
performance situation(s) interferes 
significantly with the person’s normal 
routine, occupational (academic) 
functioning, or social activities or 
relationships, or there is marked distress 
about having the phobia. 
May present as a complaint of blushing, hand 
tremor, nausea or urgency of micturition 
the individual sometimes being 
convinced that one of these secondary 
manifestations of anxiety is the primary 
problem; symptoms may progress to 
panic attacks. 
 
In individuals under the age of eighteen 
years, the duration is at least six months. 
Avoidance is often marked, and in extreme 
cases may result in almost complete 
social isolation. 
The fear or avoidance is not due to the direct 
physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
The psychological, behavioural or autonomic 
symptoms must be primarily 
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a drug of abuse, a medication) or a 
general medical condition, and is not 
better accounted for by another mental 
disorder (e.g., panic disorder with or 
without agoraphobia, separation anxiety 
disorder, body dysmorphic disorder, a 
pervasive developmental disorder or 
schizoid personality disorder). 
manifestations of anxiety and not 
secondary to other symptoms such as 
delusions or obsessional thoughts. 
 
If a general medical condition or other mental 
disorder is present, the fear is unrelated 
to it, e.g., the fear is not of stuttering, 
trembling in Parkinson’s disease, or 
exhibiting abnormal eating behaviour in 
anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa. 
The anxiety must be restricted to or 
predominate in particular social 
situations, and the phobic situation is 
avoided whenever possible. 
 
Generalised SAD: if the fears include most 
social situations 
Agoraphobia and depressive disorders are 
often prominent, and may both 
contribute to sufferers becoming 
‘housebound’. If the distinction between 
social phobia and agoraphobia is very 
difficult, precedence should be given to 
agoraphobia; a depressive diagnosis 
should not be made unless a full 
depressive syndrome can be identified 
clearly. 
 
 
In this thesis, the terms ‘social anxiety disorder’ and ‘social phobia disorder’ are 
used interchangeably on the assumption ‘that social anxiety disorder, or social phobia 
disorder, is on that part of the continuum of social anxiety where the person’s anxiety 
becomes clinically significant’ (Vertue, 2003, p. 170).  
As for social anxiety, it involves similar symptoms: feelings of apprehension, 
self-consciousness and emotional distress in anticipated or actual social-evaluative 
situations (Leitenberg, 1990). These negative symptoms of social anxiety, prominent 
amongst which are apprehension and consequent expectancies of one’s inadequate 
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performance in social settings, can lead to the withdrawal of effort and to consequent 
poor performance (Burgio, Merluzzi & Pryor, 1986; Pozo, Carver, Wellens & Scheier, 
1991), or to social withdrawal (loneliness). Such negative outcomes can potentially 
induce or even strengthen the expectation of future self-presentational failure. Pozo et al. 
(1991, p. 355) note that such negative consequences can ‘lead socially anxious people to 
perceive an existing social reality as bleaker than it really is’: hence the possibility of 
developing irrational thinking as an adjunct to social anxiety. 
Students with high social anxiety may report feeling tense, physically distressed 
(Pilkonis, 1977), inhibited and awkward (Camacho & Paulus, 1995; Reno & Kenny, 
1992; Zimbardo, 1977), acutely self-conscious and worried about receiving negative 
evaluations from others when in social situations (Winton, Clark & Edelmann, 1995), 
and generally reticent (Meleshko & Alden, 1993). Such symptoms of anxiety develop 
because of austere and severe self-censorship (Schlenker & Leary, 1985), low self-
evaluations of one’s ability, especially when anticipating a hostile audience (Schlenker, 
Weigold & Hallam, 1990), and underestimation of the positivity of impressions they 
convey to others in interactions (Campbell & Fehr, 1990).  
In this line, Lane (2007) discussed that the clear biological manifestations of 
anxiety include such symptoms as increased heartbeat, breathlessness, perspiration of 
palms, and so on, while the individual is unaware why s/he cannot curb these symptoms, 
further being unaware of the causes of this condition or whether these causes are real or 
imagined. Freud and Darwin’s explanations of these symptoms miss a necessary 
discussion of the ‘contributory social factors (overweening parental expectations, class 
shame, sexual guilt, and so on)’ (Lane, 2007, p.19). 
Some researchers (Liebowitz et al., 1985; Liebowitz, Schneier, Gitow & Feerick, 
1993) contend that there is an overlap between SAD and Avoidant Personality Disorder 
(APD) (Hofmann, Newman, Becker, Taylor & Roth, 1995). A varied and broad 
spectrum of social anxiety symptoms has also been identified and investigated in 
relevant literature, including shyness as a less severe dimension of the overall construct 
of social anxiety and loneliness (Lane, 2007; Heiser et al., 2003; Schneider et al., 2000; 
Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Van Velzen, Emmelkamp & Scholing, 2000).  
By the same token, the psychological constructs of social anxiety, social phobia 
and shyness noticeably share much common ground, but the following definitions focus 
on the unique features of each of them, though in the present study ‘social anxiety’ and 
‘social phobia’ have been used as interchangeable terms. First, social anxiety is defined 
 53 
 
as a cognitive and affective experience that is triggered by the perception of possible 
negative evaluation by others (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The term refers to unpleasant 
physiological arousal and fear of psychological harm (Leary & Kowalski, 1995). This 
definition stresses a feeling or state of arousal that is centred on interactions with others. 
Social phobia has been generally defined as a ‘marked and persistent fear of one 
or more situations in which the person is exposed to possible scrutiny by others and fears 
that he or she may do something or act in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing’ 
(American Psychological Association, 1994, p. 416). With some very few exceptions, 
the identification of social phobia usually involves marked behavioural avoidance in one 
or more social situations. As such, a phobic response is the behaviour of avoiding a 
feared stimulus or situation of a particular kind. 
On the other hand, shyness has been defined as ‘a heightened state of 
individuation characterised by excessive egocentric preoccupation and over concern with 
social evaluation … with the consequence that the shy person inhibits, withdraws, 
avoids, and escapes’ (Zimbardo, 1982, pp. 467–468). In this regard, it is worth noting 
that William James has recognised shyness as a basic human instinct, warranting 
Darwin’s opinion in this respect (Jessen, 1990). By definition, Izard (1972) described 
shyness as a discrete, fundamental emotion. Clearly put, an emotion profile of a shy 
person in a social event or situation may include interest and fear, which interacts with 
shyness (Izard, 1972; Mosher & White, 1981). Carver and Scheier (1986) have thus 
defined shyness, by borrowing self-regulation terms, as the outcome of an event or 
situation that bears unfavourable social outcome expectancies conducive to 
disengagement in task efforts.  
The common ground in most definitions of these constructs, either the ones 
already cited or elsewhere, refers to a state of discomfort and the motivation to escape 
situations that contribute to this state. Therefore, researchers need to acknowledge that 
shyness proper does not necessarily involve problematic emotion or avoidance of goals 
important to the shy person. One peculiarity of the construct that needs to be stated is 
that shyness may include social anxiety as an emotional component, but social anxiety 
does not necessarily lead to shyness behaviourally. Shyness may possibly combine both 
emotion and behaviour, but this is not necessarily the case. According to some authors 
(Henderson & Zimbardo, 2009, p. 6), ‘shy extroverts do not avoid and shy introverts 
may be phobic and not socially anxious. The avoidant behaviour has already been 
conditioned to external stimuli and is not triggered by feelings of anxiety’. 
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Despite the fact that social phobia patients have been described as more avoidant 
than shy individuals, comparisons and distinctions between these relevant terms, as 
noted above, were based on samples of normal college students; in fact, the researchers 
and authors who outlined these distinctions pointed to the dearth of empirical studies of 
shyness treatment samples (Turner, Beidel & Townsley, 1990). 
In addition, these researchers have implicitly or explicitly noted that social 
phobia is defined in the literature according to specific criteria, while shyness is not thus 
defined. However, shyness is part of common language and is described both as an 
emotional state and as a trait; therefore, specific criteria for chronic problematic shyness 
have been described in relevant literature. In this respect, chronic shyness has been 
defined as ‘a fear of negative evaluation that was sufficient to inhibit participation in 
desired activities and that significantly interfered with the pursuit of personal or 
professional goals’ (Henderson, 1992, cited in Hofmann & Dibartolo, 2010, p. 68). Later 
in this chapter, more will be said about shyness. 
Further, and more worryingly, as several researchers maintain, ‘social anxiety 
disorder (SAD) is a common and disabling disorder that may occur in different cultural 
settings, yet is under-diagnosed by clinicians’ (Kaminer & Stein, 2003, p.103). This 
requires that psychology counsellors and psychotherapists cooperate with parents and 
educational institutions to seek to recognise the problem, for the earlier it is diagnosed, 
the easier it will be to combat the disorder, simply because SAD ‘usually follows a 
chronic course characterised by increasing impairment if left untreated’ (Kashdan & 
Herbert, 2001, p. 37), especially if it ‘starts in early childhood through adolescence’ 
(Hidalgo et al., 2001, p. 279). The impairment is in social functioning and is marked by 
distress and irrationality caused by the disorder. 
4 Social Anxiety Theories 
SAD was first identified as an independently diagnosable psychopathology in its 
own right in the DSM-III of 1980 (Hidalgo et al., 2001). Previously, in the DSM-I and 
DSM-II, it had been grouped along with all other phobias (APA, 1968, p. 279). 
Therefore, theories of SAD rely much on early psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy theories grounded in Freudian psychology, behaviourism, social 
psychology and humanistic psychology. Some of the interpretations of the disorder are, 
as has been seen above, rooted in the Freudian classic conflict between the ego, the 
superego and the id; others relate the disorder to physiological and biological reasons 
deeply rooted in genetics, and some other interpretations have tackled an interplay 
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between genetico-physiological and environmental effects in the social milieu in which 
individuals with the disorder live.  
Whatever the interpretations may be, they look plausible, as will be reviewed 
below, and what should attract attention is to develop a theoretical framework that can 
benefit psychoanalysts and psychotherapists in dealing with the disorder in effective 
ways that help patients to recover from the symptoms of the disorder and start their lives 
afresh. Before delving deep into underlying theories of SAD, it would be better for 
psychotherapists and counselling psychologists to utilise an eclectic approach to psycho-
therapy, i.e., an approach that can combine more than one psycho-therapeutic method 
and one that can be grounded in varied psychological theories. The reason for adopting 
an eclectic approach to psychotherapy, or even an amalgam of psychotherapy with 
medication, is that the disorder itself falls into two broad categories of generalised and 
non-generalised subtypes. According to Hidalgo et al. (2001, p. 280), in one category, 
“most social institutions are causes of social phobia to SAD patients”. In the other 
category, one situation or several social situations that require a specific social 
performance on the part of SAD patients could potentially trigger phobia in the 
individual. However, the relationship between these two types has not yet been totally 
understood. 
In this context, it is better to devise a multi- dimensional approach to therapy: to 
this purpose, it is necessary to review the different underpinning theories that explicate 
the disorder. Vertue (2003, p. 171) has classified theories addressing social anxiety into 
three main categories: ‘genetic and evolutionary theories, behavioural and cognitive 
theories, and interpersonal theories’. 
Some researchers claim that social anxiety is a genetic predisposition (Chaleby, 
1987, Chaleby & Raslan, 1990), while others contend that there is an interplay between 
genetics and the environment which engenders social anxiety (Vertue, 2003). 
Researchers have endeavoured to provide accounts of social anxiety that accommodate 
both genetic and environmental influences. Buss (1980) maintained that self-conscious 
shyness may develop as a result of a fearful temperament plus (a) excessive socialisation 
training by parents so that children become highly sensitive to social faux pas, or (b) 
underdeveloped social skills, or both. In such a case, high levels of SAD symptoms are 
characterised by ‘a marked and persistent fear of social or performance situations’ 
(DSM-IV), as exposure to them almost invariably provokes anxiety attacks. Such 
scrutiny by others and fear of acting in a way that will be embarrassing or humiliating 
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can be a source of anxiety. In this respect, Scott (2006, p. 97) captures an image of this 
social phobia associated with shyness from a sociological perspective: 
‘Shyness is motivated by great sociability (the wish to be with people and to 
belong to a group), but this is subsumed beneath anxieties about self-
presentation. Shy [people] long to be recognised and included but doubt 
that they can make adequate, defensible contributions to the encounter.’ 
This quote of Scott’s sums up ‘the conflict between yearning and hesitation, 
showing how anxiety often intercedes between the desire to participate and the fear of 
doing so unsuccessfully’ (Lane, 2007, p. 157). Scott argues that ‘social dynamics’ are 
challenged and perhaps impeded by shyness in social interaction situations and events. 
Scott (2006) further argues that if every social encounter has been viewed as a precarious 
balance of rules and assumptions, in this case, there would be an expectation that 
everyone will play a certain level of interactional competence.  
However, if a person looks shy, their ‘moves’ are unexpected and uncoordinated 
with those around them. They always think that whatever they do, it will be 
misconstrued by others indignantly or aggressively, or they may even be accused of 
being haughty, aloof, boring or uninteresting. The real problem is that some people 
identify so strongly with the ‘shy’ label that they feel constantly anxious, lonely and 
frustrated, and understand shyness to be a chronic and debilitating condition that 
interferes with their everyday lives. Indeed, many people identify with episodic feelings 
of shyness that arise in certain types of situation. 
Other researchers (Aron, Aron & Davies, 2005; Leary & Kowalski, 1995) have 
argued that social anxiety develops when reassurance signals from others are absent, 
rather than when threat signals are present, and suggested that psychological counselling 
interventions may be warranted to redress the problem. In such a case, according to 
Leary (2001a; 2001b; 2001c), social anxiety may serve as an early warning system that 
alerts people to potential threats to social acceptance (or, more precisely, relational 
devaluation) and motivates behaviours designed to correct the situation and eliminate the 
anxiety. 
Social learning theories ascribe social phobia to one’s acquisition of adult 
behaviour patterns when one observes on the spot how adults react to social events or 
other people’s actions (see Bandura, 1997, 2008). For example, if a parent is anxious 
about appearing before others and talking to strangers in a loud voice, a child notices 
his/her parent’s apprehensions and learns these apprehensions in the social setting just 
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like the parents (Al-Ahmadi, 1991). Theories of behaviour, cognition and attention 
further maintain that social anxiety is a learned response to social stimuli, either by 
classical or operant conditioning (see for instance, Mattick, Page & Lampe, 1995).  
Some researchers (Bandura, 1982) maintain that social anxiety is a learnable 
behaviour vicariously experienced by people through contagion. By illustration, in 
classical conditioning, the development of social anxiety can be conceived as the result 
of pairing social stimuli (e.g. being watched by others) with aversive experiences (e.g. 
being berated, criticised, or otherwise devalued). It has been reported that as many as 
60% of people with social phobia disorder can identify a specific point of embarrassment 
or humiliation prior to the onset of the disorder (Mattick et al., 1989, 2004). However, 
Vertue (2003, pp. 172–3) criticises this finding on the basis that ‘… these figures are 
based on retrospective studies that are marred by the questionable accuracy of recall … 
and prospective studies are needed to eliminate this criticism’. 
Other researchers, who support the genetic theory of social anxiety, claim that 
social anxiety can be passed down genetically from one generation to another. Some 
family research appears to support a significantly elevated risk for social phobia disorder 
in relatives of participants with social phobias (Fyer, Mannuzza, Chapman, Liebowitz & 
Klein, 1993; Stein et al., 1998). Much earlier, researchers (Ohman & Dimberg, 1978; 
Seligman, 1971) contended that human and non-human primates have a natural 
propensity towards fear and phobias as a result of their evolutionary development and 
are therefore genetically inclined to developing anxiety vis-à-vis social threats.  
According to the evolutionary theory of social anxiety, this disorder is basically 
‘an adaptive emotion, selected for its ability to maintain links between individuals and 
the other individuals or social groups on whom they depend for access to survival and 
reproductive resources’ Vertue (2003, p. 172). This explains the observation that 
individuals with SAD autonomously use a variety of evolved strategies for coping with 
social anxiety provoking activities or competitive situations when they are less skilled or 
less competent than others. Vertue (2003, p. 172) further notes: 
‘The behaviours associated with social anxiety in such situations would signal 
submission to dominant individuals, letting the dominant know that no 
serious threat to resources or rank is present. Some submissive 
behaviours associated with anxiety can be seen as damage limitation 
strategies used by subordinate primates … those with low self-confidence 
… and those who feel inferior to others.’ 
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Several researchers (e.g. Fones, Manfro & Pollack, 1998) have suggested that 
people with close biological relatives with anxiety are more likely to develop anxiety 
disorders than those with an anxiety-free family history. Since the 1970s, several 
researchers have focused on psychologists’ attempts to treat SAD. Acarturk, Smit, de 
Graaf, van Straten, ten Have and Cuijpers (2009) made reference to the publication of 
four meta-analyses that examined the effects of psychological treatment. The first of 
these synthesis studies compared and contrasted the effects of cognitive behavioural 
therapy to exposure alone (Feske & Chambless, 1995). The second synthesis study by 
Taylor (1996) explored the effectiveness of cognitive behavioural treatments, including 
such procedures as exposure, cognitive restructuring without exposure, exposure with 
cognitive restructuring, and social skills training, in the alleviation and treatment of 
SAD. The third study was by Gould, Buckminster, Pollack, Otto & Yap (1997); the 
researchers included relevant pharmacological investigations in the study of cognitive 
behavioural treatments compared with these treatment approaches. The last meta-
analysis was similar in design to the previous one (Federoff & Taylor, 2001) and 
examined the psychological and pharmacological treatments of SAD. According to the 
review by Acarturk et al. (2009), both psychological and pharmacological interventions 
have been found to be effective in the treatment of social phobia disorder. 
4.1 Related psychological troubles: morbidity and comorbidity 
Psychiatrists and psychotherapists have noted that SAD does not exist 
unaccompanied by other disorders; rather, ‘… comorbidity is common and it is possible 
that two or more disorders may also co-exist.’ (Hidalgo et al., 2001, p. 284) By 
morbidity, the researcher means the patient’s potentiality to ideate suicide, attempt it or 
execute it; it also means that the SAD patient is unable to earn a living or get involved in 
work or be reliable, and in this context be inclined to be financially and socially 
dependent on others; comorbidity, on the other hand, is the development of other 
psychiatric disorders during the patient’s lifetime. Some researchers found that SAD 
patients suffer from comorbidity: in other words, 69% of SAD patients suffered from 
other lifetime psychiatric disorders (Davidson et al., 1993; Kessler et al., 1998; 
Schneider et al., 1992; Stein et al., 1998).  
In fact, SAD patients considerably suffer from comorbidity, including such 
disorders and deviations as depression, agoraphobia, substance abuse, alcohol and other 
deviant lifestyles. Researchers noted that lifestyles, especially those involving negative 
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activities such as smoking, detrimental physical activities, overuse of alcohol and body 
mass index (BMI) are major risk factors that contribute towards the development of 
somatisation and comorbidity of other cardiovascular diseases and carcinoma in some 
cases (e.g., Wittchen & Fehm, 2003). Researchers also suggested that social network 
relationships or lack thereof, such as disrupted family, friends or colleagues’ 
relationships, can be noted in SAD patients (Wittchen & Fehm, 2003). For college 
students, the costs can also extend to greater absenteeism, dropout or academic failure. 
Other related comorbidity disorders include major depressive syndromes, agoraphobia
4
, 
APD
5
, shyness, loneliness and irrationality as well as other problems related to self-
concept and identity formation dynamics, such as ‘body dysmorphic disorder’6 (Hidalgo 
et al., 2001, p. 1367). In this context, the researcher will discuss in more detail 
loneliness, shyness and irrationality as comorbidities to SAD. 
4.2 Loneliness and social anxiety 
4.2.1 Roots and diagnosis 
Loneliness is present in all age groups; however, it is an especially common 
problem among university students (Ponzetti, 1990). In this way, loneliness can be 
traditionally seen as a part or aspect of more encompassing issues of psychological 
distress rather than merely as a unique clinical problem – that is to say, it is a 
comorbidity (McWhirter, 1990).  
                                                 
4
Similar to SAD, agoraphobia refers to a psychological disorder in which patients seek to avoid social situations 
in which they may be afraid of not being able to escape in case of having a panic attack. But it differs from 
SAD in that SAD patients avoid social events in which they fear they may be embarrassed or humiliated. 
Furthermore, agoraphobics may need one or two support people, but SAD patients scarcely show or feel 
such a need. 
5
Hidalgo et al. (2001) explicated that a ‘symptomatic continuum is present between SAD and APD and both 
diagnoses can be made, especially in the context of generalised SAD. Patients with comorbid APD and 
SAD present with more severe anxiety, increased functional impairment, and a higher incidence of 
comorbidity compared with patients with social anxiety alone’ (p. 1367). According to the authors, ‘this 
combination represents a group of more severely affected patients, which may present a challenge 
regarding treatment’ (op cit.). 
6
In this disorder, patients are obsessed with concerns over their body image: i.e., possible defects about their 
appearance or innate or acquired anomalies. In such cases, patients worry a lot about appearing in social 
events, which is conducive to social avoidance and withdrawal and functional impairment.  
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There is a close relationship between loneliness and shyness; by illustration, 
Zimbardo (1977) has categorised shy individuals into two groups: shy introverts and shy 
extroverts. Shy introverts habitually tend to be alone, often indulged in mulling over 
ideas and inanimate objects. They also tend to be less socially skilled than shy 
extroverts, as well as being reluctant to approach others and talk to strangers. In this 
respect, Turner et al. (1990) hypothesised that this group in the extreme resembles 
individuals suffering from schizoid personality disorder. These shy individuals do, 
however, report desiring at least some connection with others, though they may feel 
unable to initiate and further sustain it. The second group Zimbardo (1977) recognised is 
descriptive of those people who have been identified as socially skilled, but still suffer 
internally from the symptoms of shyness, which do not manifest themselves clearly in 
social interactions. They are often constrained by social expectations and concerned 
about social rules. Again, Turner et al. (1990) have posited that this category of shy 
individuals provides the most likely candidates for social phobia, being both sociable and 
shy. No wonder, then, that shy extroverts seem to function best in highly structured 
situations/social or professional events where people in the surroundings know and 
perform their roles as expected. Therefore, several celebrities, such as well-known talk 
show hosts, theatre actors, or teachers and university professors, report being shy. 
With loneliness being empirically investigated in several studies, it has become 
clear the problem has been identified to be a unique construct (Cutrona, 1982; Riccardi, 
2009; Weeks, Michela, Peplau & Bragg, 1980), thereby drawing more attention in the 
field of counselling psychology. Therefore, researchers have conducted more studies on 
loneliness as a separate personality construct and as a comorbidity to other serious 
disorders, such as social phobia. However, to develop empirical interventions for the 
investigation of loneliness, it is necessary to determine the variables related to loneliness 
and then to define those in the high-risk group. In the literature, correlational rather than 
causal relationships have been found (McWhirter, 1990). One reason for the existence of 
correlation between loneliness and anxiety is that it is not easy to establish the direction 
of causation between loneliness and many of the features commonly associated with 
social anxiety due to the existence of reciprocal relationships, especially such emotional 
disturbances as social anxiety or depression (Heinrich & Gullone, 2006), despite the fact 
that there is only one, described as the first known, longitudinal study that has 
documented an established relationship between loneliness, depressive symptoms and 
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suicide ideation in adolescence in a stratified sample of high school students (Lasgaard, 
Goossens & Elklit, 2011). 
It has been revealed by established research so far that an array of negative mood 
states and destructive behaviour patterns are related to loneliness (Jackson, Soderlind & 
Weiss, 2000). As shown in prior empirical research conducted on loneliness, it appears 
that this problem is pertinent to psychosocial difficulties such as low self-esteem, low 
social competence, poorer social interactions and mental health problems (namely, social 
anxiety, depression, suicidal behaviours), and with physical health issues (e.g., poorer 
immune and cardiovascular functioning, sleep deficiencies). Deduced from the findings 
of such prior research on loneliness in this trend, it is revealed that a typical lonely 
person has several characteristics such as negative feelings like desperation, depression, 
impatient boredom and self-depreciation; negative attitudes about oneself, other people 
and the causes of events; and passive, self-absorbed and ineffective social behaviour 
(Heinrich & Gullone, 2006). 
4.2.2 Definitional issues 
Ponzetti (1990, p. 336) defines loneliness as ‘a multifaceted phenomenon, often 
characterised by an unpleasant, painful, anxious yearning for another person or persons’. 
From this definition, loneliness would appear to be somehow connected with social 
anxiety. Brennan (1982) indicated that loneliness can be found within every age category 
and every class in society, but is likely to affect adolescents and adults more often.  
According to Cheek and Busch (1981), causes of loneliness can be divided into 
two broad classes: situational (e.g. moving, changing jobs, divorce and the death of a 
spouse or other family member) and characterological (e.g. personality traits, such as 
shyness, timidity, etc.). Loneliness as an aspect of shyness is in some way related to 
social phobia disorder, and is a common problem among college students (Cutrona, 
1982; Shaver, Furman & Buhrmester, 1985). However, loneliness is more likely to affect 
male college students than female ones, and males are also more likely to suffer greater 
negative self-evaluations and social consequences from admitting it (Bonetti, 2009; 
Borys & Perlman, 1985; Schultz & Moore, 1986). As regards external factors, research 
has shown that individuals are differentially receptive to positive and negative 
evaluations from others. Many people react favourably to positive evaluations and 
unfavourably to negative evaluations (O’Toole, 1997).  
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College students who are characteristically lonely exhibit constrained and 
unfriendly communication styles. Lonely students approach interpersonal encounters 
with cynicism and mistrust, and tend to be hyper-alert and overly vigilant to threat in 
social situations (Stokes, 1985). College students who are lonely often describe 
themselves as anxious, shy and/or depressed (Maroldo, 1981; Ouellet & Joshi, 1986). 
4.3 Social anxiety in Saudi Arabia 
Social anxiety exists in Saudi Arabia as pervasively as elsewhere. Lane (2007, 
pp. 17–18) cites an important study by Chaleby (1987), in which the researcher contends 
that social phobia disorder (social anxiety) is prevalent in Saudi Arabia, especially 
among the male population. Chaleby based his study on an experiment with 35 
outpatients, and found that 22 (63%) actually presented with social phobia disorder. The 
study was, however, criticised by Lane (2007, p.17) as “lacking the potential of 
generalisability, given the limited sample”.  However, Lane was unaware that Chaleby 
and Raslan (1990) had developed their study further and had studied more patients. 
Eighty Saudi Arabian males with social phobia disorder, who met DSM-III criteria, were 
evaluated psychiatrically and socially according to the MMPI social withdrawal scale 
standardised to the Saudi population. They were empirically grouped as mild, moderate 
or severe cases. They were also evaluated symptomatically according to the Leeds 
anxiety-depression scale to give ratings of depression and anxiety, separately and in 
combination. Of the patients, 37.5% and 55% were found to be mild-moderately and 
severely anxious, respectively; 55% and 34% were found to be mild-moderately and 
significantly depressed, respectively. There was, however, no linear correlation between 
the level of anxiety or depression and the severity of the social phobia disorder. Social 
withdrawal ratings were matched with demographic variables, age of onset, perceived 
childhood adjustment, perceived parental behaviour, work adjustment, family history of 
psychiatric disorder and the presence of other phobias. 
According to Bassiony (2005), social anxiety is pretty rampant in Saudi Arabia, 
also proclaiming a high rate of comorbidity where 59% of the population in his study, 
who were SAD patients, had another concomitant psychiatric disorder. Also revealed is 
that patients with severe SAD were four times more likely to have depression than the 
patients with mild or moderate SAD even after controlling for confounding socio-
demographic and clinical factors. Recently, too, Al-Gelban (2007) conducted a study to 
determine the prevalence rates and severity of depression, social anxiety and stress 
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among Saudi adolescents; the researcher indicated that of 1723 male students recruited to 
his study, 59.4% had at least one of the three disorders, 40.7% had at least two and 
22.6% had all the three disorders. Moreover, more than one third of the participants 
(38.2%) had depression, while 48.9% had anxiety and 35.5% had stress. Depression, 
anxiety and stress were strongly, positively, and significantly correlated. 
The findings from these studies warrant Chaleby’s query: ‘Is there a genetic 
predisposition to social anxiety?’ In his first study, Chaleby stated, ‘The high incidence 
of social phobia disorder in Saudi Arabia is the first observation worthy of discussion’. 
(Chaleby, 1987, p. 58) Commenting on this remark, Lane (2007) stated that Chaleby 
appeared to swiftly pronounce social phobia disorder as more common in Saudi Arabia 
than in England. 
A more extensive clinical study was conducted by Al-Maleh and Al-Zarrad 
(2005). They concluded that social anxiety is highly prevalent in the Arab world. They 
found that clinical patients beset by the disorder made up 13% of patients frequenting 
psychotherapy clinics and mental health hospitals. They also reported that the ratio of 
females to males with SAD in the Arab world was 2:1. Moreover, the disorder in Arabs 
was likely to lead to the excessive use of alcohol and narcotics, especially among people 
who mistakenly tried to relieve the symptoms of the disorder on their own. 
Given this situation, the role of counselling centres, clinics and youth care centres 
in counselling and directing youth to achieve healthy psychological growth is obviously 
important. Also, a good environment with a suitable atmosphere for building a good 
citizen able to understand and accept himself/herself is essential (Zahran, 2000). 
Therefore, emotional education or training is important for young people to achieve good 
emotional adaptation and accommodation ‘through developing self-confidence, 
overcoming phobias, and achieving appropriate, flexible emotional responsiveness, and 
finally achieving emotional maturity’ (ibid: 421). Those who are vulnerable to social 
anxiety are also susceptible to irrational thinking. Psychologists and psychiatrists deduce 
that there is a nexus between social anxiety and irrationality.  
4.4 Shyness and social anxiety 
There is a relationship detectable between shyness and social anxiety, which can 
be recognised from assessing rates of social anxiety in highly shy versus normative 
samples (Chavira, Stein & Malcarne, 2002). Literature has established that social anxiety 
and shyness both share several common symptoms (Henderson & Zimbardo, 2001; 
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Turner, Beidel, & Townsley, 1990), but the two constructs are not completely 
synonymous (Chavira, et al., 2002).  
Some researchers tend to surmise that shyness and social anxiety are interrelated, 
but this supposition lacks sufficient empirical evidence to describe the nature of this 
relationship in clea terms. However, according to St. Lorant, Henderson, and Zimbardo 
(2000), the distribution of social anxiety rates among highly shy individuals is high, with 
social anxiety reaching 97% of their sample in shy people. Furthermore, Chavira, et al. 
(2002) revealed that around 49% of highly shy people had a social phobia diagnosis 
compared to 18% in normatively shy groups.  
Despite the affinity between both constructs, there are certain variables that help 
specialists distinguish shyness from social phobia; these include severity of avoidance, 
level of impairment in social and occupational functioning, and course (Turner et al., 
1990). Therefore, shyness could be a function of social anxiety, and as such could be a 
trigger in sustained cases, especially in individuals diagnosed as shy introverts 
(Zimbardo, 1977) 
4.4.1 On Shyness: Definition and Genesis 
Shyness is an unhealthy condition that is difficult to label or classify, lying on the 
‘contested boundaries’ between physical health, mental illness and social deviance’ 
(Busfield, 1996, p. 20). The borderline between shyness and other mental illnesses, such 
as social phobia or APD, however, is not easy to discern, not least because the 
classification of mental disorders reflects as much about social judgements about 
‘appropriate’ forms of behaviour as it does about objective clinical knowledge (Conrad, 
2004). Researchers define shyness as a psychopathology almost entirely in terms of the 
person’s self-report, in order to avoid an external performance standard according to 
which observers assign individuals to diagnostic categories (Henderson & Zimbardo, 
2009). Of relevance, too, it is worth noting that research in personality psychology 
suggests that self-reports are more valid for personality traits than are observer ratings, 
particularly among those who openly report their traits (Lamiell, 1997; St. Lorant, 
Henderson & Zimbardo, 2000). 
Over the past five decades or so, this more extreme form of shyness has come to 
be seen as a mental illness, but Social Phobia, SAD and APD are all relatively new 
diagnoses that are implicitly differentiated from ‘normal shyness’ (Cunningham, 2002; 
Chavira, et al., 2002). For that reason, Scott (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) argued that 
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shyness can be construed as a socially lucid response to the dramaturgical dilemmas of 
interaction, thus revealing a commitment to self-presentation and teamwork, and yet, 
paradoxically, that it is often perceived as deviant behaviour. 
Shyness can be dispositional, but socialisation and parenting styles play a role in 
engendering this disorder, too. Thus, some factors relevant to socialisation have been 
observed as principal in the initiation and development of shyness as a psychopathology, 
including parental and peer rejection and parental over-protection, leading to a lack of 
self-efficacy. For example, specific conditioning, socialisation and parenting styles can 
affect individuals early in their lives to develop shyness as a chronic disorder, for 
example when children are teased or shamed by teachers or other children in front of 
others or experience performance failures, traumatic events, and emotional or physical 
abuse or neglect (Zimbardo, 1982). 
In this line, too, observing others in similar situations can have a similar 
detrimental effect in contributing to the development of shyness: for example, viewing 
siblings or classmates who are humiliated or harshly treated, and thus imagining similar 
negative consequences to oneself. Additionally, self-blame and shame may be 
exacerbated by private self-consciousness in shy adolescents and young adults 
(Henderson, 1992; Henderson & Zimbardo, 1993). 
In addition, while some authors and researchers have recognised the 
psychological/psychopathological foundations of shyness as rising from a set of negative 
cognitive biases in some people’s attitudes towards interaction, basically from irrational 
beliefs, Henderson and Zimbardo have pointed to a changing cultural climate in which 
shyness is socially produced at an accelerating rate. In this sense, they, boldly yet 
unprecedentedly, reveal the epidemiology of shyness as a ‘new’ social malady; they 
believe that current increases in shyness prevalence rates diagnostically indicate not only 
the concomitant increase in social anxiety rates, but also a diagnostic of societal 
psychopathology, which requires a public health model plus the traditional medical and 
psychiatric model of diagnosis and treatment. Shyness is thus ‘a warning signal of a 
public health danger that appears to be heading toward epidemic proportions’ 
(Henderson & Zimbardo 2005, p. 10). 
4.4.2 Prevalence Rates and Comorbidity of Shyness and Social Phobia 
It is interesting to recognise that prevalence rates of social phobia and shyness are 
similar in modern societies across the inhabited continents according to survey studies; 
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for instance, along the past three to four decades, estimates of the prevalence of social 
phobia in the general population have increased from 2% to over 12%, with 26% of 
women and 19% of men, reporting that they were ‘very shy’ while growing up (Cox, 
MacPherson & Enns, 2005; Kessler et al., 2005). Self-reported estimations of 
dispositional, chronic shyness also indicate that the morbidity has increased during this 
time frame, from 40% to 58% (Bruce & Saaed, 1999; Carducci, Stubbins & Bryant, 
2007; Carducci & Zimbardo, 1995; Zimbardo, 1977). Interestingly, 64% of those who 
reported themselves as shy individuals also reported that they did not like themselves 
being shy, and 65% of them considered chronic shyness to be a personal hindrance for 
them in their social life. Some other research findings (Bruce & Saaed, 1999) indicated 
that 85% of the people with social anxiety disorder suffer from academic and/or 
occupational difficulties effected by their inability to cope with the demands of social 
life. 
Shyness has been reported as a frequent comorbidity among individuals seeking 
psychological assistance for a variety of behavioural disorders. There is no doubt, then, 
that shyness has demonstrated high prevalence rates. In this respect, Henderson and 
Zimbardo (2005) have appraised the proportion of chronically shy people as having 
reached nearly 50% in the American population. The authors have indicated that the 
consequences of shyness are ‘deeply troubling’ in the sense that shy people may be 
excruciatingly self-conscious, fail to take advantage of social situations and see 
themselves as awkward, inhibited and lacking in ‘basic social skills’ – the very 
characteristics of shyness that raise it up to the level of social phobia (Henderson & 
Zimbardo, 2009).  
Prior research indicated that the existence of a high degree of comorbidity in 
chronic shyness is congruent with comorbidity in social phobia meta-analyses and big-
sample studies, according to a recent study of 114 patients between 1991 and 1997 (St. 
Lorant et al., 2000). According to Henderson and Zimbardo (2009, p. 11), ‘the most 
common comorbid disorders associated with shyness were dysthymia (29%) and 
generalised anxiety disorder (27%)’. 
SAD has been identified as having characteristics similar to or involving high 
levels of shyness characteristics, but shyness constitutes a less severe dimension of the 
overall construct of social anxiety (Gilbert & Trower, 1990; Van der Molen, 1990). The 
problem with the diagnosis of SAD and shyness as a comorbidity is that the two are very 
similar. This observation has been noted by Hidalgo et al. (2001); current empirical 
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findings indicate that there is no clear-cut distinction between shyness and SAD, 
according to Hidalgo et al. (2001, p. 284), given that ‘there are cognitive, behavioural 
and physical similarities between the two’, yet, shyness is much more prevalent, at 20-
50%, compared with social anxiety, and it ‘is a larger and more heterogeneous 
condition’, though it may not cause impairment or distress as does SAD. In this regard, 
Lecrubier et al. (2000, p. 6) write that: 
‘Social anxiety disorder has been portrayed as the extreme of shyness, but 
there is no consistent evidence to support the continuum of shyness and 
social anxiety disorder.’ 
So, irrational thinking is held accountable for the initiation and rise of shyness, 
too. Henderson and Zimbardo (2009) have adeptly observed that children experiencing 
social or parental rejection or passing through cycles of negative emotions in response to 
these social rejections will introspectively focus inward more frequently, aptly attentive 
to the concomitant painful states. They begin to believe that they cause or contribute 
disproportionately to the negative or undesirable events occurring around them. This 
process generates further negative thinking, which in turn contributes to negative 
emotion in a dynamic, reciprocal downward spiral. Henderson and Zimbardo (2009) 
claim that ‘Thinking patterns and maladaptive attributions of responsibility may be 
influenced by whatever emotion is present, whether fear, shyness, shame, or anger” (p. 
13). The researchers further maintain that fear exposes the self to vulnerability. If one is 
shy, others look attractive, but potentially critical and rejecting; in their own words, “If 
one does not measure up in one’s own eyes and is ashamed, others appear contemptuous 
and the self-abased” (Henderson and Zimbardo, 2009, p. 13). 
4.4.3 Similarities and Discrepancies between Shyness and SAD 
Researchers have observed that psychosomatic symptoms tend to be mostly 
similar and related for shy, socially anxious and socially phobic adult patients, as are 
frequent negative thoughts that are often irrational (Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Turner et 
al., 1990; Zimbardo, 1977). Adolescent and adult shy patients usually report frequent 
negative cognitions, including irrational self-blame for negative social outcomes. 
Fascinatingly, younger populations, such as children, do not report negative thoughts 
with the same frequency as do adolescents and adults (Beidel & Morris, 1995). 
Nevertheless, unprompted and unstructured thoughts related to self-presentational issues 
may occur in children by age eight, which suggests the presence of negative thoughts in 
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socially anxious children (Banerjee & Yuill, 1998). The reason why they are not reported 
by children younger than seven or eight may be ascribed to differences in expressive 
behaviour tendencies rather than to differences in the actual frequency of their 
occurrence in infants and early childhood. 
In addition, social anxiety researchers have extrapolated that shyness may have 
started much earlier than social anxiety in recognition as a psychological problem during 
early childhood and infancy, as revealed in infant studies in which evidence of 
‘behavioural inhibition’ was seen as early as 21 months (see, for example, Kagan & 
Reznick, 1986; Turner et al., 1990, 1992). Of these researchers, Kagan & Reznick (1986) 
and Kagan & Snidman (1991) have maintained that 10–15% of infants reveal some 
symptoms of shyness resulting from negative cognitions of their social surroundings, and 
a similar percentage demonstrates signs of boldness, while the majority fall between 
these extremes. However, some other researchers suggested that a significant percentage 
of inhibited infants cease to be shy when they reach the age of seven, but they 
distinguished shyness from behavioural inhibition, in the sense that shyness involves a 
cognitive concern about evaluation (Cheek & Briggs, 1982).  
Research findings and empirical research results have suggested that social 
anxiety and shyness, which are characterised by a certain degree of phobic avoidance or 
social withdrawal, may start in early childhood; however, some research indicates that 
the pathological onset age of these psychopathologies appears to be the adolescence 
phase (Alden & Wallace, 1991; Henderson & Zimbardo, 2009; Rubin & Asendorpf, 
1993). In this respect, Zimbardo and Radl (1981) and Henderson and Zimbardo (2009) 
have observed that the principal contributors to the rise of shyness in adolescence are the 
concern of individuals in this age group about their attractiveness to the opposite sex and 
the onset of libido (sexual urge), including sexual desire and sexual thoughts, which 
adolescents feel to be concealed, but which are suppressed in very subtle ways. 
Social situations or events that pose a specific occasion of perceived social 
interaction deficits/difficulties are also similar in individuals suffering from social 
anxiety and shyness; for example, socially phobic individuals often report that the most 
common disturbing event for them is an ‘unstructured peer encounter’ (Morris & March, 
2004, p. 145). The case also applied to adolescents and adults, who have reported 
retrospectively on chronic shyness scales that they are most frequently impacted upon by 
shyness in challenging, unstructured peer encounters, often as a legacy from early 
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childhood (Heimberg, Dodge & Becker, 1987; Henderson, 1992; Leary & Kowalski, 
1995; Zimbardo, 1977). 
There are discrepancies between SAD and shyness, however, otherwise we 
would not have the designations shyness and social phobia or SAD in the literature. The 
following paragraph from O’Toole (1997, pp. 5–6) differentiates between the two 
disorders in more accurate terminology: 
‘When exposed to the same social situation, such as talking with a stranger, 
high scorers on trait measures of shyness become more upset and feel 
more awkward and inhibited than do low scorers, and exhibit similar 
reactions. These include tension and physical distress … inhibition and 
awkwardness … acute self-consciousness and worry about receiving 
negative evaluations from others … and reticence.’ 
O’Toole further explains that the shy person’s expectation to receive negative 
evaluation and anxious self-preoccupation during social interaction may have differential 
behavioural consequences; according to the author, research has shown that shy 
individuals place an irrational overemphasis on gaining acceptance from others. In 
addition, the author maintains, shy individuals hold unrealistically high expectations for 
themselves. This is not the case with SAD patients, though they demonstrate some levels 
of shyness. In other words, ‘shyness appears to involve primarily strong fears of 
disapproval along with compelling desires for approval’ (O’Toole, 1997, p.10).  
In addition, shyness is possibly deemed to be an enduring trait of an individual’s 
personality, whereas SAD is characterised by a group of coexisting symptoms that might 
be independent of shyness. Research testimony that shores up the distinction between 
shyness and SAD comes from developmental studies (Aspendorf, 1989; Lecrubier et al., 
2000; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler & Eaton, 1994; Wittchen et al., 2002; Wittchen & Fehm, 
2003). According to Aspendorf (1989), shy children longitudinally studied from the first 
school years through to early adolescence were not at an increased risk for developing 
SAD. Shyness is usually present in all social situations, while social anxiety may be 
triggered off by very specific situations (Wittchen et al., 1999). 
Some writers have assertively confirmed the importance of humans social 
interactions with his/her fellow humans, demonstrating the relationship between where a 
person stands in a social structure and how it affects him/her psychologically (see, for 
example, Robert Burton, 1621, reprinted 1977). Burton in this vein writes, ‘This humour 
will imprint in melancholy men the objects most answerable to their condition of life’ (p. 
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404). Therefore, psychiatrists and psychologists draw a link between shyness, social 
phobia disorder, anxiety and even stage fright (Lane, 2007).  
However, prior research investigating the relationship between shyness and 
social phobia indicated that the onset of social phobia was characterised by negative 
conditioning experiences, while the onset of shyness was not (Turner et al., 1990; 
Turner, Beidel & Townsley, 1992). This suggestion was, however, defied by Zimbardo’s 
findings, because many negative conditioning experiences, such as those experienced by 
people with social phobia, were also reported by shy individuals on the Stanford Shyness 
Survey (Zimbardo, 1977). In light of current research findings, too, it is essential to 
explore to what extent the negative stereotyping of shyness in Western versus Middle 
Eastern countries may be conducive to the rise in cases of SAD. 
Al-Atawi (1998) aptly observed that human life could be prone to various 
mixtures of confused emotions of joy and sorrow, which can possibly evoke anxiety as 
manifested in such states of human sadness, fear and distress. Irrespective of the quantity 
or degree of the intensity of these emotions, human life is afflicted by cognitive, 
affective and behavioural stressors. Lane (2007) cites a significant anecdote from 
Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy describing how shyness is combined with anxiety: 
‘Through bashfulness, suspicion, and timorousness, man will not be seen 
abroad … he loves darkness as life, and cannot endure the light, or to sit 
in lightsome places; his hat still in his eyes, he will neither see nor will be 
seen by his goodwill. He dare not come in company, for fear, he should 
be misused, disgraced, overshoot himself in gesture or speeches, or be 
sick; he thinks everyman observes him, aims at him, derides him, owes 
him malice.’ (p. 12)  
According to Burton (1621, reprinted 1977), who related this story from 
Hippocrates, the allusion to being misused suggests that man’s avoidance may emanate 
from a justified fear of possible mistreatment, probably due to potential prejudice, 
ostracism or a severe misunderstanding with other people in his vicinity.  
As already mentioned, loneliness combined with shyness can be conducive to 
SADs (Wittenberg & Reis, 1986; Zimbardo, 1977). Shyness in this sense is synonymous 
with the general tendency to be inhibited and to feel awkward in social situations and to 
experience unpleasant effects in the presence of others.  
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Zimbardo (1977) stated that shyness can be expressed in various forms of action 
and that self-definition is the only valid means of establishing who is to be included in 
this group: ‘You are shy if you think you are, regardless of how you act in public’ (1977, 
p. 30). Buss (1980) describes the shy person as one who is inhibited, inexpressive, 
anxious and wary of new situations. In a survey conducted by Zimbardo (1977, p. 37), 
“shy students reported feeling particularly nervous around strangers (70%) and in new 
situations (55%)”. Because shy people have difficulty in making new acquaintances, it 
seems likely that the trait of shyness contributes to the feeling or state of loneliness, 
especially in new situations.  
Several researchers (see, for instance, Aron et al., 2005) have observed that 
shyness sometimes appears early, as if inherited, and sometimes appears later, as if 
learned. Studies of shyness have consistently shown that the family environment, peer 
influence and the overall social environment in which humans live, especially in their 
tender years, can generate shyness as an unhealthy, psychological problem that can 
potentially induce social anxiety. This is because ‘negative affect and shyness can 
develop in a not highly sensitive person as well through repeated experiences of criticism 
and rejection in childhood or even adulthood’ (Aron et al., 2005, p. 184). 
Significant correlations between negative emotions and irrational ideation have 
been shown by Muran Kassinove, Ross & Muran, (1989), who investigated a mixed 
sample of adults taken from two mental health facilities and from a college campus. 
Further, cognitive therapists contend that social anxieties, including social phobias, may 
emanate from negative thinking and irrational beliefs. Self-generated negative thoughts 
and irrational ideas (e.g. I will humiliate myself in public; I have to be perfect; I must be 
loved) often precipitate social anxiety in the person with social phobia disorder (Valente, 
2002a, 2002b). These therapists also argue that social anxieties resulting from loneliness, 
shyness, depression or social phobia disorder can be relieved and treated by cognitive 
therapy. 
When such social interaction dynamics initiate a state of exposure to an anxiety-
provoking situation under the effects of negative feedback, this disrupts the social 
information process of anxious individuals, resulting in impaired decoding of nonverbal 
information from the interaction partner (Schroeder, 1995). Relatedly, two studies by 
Jones and his colleagues (Goswick & Jones, 1981; Jones, Hobbs & Hockenbury, 1982) 
found that lonely university students attend more to their own reactions during social 
interactions than to those of the other person. Thus, it is not surprising that directing 
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attention to the interaction partner results in reductions in loneliness (Jones et al., 1982) 
and in the actor becoming more attractive to others (Kupke, Hobbs & Cheney, 1979). 
Cognitive therapy can work here. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the construct of anxiety, first as a general 
construct related to personality construct theory and developed to discuss the 
manifestations of the illness both as a generalised mood condition and as a social phobia. 
Towards the conceptualisation of anxiety, the term was distinguished from fear, which is 
an emotional response to a perceived threat in which behaviours of escape and avoidance 
in triggering situations seem to be uncontrollable or unavoidable (Ohman, 2000).  
By the same token, the chapter has elaborated on the characteristics and 
manifestations of anxiety, both as a trait and a state, handling conscious and unconscious 
drives of anxiety as related to the personality trait of neuroticism. In this way, the 
theories underlying this construct and the theoretical orientations towards the study of 
anxiety were briefly presented. The chapter has further elaborated on social anxiety in 
terms of an explanation of the construct, its roots, discrepancies and ambiguities with 
other related concepts. 
It appears from the review in this chapter that SAD patients are mostly lonely, 
shy, and would prefer to be with people with whom they are familiar, or would rather 
keep away from strangers, tending thus to be alienated in heightened anxiety cases. 
Having outlined the differences between general anxiety, fear, panic anxiety and social 
anxiety as well as the differences between such terms as shyness or social withdrawal 
compared with social anxiety, it can be deduced from these reviews that people with 
fears, phobias or panic disorders do not develop avoidant personality disorder.  
However, some of these disorders are related together somehow; for instance, 
avoidant personality disorder results from social anxiety as people continue to cut 
themselves off from most of the world because of the fear of social interactions and other 
people, not from the fear and dread of having a panic attack. In addition, it is understood 
from this review that contrary to current psychiatric/psychological nomenclature, people 
with social anxiety do not demonstrate specific phobias or fears or panic attacks. Rather, 
they experience extreme anxiety in social settings where they fear they will have to 
perform or be on display when they are really too shy to speak publicly.  
From this review, too, it appears that according to the latest epidemiological data, 
SAD is the most common of the anxiety disorders. Data from prior research reviewed in 
 73 
 
this chapter also showed that anxiety disorders as a whole continue to be the most 
dominating type of psychological disorders that plague and afflict large numbers of 
people on the globe. 
 The chapter also highlighted the morbidity and comorbidity manifestations of 
social anxiety. It further elaborated on the relationships between social anxiety, 
loneliness, social withdrawal and social avoidance personality disorder as well as 
shyness, all dealt with in the holistic literature review of foreign and Arabic scholarship. 
The following chapter moves to discuss REBT and/or REST in the treatment of irrational 
beliefs, and consequently, in treating social anxiety. In this vein, it intends to elaborate 
on irrational thinking and irrational beliefs as related to or stimulant of social anxiety in 
the different schools of psychological thought. The chapter further provided a note on the 
justifications to use REBT as the underlying model for psychotherapy in this study, the 
origin of this theory and its development in the history of REBT psychotherapy. REST 
will also be discussed as an adjunct technique used with REBT in managing stress and 
related disturbances and an overview of research on the use of REST in combination 
with REBT for treating social anxiety will be discussed in prior research designs. 
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Part I: REBT and REST in the Treatment of Irrational Beliefs and Social Anxiety 
 Introduction 1
 
Individuals entertain different thoughts and beliefs that are reflective of their 
standpoints in different situations and events in life. These beliefs may differ 
individually or concur consensually, but ‘thoughts and beliefs are essential to the 
building of the human intellectual system and can influence the human affective domain’ 
(Addis & Bernard, 2002, p. 56).  
The term ‘belief’ is tantamount to the term ‘cognition’ in cognitive psychology. 
In the field of cognitive therapy, the general term cognition may refer to a belief, 
inference, evaluation, assumption, attitude or schema. In this respect, too, REBT 
theorists (e.g., Beal, Kopec & DiGiuseppe, 1996; DiGiuseppe, 1996; Muran, 1991; 
Nielsen, 2003) have proposed that a schematic model would accurately represent the 
underlying organisational structure of beliefs. Immanuel Kant, a philosopher, (1929) 
suggested that humans do not experience materialistic sensory representations of the 
world. Kant suggested that the inherent categories of understanding exist as a faculty or 
character trait that characterises personality independent of experience or validated 
observation in the human mind. For Kant, schemata provided the link between innate 
categories of understanding and the empirical information derived though sensory 
perception.  
In this vein, too, the term schema (pl. schemata) is of relevance here. Frederic 
Bartlett (1932) and Jean Piaget (1926) are usually credited with introducing the concept 
of a schema into the field of psychology. Their contributions heavily influenced modern 
psychologists' and cognitive scientists' understanding of what constitutes schemata. 
Within the field of cognitive therapy, a schema has been conceptualised as a type of 
mediating cognition that may lead to emotional disturbance. The term schema, however, 
is often confused with the many other terms for mediating cognitions, such as 
‘dysfunctional beliefs’, ‘automatic thoughts’ and ‘negative assumptions’ (Kwon & Oei, 
1994; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958).  
However, Kwon and Oei (1994) have pointed out that schemata, attitudes, 
dysfunctional beliefs and core cognitions can all refer to a type of cognition that is basic, 
stable, which occurs across situations and takes place at a deeper level in linguistic space 
than other types of thoughts. Kwon and Oei (1994) differentiate these deep-level 
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cognitions from surface-level cognitions that are relatively unstable, temporary and 
situation specific. An example of a surface level cognition would be the automatic 
thought that is the focus in Beck's Cognitive Therapy (1976). A deep level cognition 
underlies or generates the surface level of cognition. Clinically, this might translate to a 
negative life event activating a depressogenic schema, which in turn activates a negative 
automatic thought and, then, depressive feelings. 
Piaget (1968) has conceptualised the underlying structure of a schema as ‘a 
mental system or totality whose principles of activity are different from those of the parts 
which make it up’ (p. xxii). DiGiuseppe (1996) has proposed that irrational beliefs are 
core schemata that concern a relationship between an individual, his or her preferences, 
and the existence of these preferences in reality. Nielson (2003) suggested that there is a 
type of schema that is evaluative in nature and incorporates perceptions, inferences and 
evaluations. These schemata would lead to interpretations of what is perceived as being 
good or bad. An individual's schema may match reality or be discrepant from it. Viewing 
beliefs as evaluative schemata as opposed to separate undefined cognitive constructs 
would help clarify what therapists are attempting to change during the therapy session 
(Beal, et al.; DiGiuseppe, 1996; Nielsen, 2003). 
REBT theorists have differentiated among cognitions that are observations, 
inferences and evaluations (Ellis & Dryden, 1997; Walen, DiGiuseppe & Dryden, 1992). 
A cognition may be an observation or perception that a person has about the world 
around them. ‘Inferential cognitions refer to perceptions of reality and the inferences 
individuals draw from these perceptions’ (Walen et al., 1992, p. 17). An individual may 
observe a co-worker frowning and infer that the co-worker does not like him. Inferences 
may be accurate or they may be erroneous and inconsistent with objective reality. 
Incorrect inferential thought processes have been associated with emotional disturbance 
(Walen et al., 1992). Several types of cognitive therapies target erroneous inferential 
thoughts, such as negative automatic thoughts and erroneous assumptions (e.g., Beck, 
1976). 
Ellis's (1962) conceptualisation of irrational and rational beliefs has engendered 
confusion, ambiguity and a great deal of philosophical and logical argument (Oei, 
Henley & Miller, 1993). It remains unclear whether a belief has to meet one, some or all 
of the criteria for it to be considered an irrational belief (Beal et al., 1996). The reason is 
that it still remains unclear what type of cognition an REBT belief refers to. REBT 
theory suggests that beliefs are evaluative cognitions and not inferences. The distinction 
 76 
 
between a cognition that is an erroneous inference and a cognition that is a rigid 
evaluation is important because it distinguishes REBT from other systems of cognitive 
therapy. DiGiuseppe (1996) has questioned the clarity of the distinction between a belief 
as an exaggerated negative evaluation and an empirical distortion of reality. Demanding 
that something must be the way it is represents a cognitive distortion of reality, ‘since the 
person continues to expect that reality to be the way they want it regardless of the 
amount or type of disconfirming evidence’ (p. 8). 
However, beliefs could be rational or irrational according to Ellis’s (1996) theory 
of irrational beliefs, but “individuals still behave according to these beliefs be they 
rational or irrational” which consequently determine the way they are (Saleh, 1985, 
p.133). Aetiologically, some individuals often entertain irrational and invalid beliefs; 
therefore, ‘they are potentially apt to suffer from anxiety and other psychological 
problems’ (Saleh, 1985, p. 133). According to psychologists (for instance, see Dryden, 
2006; Ellis, 1977a; 1977b), all affective problems are the outcome of irrationality. In this 
regard, Dryden (2006, p. 11) argues that ‘people are disturbed not by adversities, but by 
their rigid and extreme views of adversities. But, these adversities or disturbing 
situations occur habitually in life. According to affective, cognitive processing theory, 
man cannot be blamed for irrationality, because ‘any disruption in rational thinking 
occurs unconsciously’ (Saleh, 1985, p. 133).  
Rational beliefs or rationality constitutes a set of beliefs in the mind of an 
individual leading him/her to think logically and objectively in a clear-minded fashion; 
therefore, “a rationally thinking human being clearly understands the causes and effects 
of a situation or an event just as he/she does in solving a maths problem” (Abu Aita, 
1997, p.127). Abu Aita reported that  
‘Humanity has passed through four different phases of intellectuality: 
mythological thinking, religious thinking, philosophical thinking and 
scientific thinking. However, the modern man, despite his scientific 
predilection, still relives these ancient periods of mythological and 
religious thinking despite the fact that s/he may oftentimes use the 
scientific method of thinking, but with varying degrees.’ (p.112)  
Abu Aita (1997) goes on to explain that no matter how one may think 
scientifically, they still entertain mythological beliefs and religious thoughts that one 
accepts gullibly and perhaps unquestioningly, in an intricate fashion. Mankind knew 
these distinct phases of thinking and consciousness, where mythological thinking was 
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the earliest fundamental basis for the later phases of religion, philosophy and modern 
science; yet  all this comes from a single mythological source. People believe in ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ luck, in totems and black magical spells; for instance, many educated Saudi 
people may believe that they fall under black magical spells in cases where 
psychosomatic symptoms disturb their psyches and bodies, and they may know this, but 
still irrationally believe in some ‘genii’ or ‘supra-natural’ power that conjures up these 
symptoms. Ordinary people in Saudi Arabia may prefer to live in mythological, 
irrational thinking sets such as believing in black magic or visiting religious gurus and 
sooth-sayers than accept to visit a psychiatrist. This could be paradoxical when we know 
that there is no difference between an educated man and a layman in this respect. 
Different categories of people in terms of of education status, social class or any other 
socio-economic variable would mix the religious with the mythological to the 
disadvantage of scientific facts because once a human being falls prone to suggestion, 
s/he would accept myths as facts and legends as history. 
Indeed, Ellis (1988) argues that humans are genetically predisposed to think 
irrationally in several cases, and at different times for no good reason; that is why 
irrational thinking develops and consequently engenders behavioural and emotional 
disturbance and general life unhappiness. This indicates that there is some basic 
biological propensity for irrationality – in other words, people ‘naturally tend to become 
aware of their irrationality’, and they progressively and enduringly work towards 
achieving rationality (Dryden, 2009, p.57). Additionally, Ellis thinks of the human 
personality as constituted of 80% biology and 20% learned (Dryden, 1990), warranting 
the proposition that the genetic basis of irrationality is unavoidable in so many cases.  
Ellis went on to refer to the term ‘biological basis’ as the ‘organism’s natural, 
easy predisposition toward developing and maintaining certain characteristics and traits’ 
(Ibid.). Moreover, literature reviews have shown that anxiety disorders, and especially 
social anxiety, are rampant in modern society, particularly amongst youth. It is 
disruptively rife amongst young people, giving rise to a variety of complex, chronic and 
severe complications. 
During therapy, a client is identified as thinking rationally or irrationally based 
upon an assessment of their emotions and behaviours. If a person appears to be 
experiencing appropriate emotional responses, therapists may assess that the client is 
thinking rationally. Ellis (1987) explained: ‘people who admit to masturbatory beliefs 
and who subsequently do not become emotionally disturbed when they don't, are using 
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“must” loosely and do not literally and unconditionally mean it’ (p. 137). There is a 
possibility, however, that some clients may adhere to a clearly illogical and anti-
empirical belief system that helps them to achieve their goals (DiGiuseppe, 1996). Since 
the definition incorporates inappropriate emotional and behavioural consequences, this 
definition is ‘circular and untestable’ (Oei et al., 1993, p. 196). 
If an individual usually entertains a variety of irrational, invalid beliefs; in this 
case, s/he is very likely to suffer from anxiety and other psychological problems (Saleh, 
1985, p.133). People, in their thinking methods, are either rational or irrational; the way 
of thinking affects one's emotions, usually leading to negative sentiments such as guilt 
and anxiety. This is commensurate with Batte’s (1996) definition of rational thoughts as 
true thoughts and irrational thoughts as the false thoughts a person may have about 
themselves, others and how things in general must function to suit their needs.  
In this context, Jensen et al., (2008) elucidate that, according to REBT theory, 
beliefs can be categorised as either rational or irrational. The former refers to logical 
thinking supported by reality and are naturally conducive to healthy emotional responses 
associated with freedom from emotional disturbance and the ability to adapt and 
accommodate to reality, while the latter is associated with psychopathology and social 
malfunctioning. Yet, they further note that rational beliefs may also be conducive to 
negative emotions such as frustration. But negative as they may look, they ‘can help one 
deal with the adversities’ (Jensen et al., 2008, p. 4). 
With time, REBT theorists began to view irrationality as a more complex 
construct with several major underlying dimensions (Ramanaiah, Conn & Schill, 1987). 
In the 1980s, the theory shifted its emphasis away from the content of irrational beliefs 
to focus on the underlying characteristics or processes of irrational thinking (Burgess, 
1990). Irrational belief processes refer to the style of irrational thinking or how a person 
makes himself or herself upset (Lega & Ellis, 2001). 
However, all affective problems can be argued to be the outcome of irrationality. 
In the first century B.C., Epictetus wrote, ‘Men are disturbed not by things, but by the 
view they take of them,’ (cited in Ellis, 1973, p. 166). Adler (1964) conveyed the same 
meaning when he acknowledged that events cannot cause failure or success in their own 
right, and people do not suffer the shock of an experience, called trauma, ‘but we make 
out of it just what suits our purposes’; therefore, ‘Meanings are not determined by 
situations, but we determine ourselves by the meanings we give to situations’ (Adler, 
1964, p.14). 
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In a classic, seminal study, Berger (1981) indicated that ‘irrational beliefs attack a 
considerable proportion of college students’, leading to psychological disturbances, 
including self-devaluation. In Berger's study, it was found that irrational beliefs are rife 
in college students surveyed as attending counselling clinics at their colleges; the study 
also revealed that they suffer from lowered self-esteem (Berger, 1981, p.25).  
Research in some Arab countries had showed that irrational beliefs could be 
conducive to psychological disturbances; this research demonstrated that it is the 
perceptions of individuals that cause their irrationality; when individuals thought 
(irrationally) that the events or situations they passed through were awful or painful or 
saddening, then their emotional disturbances had been triggered (Al-Qaisi, 1998; Al-
Tayyeb, 1990; Berger, 1983; Hussein & Hussein, 2006). When individuals indulge 
themselves in irrational thinking, and they believe that the events or situations they pass 
through are awful or painful or saddening, then their emotional disturbances are 
triggered off (Ahmed, 2004; Al-Akad, 1997; Al-Maleh & Al-zarrad, 2005; Al-Namlah, 
Fernyhough & Meins, 2006). 
Some researchers, both Arabs and non-Arabs, ascribe social anxiety disorders to 
contradictory and disintegrated parenting styles and higher family disintegration and 
disconnectedness (Dwairy, 2004; Dwairy, Achoui, Abouserie & Farah, 2006). Other 
researchers have attributed psychosocial disorders such as phobias, stress, social 
withdrawal and other personality disorders to the Gulf war, the vicious wars in the region 
and the feeling of insecurity in the Gulf region (Jones, 1995). 
Prior research has also showed that irrational beliefs are more rampant in college 
students (Al-Faisal, 1992; Al-Raihani, 1987a; Rateeb, 2000). This research has also 
demonstrated that there were statistically significant differences between irrationality 
and some disorders, such as social anxiety (Rateeb, 2000), psychological burnout 
(Ahmed, 2004), anxiety and locus of control (Abdul Rahman & Abdullah, 1994; 
Ibrahim, 1998), psychotic anxiety (Mohamed, 1992), psychological and social 
adjustment (Al-Ali, 2004), loneliness and isolation (Al-Dulaim & Amer, 2004), 
depression (Al-Raihani, Nazih & Saber, 1989), family problems between couples due to 
marriage maladjustment (Al-Qawasmi, 1995), lack of academic adaptation in college 
students (Al-Maghrabi, 1992), stress (Taher, 1995), religiosity and religious 
fundamentalism (Al-Shawi & Samoor, 2000). Some of this research has also found a 
correlation between irrationality and parenting style (authoritarianism versus democracy: 
Al-Rawi, 2003); other studies correlate it with gender, job burdens, job specialty and 
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term of service in a profession (Al-Saffar, 2002), while other research correlates it with 
gender, parental education and residence (Fatouhi, 1997), gender and culture (Al-
Raihani, 1987a). 
Dawes (2000), on the other hand, suggests that irrationality is consistently 
systematic, which implicitly suggests that irrationality is content-specific in that some 
people may think irrationally about certain topics or a specific content in relation to 
particular needs. This further implies that irrationality resists explanation and analysis 
without considering the topics and/or content that stimulates irrational thinking. Dawes 
(2000) further noted that irrationality can be detected in psychotic people, and even in 
ordinary neurotics, as Freud (1926) proposed. 
As such, it appears from this review of research that “irrationality is accountable 
for the different psychological disturbances, which are, first and foremost, brought forth 
by one's perceptions of situations and events, not the effects of such situations or 
events”; the way one perceives situations is what really matters (Al-Qaisi, 1998, p.248). 
 Definition of Irrational Beliefs 2
To define irrational beliefs, it is logical to start with the antithesis: i.e., rational 
thinking. What are rational beliefs? 
2.1 Rational beliefs 
Ellis and Dryden (1997) define rational beliefs as evaluative cognitions that are 
preferential or non-absolutist in nature. Walen et al. (1992) and Dryden (2003) have 
identified specific characteristics that constitute a rational belief. A belief is rational if it 
is ‘flexible and/or non-extreme’ (Dryden, 2003, p.9). In language, a rational belief is 
verbally expressed as a ‘desire,’ ‘preference,’ ‘wish,’ or ‘want.’ The internal structure of 
a rational belief is logically consistent. Rational beliefs are also consistent with reality 
and, therefore, can be supported by empirical evidence. Thinking rationally results in 
feeling adaptive emotions, such as concern, sadness and annoyance. A rational belief is 
therefore constructive to the person who holds it and helps an individual to attain his or 
her goals. 
Dryden (2001, 2003) has described four types of rational belief. The first type of 
rational belief is a ‘full preference’. Dryden describes full preferences as ‘flexible 
evaluations in the form of preferences, wishes, desires, wants, etc.’ (Dryden, 2001, p. 6). 
In its full form, a full preference has two parts. The first part states what a person wants 
and the second part negates the idea that the person must get what they want. This can be 
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seen in the statement ‘I want to succeed at my job … but I don't have to succeed.’ Ellis 
(1994) has argued that a preference is the primary rational belief that is at the core of 
psychological health. The three other types of rational beliefs are derivatives of a full 
preference. 
The second type of rational belief is referred to as a ‘Non-awfulizing belief’ 
(Dryden 2001, 2003). A non-awfulizing belief is the evaluation of a negative event as 
‘bad’ or ‘unfortunate’, but not ‘awful’ or ‘terrible’. The first component of a non-
awfulizing belief acknowledges that a negative event has taken place or may occur in the 
future. The second component negates the idea that the bad event is awful or the end of 
the world. An example of a non-awfulizing belief in its full form would be, ‘It would be 
bad if I don’t get the prize this year … but it would not be awful.’ 
A High Frustration Tolerance (HFT) belief is a third type of rational belief 
process. A person holding a HFT belief thinks that a negative situation or event is 
difficult to tolerate, but tolerable. The first part of a HFT belief acknowledges that it 
would be hard to tolerate a specific negative event. The second component indicates that, 
although the negative event is hard to bear, it is not intolerable. 
Dryden (2003) has suggested that a HFT belief might have a third component: 
that it is worth the effort to try and tolerate the situation. An example of a HFT belief 
with all three components would be ‘Being fired from my job is hard to tolerate, but 1 
can stand it …. and it would be worth it for me to tolerate this.’ REBT holds that 
developing a philosophy of HFT is important because it helps people to achieve their 
goals by helping them deal with the frustration of having their goals blocked. As a result, 
they experience adaptive negative emotions and are better able to problem solve. 
Dryden (2001, 2003) refers to the fourth kind of rational belief as Acceptance 
Beliefs. There are three types of acceptance beliefs: self-acceptance, other acceptance, 
and life acceptance beliefs. In REBT, the term Unconditional Self-Acceptance (USA) is 
used to describe acceptance of oneself despite one's flaws. Acceptance of another person 
despite their shortcomings is known as Unconditional Other Acceptance (UOA). An 
individual's acceptance of life conditions and everything that might occur is referred to 
as Unconditional Life Acceptance (ULA). 
Adopting a philosophy of USA or UOA involves the evaluation of an aspect of a 
person, one could say an aspect of a personality: if people evaluate the traits and 
behaviours of their personalities, it will be better for them than if they tend to evaluate 
their personalities per se. In this way, it is often surmised that if people have realistic 
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thoughts about their strengths and weaknesses and take pride in their accomplishments, 
they will feel happier and have more stability in their lives. Hence, CBT teaches people 
to assess their thoughts and behaviour, not themselves (Seligman et al., 2001). For 
example, a person's behaviour may be evaluated as good or bad.  
However, acceptance beliefs also contain a component that negates the idea that 
the self or the other person can be globally rated. Acceptance beliefs incorporate the idea 
that the self and the other person are fallible human beings who are complex and 
unrateable. An example of a self-acceptance belief would be ‘If I failed my final exam 
… it wouldn't prove that I was a failure … Rather it would indicate that I am a fallible 
human being who failed on this occasion.’ By not rating one's whole self based upon 
one's behaviour, the individual experiences an adaptive emotion and is better able to 
focus on what needs to be done to correct his or her bad behaviour. 
2.2 Irrational beliefs 
Throughout history, the concepts of irrationality and irrational thinking have 
intrigued philosophers; they thought that the irrational is whatever aberrates from the 
logical and is inconsistent with rational thinking. Lexically, the term irrationality is used 
to depict emotion-driven thinking and actions that are, or appear to be, less useful or 
logical than the rational alternatives. As such, there is a clear tendency to view our own 
thoughts, words and actions as rational and to see those with which we disagree as 
irrational. In this category of meanings, Sutherland (1992) has summarised the spectrum 
of meanings, which have been explained by different theories of irrationality as 
including, but not restricted to the following (pp. 1-14): 
 People's actual interests differ from what they believe to be their interests.  
 Mechanisms that have evolved to give optimal behaviour in normal conditions lead to 
irrational behaviour in abnormal conditions. 
 In situations outside one's ordinary circumstances, one may experience intense levels 
of fear, or may regress to a fight or flight mentality. 
 People fail to realise the irrationality of their actions and believe they are acting 
perfectly rationally, possibly due to flaws in their reasoning. 
 Apparently irrational decisions are actually optimal, but are made unconsciously on 
the basis of ‘hidden’ interests that are not known to the conscious mind 
 An inability to comprehend the social consequences of one's own actions, possibly 
due in part to a lack of empathy. 
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 Some people find themselves in this condition by living ‘double’ lives. They try to put 
on one ‘mask’ for one group of people and another for a different group of people. 
Many will become confused as to which they really are or which they wish to 
become. 
Sutherland (1992, p. 1) listed the factors that affect rational behaviour as 
including the following: 
 Stress, which in turn may be emotional or physical; 
 The introduction of a new or unique situation; 
 Intoxication; 
 Peers who convey irrational thoughts as necessary idiosyncrasy for social acceptance. 
Be that as it may, Mele (1987) showed that many human acts can function as proofs 
that irrational behaviour is remarkably universally common; therefore, certain forms of 
irrationality – especially uncontrollable actions and self-deceptions,pose difficult 
theoretical issues which philosophers have rejected as logically or psychologically 
impossible to explain. The most common forms of these are akrasia and self-deception. 
The former term means acting against one’s intuitions, or acting against one’s better 
judgment, while the second refers to self-defence mechanisms, some of which have been 
described in the earlier chapter on anxiety within the theory of Freud.  
However, Mele (1987), in a relevant vein, shows that incontinent action and self-
deception are indeed possible. While drawing upon recent experimental work in the 
psychology of action and inference, Mele (1987) advanced some explanations of akratic 
action and self-deception to resolve the paradoxes that have been extensively dealt with 
in related philosophical literature. Here, Mele (1987) argues that human beings are 
capable of rational thinking only when they are capable of managing their self-control, 
arguing that rigid akratic ideas and notions, and their subsequent acts, can be an 
insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation. 
In this respect, too, Freud's (1940) investigation of errors extends beyond the 
philosophical investigation of akrasia and self-deception, as has been referred to earlier 
in this chapter. However, Freud is more interested in exploring the culprit than in the 
precise nature of the victims of akrasia and self-deception. According to him, the culprit 
is, naturally, a wish or desire, but the victim is not always a rational requirement that is 
dramatically defied.  
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Pears (2009) clarified the Freudian view of irrationality by relating it to self-
deception. Pears said that, philosophically, some people can think reasonably in good 
ways, yet they are tempted to act in ways contrary to their logical reasoning intentionally 
and without external pressures. As earlier explained, this is known as 'akrasia', which, by 
definition, is a state of mind in which one is not in full command of oneself. Usually, this 
state is explicated in terms of a ‘weakness of the will’ and lapses in moral thinking, as in 
response to social stressors (Holton, 1999, p. 241) However, there is another type of 
explanation for irrationality grounded in wishful thinking, with recourse to appetitive 
desires. Here, irrational thinking occurs as a result of misleading opinion ‘under the 
influence of a wish’ (Pears, 2009, p. 264). In other words, irrationality is explained by 
self-deception.  
Ellis's theory of REBT has generated a discussion in the relevant literature of 
irrational and rational beliefs being responsible for an (UN) healthy emotional well-
being; i.e., rigidly held irrational beliefs are positively associated with psychopathology. 
This theory has prompted perplexity, ambiguity and a great deal of philosophical and 
logical debate in pertinent literature (Oei et al., 1993). Lexically, rational is defined as 
logical and coherent, and irrational means the opposite, i.e., illogical and incoherent. In 
Webster's Ninth New World Dictionary (9
th
 ed 1991), ‘irrational’ is defined as illogical 
or ‘not endowed with reason or understanding’ (p.639). Irrational beliefs pertain to 
evaluative cognitions that are associated with emotional disturbance (Walen et al., 1992). 
Typically, thinking irrationally leads to emotional disturbance such as depression, anger 
or anxiety. 
Ellis's definition of ‘irrational’ differs from the word's denotative meaning. In 
REBT, a belief is considered to be irrational when it is unrealistic and illogical. 
However, there are also pragmatic criteria that constitute the REBT definition of 
irrational. An irrational belief is also one that results in inappropriate emotional 
consequences and dysfunctional behaviours, and interferes with a person's ability to 
achieve his or her goals (DiGiuseppe, 1996; Maultsby, 1984). It remains unclear if a 
belief has to meet one, some or all of the criteria for it to be considered an irrational 
belief (DiGiuseppe, 1996). DiGiuseppe has suggested that ‘this lack of clarity about the 
definition could result in drastically different illogical thoughts, distortions of reality or 
self-defeating philosophies all labeled as irrational beliefs’ (p.9). 
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2.3 Theory of REBT with regard to irrationality 
Established theory and research in REBT addressed the organisation of irrational 
beliefs, mainly in terms of propositions (Dryden, 1995; Ellis, 1994; Wessler & Wessler, 
1980) or in terms of schemata (DiGiuseppe, 1996; Nielsen, 2003; David, Szentagotai, 
Eva & Macavei, 2005). REBT focuses on maladaptive evaluative beliefs in the form of 
irrational beliefs as core cognitive vulnerabilities to emotional disturbance (e.g., Ellis, 
1994). Corey (2009) describes REBT as a psychotherapy theory as, ‘the active, directive, 
time-limited, present-centred, structural approach used to treat various disorders such as 
depression, anxiety and phobias’ (Corey, 2009, p. 123). Mukangi (2010) further explains 
that REBT theory mainly focuses on how irrational thoughts affect people to the extent 
of causing detrimental effects and how these thoughts act as barriers to a happy self-
fulfilling life (Dryden, 2003).  
It can be argued that irrational thoughts held by a person can be congruent with 
his/her behaviour and reflect themselves in the person’s attitude. REBT theory can 
explain and treat irrational thinking through cognitive and emotional and behavioural 
training. REBT argues that whatever the situations in the past that led to irrational 
beliefs, people are actively using these philosophies to disturb themselves (Ellis, 1962). 
For example, cognitive: I am unable to do mathematics, affective: I feel bad just by 
thinking about mathematics. Behavioural: the person puts in minimal effort towards 
mathematics and as a result, he/she fails the subject. According to Dryden (2003), it 
derives from this that negative predispositions towards any subject makes one likely to 
fail in that particular subject, and once they change their negative attitudes, they will 
cease to fail.  
However, if man is innately inclined or predisposed to thinking in irrational 
ways, irrational beliefs are acquired from the culture and the context in which man lives. 
In this vein, Ellis (1987) hypothesised that individuals ‘have an innate propensity 
towards irrational and illogical thinking, and that they have an innate tendency to 
magnify and convert aversive life situations into catastrophes’ (Kassinove & Eckhardt, 
1994, p. 134). But this ‘supposedly innate’ propensity hypothesised by Ellis needs to be 
verified in cultures other than the American culture in which Ellis’ theory originated. In 
this way, Kassinove and Eckhardt (1994) observed that an ‘analysis of the hypothesised 
cognition-emotion link in cultures other than America will provide data to test Ellis’s 
controversial hypothesis’ (p.134). Al-Ali (2004) notes that  
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‘… we normally learn irrational thinking from parents and adults in our 
surroundings since early childhood; then we further create these irrational 
beliefs by ourselves and for ourselves through mythological thinking, and 
then inculcate and cogitate these beliefs as if they were our guiding 
principles.’ (p.4) 
 Ruminating on such irrational beliefs makes them actively live in us (Corey, 
2009). Corey further notes that ‘The basic assumption … is that people contribute to 
their own psychological problems, as well as specific symptoms, by the way in which 
they interpret events and situations in their life’ (Corey, 2009, p.76). According to REBT 
theory, rational beliefs are those that are logical and supported by empirical data. 
Rational beliefs also lead to healthy emotional responses. Therefore, they are associated 
with freedom from emotional disturbance and with greater ability to adapt and adjust 
while problem solving (Ziegler, 2000).  
Notwithstanding this, rational beliefs can also lead to negative but healthy 
emotions such as frustration, which can help the individual to deal with adversity. 
Rational beliefs are usually expressed in the form of preferences, with some tolerance to 
violating situations, or at least the acknowledgement that such situations can occur. A 
person holding such beliefs might think, ‘I would prefer that I had not told my friend’s 
secret to someone else, and I am sorry that I did.’ In REBT theory, the resultant healthy 
negative emotion would be remorse rather than guilt (Dryden & DiGiuseppe, 1990). 
2.4 Irrational beliefs and adjustment in Freudian psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis theory explains that healthy personality is well-explained by the 
psychosexual theory of Freud, which proposes that children maintain a sexual life much 
earlier than the sexual maturity of their bodies. According to the psychosexual theory, a 
healthy personality cannot be reconstructed except in adolescence and adulthood only in 
individuals who could overcome their fixation in early childhood (Hjelle & Ziegler, 
1976). 
According to Freud, adjustment is quite rare, as socio-emotional adjustment 
really means that an individual has passed through the different phases of development, 
overcoming fixation in all these phases, as he/she has a strong ego. Adjustment, to 
Freud, means sexual maturity after the age of puberty, and ‘one who is socio-emotively 
adjusted is one who is really sexually, socially and emotionally mature’ (Al-Hanafi, 
1978, p.22).  
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According to Freud, the id, the ego and the superego are the basic constituents 
that make up the human personality. The essential drive of the id is immediate 
gratification; the id is without values, ethics or logic, seeking to satiate the bodily 
instincts in a hedonistic fashion; that is, its main aim is indulging in pleasurable 
gratification without taking into account the context one is in and producing a state free 
from all tension or keeping the level of tension as low as possible. The ego is the 
executive of personality. It is the rational part that mediates between the immediate 
impulses of the id and the pressure from the superego. The ego operates according to the 
reality principle, which means that it delays immediate gratification until an appropriate 
time. The third component of the personality, the superego, represents the ideals and 
values of society as they are conveyed to the child by what the parents do and say (or 
socialisation). Within this structure, the conscience arises.  
In general, the role of the superego is to block the unacceptable impulses of the id 
and to pressure the ego to serve the ends of morality. These three constituents of the 
human personality function according to the libido that drives or inhibits the function of 
each; for adjustment to occur, these parts have to function in collaboration and 
coordination; that is, “they have all to be self- and inter-adjusted” (Hesham, 1990, p.35). 
However, in reality, this is impossible to happen, and that is why adjustment according 
to this theory is quite rare (Al-Ali, 2004). 
According to Freud, adjustment is the function of the ego; the ego is what makes 
one socially and emotionally adjusted only when it can control the id and the superego, 
striking equilibrium thereto. The weak ego thus succumbs to the lusts of the id, thereby 
allowing the latter to seize control over the personality; in this way, the individual 
becomes lusty, seeking gratification of the instincts without paying attention to reality, 
principles and the value system of the society. This, in effect, conducive to deviance and 
psychopathology (Lugo & LeMonda, 2008). By the same token, if the ego submits to the 
superego, the latter holds control of the personality, conducive to inhibition of desires, 
and consequently, to psycho-pathology and maladjustment (Ahmed, 2004; Al-Ali, 2004). 
For attaining adjustment and resolving the conflict between the id, the superego and 
reality, the ego develops defence mechanisms to lessen tension and stress and help 
induce adjustment (Al-Ali, 2004, p.32). 
Psychological defence refers to the process of regulating painful emotions such 
as anxiety, depression and loss of self-esteem. Defence mechanisms are usually defined 
more narrowly as mental processes that operate unconsciously to reduce some painful 
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emotion. In the classical sense, the latter have been further restricted to threats aroused 
by the individual's thoughts and wishes: some of them are overcome by irrationality, 
leading consequently to psychological conflict over issues of sex and aggression. 
Defence mechanisms are, therefore, unconscious psychological processes that are 
activated in threatening and anxiety-provoking situations (Cooper, 1998). Perception of 
threat from inner sources or the inner world of the ego makes people determined to 
relieve themselves from this threat or at least lessen its severity (Freud, 1936). Defence 
mechanisms mediate between internal emotional struggles and external pressurizing 
factors. Some of these defence mechanisms (e.g., extroversion) are almost always 
unadjusted, while others (e.g., prevention and denial) can be adjusted or unadjusted 
according to the degree of flexibility and the context in which they occur (Adler, 1964). 
Some irrational beliefs lie in self-deception, as earlier indicated by Pears (2009). 
Self-deception is a major term in psychoanalysis theory. This term has been used in at 
least three distinguishable ways (Paulhus, Fridhandler & Hayes, 1997). According to the 
authors, the term ‘self-deception’ is two-fold; it may refer to a ‘distinct form of defence 
in which the individual shows moral weakness in disavowing some unpleasant truth’ 
(Paulhus et al., 1997, p. 547), as it may also indicate a condition of a motivated 
unawareness of one of two conflicting or contradictory realisations of a belief or 
perception, which is not used as a type of defence mechanism, but is still concommitant 
to defence mechanisms. 
Generally, considering self-conception and irrationality as synonymous or at least 
related, expressing the concept of false self-beliefs, the term ‘self-deception’ has been 
applied to human ethology as well as social, clinical, and personality psychology; for 
instance, in ethology, research evidence for the adaptive value of limited self-knowledge 
in lower organisms implies an evolutionary basis for human self-deception (Campbell, 
1985; Tidd & Lockard, 1978; Trivers, 1985). 
However, over-reliance on self-defence mechanisms, including self-deception 
that implies irrationality, to combat depression, stress, and anxiety, is considered an 
abnormal way of social and emotive adjustment (Dawood, 2001). According to Freud, 
normal adjustment occurs through gratification of instincts while lessening self-
punishment and feelings of guilt. This helps in controlling internal conflicts between the 
three parts of the self (Al-Munaizel, 1999). 
An adjusted personality, according to Freud, is the summation of pleasure 
attainment and pain-avoidance in reality. Again, maladaptation is rooted in early 
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childhood, especially during the first five years, where fixation gnaws at the personality, 
and the child's experiences during this stage harm the personality of the child, and 
continue to do so along later phases of development (Durkin, 1995). Preservation of the 
self and protection of the ego are also instrumental to understanding adjustment and 
maladaptation according to this theory. Findings of both potential protection and risk 
associated with high pro-social behaviours are consistent with research findings from 
investigations conducted by Caplan (1993) and Hay (1994), ‘who suggested that pro-
social behaviours may contribute positively to adjustment when optimally regulated, but 
may also increase the risk of psychopathology when overly low or high’ (Nantel-Vivier, 
2010, p. 58). 
Furthermore, findings from prior research showed that the correlation between 
maladaptation or psychological dysfunctional states and irrational cognitions, beliefs and 
attitudes of college students is confirmed. In other words, the psychopathological state 
and general well-being of college students are very much affected by their belief 
systems, which if disrupted or disturbed, can potentiate psychological illnesses, such as 
social anxiety, depression, loneliness, etc. (Al-Ansari, 2007; Al-Maleh, & Al-zarrad, 
2005; Bonner & Rich, 1991; Chaleby and Raslan, 1990; Halamandaris & Power, 1997; 
Lecrubier et al., 2000; Wittchen & Fehm, 2003; Wong & Whitaker, 1993). 
From a critical point of view, Freud, like Plato, embraced the emotional 
disruption view of irrationality; thereby, Plato maintained that the soul of every 
individual has a three-part structure analogous to the three classes of a society. There is a 
rational part of the soul, which ferrets for the truth and is accountable for our 
philosophical inclinations; a spirited part which desires honour and is responsible for our 
feelings of anger and indignation; and an appetitive part, which lusts after all sorts of 
things, but money most of all (since money must be used to fulfil any other base desire). 
In a just individual (‘just’ here means balanced and psychologically healthy), the rational 
part of the soul rules, the spirited part supports this rule, and the appetitive part submits 
and follows wherever reason leads.  
Put more plainly: in a just individual, the entire soul aims at fulfilling the desires 
of the rational part, much as in the just society the entire community aims at fulfilling 
whatever the ruler’s will. Freud maintained that to be able to characterise in detail the 
‘logic’ of disruptive forces reluctant in irrational thoughts, individuals are likely to apply 
‘defence mechanisms’ employed to attempt to minimise such disruptions. However, 
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Freud differed from Plato in claiming that both the emotional forces and the barriers 
against them (‘defences’) are unconscious.  
 Biological Basis of Irrational Thinking 3
REBT researchers, prominently Ellis (1962, 1976, 1980, 1987), contend that (1) 
most humans have a strong tendency to think irrationally and to behave in self-defeating 
ways, and (2) this tendency derives in part from a genetic potential which transcends 
environmental and cultural differences. This refers to the biological or innate origins of 
irrational thinking in human beings. In this regard, Ellis (1987) maintains that we 
humans are genetically inclined to think irrationally in some cases, many times without 
good reason, in which case irrational thinking causes the eruption of behavioural and 
emotional disturbance and general life unhappiness. Further, and above all, Ellis (1987) 
claimed that humans also have another basic biological tendency – that is, they ‘naturally 
tend to become aware of their irrationality’, and “they steadily and permanently work 
towards achieving rationality” (Dryden, 2009, p.57).  
Even so, it is pretty inconceivable to imagine how Ellis (1987) could have 
calculated these statistics. Still, the important point is that Ellis's characterisation of the 
biological is essential to his inspection of the way human beings act; crudely put, Ellis 
firmly contends that there is a biological predisposition towards both rationality and 
irrationality (Ellis, 1995). By the same token, Ruth (1992) elaborately explains this by 
stating that: 
‘Basically stated, the postulate assumes that humans have a natural (i.e., 
genetic) tendency to think rationally and irrationally, and that irrational 
cognitions are quite easily learned and/or created throughout one's entire 
life span.’ (pp. 3-4) 
In other clearer terms, Ellis has hypothetically proposed that human beings are 
genetically predisposed to think irrationally and to behave in self-defeating fashions. 
This early proposal has stressed the general observation that specific human traits and 
response styles seem to be universally innate and partially responsible for the 
development and maintenance of a wide range of emotional disturbances, to some extent. 
Likewise, Ellis has observed the contributing effects from the environment and learning, 
which heighten and deepen the effects of genetic disposition; Ellis, thus, has recognised 
a possibility for an alternate explanation of human irrationality grounded in adverse 
conditioning and harmful parental rearing.  
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However, Ellis claimed that this argument looked dubious, even with the 
availability of supportive empirical data, because such an explanation largely ignored the 
biological substratum on which environmental conditions operated. Therefore, Ellis 
strongly supported an explanation which accentuated the role of genetic predispositions 
over the impact of the environment and learning. To this end, Ellis (1962) writes that 
there are multiple external stimuli and events available which contribute to inducing 
emotional disturbance in individuals. Ellis (1962) further observed that emotional 
disturbance and resistance to treatment occurs in human beings partly for biological 
reasons and partly for psychosocial reasons.  
By the same token, Ellis adeptly suggests that we need to support the psycho-
social aspects of emotional disturbance in humans ‘by looking for the biological roots as 
well’ (Ellis, 1962, p.380). Ellis thus asserts that there appear to be ‘inherent biological 
limitations of the human organism to think straight and especially to think clearly and 
logically about his own behaviour, for any consistent length of time’, and that we are 
consequently induced to develop irrational thinking habits, probably in a psycho-
pathological way (Ellis, 1962, p. 378). 
Almost all human beings demonstrate evidence of major human irrationalities. 
Thus, practically all of us disturb ourselves about life's adversities. Of course, we do not 
disturb ourselves about the same adversities and the extent to which the disturbance will 
vary from person to person, but virtually all of us do this. Our disturbance does not 
interfere with the survival of the species and most of the time it does not interfere with 
our individual existence.  
Relevantly, REBT theory maintains that when the human instincts or desires are 
weak, human beings consequently find it relatively easy to keep their beliefs flexible and 
non-extreme when their desires are not met. However, when these desires become 
stronger and particularly when they are very strong, then the human being finds it very 
much more difficult to retain flexibility and non-extremity in their beliefs. In other 
words, when human desires are strong, then they find it relatively easy to transform these 
desires into absolute necessities, and the fact that it is bad, yet tolerable, when they don't 
get what they want, into the idea that it is awful and unbearable to be thus thwarted.  
In other words, the effortlessness and facility with which most humans turn their 
desires into absolute necessities may indicate the biological underpinnings of this 
common form of human irrationality. Dryden (2009) explains this proposition by 
assuming that if human beings could retain flexible and non-extreme beliefs with regard 
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to the very strong biological needs they have, then it is near impossible for them ‘to think 
in rigid and extreme ways under these circumstances and would tend not to do so even if 
strongly encouraged to do so by our culture’ (Dryden, 2009, pp. 58). 
As Ellis often used to say, ‘Mother nature is concerned with our survival, not 
with the emotional quality of our life.’ (Ellis, 2004b, p. 12) The latter is firmly within 
our responsibility and the fact that many of us needlessly disturb ourselves shows that 
this tendency is rooted in our humanity. Ellis in this respect has finalised his genetic or 
biological theory of the explanation of human irrational thinking by distinguishing a 
number of biological causes of human neurosis and resistance to therapeutic 
interventions, be they medical or psychological. Ellis (2004b) noted that many of these 
originally biological determiners are interrelated somehow, representing an amalgam of 
cognitive, behavioural, emotional, and physiological factors: e.g., rashness and over-
impulsivity, wishful thinking, extremism, over-vigilance and over-caution, difficulty of 
unlearning, oscillation and erraticness, unsustained effort, excitement seeking, stress 
proneness and discrimination difficulties. 
Ellis also noted the presence of other determiners which are grounded in 
cognitive factors just like the core themes in the contemporary REBT model: over-
emphasizing injustice, grandiosity and over-rebellion, pre-potency of desire, 
automaticity and unthinkingness, over-emphasizing guilt, and over-generalisation 
tendencies (See, Ellis, 1962, pp. 378-414). Later, Ellis (1976) formulated the term 
‘human irrationality’, which Ellis defined as: 
‘Any thought, behaviour, or emotion that can eventually be conducive to self-
defeating consequences and which significantly interfered with human 
happiness and survival in contemporary society.’ (Ellis, 1976, p.172) 
Ellis (1976) further defined the term ‘biological basis’ as an ‘organism's natural, 
easy predisposition toward developing and maintaining certain characteristics and traits’ 
(Ibid.). 
Several notions, such as ease of acquisition and modification-elimination 
difficulty, have thus become essential to these major terms of human irrationality and 
biological basis. Simply worded, unhealthy (irrational) characteristics and traits seem to 
be quite easy to acquire and develop; however, they are the most difficult to modify or 
eliminate. Ellis has also identified that such predispositions are not solely instinctive; 
Ellis (1976) claimed that key changes that can possibly overwrite the genetic code may 
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potentially be possible, though in some cases not probable, through persistent awareness 
and continued vigorous therapeutic efforts. 
3.1 Empirical Evidence for the Biological Basis of Irrational Thinking 
In this later suggestion, having already put forward a list of key happiness-
sabotaging tendencies (see Ellis, 1976), Ellis concluded by providing a series of opinions 
and testimonies bolstering up his theory that these tendencies were biologically rooted 
and not primarily learned or environmentally acquired. These empirical and theoretical 
arguments included the following key notions: 
1. Virtually all humans, to one degree or another, tend to think, behave and emote in 
self-defeating ways despite intellectual, educational, ethnic, cultural and societal 
differences. 
2. A cluster of certain irrationalities appears particularly universal due to its cross-
cultural and cross-societal prevalence: demandingness, grandiosity, absolutism, 
dogmatism, prejudice, rigidity, low frustration tolerance, short range hedonism, 
gullibility, fallibility, overgeneralisation and self/other condemnation. 
3. Worldwide contemporary irrationalities appear to have also existed, historically and 
anthropologically, across diverse cultures and societies from the past. 
4. Despite specific counterattacks, corrective teachings and sanctions imposed by 
parents, educators and influential others, children (and adults) appear to 
indiscriminately invent and/or acquire irrationalities which contradict empirical 
knowledge and environmental feedback. 
5. Attempts to modify or eliminate certain irrationalities, whether initiated and directed 
by oneself or an influential other, are often stubbornly resisted, both consciously and 
unconsciously, despite an expressed desire to change and an awareness that such 
change would be greatly beneficial. 
6. When modifications and/or eliminations of certain irrationalities do occur, changes in 
the frequency, intensity and duration of these irrationalities are often short-lived, thus 
resulting in regression, relapse and/or newly acquired and invented irrationalities. 
Consistent with the contemporary REBT model, in his most recent biological 
proposal, Ellis (1987) focuses on irrational demandingness and grandiosity in particular, 
as opposed to human irrationality in general. Specifically, REBT's core irrational 
constructs (demandingness/grandiosity, awfulisation, low frustration tolerance and 
self/other rating (Walen et al., 1992) are emphasised, and the subtle and blatant irrational 
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beliefs which flow from these constructs in the areas of competence and success, love 
and approval, safety and comfort, and fairness and consideration are distinguished. 
Clients may subtly cling to their irrational beliefs, as they do not realise the impact those 
irrational beliefs have on the range of their verbalisations and behaviours. Preliminarily, 
patients need to be alert to the existence of hidden irrationalities implicit in their 
emotions spilt out or their behaviours coming into being. The most characteristic aspect 
about core irrational beliefs is that ‘they tend to be general rather than specific, and can 
best be identified after [the psychotherapist has] worked with clients on identifying their 
specific irrational thoughts’ (Dryden & Neenan, 2006, p. 135). Within each of these life 
spheres, Ellis demonstrates how demanding and grandiose beliefs usually predominate 
most other irrational thought processes. 
Human irrationality is ubiquitous, therefore, and the tendency for humans to 
transform their very strong desires into rigid dire necessities and extreme views if these 
instinctive desires are not achieved is universal, rendering irrational thinking as 
secondary to human instinctiveness. However, there seems to be a good deal of 
individual variation in the extent and ease with which human beings disturb themselves 
with irrational beliefs. By this token, Ellis reasserts that virtually all humans appear to be 
genetically predisposed towards irrational thinking: 
‘… practically all humans have a strong biological tendency to needlessly and 
severely disturb themselves and that, to make matters much worse, they 
also are powerfully predisposed to unconsciously and habitually prolong 
their mental dysfunctioning and to fight like hell against giving it up.’ 
(Ellis, 1987, p. 365) 
Ellis concluded that although many humans may possess the power to change 
and perhaps self-actualise, many others, even with the help of psychotherapy and other 
interventions, will unfortunately never consistently achieve and maintain emotional 
stability and general life happiness. Some human beings seem to transform even the 
weakest desires into rigidities when they fail to meet these instinctive desires, being the 
most vulnerable to suffer from irrational beliefs. In this context, Ruth (1992) adeptly 
noted that “genetic predispositions to think irrationally in early childhood are what drive 
people to form rigid demandingness, grandiosity, and egocentricity during early 
childhood” (Ruth, 1992, p. 16). 
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3.2 The biological Tendency for Rational Thinking 
Rationality is basically an exercise of reason whereby human beings come to 
conclusions when considering things most consciously. In the psychology of reasoning, 
rationality is a key term whether people can think rationally or not. In sociological 
psychology, Max Weber considered rationality in terms of four types: (1) Zweckrational 
or purposive/instrumental rationality: this relates to the expectations about the behaviour 
of other human beings or objects in the environment; such expectations are ‘rationally 
pursued and calculated’. (2) Wertrational or value/belief-oriented: a human act is 
intrinsic to the actor, be it arising from ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives. (3) 
Affectual rationality: determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling or emotion; this 
determines how acts can be ‘meaningfully oriented’. (4) Traditional rationality: this type 
is determined by ingrained habituation.  
However, in reasoning and cognitive psychology, the term has assumed different 
meanings: for instance, Johnson-Laird and Byrne have maintained that “humans are 
biologically rational in principle, but sometimes, they err in practice”. In other words, 
humans have the competence to be rational but their performance is limited by various 
factors (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009, p. 283).  
According to Ellis (2001a, b), rationality is defined contextually as the 
constructive tendency and leaning that humans have to act, emote and think in ways that 
are alternative-seeking, realistic, flexible and, most importantly, self- and social-helping 
and functional in helping humans to achieve their personal and social goals and desires. 
Rationality, too, is of a biological basis. Some researchers (Dobson & Dobson, 2009; 
Dryden, 2009) also believe that humans ‘have a biologically-based tendency to think 
rationally about life's adversities’ (Dryden, 2009, p.63). Dryden further explains: 
‘As such, we have a choice: we can choose to construct rigid and extreme 
ideas from our desires or we can choose to construct and remain with 
flexible and non-extreme ideas in relation to our desires. I have argued 
that we find it very easy to transform our desires into absolute necessities 
when these desires are strong and have a tough time being flexible about 
the attainment of these desires. This point also applies about the ease 
with which we construct extreme ideas when our desires are thwarted and 
the difficulty we have in constructing and remaining with non-extreme 
ideas when our desires are unmet.’ (Dryden, 2009, p.63) 
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The meaning of the passage above is that human beings can choose to think in 
rational ways even though they have a strong tendency to choose to construct and remain 
with irrational thinking, that is, with irrational, rigid and extreme ideas. Dryden names 
this last type of thinking, the irrational one, ‘going against the grain’ (Dryden, 2009, 
p.63). According to the author, this type of irrational thinking is difficult to sustain 
without commitment, vigour and vim – that is, irrational thinking occurs when people 
fail to be determined to align their behaviour patterns and inferential thinking with 
rational beliefs, inasmuch as they fail to bring forth ‘a corresponding determination not 
to act and think in ways that may perpetuate our irrational beliefs’ (Dryden, 2009, p.64). 
 Irrational Beliefs and Maladjustment 4
Ellis and Harper (1961) postulated that irrational beliefs are the prime causes of 
emotional maladjustment. Further, Beck (1976) and Ellis (1962) state that a person's 
faulty evaluation of possible negative outcomes can potentially bring about exaggerated 
emotional reactions. However, they differ as to the kinds of cognitions involved in these 
faulty evaluations. In this vein, Ellis (1962) contends that irrational beliefs, such as 
making personal worth contingent on another's response, can be conducive to irrational 
appraisals of social setbacks. However, Beck (1976) discriminates between real dangers 
(e.g., roaming in a jungle), which require realistic precautions, and inaccurate appraisals 
of risk (e.g. travelling by air), which lead to anxiety. In social situations, an anxious 
person evaluates a rejection or societal disapproval as much more risky than does a non-
anxious person. 
The theory of irrational beliefs postulates that our interpretations of 
environmental and social events shape our behavioural responses and these 
interpretations are determined by our own beliefs. Behaviour is thus a result of the 
individual’s belief system. Ellis (1994) argued that this belief system is universally 
shaped both by internal drives toward rationality and irrationality (i.e., self-constructive 
and self-defeating motivations) and by social influences, which indoctrinate individuals 
in their early lives (Bernard, 1986; DeSilvestri, 1989). Typically, an individual’s belief 
system will contain several of what Ellis labelled as ‘irrational’ elements (Ellis, 1962, 
1993). Some of the most pervasive elements are referred to as ‘core irrational beliefs,’ 
which are usually implicit and activated automatically. Furthermore, they tend to be 
simplistic, absolutist and overdramatic (Ellis, 1993). Ellis identified five themes that 
underscore the irrational beliefs. Ellis (1993) suggested that irrational thoughts take the 
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form of demands (this must happen: Ellis & Dryden, 1987), absolute thinking (all or 
none, no in-between), catastrophising (exaggerating the negative consequences of an 
event), low frustration tolerance (demand for ease and comfort), and global evaluations 
of human worth (people can be rated, and some are less valuable than others) (Walen et 
al., 1992). Ellis posited that if people could be prevented from indulging in irrational 
thoughts and beliefs, they would improve their ability to direct their energy toward self-
actualisation (the rational drive), which he believed could best be accomplished through 
reason (Ellis, 1994). 
Irrational beliefs affect an individual in exactly the opposite manner. Irrational 
beliefs lead to unhealthy negative emotional responses, such as guilt and anxiety 
(Dryden & DiGiuseppe, 1990). Such beliefs lead the person to further emotional 
disturbance and in effect hold the person captive, not allowing them to escape the 
negative feelings. Irrational beliefs are usually expressed as demands, musts and shoulds, 
are illogical and do not stem from empirical data. 
The formation of the irrational beliefs is not due to the subject’s intellectual 
incompetence; that is to say, detecting the irrationality of the belief in question does not 
require intellectual abilities that exceed those of the subject’s. Irrational thinking may be 
consciously sustained as a self-defence mechanism, as in self-deception or in other 
cognitive biases. Dryden and Neenan (2006) have suggested that ‘irrational beliefs, 
which are deemed to be at the core of psychological disturbance, are rigid and extreme, 
inconsistent with reality, illogical and self-and-relationship-defeating’ (p.2). 
An essential factor in irrational beliefs is demandingness, i.e. everything must 
absolutely conform to a certain standard and any variation or deviation is unacceptable, 
or even more accurately, unbearable. In other words, demandingness encompasses a 
dogmatic and absolutistic philosophy that the world must comply with the individual's 
desires (Walen et al., 1992). Demands are placed on the self, another person or the 
conditions of life (Dryden, DiGiuseppe & Neenan, 2003). Ellis believes that this 
irrational belief serves as the premise from which the other three irrational beliefs derive; 
however, this assertion has not been empirically tested (Dryden et al., 2003).  
There are three basic demands in irrational thinking. These are demands about 
self (self-directed shoulds), demands about others (other-directed shoulds), and demands 
about world or life conditions. When these demands are not fulfilled, each leads to a 
specific type of emotional response. When self-directed demands are not met, guilt and 
anxiety typically result. When other-directed demands are not met, anger is the most 
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common response. The failure to meet demands about the world and life conditions leads 
to self-pity and feelings of unfair treatment (Dryden & DiGiuseppe, 1990). Ellis's 
writings suggest that rigid demands regarding the self, others and the world are the major 
source of emotional disturbance (e.g., Ellis, 1994). Therefore, according to Ellis, 
demandingness is the primary irrational belief and the other three irrational belief 
processes are logical derivatives of demandingness (Lega & Ellis, 2001; Walen et al., 
1992).  
Most recently, Ellis (2003b) has described the relationship between 
demandingness and the other irrational belief processes; Ellis (2003b) proposes two parts 
that contribute to dysfunctional thinking that results in irrational beliefs, both working in 
collaboration to be conducive to irrationality. The first part, which is the most influential, 
relates to the individual's propensity to aggravate and intensify strong desires and 
preferences in the form of ‘musts’ or demanding necessities. The second part has to do 
with stressing the awful consequences that would follow from low performance or 
unfulfilled needs far beyond one's expectations. Dryden (2003), in this context, 
explicates the situation with this illustration: 
'If I don't perform important tasks well at practically all times, as I must, (a) 
I'll be a worthless, undeserving individual who will not be able to 
succeed or be lovable; and (b) the results I will get will not merely be bad 
and inconvenient but be absolutely horrible and I will not be able to 
enjoy life at all’ (Dryden, 2003, p. 29). 
There are also other core irrational beliefs in addition to demandingness, such as 
awfulizing. Awfulizing entails believing that the situation is far worse than it actually is. 
Another core irrational belief is low self-worth judgement. Low frustration tolerance is 
another core irrational belief. It is the perception that the adversity is unbearable.  
To reiterate, there are four types of irrational beliefs, tacitly summed up as follows: 
1. Rigid demands (e.g. ‘I must be approved of.’) 
2. Awfulizing beliefs (e.g. ‘If I’m disapproved of, it's the end of the world.’) 
3. Low frustration tolerance beliefs (e.g. ‘I can’t tolerate being disapproved of.’) 
4. Depreciation beliefs (e.g. self-depreciation: I’m worthless if I’m disapproved of’; 
other-depreciation: You’re horrible if you disapprove of me; life depreciation: Life is 
all bad if I am disapproved of.) (Dryden and Neenan, 2006). 
Internal irrationality, as implicated in irrational beliefs and irrational thinking, 
makes for more difficulties and psychological problems that need to be addressed 
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systematically in counselling psychology, since the subject not only violates canons of 
good reasoning but also standards of reasoning that s/he would, upon reflection, endorse.  
 Relationship between Irrational Beliefs and Social Anxiety 5
Irrational beliefs are thoughts and opinions that are not compatible with reality 
and most of them have been made on the basis of suspicion and personal opinions, often 
resulting in sentiments of obligation and determination (Ellis, 1979b; Hamidi & 
Motlagh, 2010; Shafi & Naseri, 1998). According to Ellis (1971), there is a relationship 
between irrational beliefs and social anxiety (and various other forms of emotional 
disturbances) as a result of the interaction of negative events or situations and negative 
emotions leading to certain irrational beliefs or any other irrational or other dysfunctional 
patterns of thought likely to cause emotional disorders (Lohr & Bonge, 1981; Malouff, 
Schutte & McClelland, 1992; Thyer, Parrish, Curtis, Nesse & Cameron, 1985).  
A relationship between maladaptive cognitions and social anxiety has been 
confirmed in prior research (Gormally, Sipps, Raphael, Edwin & Varvil-Weld, 1981; 
Monti et al., 1984; Thyer et al., 1985). In a classical correlational study (Sutton-Simon & 
Goldfried, 1979), conducted on a clinical sample of anxious individuals, which 
examined the associations between irrationality and phobic anxiety, this relationship was 
also confirmed. As such, irrational beliefs do indeed play a significant role in the 
maintenance of irrational fears and phobias, including SADs (de Jong, Merckelbach, 
Bögels & Kindt, 1998). 
As is clear throughout this chapter, cognitive-behaviourist therapists and 
cognitive psychologists investigating human reasoning concur on the occurrence of 
irrational thinking, and on its significance, but they widely vary in some of their 
conclusions about (1) the nature, frequency and causes of such irrationality, and (2) the 
means for correcting or avoiding ‘habits’ of irrational thinking. According to CBT and 
REBT therapists, it is disputably believed that irrational thinking, at least when it appears 
on any scale, is an indication of abnormality, or even of mental illness and 
psychopathology (Rachman, 1983).  
However, there is consensus as to the effects of irrationality on thinking disorders 
such as psychotic delusions, in which the irrational thinking is the central problem, but 
this consensual concurrence fades away when construing problems related to irrationality 
and emotional disturbances as social anxiety – this being the case, more research is 
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warranted. According to Deffenbacher et al. (1986), most of these cognitive-behaviourist 
therapies or interventions … 
‘[a]ppear to be based on hypothesised relationships between irrational beliefs 
and the presenting anxiety, rather than on empirically established 
relationships between beliefs and a given anxiety. (p. 282) 
Deffenbacher et al. (1986) futher explained that there is a dire need to conduct 
research that investigates the linkage between irrational thinking and specific types of 
anxiety in order to understand these types of anxiety and how to treat them using 
appropriate intervention designs, and especially in the development of group therapy 
programmes. 
Prior research and evaluations of research methods used to tap into the 
relationship between irrationality and some types of emotional distress or disturbance, 
such as social phobia, indicated that irrational beliefs are linked to some anxieties, but 
still some were affected by a variety of methodological defects (see below for a review 
of these studies under the section of measuring irrational beliefs). In brief, these studies 
(e.g., Smith, 1982; 1989) at most have ‘expressed concern about correlating self-report 
indices of irrational beliefs with self-report indices of distress’ (Deffenbacher, 1986, p. 
282). 
However, the tendency to hold irrational beliefs was positively associated with 
social anxiety and tended to correlate with negative self-statements on the Jones 
Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones, 1969) emitted in social situations. In this line, 
Craighead, Kimball, and Rehak (1977) found that subjects high on the importance of 
social approval scale of the IBT made more negative self-statements while visualizing 
social rejection scenes than did subjects low on the scale. In addition, Davison and 
Zighelboim (1987) articulated that thoughts of greater irrationality when confronted with 
a stressful social-evaluative situation than with a neutral one resulted in higher levels of 
social anxiety, confirming the observation that individuals with a tendency to become 
anxious in social situations articulated more irrational thoughts than did control subjects, 
supporting the basic assumption of cognitive-behavioural approaches that certain 
patterns of unrealistic thinking are associated with psychological distress. 
 Irrational Beliefs and Socio-emotional and Educational Adjustment 6
Some researchers (Shafi & Naseri, 1998) have described irrational beliefs as 
attitudinal beliefs, being judgemental in the first place (Ellis, 1994), and thus 
 101 
 
emphasising “a sense of obligation and compulsion, which can result in emotional and 
behavioural disorders” Al-Ali, 2004; DiLorenzo et al., 2007; Hamidi & Hosseini, 2010; 
(Hamidi & Hosseini, 2010, p. 1531) and can generate cognitive misconceptions 
(McDermut and Waga, 2003). Irrational beliefs, of all types and categories, negatively 
influence achievement, affiliation and comfort (DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner & Robin, 1988; 
Ellis, 1994; Walen et al, 1992). As such, they are considered paramount ‘cognitive 
vulnerabilities’ (Reardon & Williams, 2007, p. 626) in the sense that they affect specific 
automatic thoughts (e.g., David, Schnur & Belloiu, 2002), various emotional states, such 
as trait anxiety, trait depression, anger and guilt (Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975; Jones, 
1969), and general psychiatric symptoms, such as anxiety, depression, dysphoria etc. 
(Alden & Safran, 1978; Bernard, 1998; Jones, 1969; Malouff et al. , 1992; Solomon, 
Arnow, Gotlib & Wind, 2003). 
Adjustment is the most important indication of psychological health. It is related 
to humans’ affective, social, educational, marital and occupational domains. Social and 
emotional adjustment is of significance to human beings, especially college students, as 
it affects their social interactions and academic achievement (Al-Munaizel, 1998). Some 
claimed that social and emotional adjustment are essential to the preservation and 
sustenance of life in a series of adjustments of man to his own psychological well-being, 
interactions with other human beings and interactions within his/her immediate 
environment, including the academic environment. As such, prior research indicated that 
irrational beliefs affect psychosocial and educational adjustment (Al-Ali, 2004; 
DiLorenzo et al., 2007; Hamidi & Hosseini, 2010). Researchers believe that adjustment 
level and psychological well-being are the result of association between our ego and our 
experiences: that is, between our belief systems and behaviours (Rogers, 1961). Prior 
research revealed that irrationality is a significant predictor of emotional adjustment and 
the more one is socially and emotionally adjusted by showing unconditional and high 
levels of self-acceptance, the lower irrationality is (David et al., 2003). In this vein, 
DeBoard, Romans & Krieshok (1996) indicated that irrational beliefs and adjustment 
levels are inversely related. By the same token, if “there is a mismatch between reality 
and individual schemes (individuals’ patterns to encounter special events in the 
environment), there is likelihood that emotional breakdowns occur” (Hamidi & Hosseini, 
2010, p. 1532). Hamidi & Hosseini (2010) aptly observe that  
‘The core element of emotional disorders is the feeling of isolation and 
loneliness. Human beings need the support and sense of security that are 
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provided by others. Many experts consider positive self-respect as the 
major factor in social-emotional adjustment. It has been proposed that 
there is a reciprocal relationship between social-emotional adjustment 
and self-confidence in a way that enhancement of one of them can affect 
the strength of the other one.’ (p.1532) 
Inasmuch as beliefs are important to socio-emotive adjustment, so are they to 
educational adjustment, which is described as the interest in study and school (Karami, 
1998). Irrational beliefs can be detrimental to educational adjustment, too. Since 
educational adjustment may be impacted by variables such as motivation, mental 
capabilities, family condition, educational system, personal skills, social and cultural 
factors, and psychological factors, it is patently clear that educational adjustment is 
related to social and psychological adjustment; this correlation was detected in prior 
research, indicating that students’ adjustment at school and social and personal 
adjustment are interrelated (Hartos & Power, 2000). Furthermore, some educational 
problems such as under-achievement, dropout, absenteeismcould be be related to 
emotional maladjustment resulting from irrational beliefs. In addition,  creativity and 
innovation originate from healthy rational beliefs; in the absence of rational thinking, 
there could be a chance to develop  different forms of anxiety that impede learning (Al-
Ali, 2004; Hamidi & Hosseini, 2010). In this context, Hamidi and Hosseini (2010) 
conclude that 
‘… some parts of students’ educational problems can be related to their 
beliefs. Those students that are hardly aroused to reach a goal are coming 
from unhealthy families or from cultures in which belief systems are 
developed in an unhealthy manner. Combination of school experiences 
and unhealthy society would lead to enhancement of alienation and 
isolation from normal counterparts and normal life styles.’ (p.1532) 
These observations are commensurate with findings from empirical research that 
documented the detrimental effects of marital and family conflict scenarios within 
disintegrated families (O'Brien et al., 1991, 1995). Findings from other studies (Al-
Dulaim & Amer, 2004) indicate that irrational beliefs bolster up feelings of loneliness 
and isolation as well as consolidating the individual's feelings of disapproval and 
maladaptation. 
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 Criteria for Judging Irrational Beliefs 7
Dryden and Neenan (2006) defined irrational beliefs as ‘evaluative cognitions 
couched in the form of dogmatic and absolute musts, shoulds, have to's, got to's and 
ought's’ (p.77). Walen et al. (1992) described five characteristics of an irrational belief.  
An irrational belief is logically inconsistent, meaning that it may deduce an 
erroneous conclusion from an accurate premise. Irrational beliefs, therefore, tend to be 
extreme evaluative exaggerations of a situation, for example, ‘I failed a test and that's 
awful’ or ‘I failed a test and I'm a failure’.  
Irrational beliefs tend to be rigidly held and dogmatic in nature. Irrational beliefs 
are also inconsistent with reality and cannot be supported by empirical evidence. For 
example, a belief of ‘My wife must do what I say’ will not be supported by empirical 
evidence, as the individual holding the belief encounters situations in which his wife 
does not do what he says. The fourth criterion of an irrational belief is that it leads to 
disturbed emotions such as anger, depression, anxiety and guilt. An individual who 
rigidly adheres to a negative evaluation is likely to experience psychological disturbance 
when they encounter circumstances that disconfirm their belief (Sutton-Simon, 1981). 
For example, someone who believes ‘I must be approved of by people’ is likely to 
encounter many people who do not approve of him or her.  
The imperative and absolute features of these beliefs would lead the individual to 
respond with strong disruptive emotions. Thinking irrational thoughts and experiencing 
corresponding dysfunctional emotions is largely detrimental to people (Dryden, 2003) 
and does not allow them to achieve their goals. Ellis (1976) claimed that irrational 
beliefs are absolutistic, demanding and rigid anti-empirical evaluative cognitions related 
to the most important of therapeutic problems – human worth. Based upon a definition of 
an irrational belief being an absolutistic, rigid and illogical evaluation of activating 
experiences, one might assume that there are hundreds of specific irrational beliefs.  
However, extensive clinical observation in his practice with thousands of clients 
led Ellis to note a high degree of similarity among clients' maladaptive belief systems 
(Simon-Sutton, 1981). According to Ellis, the issue of human worth is intimately tied to 
the very core of what is usually called ‘emotional disturbance.’ Ellis (1976) believed that 
it is impossible for people to have valid self-images and that it is enormously harmful if 
they attempt to construct one. Ellis (1976, p.283) wrote: 
‘If you finally arrive, by some devious means, at a global rating of your being 
(or of your “self”), you thereby invent a magical heaven (your “worth,” 
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your “value,” your “goodness”) and a mystical hell (your “badness”). 
This deification and devilification of the individual is arrived at 
tautologically, by definition. It has no real relation to objective reality. It 
is based on a false assumption that you should or must be a certain way 
and that the universe truly cares if you are not what you ought to be. It 
refuses to acknowledge the fact that all humans are, and probably always 
will be, incredibly fallible. And it almost always results in your harshly 
condemning and punishing yourself or defensively pretending that you 
are “worthy” and “good” in order to minimise your anxiety and self-
deprecation.’ (p.283) 
Ellis formulated his ABC model to describe how adherence to such beliefs results 
in emotional distress. Ellis (1976) further explains how undesirable emotional 
consequences (e.g. anxiety, anger) are not due directly to activating events, but are the 
result of an individual’s irrational beliefs. These beliefs lead the individual to view the 
event as catastrophic in some way.  
Ellis (1962) identified 11 irrational beliefs commonly associated with emotional 
distress. These included irrational beliefs related to ego and discomfort disturbance and 
health, life-related and other-related disturbance, ego disturbance, awfulizing beliefs, low 
frustration tolerance, depreciation of self, others, and life conditions, demanding beliefs, 
and others. For more detail, see Ellis's books Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy 
(1994), and Feeling Better, Getting Better, Staying Better (2001, pp. 88-94). However, 
subsequent research has identified four categories of irrational cognitive processes: (1) 
demandingness, (2) awfulizing/catastrophizing, (3) low frustration tolerance, and (4) 
global evaluation and self-downing. These four types of irrational beliefs cover various 
content areas (e.g., performance, comfort, and affiliation) and can refer to ourselves, to 
others or to life in general (David et al., 2005).  
Irrational beliefs are typically described as evaluative beliefs (i.e., hot cognitions 
or appraisal) rather than distorted descriptions or inferences (i.e., cold cognitions: 
Szentagotai et al., 2005). Table 2 below presents this listing as it is worded in Ellis, 
1994. Although the specific wording of each of the 11 beliefs varies from text to text, the 
content of each belief remains the same. 
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Table 2: Ellis’ List of Irrational Beliefs 
Ellis's 11 Irrational Beliefs 
1. It is a dire necessity for adult humans to be loved or approved by virtually every significant 
other person in their community. 
2. One absolutely must be competent, adequate, and achieving in all important respects or else 
one is an inadequate, worthless person. 
3. People absolutely must act considerately and fairly and they are damnable villains if they do 
not. They are their bad acts. 
4. It is awful and terrible when things are not the way one would very much like them to be. 
5. Emotional disturbance is mainly externally caused and people have little or no ability to 
increase or decrease their dysfunctional feelings and behaviours. 
6. If something is or may be dangerous or fearsome one should be constantly and excessively 
concerned about it and should keep dwelling on the possibility of its occurring. 
7. One cannot and must not face life's responsibilities and difficulties and it is easier to avoid 
them. 
8. You must be quite dependent on others and need them and cannot mainly run your own life. 
9. One's past history is an all-important determiner of one's present behaviour and because 
something once strongly affected one's life, it should indefinitely have a similar effect. 
10. Other people's disturbances are horrible and one must feel very upset about them. 
11. There is invariably a right, precise, and perfect solution to human problems and it is 
catastrophic if this perfect solution is not found. 
 
Adapted from ‘Reason and emotion in psychotherapy: A comprehensive method of treating human 
disturbances,’ by A. Ellis, 1994, New York: Carol Publishing Group 
 
These categories have been found to apply to different types of irrational beliefs 
(e.g., achievement, affiliation, comfort) (e.g., DiGiuseppe et al., 1988; Ellis, 1994; Walen 
et al., 1992) and may refer to one’s own performance, other people and/or life 
conditions. While these categories are generally defined in terms of the associated 
irrational beliefs, rational beliefs within each category also exist. For example, beliefs 
associated with self-worth regarding the necessity to secure others’ approval or the 
necessity to be entirely competent will mediate between activating events and emotional 
consequences. These consequences are generally evidenced in physiological, cognitive 
and behavioural indexes of emotional distress. 
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Demandingness is viewed as a core belief involved in primary appraisal. It refers 
to absolutistic requirements expressed in the form of ‘musts’, ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ 
(e.g., ‘I must pass the exam’). The rational correspondents of demands are full 
preferences, which are flexible assertions of what the person wants. Alternatively, the 
rational counterpart stresses desires rather than demands. In therapy, individuals are 
taught to express their beliefs in the form of wishes, wants and preferences rather than 
escalating into dogmatic ‘musts’, ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ (e.g., ‘I really want to pass the 
exam, though I am aware that this may not happen’). 
In this regard, Dryden (2003, p. 29) has described the relationship between 
demandingness and the other irrational belief processes that of cause and effect; there are 
two parts to dysfunctional or irrational beliefs, but that they usually seem to be integrated 
and go together. 
The first and perhaps the most important part is people's tendency to escalate 
their strong desires and preferences into musts. The second part 
emphasises what kind of dire results will follow from people's doing 
more poorly than they supposedly must do (p. 29). 
Awfulizing/catastrophising refers to an individual’s belief that a situation is 
worse than it absolutely could be (e.g., ‘It is awful that I did not pass the exam’). More 
precisely, awfulizing beliefs refer to the extreme evaluation of a [negative] event as 
worse than it absolutely should or could be, while a rational, non-awfulizing belief refers 
to a more moderate evaluation of badness (i.e., bad rather than awful). For example, a 
rational belief would be a more moderate evaluation of badness. In REBT individuals 
learn to evaluate negative events as bad rather than awful (e.g., ‘It is very bad that I did 
not pass the exam, but this is not the end of the world’). 
Low frustration tolerance (LFT) refers to an individual’s belief that he/she will 
not be able to endure situations or have any happiness if what he/she wants does not 
exist (e.g., ‘I could not stand failing the exam’). Low frustration tolerance is the belief 
that one cannot bear certain circumstances, making a situation intolerable. HFT beliefs, 
on the other hand, assert that although a certain situation is hard to bear, it is not 
intolerable. 
The rational counterpart is statements of tolerance. Therapists teach individuals 
that they can tolerate discomfort (e.g., ‘Failing the exam would not make me feel good, 
but I could stand it’). 
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Global evaluation beliefs refer to global negative ratings about oneself (i.e., self-
downing), others and the world. The rational counterpart of global evaluation is 
unconditional self, other and world acceptance, while only rating specific behaviours. 
These beliefs appear when individuals over-generalise about others, themselves and the 
world. It is typically expressed in excessively critical (e.g., self-downing), global 
evaluations (e.g., ‘I am stupid and worthless because I did not pass the exam’). 
Acceptance of fallibility comprises the rational belief in this category. In treatment, 
individuals learn that no person can be evaluated based on a single global rating, and that 
life conditions are composed of good, bad, and neutral elements (e.g., ‘I did not pass the 
exam. It was dumb not to prepare enough, but this does not mean that I am stupid and 
worthless’). 
Irrational beliefs are considered important psychological constructs (i.e., 
cognitive vulnerability constructs). Evidence shows that irrational beliefs impact specific 
automatic thoughts, various emotional states (Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975; Jones, 
1969) and general psychiatric symptoms (Alden & Safran, 1978; Jones, 1969).  
There have been extensive reviews of Ellis's beliefs, which have been explored 
both theoretically and practically. Most of these reviews suggested that the proposition 
that irrational beliefs are responsible for a great variety of psychological and mood 
disorders, such as social anxiety, depression, etc. was met with unprecedented 
acceptance from scholars and practitioners of psychotherapy from different schools of 
thought. Ellis proposed that adherence to certain irrational ideas and the corollaries to 
which they normally lead is the primary cause of emotional disturbances via the process 
of internal re-indoctrination or autosuggestion. When at its inception, Meehl (1962) 
observed that there was considerable data obtained on the theoretical and tactical 
opinions of over 150 psychotherapists of a great variety of orientations, this made it quite 
clear that there are very few statements about the theory of psychopathology or the 
techniques of treatment that can command even near-universal assent among 
practitioners. Consequent research on the utility of the irrational beliefs theory was 
further conducted, and findings concluded that there is a wide consensus on the validity 
of the theory endorsed by psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists, psychologists and 
social workers (Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975).  
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 Measurement of Irrational Thinking 8
Ellis developed a psychotherapy approach grounded in cognitive behaviouristic 
theory. Later on, researchers tapped into the effectiveness of such cognitive therapies, 
especially the more developed form of Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT), 
harnessed for the treatment of emotional disturbances, such as social anxiety 
(DiGiuseppe, McGowan, Sutton-Simon & Gardner, 1990; Watson & Friend, 1969). 
Cognitive behaviouristic therapy covers a variety of techniques in which children and 
adolescents are taught to use cognitive meditational strategies as a means of guiding their 
behaviour, with the ultimate goal of positive behavioural and mental adjustment (Durlak 
Fuhrman & Lampman, 1991). According to DiGiuseppe et al. (1990), cognitive therapies 
and behavioural treatment conditions induce a significant reduction of anxiety specific to 
interpersonal and social behaviour. This warrants Rational-Emotive Behavioural 
Therapy (REBT) as an important treatment for anxiety, phobias and other related 
psychological problems. 
As said, this comprehensive form of psychotherapy, known as REBT, seeks to 
alter irrational beliefs in patients suffering from psychopathology and especially from 
emotional disturbances. As will be discussed in the next chapter, REBT has been widely 
investigated as an effective therapy for changing irrational beliefs to rationalised ones, 
which eventually lead to significantly less emotional distress. However, there needs to be 
a more valid and reliable inventory or measure for detecting and recognising irrational 
belief systems or structures that individuals entertain (Osman et al., 1996). There have 
been several instruments theorised and developed based on REBT theory in order to 
produce just such a measure of irrational ideation as entertained by some patients. 
8.1 Psychometric studies of Ellis's beliefs 
Ellis's theory of belief systems is basically grounded in clinical observations and 
empirical evidence, which generally support the theory, but concrete follow-up empirical 
testimony is still lacking (DiGiuseppe, 1996). Factor analytic studies have investigated 
whether or not Ellis's conceptualisation of beliefs systems is truly represented as four 
separate belief processes, as he claimed.  
In this regard, Muran, Kassinove and Dill (1992) launched a confirmatory factor 
analysis with four variations of a questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered to 
clinical and non-clinical participants. Each version of the questionnaire included a fixed 
sentence stem with four linguistic variations of each belief process. For instance, 
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demandingness was represented by the words ‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘need’ and ‘have to’, 
and awfulizing was represented by the words ‘awful’, ‘horrible’, ‘terrible’, 
‘catastrophic’. Confirmatory factor analysis, however, failed to support the four-factor 
model. The responses of clinical and non-clinical participants implied that these groups 
had different conceptualisations of irrationality. When each factor was isolated with its 
manifest variable and when the model was assessed with a single variation of the 
questionnaire at a time, there was some verification for a four-factor model among non-
clinical participants. Then, the exploratory factor analysis indicated that a general factor 
of irrationality might exist in clinical populations. These results suggested that there are 
fewer irrational beliefs among clinical subjects and that a general state of irrationality 
may be more accurately represented as a single construct. 
By the same token, factor analytic studies conducted with current measures of 
irrational beliefs also question the breakdown of irrational thinking into four separate 
belief styles or processes. DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner, and Robin (1988) and DiGiuseppe, 
Robin, Leaf, and Gorman (1989) attempted to develop an irrational beliefs measure with 
items reflecting the different subscales of demandingness (DEM), awfulizing (AWF), 
frustration intolerance (FI), and self-downing (SD). However, exploratory factor analysis 
failed to find DEM as a factor separate from the other irrational belief processes. A 
confirmatory factor analysis of the same data yielded two main factors, with DEM, AWF 
and FI loading on one factor and SD on another. 
The General Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (GABS: DiGiuseppe, Leaf, Exner & 
Robin, 1988) is a more frequently used measure of irrational beliefs that was developed 
in order to overcome the shortcomings of older measures. The GABS includes items that 
pertain to both rational and irrational beliefs and all items are cognitively worded 
(Bernard, 1990). Items were constructed to be consistent with current REBT theory and 
assess the four irrational cognitive processes of Demandingness, Awfulizing, Global Self 
Rating and Low Frustration Tolerance, as well as the three content domains of 
achievement, approval and comfort. A factor analysis conducted with the original 
version of the GABS revealed a four-factor solution that reflected the content of items 
(Bernard, 1998).  
These findings suggest that irrationality was structured around content areas such 
as the need for approval, achievement, and comfort rather than irrational processes such 
as demandingness and awfulizing. Bernard then added items to the GABS in order to 
develop an eighth subscale: a content domain subscale of fairness. Bernard (1998) 
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conducted a principal factors analysis that yielded seven factors and referred to them as 
‘Self-Downing’, ‘Other Downing’, ‘Need for Achievement’, ‘Need for Approval’, ‘Need 
for Comfort’, ‘Demands for Fairness’ and ‘Rational’. Fifty-five of the original 96 items 
loaded .40 or higher on one of the seven factors.  
One important finding from Bernard's factor analysis is that rationality emerged 
as a factor separate from irrationality. This supports REBT theory that irrational beliefs 
are a construct separate from rational beliefs. Furthermore, the underlying structure of 
irrational thinking was comprised of different factors (e.g. Self-Downing, Need for 
Approval), supporting Ellis's conception of irrationality as a multidimensional construct. 
However, while irrationality appears to consist of a number of distinct beliefs, 
beliefs characterised as rational all loaded on a ‘rational’ factor. These results suggest 
that the underlying structure of rationality is unitary and imply that if someone is rational 
in one area of his or her life, then that individual is rational across all areas (Bernard, 
1990, 1998; DiGiuseppe & Bernard, 1990, 2006). 
In Bernard's (1998) study, the construct of irrationality was divided among six 
factors, four of which reflected the content domains of achievement, approval, fairness 
and comfort. The processes of demandingness, awfulizing, and frustration intolerance 
were all subsumed within these content domains. These results suggest that the different 
dimensions of irrationality pertain to separate content areas as opposed to different 
processes. This is consistent with the results of other psychometric studies that have 
raised doubts as to whether the underlying structure of irrationality is accurately 
represented as four separate belief processes.  
The consistent findings in recent psychometric studies (e.g., Bernard, 1998; 
DiGiuseppe et al., 1988) of self-downing appearing as a factor separate from 
demandingness provide support against Ellis's argument that the process of self-downing 
is a derivative of demandingness. Furthermore, ‘the fact that DEM, AWF, and FI factor 
together suggests that these three constructs may be psychologically equivalent’ 
(DiGiuseppe, 1996, p. 14). DiGiuseppe also concluded that DEM, AWF and FI have a 
different psychological meaning from statements of self-worth. DiGiuseppe (1996) 
suggested that people might distinguish between irrational beliefs that involve the self 
and self-evaluation (i.e., self-downing) and those that refer to the outside world (DEM, 
AWF, FI). 
DiGiuseppe (1996) supported these assumptions with observations from his own 
clinical experiences. During the supervision sessions with REBT therapists, DiGiuseppe 
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(1996) observed that therapists and clients tended to use the terms demandingness 
(DEM), awfulizing (AWF) and frustration intolerance (FI) interchangeably without 
confusion. For example, if a client adhered to a belief of AWF (e.g., ‘It would be awful if 
my husband did not love me!’) they usually would respond to the therapist's disputation 
of FI (e.g., ‘would you really not stand it if your husband did not love you?’). Clients, 
however, often perceived DEM, AWF and FI to hold different meanings from statements 
of self-worth. The same client appeared confused when the therapist disputed a belief of 
SD (e.g., ‘why would you be a worthless person if he stopped loving you?’). The client, 
therefore, appeared to endorse irrational beliefs of demandingness, awfulizing and 
frustration intolerance but not self-downing. 
DiGiuseppe spoke of another client who revealed thoughts of worthlessness after 
his wife left him. DiGiuseppe explains that the psychotherapist in charge of this case 
wrongly equated self-downing (SD) with demandingness (DEM) as equivalent terms, so 
he invidiously reprimanded the client with the retort, ‘Why must you be loved by your 
wife or anyone else?’ DiGiuseppe (1996, p. 14). The patient replied he had another 
interpretation to his own case; he quizzically answered that he did not have to be loved 
by anyone, but he felt shy. 
That is what a REBT therapist should do: deconstruct an irrational belief, and 
reconstruct it in a rational fashion to help the client get rid of this rigid belief, and replace 
it with a constructive one. 
8.2 Assessing irrational beliefs 
An assessment of beliefs traditionally occurs during the course of an REBT 
session (Ellis & Dryden, 1997). During the session, assessment and treatment of 
irrationality occur almost simultaneously (Sutton-Simon & Goldfried, 1979). Both 
Socratic and didactic methods are utilised in REBT therapy in order to uncover beliefs. 
Therapists direct clients to focus on their thinking processes by asking questions such as 
‘What was going through your head at that time?’ or ‘What were you thinking?’ 
Cognitions come out as vocalised speech during the therapy session. As the clients 
verbalise their thoughts, therapists look for irrational expressions. A therapist will then 
direct the client's attention to the irrational processes of his or her thoughts using 
disputation methods. If the client does not directly express the irrational thoughts, the 
therapist hypothesises irrational thoughts that may be leading to the client's symptoms 
and shares this information with the client. The therapist may suggest an IB such as 
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‘Many people say to themselves, if my boss thinks I'm stupid that would be terrible. Are 
you thinking anything like that?’ Although the therapist's active role in the identification 
process may facilitate identification and treatment of irrationality, several negative 
outcomes may result from this direct assessment method. Sutton-Simon has suggested 
that the interviewer exerts a strong influence on the direction of the assessment ‘and thus 
may, in part, determine the picture of the clients' irrational beliefs’ (1981, p. 72).  
Despite this bias, the therapeutic session is the method generally used to assess 
for beliefs in clinical situations. By obtaining and discussing this information during the 
therapeutic session, clients are able to understand the irrational qualities that underlie 
their thoughts and change them accordingly. 
Several scales have been developed grounded in the 11 original irrational beliefs 
proposed by Ellis (1962) as the root of emotional distress as shown in the previous Table 
2. The most famous of these scales are the Jones Irrational Belief Test (as cited in Smith, 
1982), the Rational Behaviour Inventory (Shorkey & Whiteman, 1977), the Self-
Inventory (Plutchik, 1976) and the Idea Inventory (Kassinove, Crisci & Tiegerman, 
1977).  
Over 50 irrational belief measures have been developed since 1962 in order to 
assess irrational thinking processes (Ellis, 1994). Measures of beliefs have generally 
been used for research purposes. The use of accurate irrational belief measures is 
important for REBT studies, so support may be provided for Ellis's assertion that 
irrational thinking is the crucial element underlying emotional disturbance. The two 
scales that have been most commonly used in REBT research are the Irrational Beliefs 
Test (IBT: Jones, 1969) and the Rational Beliefs Inventory (RBI: Shorkey & Whiteman, 
1977). 
Preliminary scales and inventories for assessing irrational beliefs were initially 
based on a pragmatic definition, with regard to the list of 11 irrational beliefs commonly 
encountered in clinical practice (Ellis, 1962) and cited in Table 2. The first generation of 
irrational beliefs measures was grounded in Ellis’s (1962) original list of these specific, 
content-oriented irrational ideas in the table. For example, Davison, Feldman and Osbom 
(1984) constructed a reliable design for coding indices of these beliefs in thoughts 
expressed while testees visualised themselves being in stressful or neutral situations. 
However, such lists are not ideal for guiding the theoretical and empirical 
development of REBT theory and its maxims, now that they provide less ground for 
deciding whether or how specific beliefs could be considered irrational. In reality, lists of 
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specific irrational belief sets grew to include hundreds of specific irrational ideas, but 
that was too broad to fit within an empirically verifiable theory.  
Psychometrically, validation and reliability assessment of scales is a necessary 
step towards buttressing REBT as a rigid theory as well as providing researchers with 
solid measures of change for clinical outcome studies (Terjesen, Salhany & Sciutto, 
2009). Reviewers of irrationality measures (e.g. Bessai and Lane 1976; Ramanaiah et al. 
1987; Smith 1982, 1989) have assessed the psychometric characteristics of such 
measures of irrational beliefs, concluding that most of these scales are flawed for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, assuming later developments and amendments in the theory of RET, the 
inventories were not deemed as a valid representation of the present theory of rational-
emotive behavioural therapy, which clearly addresses the content validity of the scales. 
Secondly, these scales include items which measure the criteria (i.e., emotional upset) 
that irrational belief inventories are supposed to predict and consequently possibly inflate 
the predictive ability of the scales, by generating a biased impression of evidence to 
bolster up the theory of REBT. 
These inventories were used in small-scale and large-scale research studies, 
giving testimony to a positive correlation between irrational thinking and negative 
emotionality; however, there were many problems with these inventories. For instance, 
Sutton-Simon, DiGiuseppe & Miller, (1978) raised doubts as to the reliability and 
validity of these scales, given that they lack ample normative data.  
In addition, Smith (1982) indicated that irrational beliefs were not assessed by 
these inventories per se, irrespective of the emotional consequences that they were 
believed to bring forth. Smith also showed that some of the items in such inventories 
impinge on concepts as well as irrational ideation. For example, ‘When awful things 
happen, I get angry.’ Such items in their present phraseology clearly mystify irrational 
ideation and negative emotionality. In this way, the assessment of beliefs is ‘typically 
intended to evaluate more static, stable cognitive structures’ (Smith, 1982, p. 508).  
In other words, Smith (1982; 1989) indicated that one of the problems with 
measures of irrational beliefs like the IBT and the RBI is that some of the items have 
emotional content that overlaps with the item content in common measures of 
psychological symptoms [for example, ‘I get angry when terrible things happen at work’ 
(Demaria, Kassinove & Dill, 1989, p. 330)]. Such overlap may artificially inflate the 
correlations between measures of irrational beliefs and symptoms (Chang & D’Zurilla, 
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1996; Smith, 1982, 1989). In addition, Robb and Warren (1990) further analysed the 
content of the measures and concluded that they contained beliefs or cognitions that are 
not irrational beliefs but rather inferences or automatic thoughts. Yet, conceptual 
problems in the development, manipulation and use of many of the existing scales of 
irrational beliefs still exist. 
Possibly, these instruments might have been measuring the broad-band 
disposition of negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984) rather than irrationality per 
se. Furthermore, given participants’ lack of awareness of their own irrational beliefs, 
such self-report/questionnaire methods may be inappropriate for assessing irrationality 
(Brady & Kendall, 1992; Kendall & Korgeski, 1979). 
Given these defects about these inventories, some REBT researchers attempted to 
construct a measure that overcomes the problems of such scales, e.g., by separating 
irrational ideation from negative emotionality. Many measures of irrational thinking 
were constructed in an attempt to alleviate previous problems.  
In this vein, several such scales and tests of irrational thinking were developed in 
an attempt to clear with these problems. One such test was the Personal Beliefs Test 
(PBT), which consisted of 60 items answered on a three-point Likert scale (DiGiuseppe 
& Kassinove, 1976; Kassinove, 1986). This scale sought to measure irrational ideation 
based on four core beliefs that had been reduced from Ellis’ original 11: namely, 
awfulizing, low frustration tolerance, self-worth judgments and demandingness 
(Kassinove, 1986). Demandingness was further divided into self-directed shoulds and 
other-directed shoulds. As such, these sub-scales of the PBT formed the measure of the 
basic tenets of REBT theory.  
However, the PBT was further revised in the light of REBT theory maxims. This 
eventually resulted in a new inventory, the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB), which 
somewhat varied from its previous version (PBT), being comprised of 50 items rateable 
on a six-point Likert scale and designed for adults above the age of 16, thus 
corresponding to overall irrational ideation criteria outlined in REBT theory (Demaria et 
al., 1989). In this way, too, superfluous phraseology related to affect or emotional 
consequences was removed in order for irrational thinking to be possibly measured 
independently from the emotional antecedents of the ideation.  
Further, Smith (1989) has reported a movement towards hypothesizing fewer, 
more abstract, core irrational beliefs in the rational-emotive literature (Bernard and 
DiGiuseppe, 1989; Campbell, 1985; Ellis, 1984, 1985, 1987; Kendall et al., 1995; Ellis 
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& Blau, 1997; Walen et al. 1992; Warren, Zgourides & Jones, 1989). Ellis and Dryden 
(1987) modified the initial list of 11 irrational beliefs to three. Current tests should be 
developed on this theory and contain no more factors than are necessary. 
Bridges and Harnish (2010) further noted that ‘Despite the importance of 
irrational beliefs assessment, there have been no comprehensive reviews of the tests 
based on both the theories of Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck currently available to 
clinicians and investigators’ (p. 862). The two authors have critically reviewed and 
assessed the empirical work on irrational beliefs assessment and identified 25 scales and 
techniques, which they have studied with regard to their psychometric properties. 
Notably, Bridges and Harnish (2010) criticised early measures of irrational beliefs, 
including the Irrational Beliefs Test, the Rational Behaviour Inventory and the Idea 
Inventory currently in use today, on the basis that their psychometric properties are still 
in doubt. They thought that large portions of these scales lack internal consistency, 
validity and reliability, as some of the items in these scales assess both rational and 
irrational beliefs as well as emotional and behavioural responses associated with these 
beliefs. However, one cannot take these observations for granted.  
The claims of Bridges and Harnish (2010) are refutable on the grounds of the 
findings from the pilot study upon which the present investigation is based. The 
researcher piloted the IBI on a large number of participants (n = 500), which bore out a 
high reliability coefficient, inasmuch as it was adjudicated by a jury of professors from 
different countries in the Middle East, the Arabic version of it having proven valid 
enough to be run for collecting reliable data on irrational beliefs in targeted populations. 
The researchers commended highly the use of newly developed measures which 
‘possess better psychometric properties compared to the earlier, more frequently used, 
scales’ (Bridges & Harnish, 2010, p., 873). They suggested that ‘our recommendation for 
clinicians and researchers interested in assessing irrational beliefs are to use the newer 
and more specialised measures of irrationality’ (p. 873). Yet, they explain that older, 
flawed irrationality tests are still in use more commonly and frequently than the newer, 
more valid, more reliable scales, for their popularity and convenience, as well as for their 
ease of use. 
8.3 Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) 
The Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) was first developed by Jones (1969), 
becoming the most used irrationality test since then. A thorough search by Woods (1992) 
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tapping into the first 20 years since the IBT came into use, recognised 81 journal articles 
and 25 unpublished doctoral dissertations in which the IBT was used as a tool for data 
collection or as the focus of validation and reliability assessment. Contrary to the 
observations raised by Bridges and Harnish (2010) and refuted by the present researcher 
in his pilot study, one would concur with Woods (1992) on the usefulness of the IBT in 
assessing irrational beliefs. Woods, in his synthesis study, also observed that numerous 
authors and researchers have systematically used the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) 
over four decades with over 2,000 clients, students, workshop participants and people in 
RET training, concluding that the scale was good enough to be used for collecting 
information on irrational thinking patterns in these targeted populations of patients with 
‘a variety of problems including headaches and other psychosomatic disorders, Type A 
Behaviour, anxiety, anger, and suicidal contemplation … as well as its value in therapy’ 
(Woods, 1992, p.12). 
However, this measure of irrational thinking was prone to criticism in some 
evaluation research for some of the content of its items (Muran, 1991; Smith, 1982, 
1989; Smith & Allred, 1986). Smith’s (1982) major criticism was that there is a clear 
lack of discriminant validity for the Irrational Belief Test (Jones, 1969). 
Nonetheless, this measure is still a valid and reliable method of collecting data 
about irrational belief systems in individuals, especially if another effective instrument 
were to be used in gleaning information about beliefs and the psychological construct 
being investigated, e.g., attitudes, or any other psychological dispositions (Woods, 
1992). The reason is that it has been suggested by Sutton-Simon & Goldfried (1979) that 
social anxiety has a larger cognitive component than other types of trait and state 
anxieties, because social anxiety involves implicit cognitive concerns with the evaluation 
of others, while other anxieties, such as acrophobia (extreme or irrational fear of 
heights), may be related to conditioned anxiety responses accompanied by minimal 
cognitive distortion. Given this testimony and explanation by Sutton-Simon and 
Goldfried (1979), several researchers and reviewers have suggested that further 
replications of the nature of irrational beliefs among clinical samples should be 
conducted in different milieus and cultures, that the validity of the irrational beliefs 
scales needs to be established for specific classes of anxiety disorders, and that research 
is lacking into the specific irrational beliefs among people with social phobia, which 
warrants extensive and expansive research efforts in different culture (Himle, Himle & 
Thyer, 1989). 
 117 
 
Part II: Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) in the Treatment of Social 
Anxiety Disorder 
1 Introduction 
There are three psychological factors hypothesised in the maintenance of SAD: 
these are cognitive biases, deficits in social skills and operant conditioning (Kashdan & 
Herbert, 2001). 
The factors hypothesised to generate and maintain SADs address three types of 
models or theories, namely, cognitive theories, the deficit in social skills theory and 
operant conditioning theory. According to cognitive models, SAD is triggered through 
the maintenance of maladaptive beliefs and the subsequent somatic arousal induced by 
the resultant negative thoughts (Clark & Wells, 1995; Musa & Lepine, 2000).  
As explained earlier, young people who suffer from social anxiety hold beliefs 
that lead them to behave in ways that will elicit rejection or negative evaluation of 
others. These beliefs, in turn, manifest in physiological and behavioural symptoms of 
anxiety (Musa & Lepine, 2000). Any accompanying physiological reactions such as 
blushing, sweating and heart palpitations are then interpreted as evidence of negative 
performance, thereby increasing the rate of social anxiety in youths (Kashdan & Herbert, 
2001). 
Another theory, the deficits in social skills theory, has been suggested to explain 
the maintenance of SAD. Studies examining social performance in adolescents with and 
without SAD revealed that young adults with SAD are significantly more anxious and 
exhibit poorer social performance on behavioural assessment tasks compared to non-
anxious cohorts in controlled treatments (Beidel, Turner & Morris, 1999; Spence, 
Donovan & Brechman-Toussaint, 2000). 
A third theory of operant conditioning explains that negative reinforcement of 
avoidance behaviours is assumed to bear its negative effect in collaboration with parent-
child interaction styles, peer relations and perceived and imagined social threat or trauma 
in the maintenance of social anxiety (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). Negative reinforcement 
may occur when the anxiety-stricken person seeks to avert social phobia-provoking 
situations or experiences a sense of relief upon avoiding anticipatory social anxiety 
situations (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). The unhappy consequences of these operant 
factors is that avoidance coping patterns can have detrimental effects on social life 
developmental tasks and can become more difficult to modify or reform by lapse of time 
(Vasey & Ollendick, as cited in Kashdan & Herbert, 2001).  
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No matter how rapid the growth in research on the phenomenology of social 
anxiety is, the cause(s) of this disorder are identified only vaguely in the pertinent 
literature. Yet, some theories have been suggested to explain the aetiology of SAD. 
According to these theories, social anxiety can be caused by genetic factors, 
temperament, prior family antecedents, learning and environmental experiences, 
parenting styles, poor interpersonal skills and biases in pre- and post-attentive cognitive 
processing (Kendall & Suveg, 2006; Spence et al., 2000). 
Therefore, several approaches to the treatment of social anxiety have emerged in 
the light of these hypothesised factors, such as the traditional psychodynamic therapy, in 
vivo and exposure therapy, dialectical behavioural therapy, acceptance and commitment 
therapy and other social skills developing programmes. Different approaches to the 
treatment of SAD can be succinctly overviewed as below. 
1.1 Psycho-education 
This approach to treatment proposes that once an individual recognises negative 
thoughts and maladaptive beliefs, corrections in information processing can be made 
(Beck & Weishaar, 2005). The treatment for SAD usually begins with a psycho-
educational component in which information is provided about SAD and anxiety is 
discussed as a normal response (Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; Khalid-Khan et al., 2007). 
1.2 Systematic desensitisation 
This treatment approach usually combines exposure principles with cognitive 
restructuring techniques, although some forms of CBT rely more heavily on cognitive 
techniques and behavioural experiments than on exposure (Clark et al., 2003). The most 
widely taught cognitive behavioural skills that target the physiological symptoms of 
social anxiety involve training in relaxation strategies (Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; 
Khalid-Khan et al., 2007) and systematic desensitisation, a complex but very practical 
intervention strategy that has been used for several decades (Antony & Swinson, 2000). 
The use of exposure is based on models of fear development that implicate the learned 
nature of particular fears and the instrumental role that avoidance plays in maintaining 
anxiety (Clark et al., 2003). 
1.3 Relaxation training 
Applied relaxation techniques can be employed in therapy to combat the 
physiological effects of social anxiety. Individuals are provided with instruction on 
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progressive muscle relaxation, cue-controlled relaxation and skill generalisation in social 
situations (Rowa & Antony, 2005). Deep relaxation can help to reduce anxiety (Antony 
& Swinson, 2000). Regular practice of deep relaxation of 20 to 30 minutes on a daily 
basis can produce, over time, a generalisation of relaxation; that is, after several weeks of 
practising deep relaxation once per day, individuals will tend to feel more relaxed all the 
time (Antony & Swinson, 2000). 
1.4 Social skills training 
Social skills training has long been used as an intervention for socially withdrawn 
and anxious adolescents (Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; Merrell, 2001; Reinecke, Dattilio & 
Freeman, 2006; Velting & Albano, 2001). Most socially withdrawn youths tend to 
experience significant anxiety regarding their social experiences (Ginsburg & Grover, 
2005). They may feel a great deal of fear in tackling common school situations, such as 
answering a teacher’s questions in front of the whole class, speaking in public, asking 
questions of teachers or other students, or initiating conversations with peers (Merrell, 
2001).  
In addition to exhibiting shyness and withdrawal, and not interacting with their 
peers, socially withdrawn or anxious young people often have poor social problem-
solving skills (Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; Reinecke et al., 2006; Velting & Albano, 2001) 
and are less likely than their peers to engage in social problem solving after they have 
experienced a failure in trying to deal with a social situation (Merrell, 2001). They are 
likely to give up and withdraw from social situations rather than experience the 
discomfort and embarrassment they perceive will occur if they fail in these situations 
(Merrell, 2001). For socially anxious and withdrawn adolescents, social skills training 
offers a practical intervention tool to increase their ability to deal with social situations 
(Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; Merrell, 2001; Reinecke et al., 2006; Velting & Albano, 
2001). 
1.5 Rational emotive therapy 
This intervention approach, later referred to as rational emotive behavioural 
therapy (REBT), is based on the assumption that many emotional problems such as 
depression and anxiety are caused by irrational thinking and mistaken assumptions 
(Merrell, 2001). These maladaptive beliefs or irrational thoughts are conducive to low 
self-esteem, unnecessary guilt and shame, psychological stress and maladaptive 
problem-solving. 
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From this literature, two treatments have gained the most empirical support: 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and pharmacotherapy (Ginsburg & Grover, 2005; 
Rowa & Antony, 2005). However, due to the fact that this research was designed to 
present REBT as a treatment modality for SAD, pharmacotherapy and social skills 
programmes have not been addressed. 
2 Rationale for Choosing REBT as the Underlying Model for this Study 
In reviewing the status of research in the area of SADs, the literature pointed to 
the paucity of research on the treatment of socially-phobic patients using cognitive 
therapy models. However, a number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy on social anxiety. Most studies involved a comparison of social-skills 
training and cognitive restructuring in non-clinical populations.  
However, results of these studies are equivocal and treatments based on 
dysfunctional cognitions have generally not added to the effectiveness of social-skills 
training. Proponents of the social skills-deficit model of social anxiety maintain that this 
disorder can emanate from a lack of social skills within the patients’ behavioural 
repertoire and that the anxiety may be overcome through social skills training.  
In a different vein, a number of clinical studies (e.g. Falloon, Lindley, McDonald 
& Marks, 1977; Hall & Goldberg, 1977; Jerremalm & Johansson, 1981; Marzillier, 
Lambert & Kellett, 1976; Trower, Yardley, Bryant & Shaw, 1978) have shown social-
skills training to be of value in the treatment of social anxiety, but it is unclear whether 
the effects of treatment are the results of social-skills training per se. Exposure in vivo 
may account for at least part of the effects achieved with such skills-training approaches 
(Emmelkamp, 1982).  
Recently, cognitive models proposing for the explanation and treatment of social 
anxiety emphasise the role of information processing in human responses and adaptation 
(Beck & Weishaar, 2005). Thus, when one perceives that the situation requires a 
response, for instance, cognitive, emotional, motivational and behavioural schemas get 
ready to work out their effect on human social behaviour (Beck & Weishaar, 2005).  
As such, cognitive theory proposes that humans have cognitive schemas that are 
comprised of perceptions of themselves and others, aims and beliefs, memories, 
imaginations and prior experiences. These are believed to greatly affect, if not gear, the 
processing of information (Beck & Weishaar, 2005). Cognitive theorists, therefore, 
believe that well-adjusted functioning is present when an individual is making 
reasonable and adaptive interpretations of events (Beck & Weishaar, 2005). Therefore, it 
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is assumed that it is not life events that determine well-adjusted functioning but a 
realistic view of self and others (Beck & Weishaar, 2005). 
On the other hand, cognitive theory assumes that maladaptive responses 
sometimes occur because ‘of misperceptions, misinterpretations, or dysfunctional, 
idiosyncratic interpretations of situations’ (Beck & Weishaar, 2005, p. 238). It is 
assumed that one’s negative internal soliloquies can lead to maladaptive responses 
(Corey, 2009). According to Corey, the ways in which one ‘monitors and instructs 
themselves, gives themselves praise or criticism, interprets events, and makes predictions 
shed considerable light on the dynamics of emotional disorders’ (p. 345). 
In light of these considerations, it seemed worthwhile to investigate the relative 
contribution of REBT in the treatment of SAD. 
3 Origin of REBT 
Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) was founded in 1955 by Albert 
Ellis, an American clinical psychologist, as a result of his early training in 
psychoanalysis. Albert Ellis found that greater benefits were achieved in less time if 
therapy was focused on current thought processes, as opposed to past relationships, the 
then chosen method of psychoanalysis (Ellis, 1994).  
Based on his response to the inefficiency of psychoanalysis, Ellis is considered 
the founder of REBT, although its foundations had been established centuries before. 
Epictetus, a stoic philosopher, stated, ‘People are disturbed not by events, but by the 
views they have of those events.’7 (Cited in Ellis, 1973, p. 166) Ellis developed a 
formula based on such observations showing the manner in which people respond 
emotionally and behaviourally to most life events. The theory of REBT, according to 
Ellis (1975), suggests that ‘humans rarely change and keep disbelieving a profound self-
defeating belief unless they often act against it’ (Ellis, 1975, p.20). 
Dryden and Neenan (2006) mentioned that the development of the REBT 
approach started originally as Rational Therapy (RT), for Ellis wanted to emphasise its 
rational and cognitive features. By this name, Ellis demonstrated the philosophical 
influences, largely drawn from stoicism that had influenced his creation of this 
psychotherapy approach. In 1961, Ellis changed the name to Rational Emotive Therapy 
to avoid criticisms levelled at the negligence of emotions; in 1993, about three decades 
                                                 
7
 This saying can be traced in Epictetus, Hastings Crossley (trans.) (1914). The Golden Sayings of Epictetus. The 
Harvard Classics. Harvard University Press. 
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later, Ellis renamed the approach yet again, ‘calling it Rational Emotive Behaviour 
Therapy to show critics that it did not neglect behaviour’ (Dryden and Neenan, 2006, 
p.1). 
Ellis changed the name from Rational Emotive Therapy to Rational Emotive 
Behavioural Therapy in an article titled ‘Why rational-emotive therapy to rational 
emotive behaviour therapy?’ published in the Psychotherapy Journal in 1999; in fact, 
Ellis stated that Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) was wrongly named 
Rational Therapy (RT) in 1955 and then Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) in 1961.  
Ellis (1999) explicates that rational therapy addresses both cognition and 
emotion, and is uniquely behavioural, as it emphasises in vivo desensitisation. Thus, it 
views thinking, feeling and behaving as integrated and holistic processes, thereby 
incorporating cognitive, emotional and behavioural procedures in the treatment of 
psychopathology. According to Ellis (1999, p.154), ‘Rational emotive behaviour therapy 
is a preferable and more accurate term than RT or RET.’ 
The inclusion of the descriptor ‘behavioural’ refers to the fact that REBT ‘is, at 
one and the same time, highly rational-persuasive-interpretive-philosophical and 
distinctly emotive-directive-active-work-centred’ (Ellis, 1990, p. 330), and yet, it is ‘one 
of the relatively few techniques which include large amounts of actions, work, and 
“homework” assignments of a so-called nonverbal nature’ (Ibid., p. 334).  
Therefore, Ellis (1999, p. 155) elaborates that “REBT is one of the most 
behaviourally oriented of the cognitive behaviour therapies”. This therapy approach 
allows psychotherapists to systematically use imaginal desensitisation methods as well 
as in vivo exposure techniques to control anxiety-provoking situations in social phobia 
(Mersch, Jansen & Arntz , 1994; Wolpe, 1958). This approach also provides therapy to 
clients while they are in situations that are possibly conducive to psychological disease, 
and it purposefully does so until a person will change their disturbed feelings and 
irrational beliefs, leaving them the opportunity to continue in their anxiety-provoking 
situations or to abandon these situations of their free volition. REBT therapists, for this 
goal, can employ emotive-dramatic exercises, such as the shame-attacking exercise, and 
employ more behaviour-modification procedures than other behavioural or cognitive 
therapeutic procedures (Ellis, 1969, 1973). 
In point of fact, in his manifesto of Rational Psychotherapy, the first article on 
the topic, which he presented at the American Psychological Association Convention in 
Chicago on August 31, 1956, Ellis declared from the very beginning that rational 
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psychotherapy is in fact rational emotive behavioural psychotherapy, and it started like 
this in practice, but the designation was short of naming the other factors emphasised in 
this kind of psychotherapy. Ellis (1958) stated that people possibly possess four basic 
processes – perception, movement, thinking and emotion – all of which are integrally 
interrelated. Ellis (1958) thus explained the linkage between emotion, cognition and 
behaviour as follows: 
‘[T]hinking, aside from consisting of bioelectric changes in brain cells, and in 
addition to comprising remembering, learning, problem solving, and 
similar psychological processes, also is, and to some extent has to be, 
sensory, motor, and emotional behaviour. Emotion, like thinking and the 
sensory-motor processes, we may define as an exceptionally complex 
state of human reaction which is integrally related to all the other 
perception and response processes. It is not one thing, but a combination 
and holistic integration of several seemingly diverse, yet actually closely 
related phenomena.’ (Ellis, 1958, p.35) 
Ellis’s book Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy (1962) is considered his 
developed, mature manifesto for this kind of rational emotive therapy approach, and is 
viewed as a seminal work in the field, since it initiated several books and guides to 
REBT psychotherapy, such as Reason to Change: A REBT Workbook by Windy Dryden 
(2001), and Getting Started with REBT: A Concise Guide for Clients by Windy Dryden 
(2006). Ellis himself published two important books in which he revised and refined his 
theoretical and practical considerations about the approach, namely: Feeling Better, 
Getting Better, Staying Better: Profound Self-help Therapy for Your Emotions (2001) 
and The Road to Tolerance: The Philosophy of REBT (2004b). In actuality, there have 
been more than 75 books written or edited by Ellis himself on REBT. 
4 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy: The Mother Theory 
Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is being used increasingly in 
psychotherapy, with some researchers considering it as one of the ‘most effective and 
scientific therapies for use with people with psychological problems’ (MacInnes, 2004, 
p.685). But, CBT is a generic approach, including more than 20 different psycho-
therapeutic theories. Mahoney and Arnkoff (1978) proposed three central themes for 
cognitive-behaviour therapies: (1) human behaviour and affective patterns (adaptive or 
maladaptive) develop through cognitive processes such as selective attention or symbolic 
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coding; (2) these processes are activated by procedures similar to those in the human 
learning laboratory; and (3) the therapist functions as a diagnostician-educator who, after 
assessing maladaptive cognitive processes, arranges for learning experiences which will 
alter cognition and, in turn, behaviour-affect patterns. MacInnes (2004) contends that the 
effectiveness of CBT is widely supported by the fact that ‘practitioners have reported 
changes in beliefs and consequent emotional responses’ (MacInnes, 2004, p. 685). 
Furthermore, Ellis and Grieger (1977, p.22) suggest that ‘it is what individuals 
tell themselves about external circumstances and events that cause emotional 
disturbance, and not the events themselves.’ As previously indicated, researchers have 
found a relationship between people’s cognitive structures, irrational beliefs, and social 
anxiety (Davison & Zighelboim, 1987; Rohsenhow & Smith, 1982; Sutton-Simon & 
Goldfried, 1979).  
There is a nexus between social anxiety and the frequency, degree and duration 
of self-focused thoughts and negative self-referent thinking, known as anxious self-
preoccupation (Hope, Gansler & Heimberg, 1989), irrational thinking (Ellis & Grieger, 
1977) or self-absorption (Ingram, 1990). Social interaction dynamics that shift or redirect 
the attention of the individual from unhealthy internal monologues to sociable 
interactions with people rely heavily on the feedback system with what it provides of 
negative or positive evaluations and which can trigger anxiety in social situations (Hope, 
Rapee, Heimberg & Dombeck, 1990). 
Previous research has identified the roles of self-focused attention (e.g. 
Vassilopoulos, 2004), irrational beliefs (e.g. Gormally et al., 1981) and rumination and 
post-event processing (e.g. Fehm, Schneider & Hoyer, 2007; Kocovski & Rector, 2007) 
in developing or nurturing social anxiety. Findings from such research indicate that 
cognitive therapy is often a vital component in the treatment of social anxiety 
(Rodebaugh et al., 2004), including variations of Cognitive-Behavioural Theory (CBT), 
REBT, REST and other related therapies. 
In criticising RET as the master or mother theory of REBT, by analysing Ellis’s 
performance in regard with RET-specific skills, one has to take into consideration that 
‘RET was both a counselling theory and a philosophy of life’ (Weinrach et al., 2001, p., 
45). In this context, Weinrach et al. (2001) in another study conducted a content analysis 
in which the authors categorised Ellis’s statements according to Ivey and Ivey’s (2003) 
micro-counselling skills model. They concluded that the core of RET is to carve out 
emotional changes in the personality of the client, and these emotional changes affect 
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their belief systems, their feelings and behaviours, and perhaps their philosophy of life; it 
is these changes that bring forth solutions to psychological disturbances. Weinrach 
concluded that therapy must include deep changes in the belief systems of patients as 
well as in their feelings and behaviours, which requires, in turn, ‘profound changes in the 
client’s philosophy’ (Weinrach et al., 2001, p., 45). 
As an emergent theory spawned by CBT, REBT has as central tenets two 
principles that set it apart from other cognitive therapies. It considers that at the core of 
emotional disturbance lies a set of four irrational beliefs that people hold about 
themselves, other people and the world, whilst there are four corresponding rational 
beliefs that are at the core of psychological health. One of the central tenets of REBT is 
that these evaluative beliefs mediate the view that people have about events and produce 
the emotional, behavioural and inferential reactions to these events.  
Ellis, in 1986, self-critiquing his psychotherapy theory and its tenets as launching 
from RET wrote that despite the fact that RET was the pioneering school of cognitive-
behavioural therapy and here including in vivo desensitisation and homework 
assignments, this approach has witnessed huge developments since it was introduced in 
1965. This approach, as currently practised, involves several other methods, including 
but not restricted to ‘cognitive distraction, modelling, semantic analysis, problem 
solving, psycho-educational materials, rational humorous songs, rational-emotive 
imagery, shame attacking exercises, behavioural reinforcement, skill training’, etc. (Ellis, 
1986, p. 648). 
The theoretical and practical underpinnings of REBT have emphasised a special 
type of beliefs, namely irrational beliefs, sometimes described as evaluative or hot 
beliefs. These build up the main constructs in Ellis’ cognitive theory of emotion (Ellis, 
1994). Ellis (1956) at first suggested that 12 irrational beliefs cause psycho-emotional 
disturbance. Rational emotive theory now focuses on the single, abstract category of 
absolutistic evaluative beliefs prone to categorisation into four types of irrational beliefs 
(Ellis, 1994; Walen et al., 1992). These four irrational beliefs are: demands, awfulizing, 
low frustration tolerance, and self or other downing, whilst the four rational beliefs are: 
preferences, anti-awfulizing, HFT, and self/other acceptance.  
These inferential reactions can be considered as the cognitive consequences that 
accompany the emotional reaction to an event (Dryden, 1995). Such beliefs are usually 
expressed by clients in statements such as ‘the world, circumstances, you, and I should 
be different!’ or ‘the world, circumstances, you, or I are utterly, completely 
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unacceptable’ (Ellis, 1994; Walen et al., 1992). Furthermore, such thoughts/beliefs are 
believed to be particularly associated with feeling/sensations, such as anger, anxiety, 
depression, and guilt, and behaviours, as well as behavioural tendencies, such as 
procrastination or hostile aggression (Bernard, 1998).  
A more contemporary paradigm of irrational beliefs (Walen et al., 1992) makes a 
clear distinction between evaluative processes and the content of these processes (i.e., 
affiliation, approval, achievement, comfort, fairness and control). Therefore, when 
someone experiences a negative emotion, such as anxiety, the accompanying inference 
would be a perception of threat or danger. All negative emotional reactions have 
accompanying inferential reactions. (Dryden, 2001) 
5 Ego Health and Irrational Thinking 
Irrational beliefs, whatever they are, are generated and cogitated in two basic 
ways that defeat or disturb the human being: in one way, the self is cause and victim of 
irrationality through what is termed ‘ego disturbance’, and in another way, irrationality 
brings forth clients’ emotional or physical comfort in what is termed ‘discomfort 
disturbance’.  
Ellis first made this distinction between ego disturbance and discomfort 
disturbance clear in 1979–80, when he published an important two-part article on 
discomfort anxiety and contrasted this with ego anxiety (Dryden, 1999; Ellis, 1979b; 
1979c, 1980;). Dryden (2009) defines ego disturbances as ‘self-depreciation’. This act of 
self-depreciation occurs when individuals make demands on themselves, and 
consequently, fail to meet these demands. It involves: (a) the process of giving my ‘self’ 
a global negative rating; and (b) ‘devilifying myself’ as being bad or less worthy. This 
second process rests on a theological concept, and implies either that I am undeserving 
of pleasure on earth or that I should rot in hell as a subhuman (devil) (Dryden, 2009, p. 
43). 
Ego disturbance is also found in demands on others (e.g. ‘You must treat me well 
or I am no good’) and in demands on life conditions (e.g.’I must be promoted and if I am 
not I am useless’). Froggatt (2005) further explains that ego disturbance implies an upset 
to the self-image. This upset emanates from holding demands about oneself: e.g. ‘I must 
… do well/not fail/get approval from others’ followed by negative self-evaluations such 
as: ‘When I fail / get disapproval / etc.’ These beliefs create ‘ego anxiety’, which is an 
emotional tension induced by irrational self-perceptions that threaten the worth of the 
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ego, thus being conducive to other problems such as avoidance of anxiety-provoking 
situations. These situations result in discomfort disturbances.  
Dryden (2009) defines discomfort disturbances as emanating from the irrational 
belief that one must feel comfortable and have comfortable life conditions. Conclusions 
that stem from this premise are (a) its awful when these life conditions do not exist; and 
(b) I can't stand the discomfort when these life conditions do not exist. On the other 
hand, discomfort disturbance occurs in different forms and is crucial to a full 
understanding of a variety of emotional and behavioural disturbances such as unhealthy 
anger, agoraphobia, depression, procrastination and alcoholism. Drydan (2009) further 
observed that discomfort disturbance is a persistent impediment to cause “productive 
psychological change and is thus a major form of resistance to change in psychotherapy” 
(p. 44). 
It is useful to note that, according to REBT theory, demands made on other 
people either involve ego disturbance (for example ‘You must approve of me and if you 
don't it proves that I am less worthy’) or discomfort disturbance (‘You must approve of 
me and give me what I must have and if you don't I can't bear it and you are no good for 
giving me such discomfort’), and thus do not represent a (third) fundamental human 
disturbance, since they include one or other of the two fundamental disturbances. 
By the same token, Froggatt (2005) further explains discomfort disturbances as 
ones that result from demands about others (e.g. ‘People must treat me right’) and about 
the world (e.g. ‘the circumstances under which I live must be the way I want’). As such, 
discomfort disturbance are potentially generated by low frustration-tolerance (LFT) 
which results from frustrating demands, followed by catastrophising.  
In his first paper (1956) on the topic, describing REBT, Albert Ellis wrote, ‘Once 
you believe the kind of nonsense included in illogical ideas, you will tend to become 
inhibited, defensive, guilty, anxious, ineffective, inert, uncontrolled, or depressed’ 
(p.112).  
6 REBT and Ego Health 
According to REBT theory there are two types of psychological health: ego 
health and discomfort tolerance.  
6.1 Ego health 
The most common form of ego health is unconditional self-acceptance. This 
occurs when one holds preferences about oneself, but does not demand that one must 
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achieve these preferences. When one accepts oneself, one acknowledges that one is a 
fallible human being who is constantly in flux and too complex to be given a single 
legitimate rating. REBT theory advocates that it is legitimate, and often helpful, to rate 
one's traits, behaviours, etc., but that it is not legitimate to rate one's self at all, even in a 
global positive manner, since positive self-rating tends to be conditional on doing good 
things, being loved and approved, and so on. 
Ego health is also found in non-dogmatic preferences about others (e.g. ‘I want 
you to treat me well, but you do not have to do so. If you don't, I am the same fallible 
human being as I would be if you did treat me well’) and in non-dogmatic preferences 
about life conditions (e.g. ‘I want to be promoted, but it isn't essential that I am. If I am 
not, I am not useless. I am acceptable as a human being with good, bad and neutral 
points’). 
6.2 Discomfort tolerance 
This stems from the rational belief, ‘I want to feel comfortable and have 
comfortable life conditions, but I don't need to have such comfort in my life’. 
Conclusions that stem from this premise are (a) it’s bad, but not awful when these life 
conditions do not exist; and (b) ‘I can stand the discomfort when these life conditions do 
not exist’. Discomfort tolerance is central to dealing with a range of psychological 
problems and is a hallmark of what is known as psychological resilience in that it 
encourages people to face up to life adversities and cope with them head on, with 
difficulty to be sure, particularly in the short term, but ultimately to good effect in the 
longer term. Discomfort tolerance also encourages people to work hard and to be 
persistent in effecting productive psychological change and its presence augurs well for 
change in psychotherapy. Finally, discomfort tolerance forms the basis of a philosophy 
of long-range hedonism: the pursuit of meaningful long-term goals while tolerating the 
deprivation of attractive short-term goals, which are self-defeating in the longer term. 
According to REBT theory, non-dogmatic preferences about people either 
involve ego health (for example, ‘I would like you to approve of me but you don't have 
to do so and if you don't I can still accept myself’) or discomfort tolerance (‘I want you 
to approve of me and give me what I must have, but you don't have to do so. If you don't 
I can bear it’), and thus do not represent a distinct form of psychological health, since 
they include one or other of the two fundamental types of psychological health. 
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The reader has to pay close attention to the description of disturbance, brought on 
by irrational beliefs, spreading across one's ideas, emotions and behaviours. This sounds 
very much like the associative network of a schema, one in which certain powerful ideas, 
such as irrational ideas, play a central organizing role. 
Considering that these irrational beliefs are evaluative beliefs, it is conceptualised 
that these beliefs function as ‘the glue that binds a schema's perceptual, ideational, 
behavioural, and emotional elements together in a functioning cognitive structure’ 
(Nielsen, 2003, p. 35). 
Though Ellis stressing the observation that thinking was conceivably the best 
focus for understanding and intervening in a client's experience, Ellis (1956) assumed 
that behavioural, emotive and cognitive experiences are intrinsically interconnected. 
Nielsen further explains that evaluative beliefs are motivational judgments that 
individuals pass on an experience, which mobilises related schemata. These evaluative 
beliefs that define good and bad, desirable and undesirable, acceptable and unacceptable 
constitute abstract categorisation and become specific enough to seem quite personal to a 
client. REBT theory proposes, consequently, that by assessing and disputing core, 
absolutistic, evaluative beliefs, REBT can quickly outride other therapies in modifying 
‘the core of any client's schema’ (Nielsen, 2003, p. 35).  
6.3 Criteria for resolving irrational thinking 
REBT theorists have set three criteria whereby to distinguish this typically 
disturbance-related, ‘irrational’ or ‘nonsensical’ thinking from typically non-disturbance-
related, ‘rational’ or ‘sensible’ thinking.  
The first of these criteria is logical consistency; this criterion states that it is 
illogical to draw a conclusion from only one premise or other logical errors (e.g., 
because I don't like it, it must not exist).  
The second one has to do with empirical factual uniformity or consistency with 
empirical fact; that is, the best theories for living are those that are consistent with 
empirical facts, and those that are inconsistent should be either reinterpreted or 
abandoned (e.g., when I think that wrong acts absolutely must not go unpunished but 
then observe that wrong acts sometimes do go unpunished, I either reinterpret my view 
to something like ‘Though wrong acts go unpunished in this life they will be punished in 
another life’, or change my view to ‘Wrong acts sometimes go unpunished’). This gives 
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rise to supra-natural interpretations of the acts of life, and induces an unobtrusive belief 
in helpless fatalism that utterly abolishes the human will.  
The third criterion lurks in the consistency with long-term personal fulfilment: 
e.g., it is better to forego that which is desired in the short run if it proves incompatible 
with what is desired in the long run as well as to accept, and even seek, unpleasantness in 
the short run if it produces what is desired in the long run (e.g., ‘If I want to learn 
material, pass tests, and get degrees, then even though it is unpleasant to study in the 
short run, as a practical or functional matter it is best to study anyway because doing so 
is associated with getting what I more deeply desire’). This category of irrational beliefs 
integrates the reduction or avoidance of dysfunctional emotions and behaviour, such as 
anger and hostile aggression, because they have no practical advantage over more 
functional emotions and behaviour, such as annoyance and assertiveness, and they often 
have several disadvantages (e.g., association with heart problems in the case of chronic 
anger and destruction of personal relations in the case of hostile aggression). 
 Besides identifying the irrationality of thoughts and beliefs in clientele, and the sources 
of these irrational beliefs, REBT therapists usually need to induce from these clients 
more sensible and self-helping beliefs that they can feel, cognitise more vividly, and 
adopt as guiding maxims in their life (e.g., ‘Even though the world should not go my 
way, I can still work hard to try to get the things I want’).  
Based on these criteria, REBT, one may think, is both individually humanistic 
and secular in its character. As such, REBT views people as ‘holistic, goal-directed 
individuals who have importance in the world just because they are human and alive; it 
unconditionally accepts them with their limitations; and it particularly focuses upon their 
experiences and values, including their self-actualising potentialities’ (Ellis, 1980, 
p.327).  
The humanistic features of REBT spring from the fact that this category of 
psychotherapy aspires to help clients fulfil their individual human desires. But it is 
deemed secular, as it does not base or justify its practices on any form of supernaturalism 
or any other irrationality; rather, REBT seeks to root out irrational beliefs. REBT further 
surmises that whenever individuals respond to an event or the constraints of a situation, 
they do so while they actually care about it, and they promptly respond with two 
systems: the first includes ‘irrational’ thoughts/beliefs, which strongly tend to have 
associated with them both dysfunctional feelings/sensations/images and consequently 
dysfunctional behaviours/behavioural tendencies. The second includes ‘rational’ 
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thoughts/beliefs, which strongly tend to have associated with them functional 
feelings/sensations/images and consequently functional behaviours/behavioural 
tendencies. 
7 Models of REBT with Regard to Fixing Irrational Thinking 
REBT resulted from Ellis’s objective to better understand which specific features 
of personality cause people to maintain dysfunctional behavioural patterns (Ellis, 1994). 
Drawing on both Stoic and Adlerian philosophy, Ellis posited that personality was best 
defined by how people interpret and respond to their environment. Ellis (1994) further 
contended that an individual’s emotional and behavioural reactions are determined solely 
by his or her interpretations of events, not by the events themselves (Dryden & Neenan, 
2006). These interpretations are, in turn, determined by the individual’s core belief 
system. 
The basic premise underlying REBT is that emotional disturbances emerge from 
faulty thinking about events rather than the events themselves. Dryden (2006, p.6) has 
tersely described REBT as ‘one of the cognitive-behavioural approaches to counselling 
and psychotherapy’. Dryden further described how it helps in psychotherapy by getting 
the client to focus on thinking as linked to acting in order to understand the emotional 
problems of the client and how s/he can look for healthy alternatives – an approach 
based on Epictetus’s oft-cited saying that ‘people are disturbed not by adversities, but by 
the views that they take of these adversities’. As Dryden further develops this saying, 
people are indeed ‘disturbed not by adversities, but by the rigid and extreme views that 
they take of these adversities’ (Dryden, 2006, p.6).  
According to REBT, at the core of faulty thinking are rigid and absolute beliefs 
(e.g. ‘musts,’ ‘oughts’) and their derivatives (e.g. ‘awfulizing’). The faulty thinking is 
thought to be irrational because it is anti-empirical, illogical, self-defeating, and 
ultimately promotes emotional disturbances (Dryden and Neenan, 2006; Neenan & 
Dryden, 1999). 
The REBT model as proposed by Ellis and colleagues (Ellis, 1994; Ellis & 
Dryden, 1997) argues that demandingness leads to the other evaluative irrational beliefs 
(i.e., awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation/self-
downing), which, in turn, lead to emotional disturbances and associated automatic 
thoughts. In this case, awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance and global 
evaluation/self-downing function as mediators in the relationship between 
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demandingness and distress. If demands exert extreme pressures on the self, irrationality 
is generated.  
A critical review of the REBT model, as initiated by Ellis and colleagues, 
suggests that this is the preliminary phase of experimenting with the model in 
psychotherapy; in other words, the first phase of REBT theory holds demandingness as 
accountable for the gushing out of irrational beliefs that is conducive to emotional 
disturbances such as social anxiety. This model can be drawn diagrammatically (see 
Figure 1 below) in its first phase as follows: 
 
 
Demandingness 
 
Awfulizing/catastrophising 
Global evaluation/self 
downing 
Low frustration tolerance           
  
           Psychological distress 
 
                 (e.g. Social Anxiety) 
 
Figure 1:  REBT – I Phase 
Research done during REBT-I theory development suggested that the effect of 
demandingness on emotional outcomes may be mediated by awfulizing/catastrophising, 
low frustration tolerance, and/or global evaluation/self-downing. 
The second phase of the REBT model development has been described by 
DiGiuseppe (1996) as REBT-II. This second phase of REBT theorises that 
demandingness, awfulizing/catastrophising, low frustration tolerance, and global 
evaluation/self-downing can independently lead to automatic thoughts and related 
emotional disturbances. In REBT-II, there is no place for mediation, but each type of 
irrational belief makes its own impact on and unique contribution to the type of 
emotional distress it instigates and develops. This second phase of the development of 
REBT can diagrammatically be shown as in Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: REBT – II Phase 
 
Demandingness   
 
Psychological Distress 
Awfulizing/catastrophising  
Global evaluation/self-
downing 
 
Low frustration tolerance   
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Research conducted after the REBT-II development phase demonstrates that 
awfulizing/catastrophising, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation/self-downing 
are associated with one another, and that all three are associated with demandingness 
(Bernard, 1998; David et al., 2002; Mohamed, 1992). 
According to Dryden (2006, p.6), “all approaches to counselling and 
psychotherapy have their own framework for making sense of people’s emotional 
problems and the healthy alternatives to these problems”. Several psychotherapists, 
foremost amongst whom is Ellis himself, have consistently shown that REBT’s highly 
directive, educative and preventative nature can be used with children and adolescents.  
REBT has been applied to children and adolescents exhibiting conduct disorders 
(Morris, 1993), aggression (Raynor, 1992), test anxiety (Warren, Deffenbacher & 
Brading, 1976), disruptive classroom behaviours (Zelie, Stone & Lehr, 1980), attention-
deficit/hyperactive disorder (Morris, 1993), low self-esteem (Weaver & Matthews, 
1993), low self-concept (Cangelosi, Gressard & Mines, 1980), irrationality (Rosenbaum, 
McMurray & Campbell, 1991), general anxiety (Knaus, 1974; Knaus & Boker, 1975), 
and low academic achievement (Block, 1978). 
Consistenc with this conceptual framework, it appears that exposing social 
phobia to cognitive restructuring as a means of modifying the schemata of patients and 
reducing their social anxiety has been a common procedure in REBT protocols. 
The fundamental distress of patients with social anxiety lies with their fear that 
they might be negatively evaluated by others. Therefore, people with social phobia are 
concerned that they may do or say something liable to provoke negative evaluation from 
others or that they may show physical symptoms in their social situations that will make 
them appear excessively anxious to others. These negative emotional states are caused 
and sustained by these irrational beliefs of social failure in social interaction situations. 
People with social phobia cling to these irrational beliefs in the wrong belief that they 
should be impeccably competent and adequate in order for them to be worthwhile 
people. The purpose of REBT is to challenge and modify these irrational beliefs through 
discussion and persuasion to change the patient’s fundamental ideology. REBT has been 
associated with significant treatment improvements among people with social phobia in 
several studies; such improvements in therapy were maintained long after the cessation 
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of treatment (e.g., DiGiuseppe et al. 1990; Emmelkamp et al. 1985; Mattick and Peters 
1988; Mattick et al. 1989; Mersch et al. 1989).  
7.1 Cognition, irrational beliefs and emotions 
One of the major interesting threads of discussion within the cognitive 
psychology literature addresses the relationship between cognitive and emotional 
processes. Prior research tackling emotion as related to cognition has shifted away from 
an emphasis on arousal and physiological processes (Cannon, 1927; Ekman, 1992) to an 
emphasis on cognitive processes (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
There have been several cognitivist theories of emotion that have accumulated 
over time to focus on the interruption of schema and goals, or on the relationship 
between emotions and cognitions or schema, attributions, and goals (Denoff, 1991; 
Fiske, 1982; Mandler, 1975; 1990); other theories have existed to invigorate the 
appraisal of stimuli with regard to personal significance and emotional consequences in 
behavioural terms (Lazarus, 1991a). 
In this vein, according to recent research findings (Lazarus, 1991b; 1982; Smith 
& Lazarus, 1990), it was revealed that cold cognitions are relevant to emotion because 
they contribute to the data that individuals appraise with regard to adaptation 
significance; cold cognitions include attributions and inferences, which are usually 
groundless in the factual world. While cold cognitions (e.g., attributions, inferences) 
remain unevaluated (that is, they have not become irrational beliefs that push emotions 
and behaviours into action), they are not sufficient to generate emotions in effect 
(Lazarus, 1991c; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). This trend of cognitive research on emotion as 
related to cold cognitions focuses on those cognitive factors that are conscious or 
potentially consciously conspicuous (Denoff, 1991; DiGiuseppe, 1996).  
The other trend of cognitive research relevant to cold cognitions and emotions 
has emphasised the unconscious information processing involving cortical and sub-
cortical structures (e.g., David, 2000; LeDoux, 1996). Both trends of research are utilised 
in contemporary approaches of cognitive psychology to the study of emotion, thus 
providing a comprehensive portrait of human emotions. 
In this trend, Ellis’s cognitive theory of emotion formation (Ellis, 1994; Ellis & 
Harper, 1961) pertains to the first line of research, as it guides the practice of Rational 
Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT). In accordance with Ellis’s ABC model patients 
who engage in REBT are encouraged to actively dispute (D) their irrational beliefs and 
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to assimilate more efficient (E), adaptive, and rational beliefs, which should in turn have 
a positive impact on their emotional, cognitive, and behavioural responses to external 
situations and events they pass through in their life.  
In this regard, meta-analytic research and synthesis studies have supported the 
conclusion that REBT is an empirically validated form of cognitive-behavioural 
psychotherapy (e.g., Engles, Garnefsky & Diekstra, 1993). This will be dealt with in 
more elaborate detail later in this chapter.  
However, while many of REBT’s principles and pro-research findings have been 
assimilated by the psychological mainstream (Still, 2001), it still remains noticeably less 
visible in the mainstream of emotion research. This is because many of REBT’s 
hypotheses about emotion formation were not empirically investigated in adequate 
measure. 
Ellis (1962, 1994) has hypothesised his cognitive theory of emotion mainly on 
the basis of a large clinical practice, with insights from previous attempts at rational 
emotive therapy (RET). However, despite the significance of clinical data to REBT 
theories, the effectiveness of REBT, as borne out by several research testimonials, has 
indirectly been supportive of Ellis’ cognitive theory of emotion. Further, REBT research 
used to be implemented in its own terms, rather than using the framework of the 
mainstream cognitive theories of emotions, therefore becoming less visible. More 
importantly, REBT’s potential has not been fully explored in prior research conducted to 
explore Ellis’ cognitive theory of emotion formation within the conceptual framework of 
appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991a; Smith & Lazarus, 1990; Weisz, Weiss, Alicke & 
Klotz, 1987).  
The concept of emotional appraisal is an explicit feature of Ellis’ theory (Ziegler, 
2000); by the same token, the relationship between the construct of emotional appraisal 
and irrational beliefs has been deliberated by many authors (David et al., 2005; Ellis, 
1994; Ziegler, 2000). But very few researchers have undertaken empirical research based 
on this relationship between irrational beliefs and emotional appraisal (David et al., 
2002; David, Kirby & Smith, 2003)  
Assumedly, there are certain qualitative differences between specific similar 
emotions; this assumption is esoteric to Ellis’ cognitive theory of emotion. Emotions that 
ensue from irrationality of negative events/situations are called 
dysfunctional/maladaptive negative emotions (e.g., social anxiety), and those that 
proceed from irrational beliefs about positive events are called 
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dysfunctional/maladaptive positive emotions; e.g., elation after learning that your work 
was praised by all the graders of the exam, which is related to the belief that “Everyone 
MUST only say positive things about me and they did” (Dryden, 2003, p. 141). 
Emotions arising from rational beliefs about negative events are called 
functional/adaptive negative emotions (e.g., concern), while emotions resulting from 
rational beliefs about positive events are called functional/adaptive positive emotions 
(e.g., happiness).  
According to REBT maxims, dysfunctional emotions are qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively different from functional emotions, thus differing in their cognitive 
content, not in their intensity (Ellis, 1994; Ellis & Harper, 1961). Therefore, the 
hypothesis that emotions that result from rational beliefs are distinct from those mediated 
by irrational ones remains crucial to the REBT theory of emotion formation has not been 
verified (Ellis, 1994); thus, the quality of the emotions, and not their intensity, is what 
differentiates rational beliefs from irrational ones.  
In this way, an elaborate examination of this theory reveals that Ellis’s hypothesis 
of emotion formation has two major components: the first one tackles the difference 
between functional emotions and dysfunctional emotions, indicating that the difference 
is in their quality rather than their intensity. While both functional and dysfunctional 
emotions range in intensity from mild to severe, they differ in their quality. This idea has 
some indirect experimental support in prior related research. For instance, Schachter and 
Singer’s (1962) bi-factorial theory of emotion has indicated that diverse emotional states 
differ little physiologically, and that emotional experience is a consequence of the 
interaction between two factors: physiological arousal and cognitions. Because of these 
cognitive factors, the same arousal can lead to different emotional states (e.g., anger 
versus excitement).  
In this way, while arousal is a factor of relevance to the intensity of one’s 
emotional experience, still cognitions are related to the quality of emotional experience 
(Schachter & Singer, 1962). This conclusion has been later deliberated upon and 
supported by more research evidence in this trend (Lazarus, 1991b; 1991c; Sinclair, 
Hoffman, Mark, Martin & Pickering, 1994) when the arousal level is low or mild. 
Nonetheless, if arousal is too intense, it tends to produce a negative emotional state, 
irrespective of cognitive factors (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). 
The second element of Ellis’s cognitive theory of emotion suggest that rational 
beliefs and irrational beliefs mediate the formation of emotion, and that rational beliefs 
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are associated with functional emotions, while irrational ones are associated with 
dysfunctional emotions. However, as earlier indicated, there is less experimental 
evidence in support of the notion that irrational beliefs and rational beliefs mediate 
emotion formation (Bond & Dryden, 2000).  
One can briefly examine the various lines and trends of research that have 
investigated this hypothesis in the coming paragraphs. The first argument underlying 
Ellis’s REBT theory, which indicates that the core of emotional experience is irrational 
belief sets versus rational beliefs, is mainly derived from indirect evidence.  
Prior research in the arena of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that both 
‘hot’ cognitions (i.e., appraisal) and ‘cold’ cognitions (e.g., attributions) mediate 
emotions (Lazarus, 1991b; Schachter & Singer, 1962). As a result of this mediation, one 
may presume that irrational belief sets versus rational beliefs, as specific types of 
‘hot’/evaluative cognitions (e.g., Ellis, 1962; 1994) may also mediate emotion.  
The second underlying argument which assumes a significant role of irrational 
beliefs and rational beliefs in the formation of emotions is direct research investigating 
Ellis’ cognitive theory of emotion formation. Some of these studies addressed emotional 
disturbances, such as anxiety, depression (Malouff, 1992; Malouff, Schutte & 
McClelland, 1992; Tobacyk & Downs, 1986) rather than the more general theory of 
emotion formation.  
Other research is related to the more general theory of emotion formation (i.e., 
Cash, Rimm & MacKinnon, 1986; Cramer & Fong, 1991; Kassinove, Eckhardt & Endes, 
1993). For instance, Master and Gershman (1983) have revealed a greater galvanic skin 
response to the stimulus situation and to irrational beliefs than to rational and control 
statements, which is often referred to as sensitisation. However, this experiment was 
somewhat limited, as it operationalised emotional experience largely by its physiological 
concomitants, whereas REBT theory requires both quantitative and qualitative 
differences between functional and dysfunctional emotions (Ellis & Dryden, 1997). 
In a similar mode, Kassinove et al. (1977) found that participants in their study, 
which specifically investigated how college students perceived differences in emotional 
words rather than in their own emotional experiences, recognised a certain level of 
emotional intensity but they were quite ignorant of any variations in the quality of 
emotions as hypothesised by Ellis. However, their procedure used an artificial condition 
rather than an ecological one.  
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In addition, most of these researchers have not manipulated independent scales 
for arousal and affect. And it is difficult to state that they carefully tested Ellis’s 
hypothesis that dysfunctional emotions are qualitatively rather than quantitatively 
different from functional emotions, and that they differ in their cognitive content and not 
in their intensity. However, a more methodical research project investigating Ellis’s 
cognitive theory of emotion was conducted by Cramer and several others of his 
colleagues (see, for instance, Cramer & Fong, 1991). They tested the hypothesis that 
greater dysfunctional emotional distress is caused by irrational rather than rational 
beliefs about negative events or situations. Commensurate with the principles and 
maxims of Ellis’s cognitive theory of emotion, these researchers found that irrational 
beliefs and rational beliefs can both potentially contribute to the generation of emotion. 
Nevertheless, the research done by Cramer and collaborators revealed that both 
dysfunctional and functional negative emotions were greater in the irrational condition 
than in the neutral or rational conditions, a finding that runs counter to the hypotheses of 
REBT. Findings of these studies indicate that the qualitative distinction between 
functional and dysfunctional negative emotions as hypothetically suggested by Ellis and 
Harper (1975) should be replaced with a quantitative one; that is, functional negative 
emotions refer to milder feelings in comparison with dysfunctional negative emotions, 
but they do not refer to qualitatively different feelings, as the researchers suggest. 
In this vein, it is worth indicating that much of the prior research on Ellis’s 
cognitive theory of emotion formation is constrained by a variety of limitations: first, 
several of the studies have investigated the effectiveness of REBT under stressful 
situations, rendering these experiments at most more appropriate to testing the REBT 
theory and its hypotheses as a ‘vulnerability model’ whose effectiveness has been 
checked in stressful situations (Ellis, 1994) than to testing the REBT theory as a more 
general theory of emotion formation; second, the procedures used for testing are 
artificial, having been grounded in the idea that an imagined situation can induce an 
emotion much or identically akin to real life situation emotions, or that these 
experiments assumed that irrational beliefs and rational beliefs which have been induced 
experimentally in these studies are similar to those endorsed by participants in real life. 
Third, it seems that these studies have not utilised different scales for arousal and 
emotion to rigorously verify Ellis’s hypothesis that dysfunctional emotions are 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively different from functional emotions and that they 
differ in their cognitive content not in their intensity.  
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7.2 Utility of REBT with regard to irrational thinking 
REBT theory is structured around the concepts of rational versus irrational 
beliefs, which are considered to play a crucial part in all psychological disorders. While 
rational beliefs, as described earlier, are pragmatic, non-absolutistic, consistent with 
reality, and flexible, irrational beliefs are non-pragmatic, absolutistic, inconsistent with 
reality, and rigid (David, Montgomery, Macavei & Bovbjerg, 2005). 
DiGiuseppe et al. (1990) compared four separate cognitive behavioural and one 
behavioural treatment for reducing social anxiety with a waiting list control group. The 
results showed that participants in all cognitive therapies and behavioural treatment 
conditions experienced significant reduction of anxiety specific to interpersonal and 
social behaviour relative to both their pre-treatment levels and to participants in the 
waiting list control group. In addition, participants in all cognitive therapies and 
behavioural treatment conditions experienced significantly less general anxiety as well as 
less depression, and demonstrated a significant reduction in anxiety-related behaviour. 
Further, there were no significant differences between the behavioural treatment mean 
and the means of the cognitive therapies on any of the assessment measures used. 
7.2.1 Research evidence 
Research evidence in support of cognitive behavioural treatments in general and 
REBT in particular indicates that such treatments are credible interventions and superior 
to waiting-list controls. Such empirical evidence also suggests that group therapy 
providing a combination of social skills training, cognitive restructuring and graded 
exposure can be effective treatment procedures in cognitive behavioural therapies. 
Furthermore, group therapy for adolescents can potentially integrate the normal 
developmental tasks, thus providing a place where participants can safely share 
similarities and take risks with others (Baer & Garland, 2005; Hayward et al., 2000; 
Spence et al., 2000). 
Several studies examining the efficacy of cognitive behavioural group therapy as 
in REBT which utilized treatment protocols specifically designed for social anxiety 
disorder (Heimberg & Becker, 2002) proved effective after the termination of the 
treatment and in follow-up tests.  Usually, the structuring of REBT of treatments consists 
of 12 weekly  3 hour group sessions, the preliminary of which are designed to introduce 
the rationale and mechanisms for treatment, have been proven to develop group 
cohesion, and impart cognitive restructuring concepts (DiGiuseppe et al. 1990; 
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Emmelkamp et al. 1985; Heimberg & Becker, 2002; Butler et al. 1984; Clark et al. 
2006). Subsequent sessions focus on integrating REBT restructuring skills in order for 
the patients to recognize, inspect, and challenge their negative irrational beliefs before, 
during, and after participating in role-plays of feared social situations in the group 
context. 
REBT, as the culmination of cognitive behavioural therapy theories, has been 
proven to be effective for those of school and college years. Further, cumulative research 
indicates that almost 70% of youths receiving mental health services do so only at 
school, making the education system the de facto system of service delivery for children 
and youth with mental health concerns (Farmer, Burns, Phillips, Angold & Costello, 
2003; Gonzalez et al., 2004). 
In an early study of self-help use of REBT with college students, Schelver and 
Gutsch (1983) examined the effects of self-administered REBT on high and chronic 
social anxiety. Forty-five college students were administered the Social Avoidance and 
Distress Scale (SADS) and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE), then randomly 
assigned to three groups: self-administered REBT, self-administered attention placebo 
condition (Logotherapy or LOGO), and no-treatment control. The self-administered 
treatments consisted of participants utilising widely read self-help books written by 
professional therapists describing the basic tenets of each psychotherapeutic approach. 
After a five-week treatment period, SADS and FNE results indicated that while 
differences between the REBT and LOGO groups and between the LOGO and no-
treatment control groups were not significant, the REBT treatment was significantly 
more effective than the no-treatment control in reducing feelings of social avoidance and 
distress (t=-.27, p<.0116), and fear of negative evaluation (t=2.57, p<.02). Moreover, 
results indicated that REBT participants were less anxious than either the LOGO 
participants or the no-treatment participants while they were participating in the post-test 
session. Findings also suggested that self-administered cognitive therapy when treating 
social anxiety has the potential to generalise and decrease trait anxiety as well. 
Vestre and Judge (1989) sought to determine the effects of varied therapist 
contact with self-administered REBT on interpersonal and social anxiety. Sixty-eight 
introductory psychology class students were evaluated utilising the Hopkins Symptom 
Checklist (HSCL), the Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) scale, the Social Avoidance 
and Distress (SAD) scale, the Beliefs Test and the Katz Adjustment Scale (KAS). They 
were then randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups, or a no-treatment control 
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group. Each treatment group employed a five-week reading outline of The New Guide to 
Rational Living (Ellis & Harper, 1961). The therapist administered (TA) group was 
structured as a discussion group with the leader assuming the role of a teacher rather than 
a therapist. Minimal contact (MC) group participants were contacted once a week by 
telephone to encourage reading and to answer questions. Self-administered (SA) group 
participants had no contact with the researchers until the study was over. The study 
results indicated that the three treatment groups improved significantly when compared 
to the NT group on five of the seven self-report measures (FNE, F=3.66, p<.05; HSCL 
SOM, F=5.41, p<.01; HSCL ac, F=5.90, p<.001; HSCL DEP, F=6.45, p<.001, HSCL IS, 
F=3.28, p<.05), which support the findings of Schelver and Gutsch (1983).  
DiGiuseppe et al. (1990) subsequently compared four separate cognitive 
behavioural treatments and one behavioural treatment for reducing social anxiety with a 
waiting list control group. Participants consisted of 57 adults who responded to 
advertisements for the study. Self-report measures of social anxiety included the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation (FNE) scale, the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS), the 
S-R Inventory of Anxiousness (S-RIA), and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist 
(MAACL). The physiological assessment of social anxiety consisted of recording pulse 
rates for one minute, five minutes before and again during a social interaction with a 
person of the opposite sex. Behavioural components of social anxiety were assessed 
during the interaction by two trained raters using the Time Behavioural Checklist (TBC). 
Treatment for all therapy conditions was conducted in groups that met weekly for ten 
weeks for 1.5 hour sessions. Groups included REBT, Cognitive Therapy, Interpersonal 
Cognitive Problem-Solving Skills Training, Self-Instructional Training and a 
Behavioural Assertion Training group. Three advanced graduate students in clinical 
psychology, with training in each therapy, served as therapists. Each held a different 
hypothesis as to which therapy would be more effective, thus counterbalancing any 
demand characteristics. Each therapist conducted a different treatment. All therapy 
sessions were tape recorded, with the second, fifth and eighth tapes reviewed. Overall, 
statistical analyses of the findings showed that participants in all cognitive therapies and 
the behavioural treatment conditions experienced significant reduction of anxiety 
specific to interpersonal and social behaviour relative to both their pre-treatment levels 
and to participants in the waiting list control group. In addition, participants in all 
cognitive therapies and the behavioural treatment experienced significantly less general 
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anxiety as well as less depression, and demonstrated a significant reduction in anxiety-
related behaviour. 
Considerable qualitative research has been generated investigating the 
effectiveness of REBT with adolescents and adults. In a qualitative review, Silverman, 
McCarthy and McGovern (1992) found that 49 of 89 studies reported positive findings 
for REBT. Other alternative psychotherapies were not as effective as REBT, which 
produced significantly better outcomes. The aforementioned findings were 
commensurate with those reported in previous research in this respect (e.g. DiGiuseppe 
& Miller, 1977; McGovern & Silverman, 1984; Weisz, Weiss, Alicke & Klotz, 1987), 
which had examined the effects of REBT with adolescents and adults. Studies employing 
meta-analyses of previous REBT research with adolescents and adults had also 
confirmed its effectiveness. In a meta-analysis of 28 controlled experiments using REBT 
with adolescents and adults and yielding 31 comparisons, Engles et al. (1993) found a 
grand effect size of 1.62 for REBT. REBT yielded the highest overall effect size when 
compared to systematic desensitisation, combination treatments and placebo conditions 
(Taylor, 1996). In a meta-analysis of 70 REBT outcome studies yielding 236 
comparisons, Lyons and Woods (1991) addressed the efficacy of REBT in comparison to 
no treatment controls, attention control placebos and cognitive behaviour modification. 
The overall effect size of REBT was .95.  
In another synthesis study by Hajzler and Bernard (1991), findings from 21 
studies include the effectiveness of REBT in (a) decreasing irrationality in over 88% of 
the studies using a measure of irrationality, (b) increasing the internal locus of control of 
subjects in 71% of the studies using such a measure, particularly with learning disabled 
students, and (c) decreasing the anxiety of subjects in 80% of studies using measures of 
anxiety. Support was also found in over 50% of the studies in the areas of self-esteem 
and of behavioural problems. Significant, from a theoretical perspective, was the 
consistent finding that when changes in irrationality occurred there were concomitant 
changes with other dependent measures. These results were consistent with those of a 
previous qualitative review of REBT research conducted with children and adolescents 
(i.e. DiGiuseppe & Bernard, 1990). These meta-analytic results demonstrate that REBT 
is an effective form of therapy with adolescents and adults, thus warranting the use of 
this approach with college students who require psychotherapy. 
Gonzalez et al. (2004) mention several meta-analyses of the effectiveness of 
REBT interventions, especially for children and adolescents enrolled in schools and 
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university, confirming the effectiveness of REBT. According to the researchers, a 
convergent and cumulative evidence base of empirical findings with regard to 
psychotherapy suggests that these effects are significantly positive with a reasonable 
magnitude in the case of children and adolescents in comparison with the effects of these 
psychotherapies employing REBT in the case of adults. Gonzalez et al. (2004) 
concluded: 
‘Four broad-based meta-analyses with diverse child and adolescent 
populations covering a range of problems have shown the effects of 
psychotherapy to be positive, with mean effect sizes ranging from .54 
(Weisz, Weiss, Han, Granger & Morton, 1995) to .88 (Kazdin, Bass, 
Ayers & Rogers, 1990). More focused meta-analyses (i.e., specific 
subsets of treatment studies) have shown positive treatment effects as 
well.’ (p. 223) 
Generally, treatment interventions combining exposure and cognitive 
restructuring of irrational beliefs have resulted in ‘changes of around 0.9 standard 
deviations at the end of treatment and these changes have been maintained over follow-
up periods from 3 to 12 months’ (Rapee, Gaston & Abbott, 2009, p. 317). 
The above cited researchers have concluded that in the context of child and 
adolescent psychotherapy, REBT is a popular form of therapy, with many applications 
for both psychological and mental health problems, including phobias, social anxiety, 
shyness, and social withdrawal. With the increasing popularity and support for cognitive 
therapies among health professionals, a number of clinicians have used REBT theory as 
the basis for developing new patterns of working. This warrants applying REBT 
treatment to college students in need of psychotherapy for such disorders. Al-Akad 
(1997) used REBT on a sample of Egyptian outpatients to verify the approach’s 
effectiveness in reducing aggression and hostility in college students. Results showed 
significant enhancements in social behaviour and relieved hostility in participants. 
However, several REBT researchers have indicated a preference for cognitively 
centred therapy over affectively centred therapy in REBT. This is because the former 
relies on systematic changes over short and long periods of time of the central belief 
system, or what psychoanalysts call ‘the core beliefs’ (Rokeach, 1986). Cognitive 
therapy can help initiate and scaffold one’s intellectual insight, hence the importance of 
thinking and acting in consistent ways is stressed if the core unhealthy beliefs are to be 
changed (Dryden, 2001). The type of insight that promotes change is known by REBT 
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therapists as emotional insight, which ‘initiates healthy emotions and leads to 
constructive behaviour and realistic thinking’ (Dryden, 2001, p. 184). A meta-analysis 
undertaken by Hattie (1992) demonstrated that cognitively oriented programmes are 
likely to produce more positive effects in self-concept enhancement than affectively 
oriented programmes. 
Critically, one can deduce from the synthesis reviews and from reviews of 
individual studies that there is some indication of a significant relationship between 
irrational beliefs and dysfunctional emotions, such as depression, social anxiety and 
other mood disorders. Nevertheless, it is difficult to infer specific relationships between 
the discharge and treatment of irrationality and the dysfunctional emotions investigated, 
as there does not seem to be an agreed cut-off point within the belief measures that 
would indicate whether these beliefs were rational or irrational and what their degree of 
severity was. Although cut-off points were not present in the belief measures in some of 
these studies, these have been developed in measures of emotion and well-being. 
Furthermore, the theoretical model described by Ellis states that in addition to life 
events affecting the development of psychological disturbance, human beings also have a 
biological tendency to think irrationally, which has a notable impact on such disturbance.  
There is a biological basis of human irrationality; Ellis (1976) has argued that 
humans have two basic biological tendencies. First, we have a tendency towards 
irrationality; we naturally tend to make ourselves disturbed. Second, we have a tendency 
towards becoming aware of our irrationality and towards working steadily towards 
rationality. Ellis (1976) noted that this second tendency requires more effort than the 
first. Ellis (1976) made a number of points in support of this ‘biological hypothesis’. 
These included the following: 
 Human irrationality is ubiquitous. 
Nearly all human beings demonstrate some evidence of irrational thinking. People 
disturb themselves about the adversities of life, variably from one person to another and 
from one situation to another. These disturbances about life adversities do not, however, 
interfere with the survival of the human species, yet most of the time, they do not 
interfere with the individual human existence, either. The latter is firmly within one’s 
responsibility and the fact that many of us, humans, needlessly disturb ourselves shows 
that this tendency is rooted in our humanity and pops up unjustifiably from time to time.  
People cannot lead an ideally rational life all of the time and, consequently, do not 
worry about life’s adversities, for if they do so, they would rarely procrastinate and 
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would persist at striving towards their goals. As ideal as such, they would be very self-
disciplined and would live longer because they would rarely smoke and would tend to 
keep to healthy eating regimes. This is obviously not the case and although we have the 
ability to think and act rationally, the fact that we find it hard to sustain doing so is 
evidence for Ellis's (1976) view that there is a strong biological basis to human 
irrationality. 
 Ease in thinking in rigid and extreme ways 
Earlier in this chapter, the researcher distinguished between flexible beliefs and non-
extreme beliefs on the one hand and rigid and extreme beliefs on the other. Based on an 
exhaustive review of the literature, it can be deduced that REBT theory posited that rigid 
and extreme beliefs are at the core of psychological disturbance and that flexible and 
non-extreme beliefs are at the core of psychological health. It is showed, in particular, 
that both rigid and flexible beliefs are very frequently based on our desires, but what 
distinguishes them is that when people hold rigid beliefs, they transform these desires 
into rigid, absolute necessities, but when they hold flexible beliefs, they keep their 
desires flexible and acknowledge to themselves that it is not necessary to have their 
desires met. It was also showed that extreme and non-extreme beliefs stem from rigid 
and flexible beliefs respectively. 
Now, REBT theory holds that, when human desires are weak, people find it 
relatively easy to keep their beliefs flexible and non-extreme when their desires are not 
met. However, when these desires become stronger, people particularly tend to find it 
very much more difficult to retain flexibility and non-extremity in their (irrational) 
beliefs. To explain further, when desires are urgently compelling or impatiently strong, 
people tend to transform them into absolute necessities or 'musts'. If they do not achieve 
these desires, they tend to idealise these absolute necessities as awful and unbearable 
beliefs, consequently thwarted as 'inhibitions'.  
Again, the ease with which most humans do this indicates the biological 
underpinnings of this common form of human irrationality. If humans were strongly 
biologically prone to retaining flexible and non-extreme beliefs in the face of the very 
strong desires not being met, then they would find it very difficult to think in rigid and 
extreme ways under these circumstances and would tend not to do so even if strongly 
encouraged to do so by their respective culture. Ellis (2003c) further explicates this as 
below: 
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‘People not only learn or take over unrealistic expectations, absolutistic ideas, 
illogical conclusions, and irrational beliefs from their parents and their 
culture, but they also have a positive genius for inventing and exacerbating 
these self-defeating cognitions themselves. They don’t have to think 
exaggeratedly, perfectionistically, dogmatically, and unscientifically, but 
they sooner or later do; and they thereby make themselves –yes, creatively 
make themselves –emotionally disturbed and behaviorally dysfunctional. 
Their parents, teachers, and peers appreciably help them in this respect.’ 
(Ellis, 2003c, pp. 205-206) 
However, strong wishes, desires and preferences, as it is hypothesised in REBT 
theories, may hardly ever induce serious emotional trouble, still absolutistic necessities 
and demands can frequently do that. Therefore, while human irrationality is ubiquitous 
and the tendency for humans to transform their very strong desires into rigid dire 
necessities, it can still be controlled by exercise.  
Within the field of mental health, however, there is general agreement that emotional 
distress is caused by a combination of environmental and physiological causes. No 
specific physiological research has isolated the causes of any mental health problems. 
Ellis’s REBT theory and applications to psychotherapy proposed that the beliefs that an 
individual has about themselves, or the world, can increase or decrease the 
environmental distress perceived by the individual and effectiveness research explored 
relevant hypotheses without controlling for these potential physiological effects. 
7.2.2 How effective is REBT? Evidence from practice 
Ellis and his disciples in the literature devoted to the promotion of REBT theory 
and its applications assert the idea of an outstanding efficacy assigned to this category of 
psychotherapy. In this regard, Ellis (1977b, p. 2) argued that its practice had ‘immense, 
indeed almost awesome, research backing,’ and as late as 1985, Ellis claimed that ‘over 
300 controlled studies’ supported the use of cognitive-behavioural therapy in the form of 
REBT as hypothesised by Ellis (Ellis, 1985). But careful consideration of the content of 
these studies shows that few of them actually tested the distinctive features of REBT; 
rather, many of them involved testing a variety of heterogeneous treatments described 
collectively as cognitive behavioural therapy. Due to the unique phenomenological 
character of the REBT model, demonstrations of the efficiency of conventional cognitive 
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behavioural treatments do not readily build up to the enhancement of the theoretical and 
empirical considerations of this theory. 
There has been a variety of research aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of 
REBT therapy for different psychological or psychosocial problems. For instance, the 
study by Jensen (2008) evaluated the ABC Model of Rational Emotive Behavioural 
Therapy Theory, which asserts that emotional consequences (C) are not directly caused 
by adversities (A) but rather are mediated by an individual’s beliefs regarding those 
adversities (B) (Ellis 1991) and its association with the unhealthy negative emotion of 
guilt. A total of 195 Villanova University students (68 male, 127 female, M age = 19.48 
years, SD = 2.08 years) volunteered to participate in the study. Participants were asked to 
complete two questionnaires, the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) (Demaria et al., 
1989), with scales measuring Overall Irrational Ideation, Self-Directed Shoulds, Other-
Directed Shoulds, Awfulizing, Low-Frustration Tolerance, and Self-Worth Judgements, 
and the Guilt Inventory (GI) (Kugler & Jones, 1992), measuring the guilt experienced by 
the individual. It was predicted that significant associations would be found between 
Overall Irrational Ideation, Self-Directed Shoulds, Awfulizing, and Self-Worth 
Judgements and Guilt scores, whereas no significant association would be found 
between Other-Directed Shoulds and Low-Frustration Tolerance and Guilt scores. These 
predictions received mixed support. Significant associations were found between Guilt 
scores and Overall Irrational Ideation (r = -.27), Self-Directed Shoulds (r = -.21), Self-
Worth Judgements (r = -.21), and Low-Frustration Tolerance (r = -.40). No significant 
association was found between Guilt Scores and Other-Directed Shoulds (r = .02) and 
Awfulizing (r = -.12). The data suggested that Overall Irrational Thinking, Self-Directed 
Shoulds, Low-Frustration Tolerance and Self-Worth Judgements are associated with 
guilt reactions and that a tendency towards Other-Directed Shoulds and Awfulizing is 
not associated with guilt reactions. 
In a study by Eisner (2007), the researcher proved the effectiveness of REBT in 
changing destructive negative thoughts to constructive healthy thoughts among adults 
with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD). Further, to evaluate the REBT programme 
designed to treat female clients at the DuPage County Health Department who met the 
criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, Moore (2006) used a step-by-step model new to 
the field of psychology. The REBT programme was assessed as effective in changing the 
way individuals with depression felt and thought, but further development of the process 
and scope of adaptation to other groups was suggested. REBT programmes combined 
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with other enhancements like strengthening religiosity (Sias, 2006), confidence (Pelusi, 
2007), the use of Articulated Thought Disputation (Cornwall, 2008), Gestalt Awareness 
Training (Aumann, 2004), the use of cognitive disputation strategies (Kpec, Beal, & 
DGiuseppe, 2002) and unconditional self-acceptance (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001) have 
all been shown to be effective cognitive therapy adaptations. 
All in all, hundreds of studies have provided empirical evidence in support of the 
basic tenets of the REBT model. Reviews of these studies indicate that the majority of 
findings are consistent with the tenets (DiGiuseppe & Miller, 1977; Ellis, 1977b; Sutton-
Simon et al., 1978). Numerous studies have attempted to investigate the association 
between measures of irrational beliefs and a variety of measures of emotional distress 
and behavioural maladjustment. Although this type of research does not address issues of 
causality, general findings have indicated that measures of irrational beliefs reliably 
correlate with measures of emotional distress. For example, the construct of anxiety has 
been frequently used as a measure of emotional distress in this type of research and 
several studies have found significant correlations between irrational beliefs and general 
anxiety (Hajzler & Bernard, 1991; Jones, 1969; Kassinove et al., 1977; Lyons & Woods, 
1991; Silverman et al., 1992) and with specific types of anxiety, such as social anxiety 
(Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975; Sutton-Simon & Goldfried, 1979), test anxiety 
(Goldfried & Sobocinski, 1975; Trexler & Karst, 1973) and fear of heights (Sutton-
Simon & Goldfried, 1979). 
7.2.3 REBT for resolving psychosocial problems: an evaluation 
Dryden and Neenan (2006) contend that ‘REBT has a more elaborate view of 
how disturbance is maintained’ (p. 4). According to the authors, this theory of 
psychotherapy asserts that people perpetuate their disturbance for a number of reasons, 
including the following (Dryden & Neenan, 2006, pp. 4-5): 
 They lack the insight that their disturbance is underpinned by their irrational beliefs 
and think instead that it is caused by events. 
 They think that once they understand that their problems are underpinned by irrational 
beliefs, this understanding alone will lead to change. 
 They do not work persistently to change their irrational beliefs and to integrate the 
rational alternatives to these beliefs into their belief system. 
 They continue to act in ways that are consistent with their irrational beliefs. 
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 They lack or are deficient in important social skills, communication skills, problem-
solving skills and other life skills. 
 They think that their disturbance has pay-offs that outweigh the advantages of the 
healthy alternatives to their disturbed feelings and/or behaviour. 
 They live in environments which support the irrational beliefs that underpin their 
problems. 
The authors, major proponents and theorists of REBT, view that the core 
facilitative conditions of empathy, unconditional acceptance and genuineness are often 
desirable, but are neither necessary nor sufficient for initiating and sustaining 
constructive therapeutic change in psychotherapy sessions.  
However, given the proven effectiveness of REBT treatments, both in individual 
studies and in synthesis reviews of sets of studies, especially those giving favourable 
results in treating anxiety disorders, these studies have some limitations. For instance, 
there was a wide range in the ages of participants as well as in other demographic 
variables. Most psychosocial treatments need to be modified for a particular 
developmental age for comparisons to be valid enough for generalisation. In addition to 
these limitations, there are inconsistencies in the literature in identifying the effective 
and necessary components of treatment packages, such as cognitive therapy versus 
cognitive behavioural therapy. It would be beneficial if future research focused on 
controlled trials of combined treatments (i.e., comparisons of medication, REBT, and the 
combination of pharmacotherapy and REBT). Studies examining the long-term benefits 
of REBT and the use of relapse prevention sessions to reduce relapse rates may also be 
useful. In addition, studies that have diverse populations and a wide age range are needed 
to evaluate whether these protocols can be generalised to other populations. 
As demonstrated in these studies, group therapy is an effective modality to 
deliver REBT treatment packages to especially intensify the benefits of group therapy for 
adolescents, as well as to address some of the factors required to be taken in to 
consideration when forming a group therapy program for socially anxious young college 
people. 
7.3 Using REBT for treating social anxiety 
Velting, Setzer and Albano (2004) maintain that cognitive behavioural therapy 
models consist of six essential components in the treatment of social anxiety: psycho-
education, somatic management, cognitive restructuring, and problem solving, exposure 
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and relapse prevention. The following is a concise description of these six components 
as provided by Velting et al. (2004): 
7.3.1 Psycho-education  
Psycho-education refers to family training on understanding the nature of social 
anxiety, the manner in which excessive levels of this disorder are learned and maintained 
and the rationale for various treatment techniques, especially in children and early 
adolescents. Therefore, because much of social anxiety is maintained by 
avoidance/escape and unhelpful thinking, CBT will assist the people with social phobia 
with learning new ways to approach social anxiety provoking situations with greater ease 
and confidence. However, CBT does not teach ‘happy thoughts’ and promise a carefree 
life; rather, it is focused on assisting the young people with being proactive in coping 
with everyday hassles and negative life events (See Brady & Kendall, 1992).  
7.3.2 Somatic management 
Somatic management techniques may involve teaching deep, diaphragmatic 
breathing and/or some form of relaxation training. The procedures are applied 
differentially across the anxiety disorders and depend on the severity of the child’s 
impairment and comorbidity patterns. Therapists teach the child or adolescent and 
parents to view social anxiety as a tripartite construct consisting of physiological 
components (physical sensations and autonomic nervous system functions), cognitive 
elements (beliefs, assumptions, thoughts, and images) and behavioural reactions 
(typically in the form of escape or avoidance of feared situations or stimuli). 
7.3.3 Cognitive restructuring 
Cognitive restructuring involves the identification of unhelpful, social anxiety-
provoking thoughts and the subsequent challenging of these thoughts with proactive, 
coping-focused thinking and action plans based in reality. Clients are taught to treat their 
thoughts as ‘guesses’ to be tested and challenged. In the case of children or early 
adolescents, parents are often taught to serve as ‘sideline coaches’. Rather than provide 
excessive reassurance and answers to their clients’ anxious thoughts, parents are taught 
to coach their children in questioning the evidence for their thoughts and arriving at 
coping solutions. Several models for conducting cognitive restructuring with young 
people of various ages have been developed (see Kearney & Albano, 2000a, 2000b; 
Kendall, 1990; Silverman & Kurtines, 1996). 
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7.3.4 Problem solving 
Problem solving is a step-by-step process in which the child generates and tests a 
variety of active methods for coping with specific problem situations. Problem-solving 
skills are usually most effectively taught by first working through a problem that is 
concrete, real and completely unrelated to the client’s anxiety. 
7.3.5 Exposure 
This is considered the key element in the treatment of any anxiety-based disorder 
(Albano et al., 2001; Barrios & O’Dell, 1998). The process and related tasks involve 
systematic, graduated and controlled exposure of the client to his or her feared situation 
or stimulus. Exposure takes many forms, such as imaginal (e.g., through guided 
imagery), symbolic (e.g., through the use of pictures or props), simulated (e.g., through 
role-playing), and in vivo exposure (e.g., contact with the real situation/stimulus). The in 
vivo method is preferred and is the ultimate goal of any exposure programme. Exposures 
can involve anxiety-provoking situations or stimuli. 
In general, young people are encouraged to engage in exposure situations in a 
graduated manner both within sessions and as between-sessions homework assignments. 
Cognitive restructuring, problem-solving and somatic management skills are practised 
and applied during exposures. The process of exposure provides the client with new 
information about the social anxiety provoking situation and his or her ability to cope 
with the associated anxiety. 
7.3.6 Relapse prevention 
Finally, all CBT programs involve a relapse prevention component geared toward 
consolidating the child’s anxiety management skills and promoting generalisation and 
maintenance of treatment gains. Some methods of relapse prevention involve having the 
client keep a notebook or diary of ongoing progress, spacing the final sessions out to bi-
weekly or monthly visits, videotaping therapy sessions in which the client illustrates the 
techniques he or she has learned to overcome the anxiety, and ‘trading places’ with the 
therapist in a role-reversal exercise. 
There are other researchers who point to the effectiveness of cognitive therapies, 
especially REBT, in the treatment of social anxiety (DiGiuseppe, McGowan, Sutton-
Simon & Gardner, 1990; Watson & Friend, 1969). These therapies cover a variety of 
techniques in which children and adolescents are taught to use cognitive meditational 
strategies as a means of guiding clients’ behaviour, with the ultimate goal of inducing 
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positive behavioural and mental adjustment (Durlak et al., 1991). According to 
DiGiuseppe, Terjesen, Goodman, Rose, Doyle & Vidalikis (1998), cognitive therapies 
and behavioural treatment conditions can generate a significant reduction of anxiety 
specific to interpersonal and social behaviour. REBT is one type of CBT with an 
extensive history of use with children and adolescents (Bernard, 1990; Bernard, Ellis & 
Terjesen, 2006; DiGiuseppe & Bernard, 1990). Researchers have generally been 
supportive of this approach with effect size estimates from a number of meta-analyses 
ranging from 0.35 (Dush, Rirt & Schroeder, 1989) to 1.27 (Lewinsohn & Clarke, 1999). 
The research on outcomes using REBT has been somewhat contradictory, especially as it 
pertains to working with children. Authors of recent meta-analytic reviews on REBT 
with young people and Rational Emotive Education (REE), prevention based psycho-
educational approach based on REBT theory, have reported promising results (Gonzalez 
et al., 2004). 
Ellis (1962, 1980) and Ellis and Grieger (1977) support both the necessity for a 
problem solving set of treatment therapies, rooted in rational therapy theory, and 
combating irrational beliefs in the social problem solving process, especially for 
reducing situation anxiety or social phobia disorder. They claim that the adoption of an 
accepting, problem-solving-oriented approach to the problems in living is an essential 
ingredient in successful problem solving performance to reduce social anxiety. They 
maintain that the negative consequences of poor problem solving often result from a 
tendency to view the original problem or its adversities (events or situations in the 
environment or the social milieu) as highly threatening and cataclysmic. This tendency, 
in turn, results from the adherence to irrational beliefs.  
REBT attempts to change irrational beliefs for those clients who suffer from 
emotional disturbance. It is held that REBT is effective in altering irrational beliefs to 
rational beliefs, resulting in significantly less emotional distress (Jacofsky, 2006; Jensen, 
2008; Moore, 2006). 
8 REBT: Theory of Change 
To initiate effective changes in the emotions and behaviours of consultees, REBT 
therapists need to assist their clients to cognitively process their emotions and approach 
their behaviours in ways amenable to effectuate the principles of REBT as follows: 
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1. Realise that they largely create their own psychological problems and that while 
situations contribute to these problems, they are generally of lesser importance in the 
change process. 
2. Fully recognise that they are able to address and overcome these problems. 
3. Understand that their problems stem largely from irrational beliefs. 
4. Detect their irrational beliefs and discriminate between them and their rational beliefs. 
5. Examine their irrational beliefs and their rational beliefs until they see clearly that 
their irrational beliefs are false, illogical and unconstructive while their rational 
beliefs are true, sensible and constructive. 
6. Work towards the internalisation of their new rational beliefs by using a variety of 
cognitive (including imaginal), emotive and behavioural change methods. In 
particular, act in ways that are consistent with the rational beliefs that they wish to 
develop and refrain from acting in ways that are consistent with their old irrational 
beliefs. 
7. Extend this process of examining beliefs and using multimodal methods of change 
into other areas of their lives and committing to doing so for as long as necessary 
(Dryden & Neenan, 2006, p.5). 
As such, REBT therapists see themselves as ‘good psychological educators’, 
thereby seeking to inculcate into their clients the ABC model of understanding and 
dealing with their psychological and social problems, and further, to resolve them. The 
most instrumental point about REBT is that it emphasises a variety of alternative ways to 
tackle the psychosocial problems from which the consultees suffer throughout the 
counselling process. In addition, as instrumental to therapy as this adoption of a variety 
of alternatives, REBT therapists believe in the possibility of using an inter-disciplinary 
approach to psychotherapy; meaning that when they consider that a consultee is better 
suited to a different approach to therapy, they do not mind referring to another school of 
psychotherapy; that is why REBT has been applied with different methods and 
approaches of therapy such as REST.  
As such, REBT is deemed as an example of theoretically consistent eclecticism 
in that its practitioners draw upon procedures that originate from other counselling 
approaches, but do so for purposes that are consistent with REBT theory. REBT 
therapists are judiciously selective in their eclecticism and avoid the use of methods that 
are inefficient, mystical, or of dubious validity. 
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REBT therapists have their preferred therapeutic goals for their clients, namely to 
help them to change their core irrational beliefs and to develop and internalise a set of 
core irrational beliefs. However, they are ready to make compromises with their clients 
on these objectives when it becomes clear that they are unable or unwilling to change 
their core irrational beliefs. In such cases, REBT therapists help their clients by 
encouraging them to change their distorted inferences, to effect behavioural changes 
without necessarily changing their irrational beliefs or to remove themselves from 
negative activating events.  
Dryden and Neenan (2006, pp. 5–6) contend that REBT therapists normally 
utilise an ‘active-directive counselling style’ which involves Socratic and didactic 
teaching methods, and is often referred to as ‘REBT with an educational message’ 
(O’Toole, 1997, p. 117). But therapists need to vary their therapeutic style from client to 
client. Initially, REBT therapists start their therapeutic sessions with specific examples 
of identified client problems by guiding their clients to set healthy goals at the inception 
of therapy. They employ a sequence of steps in working on these examples, which 
involves using the ABC framework, challenging beliefs and negotiating suitable 
homework assignments with their clients (Dryden, 2001). Froggatt (2005) explains: 
‘For a person to go beyond feeling better to actually get better – that is, to 
achieve fundamental and lasting change – involves modifying the 
underlying core beliefs that create difficulties for them in a range of 
situations. Using our example above, rather than convince yourself that 
disapproval isn’t going to happen, you accept that it might, but deal with 
your underlying core belief that you need approval and must not ever 
receive disapproval.’ (p. 2) 
In this way, REBT therapists are guiding their clients to generalise their learning 
from one situation to another by explicitly building their cognitions and redirecting their 
beliefs throughout the counselling process in order to help them identify, challenge and 
change core irrational beliefs which are seen as accounting for disturbance across a 
broad range of relevant situations. 
The best thing about REBT as a major therapeutic strategy branching off RET is 
that it guides and helps clients to become their own therapists. In order for this change to 
occur, REBT therapists teach their clients how to use a particular skill such as 
challenging irrational beliefs, model the use of this skill, and sometimes give the clients 
written instructions on how to use the skill on their own (Dryden, 2001). Indeed, REBT 
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palpably posits that people, in addition to disturbing themselves, also are innately 
constructivists. In this regard, Ellis (1994) has argued that REBT is best seen as one of 
the constructivist cognitive therapies. In REBT, the psychotherapist places emphasis on 
the active role that humans play in constructing their irrational beliefs and the distorted 
inferences that they frequently bring to emotional episodes. As they mostly upset 
themselves with their (irrational) beliefs, and consequently disturbing, illogically based 
emotions and behaviours, they can be helped, in a multimodal manner, to dispute and 
question these irrational beliefs and develop a more workable, more self-helping set of 
constructs. In this fashion, REBT generally teaches and promotes: 
 That the concepts and philosophies of life of unconditional self-acceptance, other-
acceptance and life-acceptance are effective philosophies of life in achieving mental 
wellness and mental health. 
 That human beings are inherently fallible and imperfect and that they had better 
accept their and other human beings' totality and humanity, while at the same time 
they might not like some of their behaviours and characteristics.  
 That they are better off not measuring their entire self or their ‘being’ and should give 
up the narrow, grandiose and ultimately destructive notion to give themselves any 
global rating or report card. This is partly because all humans are continually evolving 
and are far too complex to accurately rate; all humans do both self- and social-
defeating and self- and social-helping deeds, and have both beneficial and un-
beneficial attributes and traits at certain times and in certain conditions. REBT holds 
that ideas and feelings about self-worth are largely definitional and are not empirically 
confirmable or falsifiable. 
 That people had better accept life with its hassles and difficulties not always in 
accordance with their wants, while trying to change what they can change and live as 
elegantly as possible with what they cannot change. 
In this way, constructive feedback is provided to help foster this clientele’s 
ability to improve their skills to be their own therapists. As clients learn how to use the 
skills of REBT for themselves, their therapists adopt a less ‘active-directive’, more 
prompting therapeutic style in order to support them to build up a growing dependability 
for their own therapeutic change cognitively, emotionally, and finally behaviourally. 
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9 REBT: Relationship to Post-Modern Relativism 
REBT is basically grounded on the major principles of post-modernism and 
relativism. Implicit in these tenets is the key notion that there is no absolute truth and 
that what is purported to be ‘reality’ has to be viewed and understood within the context 
in which this reality manifests itself or is manifested. However, this does not mean that 
all manifestations or concepts of reality may be deemed to be equal. What it does mean 
is that people need to be doubtful of the manifestations of natural phenomena since the 
account may say as much or in some cases more about the account giver than about the 
account given; in other words, people may over-emphasise or under-emphasise their 
interpretations of the happenings and situations of their life, which distorts the reality. 
This understanding looks an important point for REBT therapists, for consultees 
will often give an account of an experience and may invite therapists to validate the 
accuracy of their way of viewing the relevant event or situation that they have related as 
well as how they felt about that situation or event. In this way, REBT therapists should 
not primarily become occupied in discussions of the accuracy or preciseness or even 
truthfulness of their clients' perceptions and interpretations of the problematic situations 
they pass through to the advantage of supporting their clients to believe momentarily that 
their interpretations are correct so that they may be able to identify their beliefs about the 
related event.  
The beliefs are deemed to be more influential in determining their emotional 
responses to the events than their interpretations; as such interpretations are 
rationalisations of the irrational. What REBT therapists consequently suggest here is that 
there may be different ways of viewing and interpreting the events/situations that caused 
the problem to their clients and it may not be possible or even relevant to discover the 
truth of what happened to them.  
Therefore, REBT therapists advise their patients not to get stuck in the pursuit of 
absolute truth, and instead assume, at least temporarily, that their clients were correct in 
their views so they can help them to identify and deal with the beliefs about what they 
think happened to them since these beliefs are of prime importance in explaining the 
clients’ response to such events. 
As soon as REBT therapists seek to address the issues of the truthfulness or 
otherwise of their clients' interpretations of ‘reality’ (as they tend to do this after they 
have helped them to identify and deal with the rigid and extreme beliefs that lie, 
according to REBT, at the core of their responses), they persuade them to test their 
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interpretations against verifiably available data (exactly like cognitive therapists from 
Beck's cognitive therapy theory do). By so doing, REBT theorists additionally encourage 
their clients to accept as ‘true’ the interpretation that has most supportive data. In 
relevant literature, this is known as the ‘probabilistic approach’ because therapists 
encourage their clients to accept the interpretation or hunch that which is ‘true’ on 
probabilistic grounds.  
Thus, while REBT therapists encourage clients to accept as ‘probably true’ the 
interpretation of an experience that has the most supportive evidence, they should 
recognise and teach their clients to recognise that they may well be wrong and that a 
more fanciful hunch may better explain what happened. This is not only true of REBT 
therapists, but holds true of all psycho-therapy schools; for instance, Freud, in his 
defence of the criticism levelled at psychoanalysis, gives an example of a ‘middle-aged 
lady … complaining of anxiety states’ who, around 1910, ‘had consulted a young 
physician’ in her suburb. The doctor had promptly told her that ‘the cause of her anxiety 
was her lack of sexual satisfaction’, owing to her divorce, and suggested she would seek 
a fresh outlet by masturbating, starting an affair or reuniting with her husband (Freud, 
1953, p. 73, cited in Lane, 2007, p. 154).  
In this respect, Lane (2007) further relates that when Freud heard of this incident, 
he felt indignantly appalled by the physician’s misinterpretation of psychoanalysis, for 
the lady’s main complaint was a state of anxiety, but the young, inexperienced doctor 
diagnosed it mistakenly as a case of neurotic anxiety, thereby recommending a somatic 
therapy to her out of ignorance. Having reached a wrong psychoanalysis of the case of 
the lady, and prescribed a wrong treatment, the doctor did the lady great damage, as 
Freud claimed,  
‘… by failing to heed the cause of her anxiety; by assuming that it constituted 
a neurosis; by presuming that sexual release would ease her mind; by 
telling her what to do; and by confusing a practical act with its 
psychological significance.’ (Freud, 1953, p. 73) 
In this regard, Lane (2007, p. 154) further explains: 
‘Besides his questionable – even unethical – advice, the doctor broke a series 
of technical rules, due in part to his ignorance of the scientific theories of 
psycho-analysis. The irony could not be plainer – not just because of the 
scorn heaped on Freud today, but because he insisted that there are 
scientifically correct and incorrect ways of conducting analysis.’ (Ibid.) 
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This rings true simply because as Freud (cited in Lane, 2007, p. 154) reiterated 
‘A person suffering from anxiety is not for that reason suffering from anxiety neurosis’ – 
a restatement worth of pondering owing to its relevance and magnitude, because in this 
example of Freud's, the young physician's emphasis on finding a practical solution to the 
woman's anxiety completely overlooked the mental significance she had given her drives 
and the suffering that ensued from this internal judgement. 
However, it is not always possible to tell what route to take in psychotherapy. 
Freud explains that the rush of doctors to suggest treatments at first consultation by 
brusquely telling the patient the secrets that have been discovered by the psychoanalyst 
is not a professional act, as this can possibly cut off any attachment that may possibly 
develop between the psychotherapist and the patient. For these reasons, one may believe 
that REBT therapists are not as interested in what happened to their clients as they are in 
their clients' beliefs about what they think happened to them or what they think causes 
them the emotional disturbances they suffer from. 
In addition, REBT theory maintains a relativistic position about itself and its own 
propositions. Accordingly, it holds that its positions and tenets may have validity, but not 
in any absolutistic terms, and that these tenets and positions should strictly be viewed 
within the context in which situations occur and thereto must be interpreted. Its ideas 
may prove false in the years to come, so think REBT adherents. It is interesting to note, 
however, that REBT therapists seek to encourage their clients to take themselves and 
their lives seriously, but not too seriously, as they adopt the same attitude to REBT itself.  
Ziegler (2000) has explained in brief the basic assumptions concerning human 
nature that underlie REBT's personality theory.  
Ziegler's views are relevant here, now that he is both an REBT practitioner and a 
leading personality theorist (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1976). However, one cannot claim 
consensus among REBT therapists as to Ziegler's views, but given his status as an 
internationally respected personality theorist, these views are worth putting forward as an 
authority in the field. Therefore, Hjelle and Ziegler's (1992) nine basic assumptions 
concerning human nature that underpin all personality theories can be summarised as 
follows by way of elucidating Ziegler's views in this respect: 
1. Freedom – Determinism 
How much internal freedom do people have and how much are they determined by 
external and internal (e.g. biological) factors? 
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2. Rationality – Irrationality 
To what extent are people primarily rational, directing themselves through reason, or to 
what extent are they guided by irrational factors? 
3. Holism – Elementalism 
To what extent are people best comprehended as a whole or to what extent by being 
broken down into their constituent parts? 
4. Constitutionalism – Environmentalism 
To what extent are people the result of constitutional factors and to what extent are they 
products of environmental influences? 
5. Changeability – Unchangeablity 
To what extent are people capable of fundamental change over time? 
6. Subjectivity – Objectivity 
To what extent are people influenced by subjective factors and to what extent by external, 
objective factors? 
7. Proactivity–Reactivity 
To what extent do people generate their behaviour internally (proactivity) and to what 
extent do they respond to external stimuli (reactivity)? 
8. Homeostasis–Heterostasis 
To what extent are humans motivated primarily to reduce tensions and maintain an inner 
homeostasis and to what extent are they motivated to actualise themselves? 
9. Knowability–Unknowability 
To what extent is human nature fully knowable? 
These basic assumptions are translatable into the following characteristics of 
REBT: 
1. Phenomenological and stoic emphases 
REBT agrees, in large part, with the phenomenologists that we respond to events 
not as they are but more by how we see them. It also agrees, in large part, with the Stoic 
philosopher, Epictetus, who said that ‘Men are disturbed not by things but by their views 
of things’ or as Shakespeare said, ‘there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking 
makes it so.’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, ii, 249, in Thompson & Taylor, 2006). These two 
emphases show how much REBT stresses cognition in human disturbance and health. 
However, REBT emphasises in particular the role of rigid and extreme beliefs in human 
disturbance, which the phenomenologists and the Stoics do not. In this respect, it is 
worth citing Epictetus again advising against entertaining irrational beliefs: 
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‘Practise then from the start to say to every harsh impression, “You are an 
impression, and not at all the thing you appear to be.” Then examine it 
and test it by these rules you have, and firstly, and chiefly, by this: 
whether the impression has to do with the things that are up to us, or 
those that are not; and if it has to do with the things that are not up to us, 
be ready to reply, “It is nothing to me”.’ (Epictetus, translated by George 
Long, 1955, p. 1) 
Although REBT has changed its name twice its establishment as Rational 
Therapy in 1955 (it became Rational-Emotive Therapy in 1962 and Rational Emotive 
Behavioural Therapy in 1993), it has always maintained the cognitive (Rational) 
dimension in its name. 
2. Affective-experiential emphasis 
While it agrees with Epictetus in the above respect, REBT does not go along with 
another Stoic view that we should strive to develop non-emotional responses to life 
adversities. In this regard, REBT is highly affective in emphasis and encourages people 
to have passionate positive and negative responses to things that are important to them, 
as long as these responses are healthy. This even includes strong negative responses to 
significant life adversities like loss. For example, to feel very sad when one loses a loved 
one is healthy. Rational therapy was renamed Rational Emotive Therapy because many 
authors believed erroneously that the therapy neglected emotion. This was not the case 
then, and it is not the case now. REBT has an experiential element in that it advocates 
that people do fully experience their feelings. However, REBT holds that fully 
experiencing unhealthy negative feelings is not curative in itself, but is useful in that it 
helps the person to identify irrational beliefs that underpin these feelings.  
3. Behavioural emphasis 
When Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) became Rational Emotive Behavioural 
Therapy (REBT) in 1993, it was because Ellis considered that people thought, again 
erroneously, that RET neglected behaviour. This was again incorrect. REBT argues that 
people are at their happiest when they are actively pursuing their personally meaningful 
goals and when they disturb themselves they often act in ways that deepen their 
disturbance. 
4. Psychological interactionism 
REBT strongly addresses the principle of psychological interactionism, which 
argues that cognition, emotion and behaviour are not separate psychological systems – 
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rather, they are overlapping processes, and when we think in terms of cognition for 
example, we should also think of the affective (emotional) and behavioural (actual 
behaviours or action tendencies) components of these cognitions (Ellis, 1994). Indeed, 
REBT theory has emphasised this principle of psychological interactionism from its very 
inception (Ellis, 1962). Ellis has always urged REBT therapists to target all three 
systems in the change process and in particular has always advocated that without 
corresponding behavioural change, affective and cognitive change is transitory (Ellis, 
1962). The misconception that REBT neglects behavioural change prompted Ellis to 
rebrand Rational Emotive Therapy as Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT) in 
1993. 
5. Psychodynamic features 
Although REBT was created, in part, out of Ellis's disaffection with 
psychoanalysis, it is easy to assume that as a result REBT has dispensed with all 
psychodynamic insights. This is not the case. Thus, REBT therapists do agree with their 
psychodynamic colleagues that humans are influenced by unconscious ideas. 
However, in the main, these ideas can be relatively easily discovered and brought 
to the client's conscious mind and are not deeply buried within the client's psyche 
requiring a long period of exploration to be made conscious. 
Also, REBT theorists agree with diverse psychodynamic colleagues that humans 
erect defences to protect themselves from threats to their ego (Freud, 1936). Actually, 
could be argued that humans also erect defensive manoeuvres to protect themselves from 
threats to non-ego aspects of their personal domain. 
6. Constructivistic emphasis 
In this regard, Ellis (1994) has argued that REBT is best seen as one of the 
constructivist cognitive therapies. Humans are constructivists and have a considerable 
degree of choice or free will. However, free will is constrained by the fact the individuals 
are also limited by strong innate or biological tendencies and by their community living 
and social learning, to think, feel and behave. Therefore, a REBT psychotherapist is 
advised to place emphasis on the active role that humans assume in constructing their 
irrational beliefs and the distorted inferences that they frequently bring to emotional 
episodes.  
7. Existential-humanistic emphasis 
REBT has an existential-humanistic outlook, which is intrinsic to it and which is 
omitted by most other approaches to CBT. Thus, it sees people ‘as holistic, goal-directed 
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individuals who have importance in the world just because they are human and alive; it 
unconditionally accepts them with their limitations; and it particularly focuses upon their 
experiences and values, including their self-actualising potentialities’ (Ellis, 1980, 
p.327). It also shares the views of ethical humanism by encouraging people to emphasise 
human interest (self and social) over the interests of deities, material objects and lower 
animals. 
8. General semantics emphasis 
General semantics theory (GST) holds that people are influenced by the language 
that they employ to others and to themselves and that when we use imprecise language 
we are influenced for the worse (Korzybski, 1933). Thus, general semantics theory and 
REBT share a common goal in identifying such imprecise language forms as over-
generalisations, always/never thinking and the ‘is’ of predication and of identity and 
helping people to change them. As noted earlier, because of its interactional or 
multifaceted view of mental events, REBT does not neglect emotion and behaviour. 
However, as Nielsen (2003, in personal communication with Dryden, (2008) has 
observed: 
‘Examination of language offers the advantages of representing rigid 
irrational beliefs in the symbolic form of language where the belief is 
more easily examined and manipulated. While “should” is not always an 
indicator of a rigid belief (e.g. “It should rain by April 30th”), if it is used 
as a synonym for “must” it is an indicator for a rigid belief. The words 
and phrases “should”, “ought”, “must”, “have to”, “got to”, “need to”, 
and “supposed to”; “awful”, “horrible”, “unbearable”, “terrible”; and 
“better person”, “bad person”, “jerk”, “saint”; all can become useful foci 
for intervention, depending on the client's particular beliefs.’ (Dryden, 
2008, p. 13) 
Thus, it is deduced that such language can aptly suggest that the presence of 
irrational beliefs is inevitable and that when clients use such seemingly irrational 
language, they are by necessity inducing themselves to think irrationally, being 
conscious or unconscious of that. As general semanticists observed, the map is not the 
territory and thus the meaning underpinning words is of more interest to REBT therapists 
than the words themselves; i.e., the suggestiveness of words and the educational message 
are what matters to a REBT therapist. Having said that, there may be some therapeutic 
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benefit in encouraging clients to change their language in a comprehensive approach to 
helping them to think rationally. 
REBT differs from GST in that it helps people to see that their imprecise 
language (e.g. ‘he is a jerk’) frequently stems from their rigid beliefs and that it is easier 
to think in more precise ways when one has first changed one's rigid beliefs to flexible 
beliefs (see Point 21). In addition, REBT places more emphasis on the role of behaviour 
in helping people to think more precisely than does GST. 
9. Systemic emphasis 
REBT agrees with systems approaches to psychotherapy that people need to be 
understood within context. Thus, REBT holds that people are both influenced by and 
influence the interpersonal systems in which they live. However, REBT also states that 
ultimately such systems and the interpersonal interactions that occur within them only 
contribute to clients' disturbances and do not determine them. The basic REBT point is: 
‘people are disturbed not by the systems in which they live, but by the rigid and extreme 
views that they take of these systems’. 
10. REBT is against religiosity not religion 
Albert Ellis regarded himself as a probabilistic atheist, but held that religious 
belief is not an obstacle to the effective practice of REBT. The only time religious belief 
is an obstacle in REBT is when the REBT therapist brings his or her devout religious 
beliefs to the therapy. However, what is damaging here is the devoutness of the belief, 
not the religious content, and the intrusion of any devout therapist belief in the 
therapeutic process is counter-therapeutic even when the content of the devout belief is 
REBT theory. Thus it is not religion that is the problem here; it is religiosity (Ellis, 
1983). 
11. REBT theory does have echoes in certain religious thought. 
For example, the principle of other-acceptance in REBT (see Points 7 and 10) is 
similar to the Christian doctrine of accepting the sinner, but not the sin, although the idea 
that a person can be a sinner is problematic in REBT, since this involves labelling a 
person with his behaviour.  
10 Restricted Environmental Stimulation Technique (REST) 
The Restricted Environmental Stimulation Technique, commonly known as 
‘Flotation-REST’, is a cost-effective and secure method, with little or no adverse effects. 
In this method, an individual in a horizontally floating posture is placed and immersed in 
 164 
 
highly concentrated salt water. In such an environment (the floating tank), all incoming 
stimuli are reduced to the barest minimum during a short period in order to prepare the 
participants for a process of hypnosis – a cooperative interaction in which the 
participants respond to the suggestions of the hypnotist. This technique has also been 
clinically proven to provide medical and therapeutic benefits, most notably in the 
reduction of pain and anxiety (Klein & Kilhstrom, 1998; Barrett Gross, Christensen & 
Benvenuto, 2001). The salt water in the floating tank is kept at skin temperature, ear 
plugs are used to minimise sounds, and when the tank is closed, complete darkness 
prevails (Borrie, 1993; Suedfeld, 1983). 
Positive effects of Flotila REST have been reported by many studies. Mahoney 
(1990) reports increased well-being; Schultz and Kasper (1994) report euphoria of a mild 
nature and Forgays and Forgays, (1992); Norlander, Bergman, and Archer, (1998); 
Norlander, Kjellgren, and Archer, (2003); Sandlund, Linnarud, and Norlander, (2001); 
Suedfeld, Metcalfe, and Bluck (1987) suggest increased originality. In addition, some 
studies have also reported reduced tension and anxiety (Fine & Turner, 1983; Schulz & 
Kaspar, 1994; Suedfeld, 1983), reduced blood pressure (Fine & Turner, 1983; Turner, 
Fine, Ewy & Sershon, 1989) and reduced muscle tension (Norlander, Bergman & 
Archer, 1999) beside it being a suitable complement to psychotherapy (Jessen, 1990; 
Mahoney, 1990). 
The first research papers on the effects of severe stimulus monotony on human 
beings were published in the early 1950s (Bexton, Heron & Scott, 1954; Heron, Bexton 
& Hebb, 1953). Reports that extended both the experimental work and previous 
medical/psychiatric practice (Gutheil, 1978) followed. Later techniques favoured 
administering profound environmental restriction to mental patients as a therapeutic 
agent (e.g., Azima & Cramer-Azima, 1956). As a result, by the end of the 1960s, well 
over a thousand books, articles, chapters, technical reports, and conference presentations 
had been published in which the use of some form of sensory deprivation played a major 
part (Zubek, 1969). 
An array of techniques has been used to cause stimulus reduction and/or 
monotony. Present use, however, focuses on two procedures. The first is secluded bed 
rest in a completely dark and soundproof room, with minimal physical restraints and the 
time of study reduced to 24 hours or even less. This technique has been used to generate 
quantified and objective data. In the second method, the individual is made to float for 
almost an hour in a shallow bathtub-like tank. This tank is filled with a warm solution of 
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water and Epson salts (Lilly, 1977). Both of these techniques are covered by REST 
(Restricted Environmental Stimulation Therapy or Technique), which Suedfeld (1980) 
considers to be a less offensive and more accurate term than ‘sensory deprivation’. 
REST should be particularly appropriate in two types of clinical situations, 
according to both empirical research and theoretical analysis. The first involves using the 
known cognitive effects of REST for habit change. This is achievable by decreased 
distraction, increased stimulus hunger and greater openness to new information 
associated with the stimulus reduction experience. Smoking cessation and weight 
reduction are the two psychological issues that can be addressed. Stress diseases and 
dysfunctions of information processing, problems directly associated with chronic or 
acute stimulus overload, represent the second category of health psychology addressed 
by REST. 
REST in the health psychology context has been most often applied for inducing 
habit modification. REST in combination with other control treatments has shown 
generally good results, especially when the REST condition involved both darkness and 
silence. Two such reports found REST to be as effective as standard treatment 
procedures requiring considerably more time and effort (Barnes, 1976; Best & Suedfeld, 
1981); three others established REST to be considerably more favourable than placebo or 
untreated control procedures (Ovadia, 1979; Suedfeld, Landon, Pargament & Epstein, 
1972; Suedfeld & Ikard, 1974). 
10.1 REST for managing stress and related disturbances 
REST has been tacitly applied in various stress and related disturbances in such 
treatment modes as psychoanalysis, autogenic training, meditation and relaxation 
procedures, biofeedback training and various Oriental techniques (see Suedfeld, 1980). 
Although some theorists, practitioners and patients are unaware of the similarity, some 
researchers (Bernstein & Borkovec, 1973; Carrington, 1978) have explicitly drawn the 
parallel between the procedures used in meditation, relaxation and biofeedback on the 
one hand and REST on the other. 
However, there has been little systematic work on REST as a stress management 
system. A peculiar example of its application in this context is the parameters 
recommended by Leboyer (1974) for delivery rooms, which should be quiet, relatively 
dark, with slow and gentle movement and a stable temperature. Although it is difficult to 
appraise effects of this process, there have been some positive publications (e.g., 
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Guichard, 1976). Wilcox (1957), working with babies a little past birth, has treated colic 
by reducing visual, auditory and tactile stimulation, inducing tight pressure around most 
of the body and confining the infant in the foetal position. These effects are obtained by 
binding the newborn in a foetal position. Without using drugs or changing feeding 
techniques, a cure rate of 80% was attained. This stimulus restriction method is 
increasingly used to treat stress symptoms in infants who are born addicted to heroin or 
methadone (Barrett, 1981). Similarly, reduced stimulation along with social isolation has 
been identified as the treatment of choice in the management of the acute, violent phase 
of phencyclidine (PCP) and LSD overdose (Adams, 1980; Luisada & Brown, 1976). 
Autistic symptoms, hyperactivity and antisocial behaviour in children and 
adolescents have been successfully treated using REST. This involved both prolonged 
isolation coupled with fairly intensive REST and the short periods of stimulus reduction 
usually labelled ‘time out’. These positive results are inclined to support the hypotheses 
that for some children the ‘normal’ range of stimulus bombardment is in fact excessive. 
Such children react to this excess through maladaptive behaviour. Both stress and 
symptomatology are reduced if the bombardment is reduced to a level that is more 
appropriate for that particular child (Schechter, Shurley, Toussieng & Maier, 1969; 
Suedfeld, Schwartz & Arnold, 1980). 
Use of REST in stress management through the phenomenon of ‘tanking’ – 
spending time floating for purposes of relaxation – is perhaps the most publicised 
approach, and yet one of the least well studied. The change in technology from total 
immersion in a water tank – a rather frightening aspect of this variant of REST – to 
floating in a thick Epsom salt solution has led to the establishment of dozens of 
commercial facilities in which people all over North America can follow the lead of Lilly 
(1956; 1977), the inventor of the water immersion procedure. 
Lilly (1956; 1977) has focused on feelings of serenity, deep relaxation, self-
insight, transcendental experiences, flashes of creativity and improved concentration in 
his autobiographical writings and his descriptions of the experiences of others. Hundreds 
of people have used this floating technique in varying degrees. The commercial 
manufacturers emphasising the feelings of security and relative calmness have named 
their products ‘Float to Relax’, ‘Tranquillity’, ‘Samadhi’ and so on. 
Despite its popularity, the owners of these commercial ventures have no or little 
interest in collecting systematic data on the effects. All the evidence, therefore, is 
anecdotal. Objective investigation of the actual effects of REST would be essentially an 
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important input. If flotation REST turns out to be therapeutically effective, the technique 
could become an important alternative to the chamber procedure, if only because of the 
time reduction from 24-hour to 1-hour sessions. 
In addition, REST can enhance other, more standard, stress management 
procedures. It may facilitate the effectiveness of biofeedback, as Plotkin (1978) reported 
that biofeedback sessions realised in relatively profound REST conditions were 
conducive to more positive feelings about the training than sessions that were conducted 
in a more stimulating environment. Lloyd and Shurley’s (1976) research is one of the 
most creative demonstrations of the potential of REST in combination with biofeedback. 
10.2 REST combined with REBT for treating anxiety 
REST was applied in earlier studies as an intervention to enhance personal 
functioning. Azima and Cramer-Azima (1956) employed REST as a treatment invention 
with two different groups of psychiatric in-patients along with a non-patient group. 
Subjects of a psychiatric in-patients group were five patients suffering from anxiety 
states, two obsessive compulsives, five depressed patients and two hebephrenics. They 
were kept in dark and isolated hospital rooms with earplugs to reduce auditory 
stimulation for a period of two to six days. Two sets of change occurred. Firstly there 
was a ‘disorganisation of psychological structure’. Secondly a process of reorganisation 
was traced, which in most cases involved ‘constructive aggression’, with an increasing 
tendency to ‘socialisation and relationship-undertaking’ (p.122). The second group of 
four obsessional neurotics were treated with the same procedure. Although the 
participants showed no changes in symptomatology, they displayed an increased 
willingness to communicate and socialise.  
Gibby, Adams & Carrera (1960) conducted a study on 12 psychiatric in-patients 
at Richmond Veterans Administration hospital, Virginia. Six hours of reduced 
environmental stimulation was provided to the patients. The patients were diagnosed 
with various disorders, including schizophrenia, psycho-neurotic disorders, personality 
disorders and a psycho-physiologic autonomic and visceral disorder. Generalised 
qualitative changes in the behaviour of these patients were reported. Patients displayed 
an increased desire for social contacts and therapeutic relationships with the staff. In 
addition, all suggested an increase in ego strength through verbalisation of internal 
conflicts, new insights into personal difficulties and recognition of their own role in the 
maladaptive behaviour patterns that had led to their hospitalisations. 
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Reporting on study conducted on 54 female university students who were kept in 
a REST environment, Suedfeld (1980) found that the treatment led to an increase in self-
acceptance. Earlier Jones (1969) found that reducing environmental stimuli created a 
state of stimulus hunger in participants, which caused them to crave informational 
stimuli.  
In another study, Wathney (1978) examined the effects of REST on the self-
actualisation of college students. Forty-five volunteers were randomly divided into three 
equal groups, and administered the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) (Shostrom, 
1963) immediately before and after treatments. Participants of Group 1 spent three 
sessions of 1.5 hour in a REST tank. Group 2 participants also spent the same time but 
with each session preceded by a taped guided imagery message to encourage inner 
awareness and receptivity to whatever they might experience. Group 3, the control 
group, received a normal amount of stimulation and was administered the second POI 
after Groups I & II underwent their treatments. The result showed that neither Group 1 
nor Group 2 was greater than the control group on post-treatment POI scores. The author 
attributed this to several problems that might have biased the results. First, the tank’s 
effectiveness was reduced, as it was placed without caring for reduction of outside 
distraction. Second, the negative results on the written measure may have been due to an 
abnormally high mean pre-test score. Further, the author admitted that the POI might not 
have been sensitive enough to report changes that had actually taken place. 
O’Toole (1997) summed up the philosophy of REST and how it works for 
psychotherapy as follows: 
‘Suedfeld (1980) has noted that individuals are able to ignore unwanted 
thoughts concerning behaviour because of the impact of environmental 
stimuli. Barabasz (1982) found that REST, by eliminating distracting 
environmental stimuli, sets up a situation in which persons must turn to 
internal stimulation. They are forced to focus on internal stimuli and 
reduced external stimuli. The combination of focusing on internal 
material and craving external input may leave individuals less critical of 
the meaning of the input.’ (p. 18) 
Participants undergoing REST combined with other treatments successfully 
achieve and maintain trichotillomania control (Barabasz, 1979; Barabasz, 1987), 
hypertension management (Fine & Turner, 1983), relaxation of chronic pain (Fine & 
Turner, 1985), blood pressure, plasma renin, cortisol, and aldosterone levels in 
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hypertension (McGrady, Turner, Fine & Higgins, 1987), muscle contraction and 
headaches, (Rzewnicki, Alistair, Wallbaum, Steel & Suedfeld, 1990), and enhancement 
of hypnotisability (Barabasz, 1977a, b; Barabaszet al., 1997). Suedfeld (1980; 1987) 
confirmed that REST can potentially and effectively increase participants’ willingness to 
receive psychotherapy by increasing their susceptibility to the influence of external 
sources.  
However, it may be hard to draw any firm conclusions about the effectiveness of 
a REST environment in altering a person’s social anxiety from these studies due to the 
variety of problems arising from them, including the fact that what the experimenters 
attempted to effect and measure in these studies ranged from self-esteem to self-
actualisation to primary process thinking (O’Toole, 1997). Further, both REBT and self-
efficacy theory hypothesise that cognition plays an important role in emotional as well as 
physical problems, but each stresses a particular type of belief as the leading cause of 
psychopathology (see Barabasz, 2004, 2005; Barabasz & Barabasz, 2000, 2005).  
Barabasz and Barabasz (1981, 1986) used REBT, hypnosis and REST for 
moderating performance anxiety in a case study with a professional pianist and the 
treatment was proven effective. In REBT, beliefs that contain imperatives (e.g. ‘I should 
or must be accepted by others’) are viewed as the cause of dysfunctional emotional 
and/or behavioural reactions. Self-efficacy theory emphasises beliefs related to an 
individual’s level of confidence in producing certain behaviours. For example, a lack of 
confidence in making a particular impression around a valued group of people is seen as 
an important cause in social anxiety (Steven, 1995).  
Imaginative involvements, referred to as hypnosis, have been stressed by Ellis as 
an adjunct method for treatment in conjunction with REBT and REST. According to 
Hilgard (1973), imaginative involvements are experiences where individuals become 
deeply involved in absorptive activities that can induce temporary forgetting of the 
reality around them. Such involvements might induce the aesthetic enjoyment of nature, 
reading, drama and daydreaming (see Barabasz, 1976, 1977a, b; Barabasz, Barabasz & 
Mullin, 1983). Ellis (2004b, p.19) considered hypnosis as a kind of ‘mental healing’ and 
endorsed it as ‘a significantly useful mental healing method’. 
Hypnosis as an aid in REST treatment has not been studied in depth, except in 
O’Toole’s (1997) study. Notwithstanding, Koe and Oldridge (1987) were the first to 
experimentally investigate the interaction between hypnotic responsiveness or 
imaginative involvements and esteem-raising suggestions on self-concept. Their 
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experiment showed that susceptible participants demonstrated higher self-concept scores 
in terms of self-satisfaction or adequacy than unsusceptible participants (F=7.15; p<.05). 
This tendency was even more pronounced when extremely susceptible participants 
(scoring 11 or 12 on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS)) 
were compared to extremely unsusceptible participants (scoring 0 or 1 on the HGSHS). 
O’Toole (1997) has suggested that ‘two beneficial effects of REST include the 
enhancement of hypnotic susceptibility along with increased imaginative involvement’ 
(p.37). 
Earlier, Barabasz and Barabasz (1989) conducted a study on the effects of 
hypnosis on relieving chronic pain in patients in a clinical setting. Participants consisted 
of 20 patients in regular outpatient treatment for conditions in which pain was 
prominent. Results utilising the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C, showed 
significantly higher levels of hypnotisability for both high-demand (F = 29.6; p < .005) 
and low-demand (F = 32.8; P < .004) experimental groups following six hours of 
chamber REST than for the groups undergoing normal stimulation. The ischemic pain 
ratings also showed significantly lower pain scores for both high-demand (F = 7.9: p < 
.05) and low-demand (F = 8.24; p < .04) experimental groups following six hours of 
chamber REST than for the groups undergoing normal stimulation. 
 
11 Concluding Remarks 
For the purpose of providing a solid theoretical background to the present 
dissertation, this chapter has dealt with irrational thinking and REBT in the treatment of 
SAD. The chapter has been set out in two parts. Part I introduces irrational beliefs as 
inevitable occurrences in the human mind, but it describes how and when irrationality 
can become a morbidity or co-morbidity to other psychological disorders, most 
commonly social anxiety. An elucidation of the terms ‘belief’ and ‘belief system’ was 
presented at the inception of the chapter, then a definition of irrationality, irrational 
thinking and irrational beliefs was discussed against the definition of what is rational.  
There has been further discussion of irrationality with regard to REBT, 
adjustment problems and Freudian Psychoanalysis. The term ‘irrationality’ was then 
traced to its biological basis, citing empirical evidence that supports this genetic 
predisposition to irrational thinking under certain circumstances, but explaining that 
rational thinking is also genetically predisposed, and there is a biological basis for 
rationality according to pertinent research cited and dicussed in detail in this chapter.  
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Discussion also followed to explain how irrational thinking is related to or 
stimulant of maladjustment problems, based on a review of the relationship between 
irrational beliefs and finally, in this respect, the relationship between social anxiety, 
irrational beliefs and socio-affective adjustment was highlighted. Then, this discussion 
moved to the criteria for judging irrational beliefs, which consequently led to the 
measurement of irrational thinking, with special emphasis on the Jones Irrational Beliefs 
Test (IBT) (Jones, 1969). 
Part II examined REBT as a treatment for irrational thinking and social anxiety. 
These two parts, together making up the theoretical framework and literature review, 
have focused on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the present study; they 
have presented the interrelationships between social anxiety, irrational beliefs and 
emotive therapy theories in a discussion of relevant SAD theory and SAD treatment 
theory.  
The review of theory and research in Chapter One shows that SAD is one of the 
most common of all psychiatric disorders. Two major subtypes of SAD – generalised 
and non-generalised – have been recognised. This disorder and concomitant syndrome as 
described in the DSM-IV may appear in childhood and adolescence, but the symptoms 
are more severe in adolescence (Wakefield, Pottick & Kirk, 2002). 
The literature review also shows that under-recognition and/or under-treatment of 
SAD is responsible for considerable consequences of the disorder. Different theories 
have been postulated to explain the origin of SAD (i.e. ethological, traumatic, parental, 
genetic, neurobiological, etc.); however, as at the date of this research, there are no 
definitive data to endorse one theory as the exclusive initiator for the disorder. In this 
way, SAD may be the outcome of different and complex mechanisms interacting 
together (Wakefield et al., 2002). 
SAD was reported in varied research to be responsive to both 
cognitive/behavioural and pharmacological treatments. As well, cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) has become a valid and effective treatment option for SAD, especially 
when the disorder is accompanied with other comorbidities, such as shyness or 
irrationality.  
Upon reflection and examination of SAD and current treatment options, it is 
adduced that some of the theories of anxiety and proposed treatments for SAD are 
available in the literature, but are presented as separate and distinct; it is not one theory 
or the other that makes a difference in intervention alone. It is appreciated that 
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amalgamating the elements of all theories is necessary in order to be responsible and 
responsive to the client’s needs.  
Therefore, based on an extensive review of the literature, it was felt that there is a 
benefit in using an eclectic approach to therapy, in which more than one 
psychotherapeutic method could be used for reducing and treating social anxiety.  
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CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY 
 
1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents an overview of the research methodology employed in this study. 
The purpose of the present study, a replication of that of O’Toole (1997), is to 
investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of REBT and the REST on a sample of Saudi 
college students. Such examination will extend and confirm existing knowledge and 
expand research on REBT – purposes that are consistent with the definition of research 
(Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1994). It is worth mentioning here that Nunnally (1982, p.1589) 
emphasised the importance of replicating previous research; he assumes that re-
experimentation and confirmatory research by replication play a significant role in the 
scientific community through establishing reliability of the findings obtained in 
replicated research:  
‘Science is concerned with repeatable experiments. If data obtained from 
experiments are influenced by random errors of measurement, the results 
are not exactly repeatable. Thus, science is limited by the reliability of 
measuring instruments and by the reliability with which scientists use 
them.’ 
Thompson (1990) further supports this point by referring to the fact that 
measurement integrity as suggested in re-experimentation or replication using new 
participants is critical to the derivation of sound research conclusions (p. 585).  
Replication, therefore, is important for a number of reasons, including (1) 
assurance that results are valid and reliable; (2) determination of generalisability of the 
role of extraneous variables; (3) application of results to real world situations; and (4) 
inspiration of new research combining previous findings from related studies. 
1.1 A detailed critique of O’Toole’s Study 
The study by O'Toole (1997) was launched on the basis that REBT theory proved 
effective in managing social anxiety as supported by prior empirical evidence. Therefore, 
the researcher wanted to show that using REBT in combination with the REST could be 
more effective in treating social anxiety in college students. The researcher also noted 
that irrational beliefs were the main culprit for the initiation of social anxiety, so these 
were also measured in his investigation using the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). Social 
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anxiety was measured using the Interaction Anxiousness Scale, the Shyness Scale and a 
behavioural measure of the individual participant's personal sense of anxiety.  
Given that hypnotisability was thought to be enhanced following six hours of 
chamber REST (A. F. Barabasz, 1982), it was controlled for as a moderator variable for 
both REST and REBT in O'Toole's research. The hypnotisability of participants was 
determined using the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form C (SHSS:C) 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). Participants were blocked on hypnotisability level 
(low, medium and high), and assigned to treatment groups balanced for hypnotisability. 
Participants in O’Toole’s study were assigned to three groups, balanced for 
hypnotisability. These were: (1) REST plus REBT-derived message; (2) REBT therapy; 
or (3) a no-treatment control group. Following pre-testing, participants spent six hours in 
their assigned experimental condition. A between-within split-plot analysis of variance 
(SPANOVA) was conducted using pre-, post-, and one-month follow-up test scores. An 
independent post-experimental inquiry confirmed adherence to treatment protocols. 
Findings indicated that the three research groups bore out a significant decrease in scores 
on the Irrational Beliefs Test and the Interaction Anxiousness Scale from pre-test to post-
test and one-month follow-up. There were no significant differences among groups at 
post-test or follow-up. However, post-experimental inquiry of the REST participants 
group revealed that these participants fell into slumber before and/or after hearing the 
educational message, and sleeping was thus shown to attenuate REST effects when using 
shorter REST sessions such as six or twelve hours. 
The study of O'Toole (1997) failed to support the hypothesis that both REST and 
REBT treatments would enhance participants’ receptivity to changing their irrational 
beliefs compared to control participants, despite the fact that this hypothesis had been 
confirmed in some prior research findings (e.g., Dyer, Barabasz & Barabasz, 1993). This 
critically called for replication of this study in order to clear doubts concerning this 
hypothesis and to validate the hypothesis that an amalgam of REBT and REST 
treatments is more efficient than other types of psychotherapies in reducing social 
anxiety in college-age students as reported in O’Toole (1997). 
Additionally, in the study by O'Toole, the length of time spent on the sessions was 
relatively short – a matter of a few months does not give reliable proof that significant 
changes in the sets of irrational beliefs have occurred over this period of time. In his 
study, the time participants spent in the REST group therapy was limited to a total of six 
hours, which appears to be an insufficient amount of time for this treatment to be 
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effective in helping participants to significantly change their irrational beliefs. Therefore, 
O'Toole suggested that future studies might need to increase the length and number of 
sessions employed in an REST group. Prior research suggested that a period of 12 to 24 
hours of exposure to a REST environment would be much more effective in changing 
participants’ attitudes and behaviours (Barabasz & Barabasz, 1993). Therefore, O’Toole 
(1997) strongly recommended a further replication of his investigation with prospective 
researchers utilising longer treatment periods for both the REST and REBT treatment 
groups in order to maximise the impact of each treatment. 
Furthermore, O'Toole (1997) originally contrived a research design that included a 
fourth treatment group (REST with no educational message), and a sample of 20 
participants per treatment group. Inopportunely, due to the limited number of college 
students willing to participate in his study over the assumed period of three years 
expected for the data collection process, the original research design in O’Toole (1997) 
was limited to three treatment groups with ten participants per group (one REST group 
member dropped out after undergoing treatment). Therefore, O’Toole (1997) suggested 
that in future research replications, potential researchers are advised to benefit from 
conducting their investigations on a larger number of participants in a research design 
utilizing a REST-only group (receiving no educational message). O’Toole (1997) also 
suggested the use of the lighted REST procedure (A. F. Barabasz, 1982; Barabasz et al., 
1997) to help increase the potentiation of effects. 
1.2 Rationale for replication 
The present study replicates O'Toole's (1997) study, referred to above, in order to 
validate the hypotheses that both REBT and REST are more efficient than REBT alone 
in producing improved psychotherapy for reducing social anxiety in college-age students 
and to determine whether this hypotheses are generalisable to new environments. The 
reason for checking the generalisability of results in this regard has been tacitly 
summarised by Fromm & Nash (1992) in the following: 
‘The findings of laboratory settings using primarily college student populations 
are of little value unless the results can be generalised to a wide range of 
different settings, populations, and clinical situations.’ (p. 181)  
According to these authors, there was doubt concerning whether or not college 
student research populations provide valid inference. Furthermore, the replication of a 
study in a totally different environment with the application of the research methods and 
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tools to a demographically different population of participants and using different 
experimenters creates a stronger rationale for re-examination of the research hypotheses 
of the present study as follows: 
1. To assure that results obtained by O'Toole (1997) are reliable and valid; 
2. To determine the efficacy of the model with Saudi university students; 
3. To be able to apply the previously obtained results in O'Toole and the present 
research to new situations; and  
4. To inspire new research combining previous findings from related studies. 
In the Arabian environment, no similar study has been conducted, and it has been 
observed that SAD is on the increase. So experimentation with new methods of 
counselling psychology involving REBT scaffolded by other methods of psychotherapy 
is needed, thus justifying this replication both methodologically and aetiologically. 
This chapter seeks to provide a detailed overview of the methods and procedures 
of research employed in this study and then elaborate on the reliability and validation 
assessments of the instruments used in this study as below. 
 Method 2
This study utilised the experimental method to explore the main research 
question: how effective is a counselling programme grounded in REBT/REST theories in 
relieving and treating college-level students’ social anxiety and irrationality?  
By employing this experimental method and a qualitative approach involving 
content analysis to collect anecdotal and observational data, this study sought to build 
upon previous research in the same vein, and to check the effectiveness of counselling 
programmes grounded in REBT and REST therapies applied to the Saudi environment – 
research not previously undertaken in this environment as far as the researcher is aware 
based on a review of the existing Saudi and Arabian literature. Thus, answering the study 
question will or will not confirm previous empirical evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of REBT in relieving and treating social anxiety and irrational thinking, 
and also indicate its efficacy in a context in which it has not been previously been 
investigated.  
2.1 Rationale for the methodology 
The research methodology combining both quantitative and qualitative research 
was chosen as appropriate for the present study’s objectives. Quantitative research is 
based on a positivist philosophy, which assumes that there are social facts with an 
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objective reality apart from the beliefs of individuals. Qualitative research is rooted in a 
phenomenological paradigm, which holds that reality is socially constructed through 
individual or collective definitions of the situation (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). 
Experimental analysis can circumvent problems of spuriousness (false conclusions that 
seem plausibly acceptable) and fallibility.  
Moreover, randomly assigning participants to treatment groups (levels of X) 
controlled for internal validity, together with the pre-test, and also served to control for 
regression and selection factors. The pre-test also controlled for history, testing and 
instrumentation (see Gay, 1996, p.365-368), making it highly unlikely that some third 
variable would be correlated with X. If a relationship was observed between X and Y, 
the researcher could confidently proffer a causal interpretation of the findings.  
Experimental research has been described as the scientific method par excellence 
when it is feasible (Kish cited in Howarth, 1996, p. 5; Creswell, 2013). Further, and most 
importantly, the quantitative researcher typically employs experimental or correlational 
designs to reduce error, bias and other noise that keeps one from clearly perceiving 
social facts (Cozby & Bates, 2011). In addition, the quantitative paradigm is controlled, 
objective and product-oriented. That is to say, when one proceeds in a quantitative 
paradigm to test hypotheses and estimate the magnitude of variables, one may have 
derived the hypothetical relations and variables from qualitative and conceptual 
considerations.  
Moreover, one’s determination of a level of significance is partly dependent on 
what sort of qualitative effect is expected. Since the quantitative research approach 
employs quantitative measurement and the use of statistical analysis (Sarantakos, 1993, 
p. 6), this methodology involves finding answers whenever there is a need to determine 
what, how many, where and when (Gay & Airasian, 2003). 
2.2 Design 
The present study was an experimental design involving two experimental groups 
and one control group, all comprised of 75 students to which all participants were 
randomly assigned, and three time measures. The following diagram, Figure 3, shows 
this experimental design: 
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Figure 3: Experimental Design 
The dependent measures were self-reports of irrational thinking as determined by 
the scores on the Irrational Beliefs Test and social anxiety levels as determined by the 
scores on the relevant scales, and an irrational thoughts log that each participant 
Two experimental &     
one control group 
 
Group B 
REBT + REST 
Experimental 2 
25 Participants 
 
TREATMENT  
 Analysis of data  
Post-testing 
Group C 
Control Group  
25 Participants 
 
Follow-up testing (1-month later) 
 
Pre-testing 
Group A 
REBT 
Experimental 1 
25 Participants 
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maintained for one week prior to the counselling programme, one week after the 
counselling programme, and for one week one after the counselling programme had been 
stopped. These measures will be quantitatively assessed using the Validation of 
Cognition scale by Shapiro (1989).  
The participants in this study were asked in each counselling programme session 
to record in their diaries their thoughts, feelings and/or behaviours they had on the day of 
the treatment. After that, the participants were further asked to evaluate their thoughts for 
the degree of the inaccuracy of each statement they recorded down. They did so using 
Shapiro's (1989) VoC scale, which is a 7-point (1 = completely untrue to 7 = completely 
true) scale (See appendix D).  
2.3 Methodological considerations 
In a study in which two experimental groups and a control group are followed 
over time to assess group differences in the average rate of change, rate of improvement 
or enhanced psychological/psycho-social performance or effects of a psychotherapeutic 
intervention, one must decide on the duration of the study, frequency of observation, and 
number of participants. The researcher may consider how these choices affect statistical 
power and show that this power depends on a standardised effect size, the sample size 
and a person-specific reliability coefficient. This reliability, in turn, depends on study 
duration and frequency (Overall & Doyle, 1994). These relations enable researchers to 
weigh alternative designs with respect to feasibility and power.  
In planning repeated measures studies, decisions about the number of subjects 
and number of repeated measures per subject depend on the pattern of treatment effects 
and the covariance structure of the repeated measures. An overview of the literature with 
guidelines on sample size and power calculations for repeated measures designs can be 
found in Raudenbush and Liu (2001). Because the present study relied on volunteers and 
two different interventions that required specific labs, the participants who volunteered 
to participate in this study were equally distributed to the research and control groups 
totalling up to 75 college students. 
Further, parametric statistics such as ANOVA were used in this study. Parametric 
statistics rely heavily on the assumptions of the study, which are grounded in previous 
research and an in-depth review of the literature. Usually, if these hypotheses are correct, 
parametric methods can produce more accurate and precise estimates. They are said to 
have more statistical power.  
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Self-report measures were also used in the present study: the Interaction 
Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983a) and the Shyness Scale (Cheek and Buss, 1981) were 
used for measuring social anxiety; the Irrational Beliefs Test developed by Jones (1969) 
was used for measuring the irrational beliefs of participants in the study. These were the 
instruments employed by O’Toole (1997) to tap into the effects of utilising REBT plus 
REST in reducing social anxiety and irrationality. There are several other scales for 
measuring social phobia or social anxiety, but the researcher preferred to use the same 
scales originally used in the study by O’Toole for two reasons, though close attention 
was paid to validation and reliability assessment. First, the present study is a replication, 
and in this regard, the researcher should compare the findings from this study with 
findings from O’Toole’s research in order to check for the effectiveness of REBT/REST 
counselling programmes; if a different scale were to be used, there is no guarantee that 
the comparison would be controlled because there may be experimentation errors due to 
instrumentation (Refer to Gay and Airasian, 2003). Second, the kind of social phobia 
tested is related to social interaction, an appropriate scale for which is the Interaction 
Anxiousness Scale by Leary (1983a), buttressed by another measure for shyness in social 
situations appropriately deemed to be the Shyness Scale of Cheek and Buss (1981). The 
other scale of irrational beliefs developed by Jones (1969) is, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, the classical scale of rationality-irrationality dimensions and has 
been used repeatedly in relevant research; Jones’s (1969) Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) is 
also a prominent self-report instrument that assesses dispositional rationality-irrationality 
with adults which is fittingly appropriate for college students. Problems reported against 
the validation of this instrument were addressed in the Arabic version by using both an 
inter-rater adjudication (using a group of Saudi and Egyptian psychologists and 
psychometricians) and test-retest piloting. 
Since these self-report measures were originally in the English language, they 
were translated into Arabic and submitted to a jury of seven Saudi and Egyptian 
professors of social psychology, counselling psychology and psychiatry to provide their 
dictum on the wording and appropriateness of the scales.  
The researcher translated the scales used in the present study from English into 
Arabic. The researcher further attempted to find words in Arabic that could capture the 
abstract notions and terms involved in measuring the constructs of the present study, 
such as social anxiousness, shyness and irrational beliefs which required extreme care so 
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that the terms and wording in Arabic can semantically and conceptually relay the 
meanings of the original statements in the original scales. 
The translated versions of the scales were rendered to satisfy two sets of 
requirements. 
1. The translated versions ought to meet the basic standards set for all measures, 
translated or not (that is Validity, Reliability) 
2. These also must meet the requirements for semantic and conceptual equivalence 
relative to the source English measures. 
The following methods were used by the researcher to prepare Arabic versions of the 
English instruments: 
1. Direct Translation 
2. Translation/back-translation 
3. The parallel blind technique  
The researcher as a bilingual individual translated all the source language (in 
English) instruments into Arabic through direct translation. Then, a second bilingual 
lecturer in general translation in KAU with no knowledge of the wording of the original 
source language measures was hired to translate the draft Arabic language documents 
back into the source language. Then the original and back-translated source language 
versions were compared. No substantial differences between the two source language 
documents were detected. 
The translated versions were sent to seven associate and full professors of 
counselling psychology and social psychology in KAU in Saudi Arabia, Cairo 
University and Assiut University in Egypt. Those professors had experience ranging 
between 15 and 20 years in practicing clinical psychology, and some of them translated 
other psychometric instruments with validation studies in Arabic journals. There was an 
approximately total consensus over the translated Arabic versions in terms of the 
following points: 
The translated versions show semantic equivalence between the English and Arabic 
versions of the scales with regard to the choice of terms and sentence structures that 
ensure the meanings of the source language statements are preserved in the Arabic 
translation. 
The translated versions show conceptual equivalence between Arabic and English 
versions of the scales indicating an adequate quality in the comprehensibility of the 
Arabic documents, independent of the words used to operationalize the psychological 
 182 
 
terms in these scales, and regardless of any cultural differences between Arabic and 
English.  
Validation data are given under the Psychometric Properties of the Scales 
section. For more controlled measurement of irrational beliefs, and as part of the 
initiation of the counselling programme, participants were asked to participate in a 
thought-listing activity using an Irrational Beliefs Log for one week prior to, one week 
after, and for one month following their treatment. Before or after their participation in a 
social situation in which they felt anxiety, they were asked to list any/all thoughts, 
feelings and/or behaviours they had associated with the situation (or, if assessed 
beforehand, while waiting to interact). They were instructed to jot down in the diary they 
were asked to keep, the first thought, feeling, and/or behaviour they had on one line, the 
next on the second line, and so on, as a free-writing activity (ignoring grammar, spelling 
and punctuation, but maintaining conciseness, accuracy and honesty as far as possible). 
Participants were asked to later rate their thoughts for the degree of inaccuracy expressed 
in each statement after they had completed the psychotherapeutic intervention. A specific 
scale, the VoC Scale by Shapiro (1989), was used for evaluating the irrational beliefs 
collected from the qualitative data in participants’ entries/logs of irrational beliefs. This 
is a statistical procedure developed by Shapiro (1989) for quantifying qualitative or 
anecdotal data gathered from the reported logs of the participants so that their responses 
or (ir) rational thoughts can be tabulated, statistically processed, and quantitatively 
interpreted.  
3 Hypotheses 
1. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Irrational Thinking scores on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than 
participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control participants. 
2. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one-month 
follow-up re-testing than will participants exposed to REBT-only group 
counselling treatment and control participants. 
3. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Shyness Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one-month follow-up re-
testing than will participants exposed to REBT-only group counselling treatment 
and control participants. 
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4 Participation and Sampling 
Volunteer participants were recruited from one Saudi college’s student 
population. Participants were drawn from undergraduate courses through a call for 
participation in the study made by the Psychology Department of the College of Arts. 
One may deduce that this way of recruiting volunteers for the present study is more 
plausible than recruiting a purposeful sample only from the university counselling clinics 
for the following reasons: 
 Volunteers will show a desire to share their psycho-social experiences with 
their respective groups; 
 Volunteers will demonstrate a desire to accept psychological counselling in a 
group-based environment; 
 Volunteers will have and accept the opportunity to meet new people suffering 
from the same psychopathology and be personally challenged to react to 
psychological counselling; and  
 They will demonstrate a desire to give feedback to their psychotherapists. 
However, participants from this population were males only, as there is no co-
education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) educational system. Volunteers were 
assessed for social anxiety using appropriate scales in order to purposefully select the 
sample.  
5 Research Ethics 
 
According to the British Psychological Society (BPS), ethics is related to the control 
of power. Since some clients are powerless or are disadvantaged by lack of knowledge 
and certainty compared to the psychologist whose judgement they require or under 
whose counselling they are treated, a code of ethics must be established and practised in 
attempts to encapsulate the wisdom and experience of the BPS to support its members in 
their professional activities, reassure the public that it is worthy of their trust, and to 
clarify the expectations of clients. Accordingly, informed consent, which is an 
acknowledgement of the willingness of the client to participate in research or in a 
research-based counselling programme, must be sought before an experiment is, incepted 
(Francis, 1999).  
Prior consent in written form was required before launching this study. This is 
because free and informed consent lies at the heart of ethical research involving human 
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participants. Informed consent mandates that participants will be given a brief overview 
of the general focus of the study and will be asked to read and sign an informed consent 
form (Beauchamp, Faden, Wallace and Walters, 1982). Due to the nature of the study, 
and the fact that the participants to be selected were, psychologically speaking, patients 
in need of counselling treatment, personal information and their participation was kept 
confidential. 
In line with this, too, the researcher applied and obtained ethical approval from 
Brunel Psychology Research Ethics Committee on Monday, 17 November, 2008 (Email 
communication with David Bunce, See the end of Appendices). 
 Procedures 6
This section will detail the procedures of recruiting the participants and 
conducting the field study. 
1.1 Recruitment of the participants 
The participants were also asked to complate to an Interaction Anxiousness Scale 
and a Shyness Scale, the results of which were used as a criterion for selecting the 
sample of participants so that they were chosen as college students typically suffering 
from social anxiety disorder. They were volunteer participants, however, as they were 
recruited from the student population at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah by 
nominations of academic advisors and counselling psychologists in the university with a 
preliminary pool of 500 potential candidates there were only 75 typically social anxiety 
patients who volunteered to complete the field study. 
There are no formal research ethics committees in King Abdul Aziz University. 
However, for ethical reasons, as earlier indicated, formal approval from the university 
administration was obtained for the study to take place and students signed a consent 
form (See appendices) indicating their willingness to undergo the treatment and an 
approval from the Brunel Psychology Research Ethics Committee was sought and 
obtained as said. Consent was also sought from students’ parents because in the Arabian 
culture, parental consent is essential before exposing school students of any age to any 
experimental treatment, even if they were teenagers or adults in the university.  
1.2 Preliminary procedures 
Participants were given a brief overview of the general focus of the study and 
asked to read and sign an informed consent form. The Interaction Anxiousness Scale 
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(IAS: Leary, 1983a) and the Shyness Scale (Cheek and Buss, 1981) were administered to 
select those participants who exhibited high social anxiety. An Irrational Beliefs Test 
developed by Jones (1969) was administered to measure irrational thinking patterns. All 
such measures were Arabicised for study purposes and the validity and reliability 
coefficients of the scales were calculated to ensure their eligibility for use with the study 
sample. To stick to the ethical standards, volunteers were notified before they underwent 
any psychological assessments and only participants scoring 49 or above on the 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale and 43 or above on the Shyness Scale (one standard 
deviation above the mean for each measure) were considered eligible to participate in the 
study. Potential participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw at any 
time before, during or after the experiment and follow-up stages. 
1.3 The programme 
The counselling programme used in this study depicts the core of the field study 
used in the present research. It was designed based on a theory of collective REBT to 
control social anxiety in college students in Saudi Arabia according to the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Preparing the first version of the programme 
The researcher used the well-established theoretical frameworks and research-
inspired perspective of psychotherapy used in O'Toole's study (1997). For this purpose, 
too, the researcher used materials developed by other authors (Dryden, 1990, 1995; Ellis, 
1984, 1985, 1997, 1998) to help in developing the programme, which was written in 
Arabic, for the psychotherapists (see Appendix F: a synopsis of the programme for the 
research groups is also given in English in the appendices). 
 
Step 2: Validating the programme 
The programme was sent to 7 psychotherapists and professors to validate it for 
use with the participants in this study. The jurors presented their suggestions to modify 
the programme and its sessions for the respective groups according to their perspectives 
and experience in the field and in accordance with the objectives of the present study. 
Step 3: Development of the programme 
The counselling programme is made up of two versions: one is based on REBT 
only, and the other is a combination of REBT and REST. A description of each is 
provided later. 
 186 
 
The programme is formed of 24 sessions of psychotherapy: 12 sessions for 
REBT and 12 sessions for REBT plus REST. That is, treatment continued for two 
months, with three sessions a week, and each session lasting two hours, totalling 48 
hours of psychotherapy according to this treatment protocol. Several researchers 
suggested that effective REBT treatments should consist of 12 weekly 2 to 3 hour group 
sessions, the first two hours of which should be to introduce the rationale for treatment in 
order to develop group cohesion, and communicate cognitive restructuring concepts 
(DiGiuseppe et al. 1990; Emmelkamp et al. 1985; Heimberg & Becker, 2002; Butler et 
al. 1984; Clark et al. 2006). 
The programme also included participant diaries and self-evaluation forms for 
each participant to appreciate psychotherapy protocols in each session. Following is a 
timetable and brief description of the sessions delivered to the REBT experimental group 
and the REST plus REBT sessions; the same topics were given to the REST therapy 
group which met for 6-hour sessions approximately one week apart. The initial session 
was primarily educational, and the second session primarily involved discussion of the 
results of homework assignments and supportive therapy for maintaining and improving 
progress made in the homework assignments. The REST procedures followed in this 
study made use of the first type of procedures described on earlier. The purpose of this 
REST technique was to reduce or restrict sensory stimuli by secluding participants in a 
quiet room, completely dark and sound-proof, with the least physical restraints. 
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Table 3: Description of the Therapy Sessions(REBT alone and REBT + REST) 
Description of Sessions Topics Dates Sessions 
Psychotherapists and participants get introduced; pre-testing 
participants on the tools of the study; session’s educational message; 
home assignments  
Introduction 14/12/2008 0 
Introducing relaxation techniques and exercises to confront 
emotional stress and reduce anxiety; think of situations that trigger 
off social anxiety, identify themes of problems, identify major 
unhealthy emotions and relevant behaviours, Identify the rational 
alternatives to participants' irrational beliefs, allocate certain home 
assignments  
Learn how to relax! 16/12/2008 1 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Identify major unhealthy negative 
emotion in this episode; train participants on how to relate their 
thinking/beliefs to their emotions/behaviours; train them on how to 
defy and alter negative unhealthy emotions; give in-session tasks and 
Dryden REBT Forms; Allocate home assignments . 
How unhealthy 
negative emotions 
crop up! 
18/12/2008 
20/12/2008 
22/12/2008 
2-3-4 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Introducing how irrational beliefs 
originate, how to notice them, how to curb and/or alter them, and 
present the A.B.C.D.E model in detail. 
 
Relating thoughts, 
emotions and 
behaviours together 
25/12/2008 
27/12/2008 
29/12/2008 
5-6-7 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Introduce REBT theory in 
psychotherapy; introduce the tenets of REBT according to Ellis; 
Illustrate how irrational thoughts are associated with 
psychopathology; explain what normality or abnormality is 
according to REBT theory in Ellis; give tasks and forms; ask 
participants to write their diaries; allocate home-work assignments.  
Introducing therapy 
through the 
A.B.C.D.E. Model 
1/1/2009 
3/1/2009 
5/1/2009 
 
8-9-10 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Introduce conceptualisations about 
social anxiety, symptoms of social anxiety, the characteristics of 
people with social anxiety; introduce thoughts logs to record one’s 
beliefs, give REBT tasks to correct irrational beliefs, give in-session 
tasks grounded in REBT to combat social anxiety; give home tasks 
and assignments in consistence with session goals 
 
How people deny 
that they are 
socially anxious! 
8/1/2009 
10/1/2009 
12/1/2009 
11-12-
13 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Train participants on methods to 
improve self-image and raise self-esteem; give home assignments in 
consistence with goals of the session. 
Improving self-
image, enhancing 
self-esteem to defy 
social anxiety 
15/1/2009 
17/1/2009 
19/1/2009 
14-15-
16 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Brainstorm the major reasons for 
irrational thinking; make a record of different categories of irrational 
thoughts that cause social anxiety in participants; apply some REBT 
techniques to combat and defy irrational thoughts; Questioning 
healthy, rational beliefs and your unhealthy irrational beliefs as the 
core of REBT. introduce Socrates didactics and client-centred 
dialogues as methods of REBT; identify type of situations that 
trigger off social anxiety, categorise in themes, identify relevant 
unhealthy emotions, recognise types of behaviours to cope with 
unhealthy negative emotions; change your unhealthy negative 
emotion to a healthy negative emotion; change your unconstructive 
behaviour to constructive behaviour.   
Combatting and 
defying irrational 
beliefs 
22/1/2009 
23/1/2009 
25/1/2009 
17-18-
19 
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1.4 Initiation of the programme 
The counselling programme, grounded in REBT plus REST psychotherapy 
theories, was implemented by only two psychotherapists selected by the researcher in 
collaboration with the chairman of the Department of Psychology in the College of Arts 
& Humanities of King Abdul-Aziz University (KAU) due to considerations of workloads 
(teaching, researching and counselling) in the department. They were selected on the 
basis that they had experience with REBT.  
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Deal with doubts, reservations and 
objections to adopting one’s healthy belief and / or giving up one’s 
unhealthy belief; help participants how to defy doubts, suspicions, 
reservations and overcome problems/difficulties; demonstrate the 
concept of positive thinking; give in-sessions tasks on defying 
doubts, suspicions, reservations as a way to overcome problems that 
cause social anxiety; demonstrate situations; give homework 
assignments in line with session goals  
Dealing with your 
doubts, suspicions, 
reservations and 
objections: Learn 
how to reduce and 
alleviate your social 
anxiety 
28/1/2009 
30/1/2009 
20-21 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session. Plan to face the critical A; Avoid 
safety-seeking strategies; Take appropriate risks in facing the critical 
A; Review healthy beliefs at appropriate points; Review healthy 
beliefs in different ways; Use imagery to rehearse taking action; Use 
role-play to rehearse taking action; Identify and overcome blocks to 
taking action; explain how to build constructive adaptive behaviours 
in social situations; role-play actions to model appropriate social 
skills in model situations; list homework assignments that they can 
do to strengthen their conviction in their healthy beliefs.  Ask 
participants to self-assess their progress in the treatment; ask them to 
assess their positive new behaviours to defy social anxiety; ask 
participants to list their core unhealthy belief in a demand form and 
one of the following irrational beliefs: awfulizing belief; low 
frustration tolerance belief or depreciation belief, list next to it 
alternative core healthy beliefs in the form of a full preference and 
one of the following rational beliefs: antiawfulizing beliefs; HFT 
beliefs or acceptance beliefs. 
Taking Action: 
Training on 
required social 
skills 
3/2/2009 
5/2/2009 
22-23 
Proceedings of the previous sessions are summarised as an 
introduction to each next session; show how to identify and deal with 
core unhealthy beliefs; demonstrate how to identify participants' core 
unhealthy beliefs, identify disturbance-related themes in a stepwise 
series of REBT procedures; demonstrate how participants can 
monitor their preoccupations; distribute and demonstrate how to fill 
in the Dryden Core Belief Form (DCBF); train on group assertive 
behaviour in group cognitive therapy; show how collective assertive 
behaviour training can result in effective alleviation of social anxiety 
Dealing with your 
core unhealthy 
beliefs: training on 
assertive behaviour 
7/2/2009 24 
Administer post-tests of all scales.  Evaluation of the effectiveness of REBT 
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1.4.1 Therapy credentials of the Professors 
Two associate professors of clinical psychology were hired by the Department of 
Psychology in KAU to carry out the therapeutic REBT and REBT/REST therapies for 
the research groups. The psychotherapists are trained in counselling psychology, 
especially rational emotive behavioural therapy. They had been practicing REBT in the 
Counselling Centre, which is a service facility for helping students with psychological 
problems attached to the College of Arts & Humanities and the Deanship of Student 
Affairs in KAU. Biographical data about the psychotherapists follow below: 
Dr. Esam Abdul Latif Akkad 
He is an associate professor of clinical psychology in the Department of 
Psychology in the College of Arts & Humanities of King Abdul-Aziz University (KAU). 
He also works as a psychotherapist in the Counselling Facility. His doctoral work and 
clinical experience started with his training on REBT as a doctoral student receiving 
training on REBT under supervision of Albert Ellis in a channel supervision programme 
for doctoral candidates sent from Egypt to the USA. His doctoral work was on the use of 
REBT in psychotherapy of depression. 
Dr. Assayed Khalid Mat-hana 
He is an associate professor of psychotherapy in the Department of Psychology 
in the College of Arts & Humanities of King Abdul-Aziz University (KAU), Jeddah, 
KSA. He is also a psychological counsellor in the Counselling Psychology Facility. 
Both psychotherapists have a certified diploma in psychotherapy from Egyptian 
and Saudi universities. They also had received ample training on REBT psychotherapy 
from different counselling psychology departments in Egyptian and Saudi universities. 
They had an experience of 20 years or more working in psychotherapy, and they have 
written copiously on psychotherapy using REBT.  
1.4.2 Researcher’s role and background 
The researcher has read the basic books written by Albert Ellis and Dryden on 
REBT, especially their writings related to the theoretical assumptions underlying 
personality traits and treatment and the ABC theory that highlights an interpretation of 
the relationship between thinking and emotions.  
The researcher also read extensively prior research conducted in the field of 
rational emotive behavior therapy in order to make use of the techniques and procedures 
used in REBT psychotherapy treatments. 
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The researcher corresponded with the Albert Ellis Institute in New York to obtain 
REBT manuals, books and guides to REBT therapies. In this way, the researcher 
collected sufficient material to use for understanding and applying REBT therapy to his 
study, using two professionals who were capable of following the protocols of REBT in 
treating personality disorders. 
The researcher’s role during the sessions was restricted to reviewing the sessions’ 
protocols with the psychotherapists, recognising the techniques of REBT and 
REBT/REST sessions, and distributing and collecting the evaluation forms and diaries 
and other assignments for the experimental participants. The researcher also helped in 
managing the psychotherapy sessions without any biased intervention in the therapy 
protocols. 
At the beginning of the study, the researcher requested the psychotherapists to 
ask the participating students to use irrational thought logs, or to keep a journal, and to 
write anecdotal reports in each case. The researcher assigned the instruments and the 
programme in their final versions and provided a guide to accompany the programme.  
1.5 Placebo effects 
A placebo
8
 is defined as a substance without a pharmacological effect or a sham 
treatment or an inactive procedure. The so-called ‘placebo effect’ is a non-specific effect 
related to the credibility of the intervention, patients’ expectations and the therapeutic 
setting. Placebos are often used as controls when there is no active or standard beneficial 
treatment (Bausewein, 2008). Although no treatment or comparable placebo was 
designed for the research groups, this study utilised an appropriate control condition for 
inter-group comparisons. 
1.6 Procedures of the study (detailed description) 
Participants in the study were administered the IAS and the Shyness Scale to 
decide whether the criterion for inclusion in the study had been met. All participants who 
scored one standard deviation above the mean for each measure (The scores of the scales 
                                                 
8
 A placebo is an inactive medical intervention intended to lead the recipient to believe that the intervention may 
improve their condition. In one common placebo treatment, a patient is given an inert ‘sugar pill’ and told 
that the pill may improve their condition. The fact that the pill is inert is withheld from the patient. The 
intervention may cause the patient to believe that the treatment will change his condition; this belief 
sometimes causes the patient's condition to change, a phenomenon known as the placebo effect. 
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are as follows: IAS=49, Shyness Scale=43) were included in the study. All participants 
were then administered the IBT to obtain baseline amounts of irrational thinking. 
The participants were assigned to three groups: a REBT/REST group, a REBT-
only group and a control group. No REST-only group was contrived in the research 
design, as in the original study by O’Toole, because of the rarity of volunteers in this 
study who are eligible according to the sampling criteria. Also, the researcher wanted to 
discriminate the effects of REBT plus REST treatment vis-à-vis REBT-only treatment, 
with no intention to research the effectiveness of REST, which is already well-
documented in prior research.  
Prior to the start of the counselling programme, the researcher and the 
psychotherapists conducted a preliminary collective meeting with the participants in the 
study, for both experimental groups: 
 To assure that each and every participant had joined the counselling 
sessions of his own volition, quite convinced of the need to receive 
psychotherapy for social anxiety. 
 To assure the participants that psychotherapy is important in its own 
right as a solution for their social phobia disorder. 
 To introduce the participants to the importance of collective therapy 
for achieving the counselling purposes of the programme. 
 To introduce the techniques of participating in the programme 
sessions. 
 To assure participants that confidentiality was absolutely guaranteed. 
 To give the participants instructions as to how to participate and what 
role they will assume in the programme sessions. 
In addition to these, they were also requested to do the following: 
 Partake in social introductions within the group with other 
individuals in their respective groups. 
 Consolidate social relations with the group and ensure that the 
objectives of collective psychotherapy can be achieved on mutual 
understanding in a collaborative spirit. 
 Introduce the objectives and activities of psychotherapy sessions. 
 Introduce the nature of sessions, the protocol of psychotherapy and 
the number and dates of the programme schedule in each group. 
 192 
 
These procedures could lead the participants to empathise with the counsellors, 
which could interfere with the results of the study. However, maintaining a good 
relationship with the participants was deemed instrumental for getting the best of the 
programme in terms of its effects. In addition, a good relationship with the participants 
was important to get them to develop rational thinking and get rid of irrational beliefs. 
1.6.1 REST/REBT condition protocol 
Consistent with O'Toole's study, REBT and REST participants in their relevant 
experimental conditions were given an intensive orientation to the REST and REBT 
procedures, having then received all psychotherapeutic information concerning their 
treatment condition in a peaceful, serene and comforting manner.  
A REST chamber was used to provide the REBT plus REST treatment in the 
counselling clinic of the college at Jeddah. This chamber is sound-proof, and is equipped 
with an intercommunications system, a silent positive pressure ventilation system and a 
dim lighting system. The room was also equipped with cosy and comfortable sofas. In 
addition, participants in the REBT/REST treatment accommodated in this chamber were 
provided with wax earplugs to increase sound attenuation. The lab was wide enough to 
seat 25 participants in cosy and comfortable sofas. It is worth mentioning that the 
sessions for each group were collective counselling sessions. 
Floatation tanks were not used in this study as it was the case in O’Toole’s 
experiment. However, a quiet room was used instead, as the counselling facility of King 
Abdulaziz University did not have these float tanks, and it was not possible to provide 
them soon within the timeline of the field study.  
Since participants need to enter the floatation tanks nude (Hutchison, 2003), it 
was culturally very sensitive to get this to happen in Saudi Arabia, even in a health care 
facility. The participants would persistently have refused to get nude into these tanks 
once they were introduced to the idea.  
In addition, the psychotherapists hired for this study suggested using a lab to 
imitate the effects of restricted environment stimulation procedures, especially in group 
cognitive therapy where floatation tanks could not be possible anyway. 
In practice, floatation tanks were reported to have some practical problems 
(Seudfeld, 2013). Some float users maintained that the complicated head-masks and tight 
apparel used to help the clients breathe in the salty water tanks could constrict blood 
circulation and create uncomfortable physical conditions. The tightness of the mask on 
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the face and the retention strips wrapping around the back of the head were 
uncomfortable in long sessions as well. The continuous hissing of the air valves and 
bubbling of exhaust air out of the mask also could prevent the possibility of silence. The 
mask faceplate is also normally hard and can possibly impede visual isolation; in this 
case, the tank user will seek out help entering and leaving the float tank since the mask 
obviously blinds them. The tight neoprene clothing is awfully uncomfortable particularly 
for the sensitive regions of the body. Even in modern tanks using Epsom salt, ears of the 
clients are still submerged in salty water when the participant is in a relaxed position, 
thereby leading to greatly reduced hearing even with the use of ear-plugs to protect 
against saline. In short, float tanks may not have been ideal for REST sessions in the 
case of the present study. 
The protocol used in the REST chamber followed the following series of 
procedures: 
 Participants were re-oriented to the chamber, after which the experimenter 
answered any questions they might have. Immediately after entering the 
chamber, the REBT/REST participants were given brief relaxation training. 
They were also encouraged to practice relaxation exercises while they were 
in the chamber. 
 They were thus reassured in a tranquil and serene lab environment 
concerning any fears or apprehensions about the REST procedures. The 
psychotherapist assigned to this group of participants conducted a brief pre-
experimental interview in an attempt to assess whether the participants had 
been prone to any stress, anxieties, or other events which could make the 
REST sessions uncomfortable for them, This was done each time a session 
was conducted. 
 The psychotherapist responsible for this group addressed all participants 
undergoing REST in Arabic as follows, seeking answers to a set of questions 
at the start of the sessions: 
I would like to ask you the following questions to ensure that you have 
not experienced anything either recently or in the past that would make your 
time in the REST environment uncomfortable for you: 
 194 
 
1. Have you experienced any unusual types and/or amounts of stress, anxieties 
and/or other events that may be having an effect on your daily functioning 
recently? 
2. Have you experienced any unusual types and/or amounts of stress, anxieties 
and/or other events in the past that may be having an effect on your daily 
functioning recently?  
If participants answered affirmatively to either question, the 
psychotherapist would continue the rest of the questions as follows: 
3. How have they been affecting you? 
4. How have you been dealing with them? 
5. Do you think you will be able to focus on other things while in the 
REST/REBT condition? 
On the basis of their responses to these questions, no participant was excluded 
from participating in the present study. This brief pre-experiment interview was 
conducted to assess whether the participant had been subjected to any stress, anxieties, or 
other events which could make the REST session uncomfortable. After the participants 
were comfortably situated in the REST/REBT condition, the following message was 
read over the intercommunication system:  
Please feel free to tell me whatever you want about your reactions to this 
session. Your experiences will be helpful in understanding the results of 
the study. Whatever you choose to talk about will, of course, be kept 
confidential. Since it is contrary to the purpose of the REST/REBT 
condition sessions, I will not engage in conversation with you in 
response to your remarks over the intercommunication system. At 
different times, you may feel relaxed, anxious, bored or quite 
comfortable and you may at times engage in problem-solving, intense 
fantasies, reminiscing, daydreaming or wondering about the purpose of 
the REST/REBT condition sessions. You may at times feel uncomfortable, 
but the desire to leave is usually quite temporary. During the sessions, 
educational messages relevant to session topics will be read out for you; 
these messages have been designed to help you achieve your desired 
goal of decreasing your feelings of social anxiety. Try not to sleep during 
the session, but if you should fall into slumber unawares, don't feel 
guilty. Do you have any questions? 
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After two hours, a recorded adaptation of the basic tenets of REST was played 
twice for participants over the REST lab sound system. Participants could request to hear 
this message again as many additional times as they wished. All REST/REBT 
participants were continuously monitored throughout the bi-weekly 6-hour sessions by 
the counsellor and the researcher in the counselling lab. When it was necessary, Sanders 
and Reyher's (1972) criteria for terminating REST were followed. Examples of session 
materials for this experimental group are appended to this study. This REBT/REST 
treatment continued for a period of two months, three sessions in weekly, with each 
session amounting to two hours: that is, the overall length of this treatment. 
There was no need to include a REST-only group for this experiment, given that 
the purpose of the present study was to compare REBT versus REBT plus REST. 
Further, REST is a concomitant procedure used to consolidate approaches to 
psychotherapy. 
1.6.2 REBT therapy condition protocol 
Participants in this condition were exposed two-hour REBT therapy group 
sessions. In these sessions, participants were introduced to the main concepts of REBT, 
and given the chance to put these concepts into practice in their daily lives, and reassured 
that they should adhere to these tenets on a regular and conscious basis. This included 
learning the ABC theory of how irrational beliefs about daily events can lead to 
emotional disturbance; assessing how their personal irrational beliefs are resulting in 
social anxiety; setting therapeutic goals that are specific, realistic, achievable and 
measurable: making a commitment to invest the time and energy necessary to achieve 
these goals; and, with the support of the group, challenging their irrational beliefs and 
deciding on more appropriate and rational beliefs to substitute in their place. At the end 
of a session and at the beginning of the next session, participants heard the same 
recorded adaptation of the basic tenets of REBT. In between sessions, participants were 
given homework assignments designed to help them maintain their focus on, and work 
at, changing their irrational beliefs. Examples of session materials for this experimental 
group are appended to this study. 
As is the case in the first experimental group, the REBT treatment continued for 
one month, also with three sessions a week, and each session lasted two hours, with a 
total of 24 hours of psychotherapy according to this treatment protocol. 
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1.6.3 No treatment control protocol 
Participants in this condition spent bi-weekly 6-hour sessions in a non-
REST/REBT or REBT only environment located in the college psychological 
laboratories, where normal levels of stimulation were assured. Participants brought 
personal materials to help maintain normal levels of stimulation; e.g., textbooks, class 
notes, study materials, magazines, etc. However, the control group participants were not 
isolated from the other experimental participants as they were interacting with each other 
before the sessions or after the sessions since the sessions for the research groups were 
consecutively held on the three days of the week the lab was reserved or this study.  To 
exactly model the study of O’Toole (1997), extra materials were provided as needed. 
Social contact was maintained through intermittent interruptions by the experimenter 
approximately every hour to help ensure that the participants were experiencing normal 
amounts of stimulation. They did not receive any training in the basic tenets of REBT or 
REST plus REBT. 
1.6.4 Follow-up 
Directly after their treatments, or no treatment in the control case, and again after 
a one-month interval, participants in the three groups were asked to report their irrational 
thinking patterns by completing the IBT, report their experiences of social anxiety by 
completing the IAS and Shyness scale and complete an Irrational Thoughts log for the 
one week just before taking the research scales. 
2 Limitations  
Several limitations of this study should be noted.  
1. This study employed purposeful sampling so that the study findings could aid in 
providing appropriate educational and counselling assistance for students suffering 
from social anxiety, social phobias. In other words, the findings of the study are 
limited to the sample recruited for this study; i.e., a section of male, college Saudi 
population in the Western region of KSA. 
2. The study was conducted during the academic year 2008–2009. This is a time 
limitation. 
3. This study was restricted to the College of Arts and Humanities in Jeddah city in 
Saudi Arabia and its available facilities. 
4. The findings were delimited by the scales and measures utilised for assessing and 
diagnosing social anxiety, irrational beliefs and shyness as well as by the 
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REBT/REST counselling programme developed for this study and used within the 
cited limitations. 
5. Personal information about participants was not revealed to any authority due to the 
consent agreement reached between the researcher and psychotherapists on the one 
hand and the students participating in the treatment programmes on the other hand. 
3 Instruments  
The Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983a) and The Shyness Scale of 
Cheek and Buss (1981) were administered to select participants who exhibited high 
social anxiety.  
An Irrational Beliefs Test developed by Jones (1969) was also administered to 
measure irrational thinking patterns. These are classical tests that were used in the 
original study of O’Toole (1997). 
All such measures were Arabicised and proven for their reliability and validity 
for the region where they were to be used, with appropriate validation and reliability 
coefficients attained. The English forms of these scales and instruments were translated 
into Arabic using appropriate terminology in a comprehensible fashion for the Saudi 
subjects participating in the study. Afterwards, the instruments were adjudicated for 
validation by a jury of experts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Further methods of validation 
were used as outlined below in this chapter. 
Validation was conducted using multiple psychometric methods: (1) through 
assessing the face validity of the scales; the test is said to have face validity if it ‘looks 
like’ it is going to measure what it is supposed to measure (Anastasi, 1988); and (2) 
through measuring the content validity where content validity is based on the extent to 
which a measurement reflects the specific intended domain of content (Carmines & 
Zeller, 1991, p.20). According to Crocker and Algina (1986), reliability can be defined 
as the ‘desired consistency (or reproducibility) of test scores’ (p. 105). There are various 
models with which score reliability can be estimated (Carmines & Zeller, 1991; Cohen, 
Manion & Morrison, 2000). Reliability was checked to ensure the internal consistency of 
the scales to be employed, especially as being English scales, they had to be translated 
and standardised to match the Saudi Arabian environment.  
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3.1 Psychometric properties of the scales 
This section presents the standard statistical methods used for establishing the 
validity and reliability of the scales used in the study, including the reliability 
coefficients for all the scales. 
3.1.1 Validity  
3.1.1.1 Irrational Beliefs Scale (Translated and and proven for reliability and validity by 
the Researcher): 
The Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT, Jones, 1969) consists of 100 Likert items 
arrayed on ten subscales corresponding to each of Ellis’s (1962) ten irrational beliefs. 
Sample items include ‘It is important to me that others approve of me’ and ‘I hate to fail 
at anything’. Jones (1969.) labelled the ten subscales as follows: Demand for Approval, 
High Self-Expectations, Blame Proneness, Frustration Reactivity, Emotional 
Irresponsibility, Anxious Over-concern, Problem Avoidance, Dependency, Helplessness 
and Perfectionism. Jones reported internal consistency estimates for the individual scales 
as ranging from .45 to .72, a test-retest coefficient of .92, and a concurrent validity r of 
.61 that involved relationships with psychiatric problems (Lohr & Bonge, 1981). Lohr 
and Bonge (1982) essentially replicated the factor structure reported by Jones, 
supporting the latter's validation procedure. 
Logical validity of the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (Jones, 1969) was assessed to 
recognise the rational relationship between the scale's statements and the purpose it is 
used for; in other words, this procedure was taken to calculate an estimate of how much 
a measure represents every single element of the construct of irrational thinking. The 
scale was sent to seven professors of social psychology, counselling psychology and 
psychiatry working in Saudi and Egyptian universities and attached psycho-clinics to 
judge whether the statements that form the scale are commensurate with the content and 
purpose of the scale – that is, whether they denote social anxiety. An estimate of 86% of 
agreement over the validity of the 100 items of the scale was accepted as a criterion for 
validating the statements of the scale. The agreement percentage over the validity of the 
scale's items ranged between 86% and 100 %. Therefore, all items of the original 
questionnaire were included in the final translated scale (Appendix C).  
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3.1.1.2 The Shyness Scale of Cheek and Buss (1981) 
The Revised Cheek and Buss Shyness Scale (RCBS: Cheek, 1983, translated and 
proven for reliability and validity by the researcher), was used to assess shyness. The 
RCBS is a 13-item self-report survey that has a scale range of 13 to 65. The RCBS, 
which has been characterised as ‘the measure of choice’ in shyness studies, assesses both 
affective and behavioural aspects of shyness. Studies of the RCBS have reported a 
Cronbach alpha score of 0.90, suggesting internal consistency, an average inter-item 
correlation of 0.39, and a 45-day test retest reliability of 0.88. Further, the RCBS has 
suitable convergent validity, since it correlates highly with many other measures of 
shyness, including other self-report measures and aggregated ratings of shyness by 
friends and family (Leary, 1991). 
Logical validity of the RCBS (Cheek, 1983) was assessed to estimate how much 
a measure represents every single element of the construct of shyness. The scale was sent 
to seven professors of social psychology, counselling psychology and psychiatry 
working in Saudi and Egyptian universities and attached psycho-clinics to judge whether 
the statements that form the scale are commensurate with the content and purpose of the 
scale – that is, whether they denote shyness. An estimate of 86% of agreement over the 
validity of the 13 items of the scale was accepted as a criterion for validating the 
statements of the scale. The agreement percentage over the validity of the scale's items 
ranged between 86% and 100%. Therefore, all items of the original questionnaire were 
included in the final translated scale (Appendix B).  
3.1.1.3 The Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Translated and Standardised by the 
Researcher): 
The Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983a) assesses social anxiety. The 
IAS has demonstrated high test-retest and internal reliability (Leary & Kowalski, 1995). 
The IAS consists of 15 items that span a broad range of anxiety-evoking situations, 
including interactions with strangers, parties, dating, and dealing with authority figures. 
This measure was designed to measure the tendency to feel nervous in social encounters 
independent of patterns of inhibited, introverted or avoidant behaviour (Leary, 1983b). 
The logical validity of the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (Leary, 1983a) was 
assessed to estimate how much a measure represents every single element of the 
construct of social anxiety. The scale was sent to seven professors of social psychology, 
counselling psychology and psychiatry working in Saudi and Egyptian universities and 
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attached psycho-clinics to judge whether the statements that form the scale are 
commensurate with the content and purpose of the scale – that is, whether they denote 
social anxiety. An estimate of 86% of agreement over the validity of the 15 items of the 
scale was accepted as a criterion of validating the statements of the scale. The agreement 
percentage over the validity of the scale's items ranged between 86% and 100%. 
Therefore, all items of the original questionnaire were included in the final translated 
scale (Appendix A).  
3.1.2 Reliability  
Reliability usually refers to the extent to which a measurement instrument 
produces the same results, with the same participants or different participants, under the 
same conditions, each time it is used – that is on repeated trials (Anastasi, 1988). As 
such, it refers to the stability, accuracy and precision of measurement. An exemplary 
case study design ensures that the procedures used are well documented and can be 
consistently repeated with the same results. Yet, researchers should strive for reliability 
values of .70 or higher (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). That is to say, the measurement 
instrument is usually considered reliable if a participant’s internal consistency score is 
broadly similar. Reliability in this study was checked to ensure the internal consistency 
of the scales to be employed, especially as being English scales they had to be translated 
and proven for reliability and validity to match the Saudi Arabian environment. The 
Alpha can vary from 0 to 1, indicating that the test is perfectly reliable. 
Towards this end, the Split Half Method (The Co-efficient of Stability and 
Equivalence) is administered once on a sample of subjects. Each individual score is 
obtained in two parts (odd numbers and even numbers). The scoring is done separately 
of these two parts – even numbers and odd numbers of items. The co-efficient of 
correlation is calculated from two halves of scores. The co-efficient of correlation 
indicates the reliability of the test as determined by the split-half method. The self-
correlation co-efficient of the whole test is then estimated by using the Spearman-Brown 
Prophecy formula alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1 and may be used to 
describe the reliability of factors extracted from dichotomous (that is, questions with two 
possible answers) and/or multi-point formatted questionnaires or scales (i.e., rating scale: 
1 = poor, 5 = excellent). The higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale is. 
Nunnaly (1978) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient but lower 
thresholds are sometimes used as acceptable levels of reliability as is reported in the 
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literature. In the present study, assessment of reliability coefficients was conducted as 
follows: 
In summary, for the Irrational Beliefs Test, internal consistency estimates of 
irrational beliefs, based on a sample of 500 male students from the Department of 
Psychology in Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of King Abdu-Aziz, in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, were moderately high, since they yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.77, indicating acceptable scale reliability for Irrational Beliefs, a Spearman-Brown 
coefficient of 0.71 and a Guttman split-half coefficient of 0.69, again showing acceptable 
scale reliability.  
For the Shyness Scale, Cronbach α = 0.75, a Spearman-Brown coefficient of 0.67 
and a Guttman split-half coefficient of 0.68, thus demonstrating an acceptable scale 
reliability.  
Finally, for the Interaction Anxiousness Scale, Cronbach’s alpha scores reached 
0.61, while Spearman-Brown = 0.69, and a Guttman split-half coefficient of 0.69, also 
pointing to acceptable scale reliability. The reliability coefficients for all three scales are 
shown in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Reliability coefficients for all scales 
Scales 
 
Cronbach’s 
 Alpha 
Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient 
Guttmann Split-Half 
Coefficient 
Irrational Beliefs 
 
0.77 
0.71 0.69 
The Shyness Scale 
 
0.75 0.67 0.68 
The Interaction  
Anxiousness Scale 
0.61 0.69 0.69 
 
4 Validity of the Instruments 
In order to evaluate the validity of the measures, statistics are presented in Table 
5 below and the three correlations between Irrational Beliefs, the Shyness Scale and the 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale are compared. As shown in Table 5, the correlations along 
the validity diagonal are significantly high, ranging from 0.601 to 0.910, with a mean of 
0.673. All other significant correlations were in the expected direction. 
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Table 5: Validation of the Three Instruments 
   Irrational 
Beliefs 
Shyness 
Scale 
Interaction 
Anxiousness 
 
Irrational 
Beliefs 
  
  
Pearson Correlation 1 .345(**) .287(**) .910(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 
the Shyness 
Scale 
  
  
Pearson Correlation .345(**) 1 .631(**) .673(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 
N 500 500 500 500 
Interaction 
Anxiousness 
Scale 
  
  
Pearson Correlation .287(**) .631(**) 1 .601(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 
N 500 500 500 500 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.1 Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis is an advanced correlational statistical procedure, which is used to 
identify unobserved or latent variables called factors that are predicted by a theory. 
Factor analysis is most commonly used in the development of measuring devices 
in which the goal of the researchers is either to confirm (confirmatory factor analysis) or 
identify (exploratory factor analysis) factors included within a measure which is said to 
operationally define a theory (Nunnally & Berstein , 1994, p. 220) 
Factor Analysis is a statistical method commonly used during instrument 
development to cluster items into common factors, interpret each factor according to the 
items having a high loading on it, and summarise the items into a small number of 
factors (Bryman & Cramer 1999). Loading refers to the measure of association between 
an item and a factor (Bryman & Cramer 2005). A factor is a list of items that belong 
together. Related items define the part of the construct that can be grouped together. 
Unrelated items, those that do not belong together, do not define the construct and 
should be deleted (Munro 2005). 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is a particular factor analysis method used to 
examine the relationships among variables without determining a particular hypothetical 
model (Bryman & Cramer 2005). EFA helps researchers define the construct based on 
the theoretical framework, which indicates the direction of the measure (DeVon et al. 
 203 
 
2007) and identifies the greatest variance in scores with the smallest number of factors 
(Delaney 2005; Munro 2005). 
One frequently used criterion for the number of factors to rotate is the 
eigenvalues-greater-than-one rule proposed by Kaiser (1960). According to this rule, 
there are as many reliable factors as there are eigenvalues greater than one. The 
reasoning is that an eigenvalue less than one implies that the scores on the component 
would have negative reliability.  
4.2 Factor Analysis in the Present Study 
The use of factor analysis in the current study for three times has been to check 
the credibility and validation of the study tools. It was clear through this advanced 
technique in statistics that the Irrational Thinking Scale has produced 35 factors. The 
Anxiousness Scale produced three factors. The Shyness Scale produced 4 factors. This 
served to identify a set of latent constructs underlying the battery of measured variables. 
There were some procedures designed to determine the optimal number of factors to 
retain in EFA, including Kaiser's (1960) eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule (or K1 rule), or 
Cattell's (1966) scree plot to help in selecting the appropriate number of factors. It is 
worth noting that exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is often used by researchers when 
developing a scale and serves to identify a set of latent constructs underlying some 
related measures of scales to test the measured variables as is the case in the present 
study. Though the researcher used pre-made scales borrowed from the replicated study 
of O'Toole (1997), the translation into Arabic required additional validation methods; the 
use of EFA procedures in this study helped collect more accurate data when each factor 
has been represented by multiple measured variables in the analysis of the battery of tests 
measuring irrational beliefes, social anxiety and shyness. 
4.2.1 The Irrational Beliefs Scale 
In Irrational Beliefs, 35 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00 have been 
identified (see Table 26 in Appendix G). 
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The scree plot in Figure 4 below graphs the eigenvalue against the factor number. 
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Figure 4: Scree plot showing the eigenvalue against the factor number in Factor Analysis of 
the Validity of the Irrational Beliefs 
 
A. Factors:  
The initial number of factors is the same as the number of variables used in the 
factor analysis. However, not all 100 factors have been retained; only the first thirty five 
factors were retained. 
 
B. Initial Eigenvalues: 
Eigenvalues are the variances of the factors. Because the researcher conducted a 
factor analysis on the correlation matrix, the variables were standardized, which means 
that the each variable has a variance of 1, and the total variance is equal to the number of 
variables used in the analysis. 
C. Total: 
This column contains the eigenvalues. The first factor will always account for the 
most variance (and hence has the highest eigenvalue), and the next factor will account 
for as much of the left over variance as it can, and so on. Hence, each successive factor 
will account for less and less variance.  
D. % of Variance: 
 This column contains the percent of total variance accounted for by each factor. 
E. Cumulative %: 
This column contains the cumulative percentage of variance accounted for by the 
current and all preceding factors. For example, the third row shows a value of 61.643. 
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This means that the first thirty five factors together account for 68.313% of the total 
variance.  
F.  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings: 
The number of rows in this panel of the table correspond to the number of factors 
retained. So there are thirty five rows, one for each retained factor. The values in this 
panel of the table are calculated in the same way as the values in the left panel, except 
that here the values are based on the common variance. The values in this panel of the 
table will always be lower than the values in the left panel of the table, because they are 
based on the common variance, which is always smaller than the total variance. 
G. Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings: 
The values in this panel of the table represent the distribution of the variance after 
the varimax rotation. Varimax rotation tries to maximize the variance of each of the 
factors, so the total amount of variance accounted for is redistributed over the thirty five 
extracted factors. 
4.2.2 The Shyness Scale 
Furthermore, in the Shyness Scale, four factors with eigenvalues greater than 
1.00 were determined (see Table 6 below). 
Table 6: Comparison of Extraction and Rotation Methods (N = 500) for the Shyness 
Scale 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
  
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varianc
e 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.757 25.048 25.048 3.757 25.048 25.048 3.299 21.991 21.991 
2 1.339 8.926 33.974 1.339 8.926 33.974 1.493 9.951 31.941 
3 1.124 7.494 41.468 1.124 7.494 41.468 1.254 8.358 40.300 
4 1.026 6.838 48.306 1.026 6.838 48.306 1.201 8.006 48.306 
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The scree plot in Figure 5 below graphs the eigenvalue against the factor number. 
Scree Plot
Component Number
151413121110987654321
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
4
3
2
1
0
 
Figure 5: Scree plot showing the eigenvalue against the factor number in the Comparison of 
Extraction and Rotation Methods for the Shyness Scale 
4.2.3 Interaction Anxiousness Scale 
Additionally, in the Interaction Anxiousness Scale, three factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.00 were determined (see Table 7 below). 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Extraction and Rotation Methods (N = 500) for the Interaction   
Anxiousness Scale 
C
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
  
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.224 26.864 26.864 3.224 26.864 26.864 2.513 20.938 20.938 
2 1.633 13.612 40.476 1.633 13.612 40.476 1.822 15.187 36.124 
3 1.181 9.839 50.315 1.181 9.839 50.315 1.703 14.191 50.315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
The scree plot in Figure 6 below graphs the eigenvalue against the factor number. 
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Figure 6: Scree plot showing the eigenvalue against the factor number in the Comparison of 
Extraction and Rotation Methods for the Interaction Anxiousness Scale 
 
 
5 Concluding Remark 
This chapter was set in two parts. Part I has dealt with the methods and 
procedures applied in this study and elaborated on the rationale for replicating this study, 
the design used, and the description of the research groups, the counselling programme 
and the procedures of administering the programme as well as on the measurements 
used. Further, the chapter has dealt with the methods and results of checking the 
reliability and validity of the scales used in the study. Statistical analyses indicated that 
the instruments were reliable and valid enough in their Arabic forms for administration 
to the participants in the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Part I: Quantitative analysis results 
 Introduction 1
This chapter presents the findings from the experimental study. The results are 
presented in terms of the hypotheses set for the study at the very inception – hypotheses 
that have been formulated based on a thorough review of the literature and on the 
findings from the replicated original study by O’Toole (1997). Therefore, the research 
findings for the main research question are presented in this chapter accordingly.  
The three outcome variables of this study were: irrational thinking scores, 
shyness scores, and interaction anxiousness scores. Each outcome was measured at three 
time points: pre-test, post-test, and one-month follow-up. Participants were exposed to 
three treatments: REBT only, REBT/REST, and the control group. Each treatment 
consisted of 25 participants. All participants had completed the study with no absence. 
Repeated-measures analysis of variances (ANOVA) were conducted to determine 
whether performance differed across groups and conditions to (dis)confirm the following 
hypotheses: 
1. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Irrational Thinking scores on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than 
participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control participants. 
2. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one month 
follow-up re-testing than participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and 
control participants. 
3. Participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Shyness Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one month follow-up re-testing 
than participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control participants. 
The analyses of the data were conducted using SPSS version 22 (IBM Corp, 2013). The 
results pertaining to the analysis done and the graphical representation of relevant results 
are presented in this chapter. 
 
 Results 2
This section presents the findings from the experimental study. The results are 
presented in terms of the hypotheses set for the study at the very inception – hypotheses 
that have been formulated based on a thorough review of the literature and on the 
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findings from the replicated original study by O’Toole (1997). Therefore, the research 
findings for the main research question are presented in this chapter accordingly.  
 
2.1 Irrational Thinking 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted determine if irrational thinking 
scores were statistically significantly different between the three treatment conditions 
(REBT, REBT/REST, and control) at pre-test, post-test, and one-month follow up. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity suggested that the variances of the differences between all 
combinations of the independent variables were equal (p = 0.719). Hence, the 
assumption of homogeneous variances for repeated-measures ANOVA was satisfied. 
The multivariate normality assumption for repeated-measures ANOVA was examined 
via the chi-square quantile –quantile plot (Figure 7). As most points lie very nearly along 
the 45 degree line, we concluded that the multivariate normality assumption was 
satisfied for the repeated-measures ANOVA. 
 
Figure 7: Chi-square QQ plot, outcome variable = irrational thinking scores 
 
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of 
irrational thinking scores by treatment group at each time point. Recall that higher 
irrational thinking scores indicate more irrational thinking. Figure 8 is the visualization 
of Table 8. It appears that there was a decreasing trend of irrational thinking in both 
REBT and REBT/REST treatment groups though out the study period. 
The analysis results suggested that there was a statistically significant interaction 
effect of time and treatment (p = 0.000) (Table 9), indicating the treatment effects on 
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irrational thinking scores varied at each time point. Table 10 shows the test results of the 
treatment effects at each time point. The results suggest that there was a statistically 
significant difference in irrational thinking scores among the three treatment groups at 
post-test (p = 0.000) and one-month follow up (p = 0.000). However, there was no 
statistically significant difference in irrational thinking scores among the three treatment 
groups at pre-test (p = 0.560).  
The results of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time point 
are presented in Table 11. It appears that at post-test, there was a statistically significant 
difference in irrational thinking scores between REBT and REBT/REST (p = 0.000), 
between REBT and control (p = 0.000), and between REBT/REST and control (p = 
0.000) (M = 40.64, SD = 4.98 for REBT; M = 33.64, SD = 4.98 for REBT/REST; M = 
60.38, SD = 3.40 for control). At one-month follow up, there was a statistically 
significant difference in irrational thinking scores between REBT and REBT/REST (p = 
0.000), between REBT and control (p = 0.000), and between REBT/REST and control (p 
= 0.000) (M = 38.88, SD = 5.18 for REBT; M = 32.24, SD = 5.08 for REBT/REST; M = 
51.96, SD = 5.33 for control).  
According to the analysis results, hypothesis 1 was supported. In other words, 
participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition would show significantly lower 
Irrational Thinking scores on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than participants 
exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control participants. 
 
Table 8: Mean (SD) of the irrational thinking scores 
 Pre-test Post-test One-month follow up 
REBT 51.92 (6.77) 40.64 (4.98) 38.88 (5.18) 
REBT/REST 51.84 (4.84) 33.64 (4.98) 32.24 (5.08) 
Control 50.44 (4.42) 50.48 (3.40) 51.96 (5.33) 
Note: SD = standard deviation. 
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Figure 8: Profile plot of irrational thinking scores 
 
Table 9: Tests of within-subjects effects 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Time 5105.53 2 2552.76 101.78 0.000* 
Time X Treatment 3413.14 4 853.28 34.02 0.000* 
Error (time) 3611.60 144 25.08   
Note: Outcome variable = irrational thinking scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F 
statistic. p = p-value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 10: Test results of the treatment effects at each time point 
Time  Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Pre-test Treatment 34.64 2 17.32 0.59 0.560 
Error 2130.96 72 29.60   
Post-test Treatment 3578.43 2 1789.21 87.65 0.000* 
Error 1469.76 72 20.41   
One-month follow up Treatment 5033.79 2 2516.89 93.21 0.000* 
Error 1944.16 72 27.00   
Note: Outcome variable = irrational thinking scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F 
statistic. p = p-value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 11: P-values of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time 
point 
Pairwise comparison Pre-test Post-test One-month follow-
up 
REBT vs. REBT/REST 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
REBT vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
REBT/REST vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
Note: Outcome variable = irrational thinking scores. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
2.2 Interaction Anxiousness 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted determine if interaction 
anxiousness scores were statistically significantly different between the three treatment 
conditions (REBT, REBT/REST, and control) at pre-test, post-test, and one-month 
follow up. Mauchly’s test of sphericity suggested that the variances of the differences 
between all combinations of the independent variables were equal (p = 0.725). Hence, 
the assumption of homogeneous variances for repeated-measures ANOVA was satisfied. 
The multivariate normality assumption for repeated-measures ANOVA was examined 
via the chi-square quantile –quantile plot (Figure 9). As most points lie very nearly along 
the 45 degree line, we concluded that the multivariate normality assumption was 
satisfied for the repeated-measures ANOVA. 
 
 
Figure 9: Chi-square QQ plot, outcome variable = social anxiousness scores 
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Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of 
interaction anxiousness scores by treatment group at each time point. Recall that higher 
interaction anxiousness scores indicate more interaction anxiousness. Figure 10 is the 
visualization of Table 12. It appears that there was a decreasing trend of interaction 
anxiousness in both REBT and REBT/REST treatment groups though out the study 
period. 
The analysis results suggested that there was a statistically significant interaction 
effect of time and treatment (p = 0.000) (Table 13), indicating the treatment effects on 
interaction anxiousness scores varied at each time point. Table 14 shows the test results 
of the treatment effects at each time point. The results suggest that there was a 
statistically significant difference in interaction anxiousness scores among the three 
treatment groups at post-test (p = 0.000) and one-month follow up (p = 0.000). However, 
there was no statistically significant difference in interaction anxiousness scores among 
the three treatment groups at pre-test (p = 0.686).  
The results of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time point 
are presented in Table 15. It appears that at post-test, there was a statistically significant 
difference in interaction anxiousness scores between REBT and REBT/REST (p = 
0.000), between REBT and control (p = 0.000), and between REBT/REST and control (p 
= 0.000) (M = 39.64, SD = 4.98 for REBT; M = 33.64, SD = 4.98 for REBT/REST; M = 
47.48, SD = 3.40 for control). At one-month follow up, there was a statistically 
significant difference in interaction anxiousness scores between REBT and REBT/REST 
(p = 0.000), between REBT and control (p = 0.000), and between REBT/REST and 
control (p = 0.000) (M = 40.88, SD = 5.18 for REBT; M = 34.24, SD = 5.08 for 
REBT/REST; M = 48.96, SD = 5.33 for control).  
According to the analysis results, hypothesis 2 was supported. In other words, 
participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower 
Interaction Anxiousness Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one month follow-
up re-testing than participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control 
participants. 
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Table 12: Mean (SD) of the interaction anxiousness scores 
 Pre-test Post-test One-month follow up 
REBT 47.40 (6.65) 39.64 (4.98) 40.88 (5.18) 
REBT/REST 47.94 (4.84) 33.64 (4.98) 34.24 (5.08) 
Control 46.62 (4.42) 47.48 (3.40) 48.96 (5.33) 
Note: SD = standard deviation. 
 
Figure 10: Profile plot of interaction anxiousness scores 
 
Table 13: Tests of within-subjects effects 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Time 2167.10 2 1083.55 43.18 0.000* 
Time X Treatment 2042.99 4 210.75 20.35 0.000* 
Error (time) 3613.76 144 25.10   
Note: Outcome variable = interaction anxiousness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F 
statistic. p = p-value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 14: Test results of the treatment effects at each time point 
Time  Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Pre-test Treatment 22.02 2 11.01 0.40 0.686 
Error 2090.72 72 29.04   
Post-test Treatment 2408.43 2 1204.21 58.99 0.000* 
Error 1469.76 72 20.41   
One-month follow up Treatment 2717.12 2 1358.56 50.31 0.000* 
Error 1944.16 72 27.00   
Note: Outcome variable = interaction anxiousness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F 
statistic. p = p-value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 15: P-values of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time 
point 
Pairwise comparison Pre-test Post-test One-month  follow-
up 
REBT vs. REBT/REST 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
REBT vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
REBT/REST vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
Note: Outcome variable = interaction anxiousness scores. * indicates significant at the 0.05 
level. 
 
2.3 Shyness 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted determine if shyness scores were statistically 
significantly different between the three treatment conditions (REBT, REBT/REST, and 
control) at pre-test, post-test, and one-month follow up. Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
suggested that the variances of the differences between all combinations of the 
independent variables were equal (p = 0.779). Hence, the assumption of homogeneous 
variances for repeated-measures ANOVA was satisfied. The multivariate normality 
assumption for repeated-measures ANOVA was also examined and was satisfied 
(Appendix H). The multivariate normality assumption for repeated-measures ANOVA 
was examined via the chi-square quantile –quantile plot (Figure 11). As most points lie 
very nearly along the 45 degree line, we concluded that the multivariate normality 
assumption was satisfied for the repeated-measures ANOVA.  
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Figure 11:Chi-square QQ plot, outcome variable = shyness scores 
 
Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of 
shyness scores by treatment group at each time point. Recall that higher shyness scores 
indicate more shyness. Figure 12 is the visualization of Table 16. It appears that there 
was a decreasing trend of shyness in both REBT and REBT/REST treatment groups 
though out the study period. 
The analysis results suggested that there was a statistically significant interaction 
effect of time and treatment (p = 0.000) (Table 17), indicating the treatment effects on 
shyness scores varied at each time point. Table 18 shows the test results of the treatment 
effects at each time point. The results suggest that there was a statistically significant 
difference in shyness scores among the three treatment groups at post-test (p = 0.000) 
and one-month follow up (p = 0.000). However, there was no statistically significant 
difference in shyness scores among the three treatment groups at pre-test (p = 0.707).  
The results of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time point 
are presented in Table 19. It appears that at post-test, there was a statistically significant 
difference in shyness scores between REBT and REBT/REST (p = 0.008), between 
REBT and control (p = 0.000), and between REBT/REST and control (p = 0.000) (M = 
39.52, SD = 5.01 for REBT; M = 35.52, SD = 5.01 for REBT/REST; M = 46.48, SD = 
3.40 for control). At one-month follow up, there was a statistically significant difference 
in shyness scores between REBT and REBT/REST (p = 0.001), between REBT and 
control (p = 0.003), and between REBT/REST and control (p = 0.000) (M = 40.88, SD = 
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5.18 for REBT; M = 35.24, SD = 5.08 for REBT/REST; M = 45.96, SD = 5.32 for 
control).  
According to the analysis results, hypothesis 3 was supported. In other words, 
participants exposed to the REBT/REST condition will show significantly lower Shyness 
Scale test scores on post-testing and on the one month follow-up re-testing than 
participants exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and control participants. 
 
 
Table 16: Mean (SD) of the shyness scores 
 Pre-test Post-test One-month follow up 
REBT 45.12 (6.53) 39.52 (5.01) 40.88 (5.18) 
REBT/REST 45.70 (5.14) 35.52 (5.01) 35.24 (5.08) 
Control 44.42 (4.40) 46.48 (3.40) 45.96 (5.32) 
Note: SD = standard deviation. 
 
 
Figure 12: Profile plot of shyness scores 
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Table 17: Tests of within-subjects effects 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Time 1004.83 2 502.41 19.81 0.000* 
Time X Treatment 1255.13 4 313.78 12.37 0.000* 
Error (time) 3652.96 144 25.37   
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F statistic. p = p-
value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 18: Test results of the treatment effects at each time point 
Time  Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F p 
Pre-test Treatment 20.54 2 10.27 0.35 0.707 
Error 2124.16 72 29.50   
Post-test Treatment 1538.03 2 769.01 37.34 0.000* 
Error 1482.72 72 20.59   
One-month follow up Treatment 1437.79 2 718.89 26.62 0.000* 
Error 1944.16 72 27.00   
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F statistic. p = p-
value. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 19: P-values of pairwise comparisons between treatment groups at each time 
point 
Pairwise comparison Pre-test Post-test One-month follow-
up 
REBT vs. REBT/REST 1.000 0.008* 0.001* 
REBT vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.003* 
REBT/REST vs. Control 1.000 0.000* 0.000* 
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. * indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Part II: Results of the Content Analysis 
The purpose of the analysis in Part II was to complement the analysis results of 
Part I, and present the qualitative data obtained from the reflections and cognitions of the 
participants in the study with regard to the questions and hypotheses set for this study. A 
content analysis devised in light of Shapiro’s (1989) Vlidity of Cognition Scale 
(henceforth, VoC) serves to introduce the qualitative data obtained and how the 
researcher arrived at the quantified results by manipulating Shapiro's VoC scale (See 
Appendix D). Baseline measures include the Validity of Cognition ([VoC] Shapiro, 
1989) scale, on which clients rate how true the positive cognition feels on a 1 to 7 scale, 
with 1 = totally false and 7 = totally true, and a Subjective Units of Disturbance ([SUD] 
Shapiro, 1989) scale, which uses a 0–10 scale, with 0 = calm/neutral and 10 = the worst 
it could be. More will be given on the nature, benefits and reasons for the use of VoC for 
content analysis within the discussion of rating thoughts with regard to experience in the 
coming pages. 
The results are presented and analysed in terms of such hypotheses that have 
been formulated based on a thorough review of the literature and on the findings from 
the replicated original study by O’Toole (1997). In the end, a critical summary of the 
research findings for the main research question as presented in this chapter and the 
previous one will be put forward accordingly.  
3 Rating Thoughts with regard to Experience 
The ability to gain or reconstruct meaning from previous experience and the 
capacity to interpret such experience are characteristic of mentally healthy individuals, 
whereas losing these two capacities can be indicative of psychological disorders, such as 
stress or anxiety disorders (Shapiro, 1995). According to Shapiro (2008): 
‘Clinical experience has clearly shown that when an individual is locked into a 
particular interpretation of reality, the source of the problem is the 
interaction of the present situation with disturbing memories. For example, 
combat veterans may react with violent rage in the present because a co-
worker’s incompetence triggers memories of comrades who died in 
Vietnam because of negligence. For them, albeit on a preconscious level, 
incompetence means impending disaster. Such pre-constructed, rigid 
schema and reaction patterns appear to be manifestations of unprocessed 
information in which negative affect dominates.’ (p. 7) 
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As cognitive therapists may concentrate on the beliefs presently displayed, this 
helps rating previous events that have contributed to the present problem (Shapiro, 
2008). Therefore, the VoC scale is used as a measure of rating such etiological events, 
which has become the central focus of both theory and practice (See Appendix D). As 
such, the VoC is a semantic differential scale that assesses the ‘felt truth’ about a self-
statement relating to the memory of a particular event (Shapiro, 1989).  
The validation of cognition scale (VoC) is used to obtain information about a 
client's progress with regard to past events, present triggers and future templates that are 
targeted for reprocessing this information to relate to current therapy practice. In other 
words, it is used to bring forth the perceptions of the client’s schemata of events that 
triggered irrational beliefs and how these events were validly perceived with regard to 
the positive cognitions that helped to root out irrational beliefs at a particular phase of 
treatment (Shapiro, 2008). The use of VoC is not only for rating the felt truth about 
cognitised or perceived beliefs about the clients' progress with their psychotherapy, but it 
also helps to ‘integrate the perceptions of sensory input and the cognitive components of 
experience into an associated internal memory network to allow for ecological, healthful, 
balanced functioning’ (Shapiro, 2008, p. 8). Shapiro (2008) here affirms that: 
‘All the contributors to a happy and fruitful existence are available when one is 
able to trust one’s own perceptions, bond, experience joy and intimacy, 
and achieve a sense of greater purpose, service, and connection, however 
those may be defined. This experience is possible because a physiological 
mechanism is in place to take any perceptual experience, including 
disturbance, to a higher level of mental health.’ (pp. 8-9) 
However, one of the major problems encountered in research into the value of a 
new treatment for social anxiety or other psycho-social states and/or diseases is the small 
number of participants in controlled experiments, such as this present study. Another 
problem is the great diversity of symptoms which social anxiety and irrational beliefs 
patients display, making it difficult to standardise trials. 
These two problems may be partly overcome by the use of the method of rating 
devised by Shapiro (1989; 1995), i.e., the VoC scale. The Shapiro cards scale method of 
assessment utilises daily behaviour reports and has been widely accepted and used across 
a variety of situations with patients with challenging behaviours in order to document 
change in those behaviours (Chafouleas, Riley-Tillman & Sassu, 2006) under particular 
circumstances such as hypnosis or desensitisation (Shapiro, 1989) Use of the VoC allows 
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researchers to broaden their subject base because they can include data from participants 
who may not be necessarily be near their physical region. Additionally, a standardised 
coding scale generates greater reliability among trials. However, because the VoC relies 
on participants’ subjective responses of how they feel, each participant may use the scale 
differently, and results among participants may vary greatly. The participants in this 
study kept thoughts and feelings diaries or logs in order to observe their progress in the 
counselling programme. They were requested to participate in a thought-listing activity 
using an Irrational Beliefs Log for one week prior to, one week after, and one month 
following their treatment.  
Example: Mesfer was in the midst of reprocessing a disturbing or anxiety-
provoking event involving malicious accusations by his father (i.e., ‘You’re a failure.’ 
‘You must have been careless about your studies somehow.’ ‘You deserved your 
failure.’). These comments were made by his father after Mesfer had repeated the junior 
year for two years, three months earlier. Following several sessions of therapeutic 
strategies, using REBT plus REST to unblock or shift his processing of this social phobia 
provoking memory and the latent irrational belief that he is an irrevocable failure, 
Mesfer’s level of disturbance (feeling of anxiety and irrational beliefs about his academic 
capacities) did not change. The clinician strategically asked Mesfer to focus on the words 
‘I am a success,’ (his original negative cognition) and to scan for earlier events in his life 
that were disappointing and humiliating. The memory that finally emerged was the 
memory of his siblings scolding and blaming him for the years he spent at college 
unsuccessfully, with this taking place in the presence of guests or other relatives. The 
memory of his brothers’ cruel behaviour feeds his irrationality and social anxiety ‘I do 
not want to appear in social events involving my siblings’. 
The psychotherapist, applying REBT plus REST, used to utilise blocking beliefs, 
or counter-irrational beliefs. A blocking belief is a belief that stops the processing of an 
initial target. Blocking beliefs typically show themselves when the clinician is evaluating 
the Subjective Units of Disturbance (SUD) or VoC in a process named by Shapiro as 
desensitisation. In this desensitisation process, the SUD level will not move below a 1 
and, in the installation phase, the VoC remains below a 7
9
. Typically, when the 
                                                 
9
 A negative self-devastating belief that arises when the disturbing experience is brought to mind might be 
something like, “It’s all my fault”, “I am not good enough”, “I am vulnerable”, “I am powerless”. A 
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psychotherapist asks the patient in the desensitisation phase, ‘What prevents it (i.e., 
SUD) from being a 0?’ or, if the patient is in the installation phase, ‘What prevents it 
(i.e., VoC) from being a 7?’ the client is able to respond with a negative belief and an 
appropriate, associative early memory. At this point, the processing on the initial target 
is stopped until the blocking belief memory has been targeted and reprocessed. Then, 
and only then, is the original memory retargeted and reprocessing continued. Towards 
this end, the psychotherapist used the Subjective Units of Disturbance (SUD) together 
with the VoC as an instrument that he filled himself in the sessions (See Sequel to 
Appendix D). 
Participants in REBT plus REST who were resistant to these sessions of 
psychotherapy or who were persuasively led to this therapy at the urging of someone 
else (e.g., referrals by the college’s counselling centre) were most susceptible to this 
phenomenon. They had been in therapy, not by their own volition, but because of 
someone else are prompting, and they possessed no desire to report or deal with any of 
their personal feelings. 
As explained in Chapter Three, by the end of each treatment session, the 
participants were requested to conduct a listing activity after they had participated in a 
social situation in which they felt anxiety by listing the thoughts, feelings and/or 
behaviours they associated with such situation they had encountered one week prior to, 
one week after, and for one month following their treatment. Accordingly, they were 
asked to perform the listing activity for three separate occasions. The qualitative data 
obtained from this activity were quantified by the Shapiro scale (1989) on a range of 0 to 
7. The Shapiro scale is a technique employed to identify themes in qualitative data so 
they can be coded and turned into quantified data. Such open coding or qualitative 
analysis (Berelson, 1952) or latent coding (Shapiro and Markoff, 1997) can be done 
through recognising the characteristics of the phenomena being studied. Open coding 
involves ‘breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing 
data’, in the initial phase of data acquisition and profiling overall features of the 
phenomenon at issue (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 61), often, in terms of properties and 
dimensions. The examination of such data is often conducted to fracture it and generate 
codes that could proceed ‘line by line’ in a tedious, yet highly generative fashion, and is, 
                                                                                                                                         
preferred, positive cognition (or positive, adaptive belief) is also identified to ascertain and verbalize the 
client’s desired outcome.. 
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therefore, often recommended in the initial phases of analysis, by sentence or paragraph, 
or by a holistic analysis of an entire document.  
The open coding process, while procedurally guided, is fundamentally 
interpretive in nature, and grounded theory researchers ‘must include the perspectives 
and voices of the people’ whom they study (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 274). In the case 
of this study, for instance, only one coder was used, which creates a lack of inter-rater 
reliability and leaves room for potential bias. Ideally, more than one coder would be 
employed to prevent misinterpretations and ensure that the scale and measurements 
made are accurate. 
The participants in the present study were asked in each psychotherapy session to 
write down in their diaries their thoughts, feelings and/or behaviours they had on the day 
of the treatment. Afterwards, the participants were requested to rate their thoughts for the 
degree of inaccuracy expressed in each statement they wrote. They did so using 
Shapiro's (1989) VoC scale, which is a 7-point (1 = completely untrue to 7 = completely 
true) scale (See Appendix D).  
By illustration, evoking the case of Mesfer, the participant was asked to rate the 
trueness of his feelings about the beliefs he held and was thought to be responsible for 
his trauma (i.e., social anxiety) on a scale of 1 to 7 points: e.g., is it true that I am a 
failure?  
Overall, the social events that the participants in this study described by the end 
of each session in the form of qualitative thoughts/logs of feelings were varied by all 
means in both types of social situations deemed as social anxiety-triggering and also 
greatly varied in terms of the intensity of the social anxiety felt. The participants, overall, 
reported a variety of instances (50 in number) which involved social interactions with 
others: 20 instances of interacting with people (tribal relatives at social gatherings); 15 
instances of interacting with figures of authority inside family, local community or at 
university; 10 instances of interacting with women inside the kin and kindred tribe; and 5 
instances of interacting with friends and comrades. These were grouped into three social 
situations per participant: (1) social interactions with others in social gatherings; (2) 
social interactions in study environments; and (3) social interactions in situations 
involving the other gender. 
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3.1 Results from Thoughts and Feelings Logs Kept by Participants 
The analysis results of the two-way analysis of variances using the data obtained 
from the three situations for the three treatment groups (REBT, REBT/REST, and 
control) at three different intervals of the study (pre-test, post-test, and one-month follow 
up) are presented in this section. Because the anxiety level scores were measured at three 
intervals of the study for each subject, the observations from the same subjects at the 
three study intervals were assumed to be independent as the time between the intervals 
was comparatively long for an intervention like the one used in the present study. 
 
 The analysis results for the first situation are presented in in Table 20. There was 
no treatment and time interaction effect. However, the treatment effect was significant (p 
< 0.01). To determine which two treatment groups were significantly different in the 
anxiety scores, Tukey’s post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed (Table 21). The 
results suggested that there was a statistically significant difference in anxiety level 
scores between REBT/REST and control, and between REBT and control (M = 37.9 for 
REBT/REST; M = 43.5 for REBT, and M = 53.7 for control). The results indicated that 
participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower anxiety, compared to 
participants in the control group, across the study periods. 
 
Table 20: ANOVA Table: First Situation Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety level scores 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F 
Treatment 3122.59 2 1561.29 60.108* 
Time 5989.95 2 2994.97 115.303* 
Treatment X Time 55.47 4 13.87 0.534 
Error 5610.56 216 25.98  
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F statistic. * 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 21: Tukey’s Test for Pairwise Comparisons of the First Situation 
Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety Level Scores  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated means. ** Indicates mean difference was 
significant  
at 0.01 level. 
 
The analysis results for the second situation are presented in in Table 22. There 
was no treatment and time interaction effect. However, the treatment effect was 
significant (p < 0.01). To determine which two treatment groups were significantly 
different in the anxiety scores, Tukey’s post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed 
(Table 23). The results suggested that there was a statistically significant difference in 
anxiety level scores between REBT/REST and control, and between REBT and control 
(M = 33.16 for REBT/REST; M = 34.08 for REBT, and M = 45.64 for control). The 
results indicated that participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower 
anxiety, compared to participants in the control group, across the study periods. 
 
Table 22: ANOVA Table: Second Situation Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety level scores 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F 
Treatment 7255.76 2 3627.88 141.024* 
Time 46.51 2 23.25 0.904 
Treatment X Time 81.73 4 20.43 0.794 
Error 5556.64 216 25.73  
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F statistic. * 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 REBT (43.5) Control (53.7) 
REBT + REST (37.9)   1.9   11.77** 
REBT (43.5)    9.87** 
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Table 23: Tukey’s Test for Pairwise Comparisons of the Second Situation 
Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety Level Scores  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated means. ** Indicates mean difference was 
significant at 0.01 level. 
 
The analysis results for the third situation are presented in in Table 24. There was 
no treatment and time interaction effect. However, the treatment effect was significant (p 
< 0.01). To determine which two treatment groups were significantly different in the 
anxiety scores, Tukey’s post hoc pairwise comparisons were performed (Table 25). The 
results suggested that there was a statistically significant difference in anxiety level 
scores between REBT/REST and control, and between REBT and control (M = 34.53 for 
REBT/REST; M = 35.40 for REBT, and M = 43.95 for control). The results indicated 
that participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower anxiety, compared 
to participants in the control group, across the study periods. 
 
Table 24: ANOVA Table: Third Situation Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety level scores 
Source Type III Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F 
Treatment 4060.19 2 2030.09 77.581* 
Time 40.56 2 20.28 0.775 
Treatment X Time 57.73 4 14.43 0.552 
Error 5652.16 216 26.17  
Note: Outcome variable = shyness scores. DF = degrees of freedom. F = F statistic. * 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 REBT (34.08) REBT + REST (33.16) 
Control (45.64) 11.56** 12.48** 
REBT (34.08)  0.92 
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Table 25: Tukey’s Test for Pairwise Comparisons of the Third Situation 
Thoughts/Feelings Logs Anxiety Level Scores  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated means. * indicates mean difference was 
significant at the 0.05 level. ** Indicates mean difference was significant at 0.01 level. 
 
4 Conclusions: Findings with Regard to the Main Research Question 
The main research question seeks to find an answer to whether the suggested 
counselling programme grounded in using REBT and REST is effective in relieving and 
treating irrational thinking, social anxiety, and shyness among Saudi College Students in 
a governmental university. As seen in the analysis results, REBT therapy was effective, 
but when it was combined with REST, the treatment group that received REBT plus 
REST was more responsive in the counselling programme, demonstrating more 
improvement in relieved irrationality, social anxiousness and shyness than the REBT-
only treatment group and the control group. The control group which received neither 
REBT nor REBT plus REST treatments showed very similar pre-testing and post-testing 
scores on the measures used for assessing the level of irrationality, social anxiety and 
shyness, which indicates that some improvement has been achieved, again demonstrating 
that in a controlled experiment, REBT combined with REST had more 
psychotherapeutical effectiveness than REBT only or no treatment at all. 
Additionally, the analysis results of thoughts/feelings logs for the anxiety level 
scores indicated that participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower 
anxiety, compared to participants in the control group, across the study periods. 
 
 
 
  
 REBT (35.40) REBT + REST (34.53) 
Control (43.95) 8.55* 9.41** 
REBT (35.40)  0.87 
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CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, SUMMARY & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1 Introduction 
This study attempted to determine if a treatment programme, based on the 
principles of REBT and/or Restricted Environmental Stimulated Therapy (REST), would 
reduce irrational beliefs, anxiety and shyness of 75 college students diagnosed with 
SAD; 25 students were assigned to an experimental group counselled using REBT only 
(henceforth, referred to as Experimental Group 1), 25 students were assigned to another 
experimental group counselled using REBT plus REST (henceforth, referred to as 
Experimental Group 2), and finally 25 students were assigned to the control group with 
no treatment. Irrational beliefs was measured using the Irrational Belief Scale; anxiety 
with the Social Interaction Scale; and shyness with the Shyness Scale.  
The student-participants were selected based on the recommendation of the 
counselling psychology clinic of the College of Arts & Humanities, King Abdulaziz 
University in Jeddah. The said clinic did a screening of the student-participants who 
manifested the signs and symptoms of SAD. The mentioned signs and symptoms were 
measured three times: pre-test, post-test and one month after the post-test. 
2 Significant findings 
The study examined the treatment effects on irrational thinking, shyness, and 
interaction anxiousness, across the three study periods, pre-test, post-test, and one-month 
follow up. The results suggested that there was no statistically significant difference in 
irrational thinking, shyness, and interaction anxiousness among the three treatment 
groups at pre-test. However, it was discovered that participants exposed to the 
REBT/REST condition would have significantly less irrational thinking, shyness, and 
interaction anxiousness on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than participants 
exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and participants with no treatments (control 
group). The study also found that participants exposed to the REBT-only treatment 
would have significantly less irrational thinking, shyness, and interaction anxiousness on 
post-testing and at one-month follow-up than participants with no treatments (control 
group). 
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Additionally, the analysis results of thoughts/feelings logs for the anxiety level 
scores indicated that participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower 
anxiety, compared to participants in the control group, across the study periods. 
3 Benefits of REBT 
The notable reduction in the levels of irrational thinking of the participants with REBT-
only treatment discovered in this research study confirms the research findings of 
Watson and Friend (1969), DiGiuseppe et al. (1990) and O'Toole (1997). These 
researchers concluded that REBT is effective in alleviating and treating social anxiety. 
According to DiGiuseppe et al. (1990), cognitive therapies and behavioural treatment 
conditions can generate a significant reduction of anxiety specific to interpersonal and 
social behaviour. REBT is one type of CBT with an extensive history of use with 
children and adolescents (Bernard, 1990; Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1994). Researchers 
have generally been supportive of this approach with effect size estimates from a number 
of meta-analyses ranging from 0.35 (Dush et al., 1989) to 1.27 (Lewinsohn & Clarke, 
1999). REBT is within this specific branch of therapy. There has been a plethora of 
research that has recognised the relationship between people’s cognitive structures, 
irrational beliefs and social anxiety (Davison & Zighelboim, 1987; Rohsenhow & Smith, 
1982; Sutton-Simon &Goldfried, 1979).The present study falls within this category of 
research, confirming the findings that REBT is an effective treatment technique for 
social anxiety, irrationality and rumination of beliefs that lead to different forms of 
anxiety, especially social anxiety (Bernard et al., 2006; DiGiuseppe et al., 1998; 
DiGiuseppe & Bernard, 1990; Durlak et al., 1991; Gormally et al., 1981; Kocovski & 
Rector, 2007; Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Schulz & Kaspar, 1994; Vassilopoulos, 2009; 
Watson & Friend, 1969;). By the same token, many researchers concluded that in the 
circumstances of child and adolescent psychotherapy, REBT has become a popular form 
of psychotherapy for both psychological and mental health problems, including phobias, 
social anxiety, shyness and social withdrawal. With the increasing popularity and 
support for cognitive therapies among health professionals, a number of clinicians have 
used REBT theory as the basis for developing new patterns of working with 
psychopathology patients. 
However, the present study also showed that the REBT treatment was not much 
effective as REBT plus REST in reducing social anxiety.  This means that the REBT 
plus REST treatment was more effective than REBT only. This confirms earlier findings, 
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for example the assertion that REBT is helpful in inducing self-esteem; as earlier noted 
in O'Toole (1997),  
‘the most consistent research findings show an inverse relationship 
between measures of shyness and global self-esteem which 
typically correlate around the -.50 level’ (p. 6).  
It is noted in the literature review that there is a relationship between self-esteem, 
self-presentation and inter-personal relationships which could affect social interactions 
(Leary, 2001c); the lack of self-esteem could lead to crushing the ability to socialise in 
social settings which is correlated to social phobia as presented in prior research (Quellet 
& Joshi, 1986; Schlenker, etal., 1990; Weaver & Mathews, 1993). Other studies showed 
that the lack of self-esteem leads to loneliness and shyness (Ceyhan et al., 2008; Ceyhan 
& Ceyhan, 2011; McWhirter, 1990; Yerin-Güneri, 2006). In addition, Lecrubier et al. 
(2000) found that ‘poor social skills, hypersensitivity to criticism and negative 
evaluation, and difficulty being assertive, as well as low self-esteem and feelings of 
inferiority’ are significant causes of social anxiety. Similar findings are present in Lake  
& Arkin (1985) and more recently in Heinrich & Gullone (2006). 
The findings regarding REBT from this study confirms the findings of O’Toole’s 
study, which claims that REBT interventions are effective techniques harnessed by 
psychotherapists for alleviating shyness in people with social phobia.  
As a procedure, the basis on which psychotherapy functions in the case of shy 
people is that these individuals suffer from self-defeating attributions. (Lazarus, 1968; 
1991c; Malouff, 1992; Malouff et al., 1992; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Tobacyk & 
Downs, 1986). These self-defeating attributions are indeed irrational beliefs. 
Furthermore, according to Arkin and Grove (1990) and Miller (1995), shy people 
emphasise unstable causes for positive outcomes and internal (i.e., dispositional) causes 
for negative outcomes, affectively and behaviourally (O'Toole, 1997). Indeed, REBT 
interventions work wonders in alleviating shyness.  
4 Enhancing REBT with REST 
The marked reduction in the outcome measures of the subject of irrational 
thinking in participants with REBT/REST treatment, affirms the claims of Azima and 
Cramer-Azima (1956), Barabasz (2004; 2010), Barabasz & Barabasz (1981), Barabasz & 
Barabasz (2000), Hilgard (1973) and O’Toole (1997) that REST, as a technique, could 
enhance the effects of REBT. The exact mechanism by which this mentioned process 
takes place may as well be one, or a combination, of the following: (a) It increases 
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participants’ willingness to receive psychotherapy by increasing their susceptibility to 
the influence of external sources (Suedfeld, 1980 & 1987; and O'Toole, 1997); (b) the 
techniques it employs induce muscle contraction and relieve headaches (Rzewnicki et 
al., 1990); and (c) it enhances hypnotisability (Barabasz et al. 1997; Barabasz, 1977a; 
Barabasz, 1977b). 
Hajzler & Bernard (1991)revealed that REBT is an effective therapy for 
decreasing irrationality and ameliorating the internal locus of control of clients, which 
greatly helps in alleviating the anxiety of most subjects recruited in the different samples 
in the studies reviewed. These findings are also commensurated with other more recent 
meta-analysis studies; for instance, Engles et al. (1993). Acarturk et al. (2009), 
Federoff& Taylor (2001), Gonzalez et al. (2004), Gould et al. (1997), Hattie (1992) and 
Weisz et al. (1995) all indicated that, in controlled experiments using REBT with 
adolescents and adults, favourable effects were evidenced to the good of using REBT in 
treating psychotherapy. 
REST, commonly known as ‘Flotation-REST’ has been reported in relevant 
literature as enjoying positive effects in many studies (Mahoney, 1990; Norlander et al., 
2003; Sandlund et al., 2001, Schultz & Kasper, 1994, to cite just a few). REST was used 
and can potentially be used as a therapeutic agent (Azima& Cramer-Azima, 1956). It is 
thus used to help induce the cognitive effects of cognitive therapy techniques, such as 
REBT, for the effective insinuation of habit change. This is achievable by decrease of 
distraction, increased stimulus hunger, and greater openness to new information 
associated with the stimulus reduction experience.  
REST was also used as a stress management technique, and hence, increases its 
effectiveness in helping relieve stress and other psychological disturbances. As earlier 
noted in Chapter Two, REST was applied in earlier studies as an intervention to enhance 
personal functioning. When combined with REBT, REST can bear more favourable 
effects. According to Suedfeld (1980), clients can potentially scrap as unwanted all 
beliefs and thoughts concerning behaviour because of the environmental stimuli that can 
rid external distracters.  
According to O'Toole (1997), REST  
‘sets up a situation in which persons must turn to internal stimulation. They are 
forced to focus on internal stimuli and reduced external stimuli. The 
combination of focusing on internal material and craving external input 
may leave individuals less critical of the meaning of the input.’ (p. 18)  
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The present study has confirmed the findings from O'Toole (1997) that an 
amalgam of both REBT and REST is more effective than REBT only treatment. This 
finding, too, is in line with prior research in which REST was combined with hypnosis 
and REBT for moderating performance anxiety (e.g., Barabasz, Baer, Sheehan & 
Barabasz 1986; Barabasz et al., 1984; Ellis, 2004a). One possible interpretation for that 
is that REST can potentially and effectively increase participants’ willingness to receive 
psychotherapy by increasing their susceptibility to the influence of external sources. 
5 Discrepancies between O’Toole (1997) and the Present Study 
These results in this study confirm the major findings of O’Toole which 
concluded that the REBT, in conjunction with REST is more effective than solely using 
REBT. But, both REBT and REST, as separate techniques, are still effective in 
alleviating irrationality, and therefore, social anxiety.  
O'Toole (1997) hypothesised that participants who have received REST 
(Experimental Group 2) would report significantly less irrational thinking compared to 
participants in the other two groups was not supported as there was  no REST-only group 
in the present study. The data in Chapter Four, however, shows that there were 
significant reductions in IBT test scores from pre-to post-test and pre-test to follow-up, 
with no significant differences between treatment groups at post-test or follow-up for the 
REBT+REST group in the present research. There appeared to be no advantage to 
utilizing any single treatment over the other two. As O'Toole (1997) hypothesised that 
participants who received REST would report significantly less social anxiety compared 
to participants in the other two conditions, this was not supported in the present study as 
there was no REST-only group. However, there was significant decrease in IAS test 
scores from pre- test to post-test and pre-test to follow-up, with noted significant 
differences between treatment groups at post-test and follow-up measurements for the 
second experimental group where REST was combined with REBT. There appeared to 
be no advantage to employing any single treatment over the other two. In terms of the 
effects of the counselling programme, of REBT only and of REBT in conjunction with 
REST on the variable of shyness. This could be due to the fact that this trait is not easily 
reductible in a matter of the weeks of the duration of the programme. 
 
In point of fact, there was no special treatment to test the effectiveness of REST 
treatment in isolation inasmuch as there was for REBT treatment. In my experiment, 
there were three treatments: REBT only, REBT plus REST and a control group with no 
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treatment. The researcher did not include a special treatment group to receive REST 
only,  for one believes that REST is an additional, complementary and integrative 
treatment or rather an aide to psychotherapy. As could be seen from the present study 
findings, REST has consolidated and empowered REBT, as shown in statistically 
significant differences between REBT only and REBT plus REST to the good of the 
latter treatment group where irrational beliefs were far more decreased and social anxiety 
was far more reduced, though both treatments led to improvements the two experimental 
groups. 
Since there was a significant reduction in the irrational beliefs of the participants, 
and a corresponding reduction in social anxiety test scores for the two treatment groups 
from pre-test to post-test and follow-up, the findings from the present study seem to 
support  the theory that there is a correlation between a person's irrational beliefs (Ellis, 
1977b) and their social anxiety (Ellis, 2004b; Emmelkamp et al., 1988; DiGiuseppe et 
al., 1998; O’Toole, 1997; Schelver & Gutsch, 1983; Vestre & Judge, 1989; Warren et al, 
1989). This supports the hypothesis that both REBT and REST treatments would 
enhance participants’ receptivity to changing their irrational beliefs compared to control 
participants; but this does not seem to support different findings in some prior studies in 
this point (e.g., Barabasz & Barabasz, 1993; Dyer et al., 1993; Suedfeld, 1980). 
The success of the REBT and/or REBT plus REST treatments arises from the 
observation that adopting a problem-solving oriented approach to the problems in living 
is an essential ingredient in successful problem-solving performance to reduce irrational 
thinking. In fact, negative affect and the negative consequences of poor problem-solving 
is thought to originate in an irrational way of thinking about the problems or their 
adversities in the sense that these events or situations are believed to be highly 
threatening and cataclysmic, whereas in fact, they are not. A REBT intervention can 
potentially help in altering irrational beliefs to rational beliefs, resulting in significantly 
less emotional distress (Ellis, 1962; 1977a; Jacofsky, 2006; Jensen, 2008; Moore, 2006;). 
The intervention programme both for the REBT and REBT plus REST groups 
was also intended to encourage the participants to accept ‘probably true’ interpretations 
of the experiences which they thought were social anxiety-provoking for them. 
It is strongly recommended that in future studies, volunteers in similar research 
should be recruited from different universities and backgrounds to avoid any interactions 
between the control students and their cohorts in the othe experimental groups to avoid 
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subject-subject interactions that may vitiate the validity of their performance on the 
tests/scales used in data collection on pretesting and/or posttesting. 
The REBT approach with REST, which induces desensitisation, helps shy people 
to selectively focus on the tasks they are up to in social interactions at the cognitive, 
affective and consequently at the behavioural levels. The problem with shy people is that 
they are too much self-focused, which interferes with the attention that should be paid to 
others during interactions, shy people are believed to suffer from a ‘selective attention 
deficit’ that impairs their ability to participate effectively in social transactions (Hartman, 
1983; O'Toole, 1997). As demonstrated in this study, and that of O’Toole (1997), 
shyness can be deterred and treated by REBT interventions. It can, furthermore, be 
alleviated by REBT which provides cognitive, affective and behavioural training, which 
staves off shyness and its symptoms, and REST which helps desensitise one’s emotions 
and bodily degree of interaction with the internal covert impulses (dispositional stimuli) 
resulting from the self-defeating attributions which in themselves are resultant from 
irrational thinking, crushed self-esteem, and a persistent resistance to positive feedback.  
Finally, O'Toole (1997) argued that the improvements in post-testing on social 
anxiety, shyness and lowered irrational beliefs were the outcome of a statistical 
regression towards the mean. According to O'Toole (1997), the participants were 
sensitised and more aware of their self-perception and feelings of anxiety, and thus, they 
were more inclined towards expressing these feelings on pre-testing before receiving any 
experimental treatment as it appeared on the pre-test scale results. This may possibly 
explain the reduction that occurred significantly on post-testing in social anxiety and 
irrationality.  
In this study, the improvements have been proven to be the result of the 
intervention programmes both in quantitative and qualitative data analyses. The concept 
of irrational beliefs contributing to the social anxiety of college students appears to be a 
factor of impact in initiating and maintaining SADs in this population. Indeed, when the 
intervention programmes for the Experimental Group 1 and Experimental Group 2 were 
geared towards effecting a reduction in the participants’ irrational thinking patterns, their 
reports of social anxiety decreased after having been cognitively, emotionally and 
behaviourally trained on how to reduce/obliterate their irrational beliefs and enhance 
their rational thinking patterns. 
According to the findings of this study, a system of irrational beliefs could 
contribute to the social anxiety of college students as it was the case in the participants of 
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the present study, and this appears to be the clincher in initiating and maintaining SADs 
in this population of college students within the limitations of the present study.  
6 Delimitations 
The validity, expandability, and generalisability of the evidence generated by the 
study should be interpreted with caution because of the following delimitations: 
This study employed purposeful sampling so that the study findings could aid in 
providing appropriate educational and counselling assistance for students suffering from 
social anxiety, social phobias and other related socio-psychological disorders in in Saudi 
college students. In other words, the findings of the study are limited to the sample used 
for this study; i.e., a section of male, college Saudi population in the Western region of 
KSA. Furthermore, this study was conducted during the academic year 2008–2009, thus, 
being time-limited to this period. 
In this way, the respondents involved only 75 male college students from the 
College of Arts and Humanities, King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
distributed to their respective groups, each comprising of 25 participants. As such, 
evidence may not be generalisable to the universe of teenagers in Saudi Arabia who are 
diagnosed with SAD. Also, one of the gaps in the current literature was not tested: 
whether it is really more common among males than females; this is due to the cultural 
characteristics of the Saudi society which does not allow for co-education. 
The selection of respondents for the study did not make distinctions, thus, the 
generated data are not really specific, to wit, (a) SADs are of two general types: 
generalised and non-generalised. The way by which the respondents were screened did 
not make any distinction; (b) the occurrence of SAD has been known to have co- 
morbidities. The selection of respondents to the study did not make any distinctions; (c) 
social network relationships affect occurrence of SAD, but the screening of the 
respondents did not make any distinctions; and (d) the internet exposure is known to 
affect occurrence of SAD, but the screening of respondents did not take this into 
consideration. 
The full effects of REBT and/or REST in reducing irrational thinking and 
consequently, reducing anxiety can only be achieved if subjects are exposed to 
hypnotism prior to therapy. This study did away with the use of hypnosis and in its stead, 
utilised another technique where a psychotherapist exposed subjects to suggestive, 
relaxing, and desensitizing environment before the therapy sessions began. This may 
have an effect on the purity of the data. 
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The study was not conducted under strict laboratory conditions. The respondents 
were made to frequent the college’s counselling centre and they were made to go home 
after the required tests measuring their irrational thinking, anxiety and shyness were 
completed. As such, they have been exposed to extraneous variables in their respective 
environments at home which may unduly affect the results of the study. 
Furthermore, the findings were constrained by the scales and measures utilised 
for assessing and diagnosing social anxiety, irrational beliefs and shyness, as well as by 
the REBT/REST counselling programme developed for this study and used within the 
cited limitations. 
7 Summary, Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This experimental study was aimed at finding answers to the main research 
question: what is the effectiveness of the suggested counselling programme grounded in 
REBT/REST theories in relieving and treating college-level students’ social anxiety and 
irrationality? 
As such, randomly assigning participants to treatment groups (levels of X) 
controlled for internal validity together with the pre-test, and also served to control for 
regression and selection factors. The pre-test also ‘controlled for history, testing and 
instrumentation’ (see Gay, 1996, p.365–368) making it highly unlikely that some third 
variable would be correlated with the variables of the study. The dependent measures 
were self-reports of irrational thinking as determined by the scores on the Irrational 
Beliefs Test and social anxiety levels as determined by the scores on the relevant scales, 
and an irrational thoughts log that each participant maintained for one week prior to, one 
week after, and for one month after therapy had ceased as quantitatively assessed using 
the validation of cognition scale (VoC) by Shapiro (1989). 
7.1 Sampling 
Volunteer participants were recruited from a Saudi college’s student population. 
Participants were drawn from undergraduate students through a call for participation in 
the study made by the psychology department of the college.  
7.1.1 Research Ethics & Procedures 
Prior consent, obtainable in written form, was required before launching this 
study. Personal information about participants was not revealed to any authority due to 
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the consent agreement reached between the researcher and psychotherapists on the one 
hand and the students participating in the treatment programmes on the other hand. 
Participants in the study were then administered the IAS and Shyness Scale to 
decide whether the criterion for inclusion in the study had been met. All participants who 
scored one standard deviation above the mean for each measure (IAS = 49, Shyness 
Scale = 43) were included as participants. All participants were then administered the 
IBT to obtain baseline amounts of irrational thinking. 
7.1.2 REST/REBT Condition 
REBT/REST participants were given an intensive orientation to the REST and 
REBT procedures. They were thus reassured in a tranquil and serene lab environment 
concerning any fears or apprehensions about the REST procedures. The psychotherapist 
assigned to this group of participants conducted a brief pre-experimental interview in an 
attempt to assess whether the participants had been subjected to any stress, anxieties or 
other events which could make the REST sessions uncomfortable for them. 
7.1.3 REBT Therapy Group Condition 
Participants in this condition were exposed to a bi-weekly 3-hour REBT 
counselling group sessions per week. In these sessions participants were introduced to 
the main concepts of REBT, and given the chance to put these concepts into practice in 
their daily lives, and advised that they should regularly – and consciously – adhere to 
these tenets.  
Procedures also included learning the ABC theory of how irrational beliefs about 
daily events can lead to emotional disturbance: assessing how their personal irrational 
beliefs result in social anxiety; setting therapeutic goals that are specific, realistic, 
achievable and measurable: making a commitment to invest the time and energy 
necessary to achieve these goals; and, with the support of the group, challenging their 
irrational beliefs and deciding to substitute more appropriate and rational beliefs. At the 
end of a session and beginning of the next, participants heard the same recorded 
adaptation of the basic tenets of REBT. In between sessions, participants were given 
homework assignments designed to help them maintain their focus on, and work at, 
changing their irrational beliefs. 
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7.1.4 No treatment control 
Participants in this condition spent three hours a week in a non-REST/REBT or 
REBT only environments located in the college psychological laboratories, where 
normal levels of stimulation were assured. Participants brought personal materials to 
help maintain normal levels of stimulation (e.g., textbooks, class notes, study materials, 
magazines, etc. to exactly model the study of O’Toole, 1997), and extra materials were 
provided as needed. Social contact was maintained by intermittent interruptions by the 
experimenter approximately every hour to help ensure participants were experiencing 
normal amounts of stimulation. They did not receive any training in the basic tenets of 
REBT or REST plus REBT. In addition, the control group participants were not isolated 
from the other experimental participants as they were interacting with each other before 
the sessions or after the sessions since the sessions for the research groups were 
consecutively held on the three days of the week the lab was reserved or this study.   
7.1.5 Follow-up  
Immediately following their treatments, or no treatment in the control case, and 
again after a one-month period of cessating the treatment, participants in the three groups 
were asked to report their irrational thinking patterns by completing the IBT and 
reporting their experiences of social anxiety by completing the IAS and Shyness scale 
and finally completing an Irrational Thoughts log for one week. 
8 Summary of Findings 
The study examined the treatment effects on irrational thinking, shyness, and 
interaction anxiousness, across the three study periods, pre-test, post-test, and one-month 
follow up. The results suggested that there was no statistically significant difference in 
irrational thinking, shyness, and interaction anxiousness among the three treatment 
groups at pre-test. However, it was discovered that participants exposed to the 
REBT/REST condition would have significantly less irrational thinking, shyness, and 
interaction anxiousness on post-testing and at one-month follow-up than participants 
exposed to REBT group therapy treatment and participants with no treatments (control 
group). The study also found that participants exposed to the REBT-only treatment 
would have significantly less irrational thinking, shyness, and interaction anxiousness on 
post-testing and at one-month follow-up than participants with no treatments (control 
group). 
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Additionally, the analysis results of thoughts/feelings logs for the anxiety level 
scores indicated that participants treated with REBT/REST and REBT only had lower 
anxiety, compared to participants in the control group, across the study periods.  
9 Conclusions 
The National Comorbidity Survey has borne out recent data showing that social 
anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most common mental illnesses, third in order after 
depression and alcohol abuse (Kessler et al. 2005). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) defines social anxiety (synonymous with social 
phobia) as an intense fear of negative evaluation from others, and a chronic concern and 
self-doubt about one’s social ability and social performance.  
Even though the terms social phobia and social anxiety have been used 
interchangeably or synonymously in the literature, the former is more accurately used to 
refer to a clinically diagnosed condition, whereas the latter, being a milder form of social 
discomfort, is more prevalent than is probably diagnosed and statistically reported. 
However, social anxiety in its most severe form can emotionally and physiologically 
disable SAD patients, with many of them struggling to cope with other psychological 
concomitant challenges, such as finding or maintaining functional pro-
social/professional life relationships and/or engagements. As reviewed in the literature, 
prior research findings demonstrated that approximately one half of the patients suffering 
from social anxiety had a co-morbid mental, drug, or alcohol problem (Barlow, 1991; 
2002).  
Further and above all, if left without due, in-time interventions, SAD can be 
chronic and pervasive, not only due to the concomitant co-morbid conditions, but 
because of a morbid dependence on social avoidance mechanisms inevitably employed 
by SAD sufferers. Despite the fact that avoidance, loneliness, social avoidance and 
shyness may provisionally abate, alleviate or even eliminate SAD symptoms, the 
underlying fears will usually remain in the inner soul of the SAD sufferers, precluding 
them to accommodate functionally in social/professional life. This observation is well-
established in prior research demonstrating that approximately 85 percent of SAD 
patients experience academic and/or occupational difficulties caused by their incapacity 
or failure to meet the social demands of starting or even maintaining their jobs or social 
relationships (Bruce & Saaed, 1999; Carducci, Stubbins & Bryant, 2007; Carducci & 
Zimbardo, 1995; Zimbardo, 1977; Kashdan & Herbert, 2001).  
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Prior research has detected a correlation between social anxiety and irrational 
beliefs. Therefore, Ellis (1962) suggested that irrational beliefs could be the primary 
culprit inducing emotional and behavioural disorders. Using this theoretical framework 
by Ellis (1962), which has been consequently substantiated by solid empirical research, 
it is deduced that the predicaments experienced by SAD patients are not caused by 
specific conditions or events; rather they are caused by their explanation and evaluation 
of such conditions and events. Irrational-thinking individuals often tend to pass absolute 
and resolved judgments based on mistaken perceptions of the reality. These judgments 
and perceptions often contradict with the self and life realities, which bring forth 
emotional stress likely to engender anxiety, depression, and sadness (Dryden, 1999). 
As discussed in great detail in the first two chapters, social anxiety has been 
proven to be one of the most prevalent psycho-social disorders. In addition, the social 
and academic environment has seen a dramatic and significant surge in mental health 
and behaviour problems among college students. The findings from this study show that 
social anxiety in the general student population is significantly correlated with irrational 
thinking in the Arab academic environment. This study is also unique as it has 
demonstrated how common social anxiety and irrational thinking is on college campuses 
today in Saudi Arabia as elsewhere in the world. 
In addition, the counseling psychology research findings have been specifically 
focused on cognitive and emotional aspects of personality development and role in 
psychological and social accommodation. Thus, an emotional-rational therapy approach 
developed by (Ellis, 1962) contributed to explanation of the relationship between one's 
irrational beliefs and emotional and behavioural disorders which can help alleviate, 
reduce and treat SAD once these irrational beliefs have been eliminated. 
The present study supports O'Toole's research findings that REBT is effective in 
alleviating and treating social anxiety. This finding is compatible with prior research 
(Bernard, 1990; Bernard & DiGiuseppe, 1994; DiGiuseppe, et al., 1990; O'Toole, 1997; 
Watson & Friend, 1969). Prior research has demonstrated that there were statistically 
significant differences between irrationality and some disorders, such as social anxiety 
(Rateeb, 2000).  
Ellis (1971) conjectured that there is a relationship between irrational beliefs and 
various other forms of emotional disturbances, such as social anxiety, resurging as a 
result of the interactions of negative events or situations and negative emotions 
conducing to certain irrational beliefs or any other irrational or other dysfunctional 
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patterns of thought likely to cause emotional disorders (Lohr & Bonge, 1981; Niedenthal 
et al., 2005; Thyer et al., 1985; Tiba, 2010). Therefore it may be explained, as revealed 
in several relevant research endeavours, that SAD patients were found to be 
inconsistently receptive to positive and/or negative evaluations from others (Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979), they may be affected by their own reactions to appraisals from others 
(Jones, 1973), and the individual's self-evaluation or self-concept has been seen as a 
likely mediator of reactions to social evaluation (Shrauger, 1982). 
The underlying point in the replication of O’Toole’s work (1997) is to assert that 
by reducing irrational beliefs to a minimum, one can behave normally, with less anxiety 
– a point deduced from prior research, too, and confirmed in the present study (Davison 
& Zighelboim, 1987; O'Toole, 1997; Rohsenhow & Smith, 1982; Sutton-Simon & 
Goldfried, 1979). Clearly put, the findings from the present study confirmed that REBT 
is an effective treatment technique for social anxiety, irrationality and rumination of 
beliefs that lead to different forms of anxiety, especially social anxiety (Bernard et al., 
2006; DiGiuseppe & Bernard, 1990; DiGiuseppe et al., 1998; Durlak et al., 1991; Fehm 
et al., 2007; Gormally et al., 1981; Kocovski& Rector, 2007; Rodebaugh et al., 2004; 
Schulz & Kasper, 1994; Vassilopoulos, 2009; Watson & Friend, 1969). As stated in the 
previous chapter, several studies were conducted to test the effectiveness of REBT or 
REST separately or in combination at the time O’Toole launched his study, but still these 
studies were rare, and were done mostly in the West; sparse studies were conducted in 
the Arab world on the effectiveness of REBT in treating anxieties. Further, in different 
contexts, many studies have been conducted on irrational belief dimensions among 
college students in developed societies.  
By and large, researchers in Western societies have used counselling skills and 
cognitive-behaviour interventions for disputing the types of irrational thinking such as 
demandingness, awfulizing and depreciation. Few studies are available from Saudi 
Arabia or the Middle East, however, although such irrational belief systems and their 
negative consequences such as depression and social anxiety had been observed three 
decades ago among undergraduate students in some Arab countries (Nadeem, 1998). For 
example, Nadeem (1998) observed that three privileges in Arab societies (e.g., love, 
protection and social acceptance), are essential not only for a peaceful psychological life 
of individuals in these societies, but also for their very survival. By the same token, 
Nadeem (1998) demonstrated that the lack of independence among Yemeni individuals 
(a very similar society to the social structures of Saudi Arabia), together with excessive 
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fatalism, is likely to generate not only many obstacles to development, particularly from 
adolescence onwards, but also trigger emotional disturbances such as depression and 
social anxiety. Saleh (1985) indicated that Arabs are prone to suffer from social anxiety 
and other emotional disturbances because of irrational belief systems. Research in some 
Arab countries had showed that irrational beliefs could be conducive to psychological 
disturbances; this research demonstrated that it is the perceptions of individuals that 
cause their irrationality. When individuals thought (irrationally) that the events or 
situations they passed through were awfulizing, painful or saddening, then their 
emotional disturbances were triggered off (Ahmed, 2004; Al-Akad, 1997; Al-Faisal, 
1992; Almaleh & Al-zarrad, 2005; Al-Namlah et al., 2006; Al-Raihani, 1987b; Rateeb, 
2000). Chaleby in a series of studies has further suggested that social phobias are 
rampant in Saudi Arabia, even claiming that it is more rife in Saudi Arabia than it is in 
England (Lane, 2007). 
The present study has come to fill in this gap in Arab literature. In addition, 
reviews of prior studies and relevant literature indicated that, from 1997 onwards to 
2008, more research as well as theoretical synthesis studies were carried out on the 
effectiveness of REBT (Anderson, 2000; Aumann, 2004; Banks, 2006; Cornwall, 2008; 
Ford, 2009; Gonzalez et al, 2004; Gregas, 2009; Jensen, 2008; Koffler, 2005; Moore, 
2006; Pace, 2006; Sharp, 2003; Sias, 2006). 
In conclusion, REBT has become one of the most widely accepted forms of 
psychotherapy for both psychological and mental health problems for which irrational 
thinking is the most culpable factor, such as phobias, social anxiety, shyness and social 
withdrawal. With the increasing popularity of, and evidence-based support for, cognitive 
therapies used by counselling psychologists and psychotherapists, a number of clinical 
psychologists and counsellors have used REBT applications as the basis for developing 
new patterns of solving problems rooted in psychopathology. This has provided 
evidence-based guarantees for applying REBT treatment to college students in need of 
psychotherapy in order to treat such disorders, especially the SAD – the most prevalent 
disruption of well-being. 
10 Criticisms of the Present Study 
As was the case in the original study by O'Toole (1997), the session time 
allotments that participants spent in the REBT and the REBT plus REST therapy groups 
were limited and short enough to provide a clear discrepancy in the statistical processing 
between post-assessments as compared with the pre-assessments. In fact, due to logistic 
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problems in the labs and the students' lack of desire to spend longer time in therapy, it 
appears that the session time was insufficient to eradicate irrational beliefs altogether as 
claimed in previous research. The length of time the subjects were engaged in therapy 
restricted the extent of the study because the participants’ availability was limited by the 
academic calendar as they were volunteer students from the university. Therefore, it is 
strongly suggested that future research tapping into the effects of REBT and/or REBT 
plus REST should dedicate more time to therapy sessions over longer periods of time 
rather than a period of a couple of months. As suggested by O'Toole, future studies may 
want to increase the length and number of sessions employed in an REBT group as well 
as in the REBT plus REST group. Longitudinal research on the effectiveness of research 
can confirm the effectiveness of REBT in treating social anxiety in college students. 
However, employing REST therapy has its limitations as many clients are not willing to 
invest the time to subject themselves to sensory deprivation. Currently, REST still 
requires an unwieldy flotation tank, which can seem quite intimidating and inconvenient 
when clients can choose instead a 1-hour session of talk therapy.  
In addition, the effects of REST-only psychotherapy should be compared with 
REBT and REBT plus REST, too. The original research design in O’Toole (1997) had 
included a fourth treatment group (REST with no educational message), comprising of 
20 participants per treatment group. Unfortunately, due to the limited number of college 
students diagnosed as having social phobia and shyness rooted in irrational thinking 
readily available to participate in the present study over the few months period of 
empirical data collection, the research design of this study was limited to two treatment 
groups with 25 participants per group. Future research would likely benefit from 
studying a larger number of participants in a research design utilizing a REST only 
group (receiving no educational message), which would add up to the statistical power of 
ANOVA or t-test comparisons of findings on pre-testing, post-testing, and an interval of 
a few months after post-testing rather than a one-month interval period. This is true when 
considering effect size considerations. As earlier noted in this chapter and elsewhere, the 
Multivariate Eta Square (0.69) suggested a very large effect size of the counselling 
programme in reducing irrational beliefs in the participants in both treatment groups. 
However, original effect size calculations, based on REST research in other areas, 
indicated that a limited number of participants could be adequately sufficient to prove 
the effectiveness of counselling programmes grounded in REST/REBT treatment. Still, a 
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greater variability than expected was found on the dependent measures used as noted by 
O'Toole (1997).  
Analysing the effects of a REST only group is also important to determine if the 
combination of REBT and REST therapy produces a synergistic effect or not. It may be 
that simply putting participants under more therapy, regardless of whichever class it may 
be, will improve their psychological health. If the effects of receiving both REBT and 
REST are greater than the combination of REBT alone and REST alone, then that future 
study can conclude that REBT and REST complement one another. In contrast, the 
control group was simply told they were on a waiting list for therapy, and they 
participated in their usual daily chores. The first experimental group receiving REBT 
alone showed comparative improvement in their alleviated social anxiety, while the 
second experimental group showed better improvements due to the fact that REST was 
introduced to support REBT by creating a more conducive environment for 
suggestibility and responsiveness to the treatment in a more comfortable setting.  
This study only examined participants suffering from SAD. However, additional 
research on the effectiveness of REBT and/or REBT plus REST should further explore 
the effects of this psychotherapy on treating other emotional disorders, such as 
depression, stress, general anxiety, test anxiety, different types of phobia and other 
personality disorders such as shyness and social withdrawal. Testing the effects of REBT 
and REST on other psychological disorders would increase its relevance to more 
therapists and clients if the same results are found.  
In addition, it should be noted that rationality and irrationality in REBT theory 
are relative to the individual's particular goals, purposes, motivations, priorities and 
options, and these concepts of what is rational versus what is irrational are culture-
specific in the first place. The case being as such, what is considered sound judgment or 
good sense as rational belief system for an individual in a certain culture may be foolish 
or irrational in another culture. Rational beliefs (those that are helpful to the individual in 
a particular context or the logical statement opposite to irrational beliefs) are not always 
logical or factually supported, but many – probably most – are. Some religious rituals are 
accepted rational behaviour in Islamic culture, while they might be evaluated as 
irrational behaviours among, for example, Indian, European and American cultures. Such 
considerations have to be taken in future replica research by designing culture-
responsive scales or tests of irrational thinking appropriate to Arabian society. 
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By the same token, REBT greatly emphasises the distinction between rational 
preferences as the basic needs through some verbal expressions (wants, wishes, hopes 
and desires) and irrational preferential beliefs such as musts, shoulds and demands. This 
clearly pronounced distinction was lacking of awareness in the Arab culture of Saudi 
society (musts refer to illogical belief and wishes refer to logical preference). Despite the 
fact that the scales, especially the IBT, were validated to be appropriate for use in their 
Arabic version in the present study, there should still be a specific scale for measuring 
irrational beliefs in Saudi Arabia. The researcher used two scales for measuring and 
detecting social phobia in my sample: the social interaction anxiousness and the shyness 
scale. There should be other independent measures, specifically designed for the Arab 
world, for measuring social phobia. In fact, such scales are available, and some of them 
have been specifically designed to be appropriate for the Arabian environment (Saleh, 
1987). However, in this research, Arabic editions of the same tools used in the original 
study by O'Toole were preferred for purposes of comparison and therefore, they were 
pilot-tested for reliability and validity for use in the present study. 
Although original effect size calculations showed that the number of participants 
used in this study was sufficient to draw conclusions, this study can be bolstered further 
by increasing its sample size. The participants were selected through nominations by the 
university’s academic advisors and counselling psychologists, and these professionals 
may have unconsciously chosen students whom they believed would have greater 
success receiving REBT/REST therapy. Additionally, because these participants were 
aware and willing to participate in this study, their anticipation of receiving therapy may 
have influenced their results. Those who see themselves as receiving more therapy in the 
REBT/REST group may have given greater efforts to improve. The sample group was 
also limited in its diversity by recruiting only male participants when the ratio of females 
to males with SAD is 2:1. Lastly, given that the entire sample was composed of 
university-level students, the success of a cognitive-based therapy may partly be due to 
their level of education.  
Certain uncontrollable factors may also have swayed the results of this study. For 
example, the study participants were not confined in a laboratory setting: they were free 
to be exposed to other influences once they returned to their home environment. Even 
talking with others about the study they are participating in may have changed their 
outlook on their disorder and their circumstances. Also, it is difficult to perform a blind 
study on the participant as both the therapist and the participant can easily determine of 
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which experimental group the participant is a member. Thus, expectation can motivate 
both the therapist and the participant to succeed.  
11 Recommendations and suggestions for future research 
The use of REST in combination with REBT has been evidenced as an effective 
aid to psychotherapy grounded in REBT theory. In this line, using a REST environment 
to improve and ameliorate the receptivity of suggestions for alleviating irrational 
thinking and reducing somatic symptoms of social anxiousness in college students has, 
unlike the original study of O'Toole, been demonstrated as an integrated and 
complementary assistant to REBT therapy, especially when accompanied by educational 
messages in an environment with normal stimulation. 
Another way to expand this study is to improve the limitations of REBT and 
REST therapy altogether. Since REBT focuses on addressing cognitive symptoms, the 
emotional components of psychological disorders are often neglected. Additionally, due 
to the inconvenience of REST treatment on the client, it could be less likely to be chosen 
by the client if given other options. As mentioned in the section discussing the 
limitations of this present study, cultural relevance is extremely important. Research can 
be conducted on how likely the Arab world would accept REBT/REST therapy as a 
treatment plan. Good clinical practice evaluates a client’s needs in a holistic aspect, 
taking into consideration its content, delivery and receptivity.  
On that note, future research can be expanded to include neuroimaging studies 
that will better reveal how decreased physical stimulation enhances the receptivity of 
cognitive therapy. If a subject is sweating because he is nervous, for example, then most 
of his mental energy is concentrated in telling himself to stop sweating, and he cannot 
stop to consider the cognitive therapy techniques he previously learned. However, once 
that physical stimulation is decreased by REST therapy, then he is better able to focus on 
how to change his perspective on the external circumstance that he is experiencing. It 
can be hypothesised that reducing somatic symptoms may correlate with greater activity 
in the prefrontal cortex, the region of the brain associated with higher thinking. Seeing 
the neurological underpinnings of which areas in the brain are activated will provide 
greater insight into the biological roots of how REBT and REST therapy operate. It may 
also lead the way for new pharmaceutical developments and start tracking the changes 
made in the brain due to perspective shifting. 
Future research tapping into the effects of religious faith and commitment, 
especially the Islamic faith, can be explored in further research that may design 
 247 
 
counselling programmes of REBT grounded in the Muslim faith. In fact, many of the 
tenets of the Islamic faith, and by extension, Christianity, Judaism and others, are 
compatible with those of REBT, and the utilisation of faith for enhancing rational 
thinking and combating irrational beliefs is an interesting topic for Saudi researchers. In 
addition, the extent to which religiosity impacts on mental illness remains understudied, 
and the extent of using REBT counselling programmes grounded in religious faith is 
quite ignored or unexplored. In the present study, REBT psychotherapeutic applications 
have primarily dealt with belief systems from a purely philosophical perspective, but the 
treatment programme did not provide any instruction as to how religion and REBT may 
be compatible. Furthermore, the possibility that faith-based counselling programmes 
may have any impact on the final outcome still remains unclear. This would require 
further research to determine the impact of faith-based treatment models versus non-
faith-based treatment models. There are several rationales why REBT could be an 
appropriately suitable psychotherapy for use with religious clients. First, REBT is an 
appropriate treatment method for individuals with strong adherence to religious faith 
specifically because it is a belief-focused therapy (Nielsen, 2003). The psychotherapeutic 
system of REBT is highly harmonious with many basic principles of universally known 
religious scriptures and belief systems (Ellis, 1983). In this regard, the Jewish, Christian 
and Muslim perspectives, that all people are equally worthwhile and that all sins are 
pardonable and atonable, may serve as an appropriate undergirding for those techniques 
of REBT which seek to emphasise the riddance or at least overcoming of the tendency to 
rate one's own worth and the value of others on quite irrational or subjective bases. The 
Christian and Muslim stance of accepting the sinner but not the sin can be relevant here. 
Noticeably, Ellis has stressed that REBT does not disregard or lightly consider immoral 
acts and sins, but rather, it wholeheartedly accepts the humanity and fallibility of those 
who commit such acts and sins and seeks to redress them (Ellis & Dryden, 1997). 
Nielsen, Johnson, & Ridley (2000) have adeptly noted that ‘Religious doctrine and 
rational emotive psychology both endorse the centrality of belief in the emotional, 
behavioural, and cognitive lives of human beings.’ Therefore, recognizing and 
comprehending religious beliefs, and the content and quality of one’s religious belief 
system, is an elementary step towards perceiving and comprehending the nature and 
quality of both religion as a human phenomenon and religion as a force in an individual's 
life (Nielsen et al., 2000). In this regard, Tillich (1952) noted that ‘whatever concerns a 
man ultimately becomes god for him’ (p. 211). 
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Having been proven as an effective addition to REBT, REST should be studied in 
its own right as a therapy and in combination with REBT therapy in the Saudi context. 
Several studies utilised REST designs involving longer periods of time in the REST 
sessions, revealing that REST could bear significant effects in changing the attitudes and 
personal functioning of participants (Barabasz & Barabasz, 1993; Barabasz, Barabasz & 
Dyer, 1993; Dyer et al., 1993; Suedfeld, 1980). Therefore, prospective researchers may 
need to endeavour researching the effects of REST in decreasing and further eradicating 
irrational beliefs among college students as well as treating emotional disturbances, such 
as different types of anxieties and phobias, stress and depression. In the present study, 
hypnosis was not used as it was ideally used in O'Toole or other works by other authors. 
However, given the possibility that the hypnotisability level of participants may also 
influence the effectiveness of the REST environment, this should further be explored as 
an intervening variable in prospective research. Controlled studies as such may be 
conducted for the purpose of comparing the effects of suggestions for rational thinking 
on high versus low hypnotisable participants in a REST versus non-REST environment 
on the one hand and REBT versus REBT plus REST environments on the other hand. 
Thus, given that the use of rational suggestions has been demonstrated in some prior 
research as in the present study to be effective, prospective research may also use a wider 
variety of assessment instruments appropriate for the Arabian environment to examine 
different areas in which the rational suggestions may be having a positive effect on 
participants' psychological lives. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
INTERACTION ANXIOUSNESS SCALE 
 
Name: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
College:  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Department: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Academic 
Number: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Instructions: 
Read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is characteristic or true 
of you. Then place a number between ‘1’ and ‘5’ in the correct space according to the 
following scale. 
1 = The statement is not at all characteristic of me. 
2 = The statement is slightly characteristic of me. 
3 =The statement is moderately characteristic of me. 
4 =The statement is very characteristic of me. 
5 =The statement is extremely characteristic of me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 294 
 
  
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers.      
2. I usually feel uncomfortable when I am in a group of people I 
don't know. 
     
3. I am usually at ease when speaking to a member of the opposite 
sex. 
     
4. I get nervous when I must talk to a teacher or boss.      
5. Parties often make me feel anxious and uncomfortable.      
6. I am probably less shy in social interactions than most people.      
7. I sometimes feel tense when talking to people of my own sex if 
I don't know them well. 
     
8. I would be nervous if I was being interviewed for a job.      
9. I wish I had more confidence in social situations.      
10. I seldom feel anxious in social situations.      
11. In general, I am a shy person.      
12. I often feel nervous when talking to an attractive member of the 
opposite sex. 
     
13. I often feel nervous when calling someone I don't know very 
well on the telephone. 
     
14. I get nervous when I speak to someone in a position of 
authority. 
     
15. I usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are 
quite different from myself. 
     
  592
 
 
 أملحق 
 مقياس القلق أثناء التفاعل الاجتماعي
  الاسم
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
  الكلية
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
  القسم
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
  الأكاديميالرقم 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 :تعليمات
 :اقرأ العبارات الآتية قراءة واعية، ثم اختر ما يناسب كل عبارة من استجابات  تصف شخصيتك وسماتك النفسية وفق المدرج الآتي
 .العبارة لا تنطبق إطلاقا ًعلى شخصي - 1
 .العبارة تعبر بعض الشئ عن بعض سماتي - 2
 .العبارة تعبر عني إلى حد ما- 3
 عن شخصي بشكل كبير العبارة تعبر - 4
 العبارة تعبر عني بشكل كبير جدا ً - 5
  
  692
 
 5 4 3 2 1 العبـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــارة
      غالبا ًما أشعر بالعصبية في التجمعات مع الآخرين حتى في المواقف غير الرسمية. .1
      عادًة أشعر بعدم الارتياح عندما أجتمع مع أناس لا أعرفهم. .2
      بالارتياح عندما أتحدث مع أحد من الجنس الآخر.أشعر  .3
      ينتابني شعور بالعصبية إذا اضطررت اضطرارا ًللحديث مع المعلم أو مع المدير. .4
      ُتشعرني الحفلات والتجمعات بالقلق وعدم الارتياح. .5
      الاجتماعية.أنا أقلُّ خجلا ًعلى الأرجح من معظم الناس، وبخاصة في التفاعلات  .6
      أشعر أحيانا ًبالتوتر عندما أتحدث مع أناس من نفس جنسي لاسيما إذا لم يكن بيني وبينهم سابق معرفة. .7
      قد تنتابني حالة من العصبية إذا عقدت مقابلة مع أحد للحصول على وظيفة أو عمل. .8
      أتمنى لو أنني واثق بنفسي أثناء التفاعلات الاجتماعية. .9
      نادرا ًما تنتابني حالة من القلق في أثناء التفاعل الاجتماعي مع الآخرين. .11
      أشعر بأنني ـ بصفة عامة ـ رجل خجول. .11
      غالبا ًما أشعر بالعصبية عندما أتحدث مع أحد من الجنس اللطيف، وبخاصة إذا كانت جذابة. .21
      هاتفية مع شخص لا أعرفه جيدا.ًغالبا ًما أشعر بالعصبية عندما أجري مكالمة  .31
      أشعر بالعصبية إذا تحدثت مع شخص ذي سلطة أو منصب. .41
      عادًة ما أشعر بالارتياح في صحبة الآخرين، وحتى وإن اختلفوا في أمزجتهم وسماتهم النفسية عني. .51
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Appendix B 
SHYNESS SCALE 
 
Name: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
College: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Department: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Academic 
Number: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Instructions: 
Read each item carefully and decide the degree to which the statement is 
characteristic or true of you. Then place a number between "1" and "5" in the 
correct space according to the following scale. 
1. The statement is not at all characteristic of me. 
2. The statement is slightly characteristic of me. 
3. The statement is moderately characteristic of me. 
4. The statement is very characteristic of me. 
5. The statement is extremely characteristic of me. 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I feel tense when I'm with people I don’t know well.      
2. I am socially somewhat awkward.      
3. I do not find it difficult to ask other people for information.      
4. I am often uncomfortable at parties and other social functions.      
5. When in a group of people, I have trouble thinking of the right 
things to talk about. 
     
6. It does not take me long to overcome my shyness in new 
situations. 
     
7. It is hard for me to act natural when I am meeting with new 
people. 
     
8. I feel nervous when speaking to someone in authority.      
9. I have no doubts about my social competence.      
10. I have trouble looking someone right in the eye.      
11. I feel inhibited in social situations.      
12. I do not find it hard to talk to strangers.      
 
 
  892
 
 
 ملحق ب
 مقياس الخجل 
 الاسم
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 الكلية
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 القسم
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 الأكاديميالرقم 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 :تعليمات
اقرأ العبارات الآتية قراءة واعية، ثم اختر ما يناسب كل عبارة من استجابات  تصف شخصيتك وسماتك النفسية وفق المدرج 
 :الآتي
 .العبارة لا تنطبق إطلاقا ًعلى شخصي = 1
 .= العبارة تعبر بعض الشئ عن بعض سماتي 2
 .= العبارة تعبر عني إلى حد ما 3
 تعبر عن شخصي بشكل كبيرالعبارة  =  4
 = العبارة تعبر عني بشكل كبير جداً  5
 5 4 3 2 1 العبـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــارة
      .أشعر بالتوتر عندما أكون في صحبة أناس لا أعرفهم جيداً  .1
      .أعتقد أنني أخرق اجتماعيا ًبعض الشئ .2
      .من الآخرين لا أجد ثَمَّ صعوبة ًفي الاستفسار وطلب المعلومات .3
      .أشعر غالبا ًبعدم الارتياح في الحفلات وغيرها من المواقف الاجتماعية .4
      .عندما أكون في صحبة من الناس، أجد صعوبة في فتح موضوعات مناسبة للحديث عنها معهم .5
      .لا يستغرقني الوقت والجهد أن أتغلب على حيائي في المواقف الاجتماعية الجديدة .6
      .قد يصعب الأمر عليَّ أن أتصرف على سجيتي عندما أقابل أناسا ًجددا ًللوهلة الأولى .7
      .أشعر بالعصبية عند التحدث مع شخص ذي سلطة ومنصب .8
      .لا تنتابني الشكوك إزاء كفائتي الاجتماعية .9
      .أجد صعوبة في أن أنظر إلى أي شخص مباشرة في عينه أثناء الحديث .01
      .أشعر بالتثبيط والإحباط في المواقف الاجتماعية .11
      .لا أجد ثَمَّ صعوبة ًفي الحديث إلى الأغراب .21
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Appendix C 
IRRATIONAL BELIEFS TEST 
 
 
Name: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
College: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Department: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
Academic 
Number: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………… 
 
1 If you STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2 If you SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
3 If you NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 If you SOMEWHAT AGREE 
5 If you STRONGLY AGREE 
 It is not necessary to think over any item very long. Mark your answer quickly and go 
on to the next statement. 
 Be sure to mark how you actually feel about the statement, not how you think you 
 should feel. 
 Try to avoid the neutral of ‘3’ response as much as possible. Select this answer only if 
you really cannot decide whether you tend to agree or disagree with a statement. 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1. It is important to me that others approve of me.      
2. I hate to fail at anything.      
3. People who do wrong deserve what they get.      
4. I usually accept what happens philosophically.      
5. If a person wants that he can be happy under almost any 
circumstances. 
     
6. I have a fear of some things that often bothers me.      
7. I usually put off important decisions.      
8. Everyone needs someone he can depend on for help and 
advice. 
     
9. "A zebra cannot change his stripes".      
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1O. There is a right way to do everything.      
11. I like the respect of others. but I don't have to have it.      
12. I avoid things I cannot do well.      
13. Too many evil persons escape the punishment they 
deserve. 
     
14. Frustrations don’t upset me.      
15. People are disturbed not by situations but by the view they 
take of them. 
     
16. I feel little anxiety over unexpected dangers or future 
events. 
     
17. I try to go ahead and get irksome tasks behind me when 
they come up. 
     
18. I try to consult an authority on important decisions.      
19. It is almost impossible to overcome the influence of the 
past. 
     
20. There is no perfect solution to anything.      
21. I want everyone to like me.      
22. I don't mind competing in activities where others are better 
than I. 
     
23. Those who do wrong deserve to be blamed.      
24. Things should be different from the way they are.      
25. I cause my own moods.      
26. I often can't get my mind off some concern.      
27. I avoid facing my problems.      
28. People need a source of strength outside themselves.      
29. Just because something once strongly affects your life 
doesn't mean it need do so in the future. 
     
30. There is seldom an easy way out of life's difficulties.      
31. I can like myself even when many others don't.      
32. I like to succeed at something but I don't feel 1have to.      
33. Immorality should be strongly punished.      
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34. I often get disturbed over situations I don't like.      
35. People who are miserable have usually made themselves 
that way. 
     
36. If I can't keep something from happening, I don't worry 
about it 
     
37. I usually make decisions as promptly as I can.      
38. There are certain people that I depend on greatly.      
39. People overvalue the influence of the past.      
40. Some problems will always be with us.      
41. If others dislike me, that's their problem, not mine.      
42. It is highly important to me to be successful in everything I 
do. 
     
43. I seldom blame people for their wrongdoings.      
44. I usually accept things the way they are, even if I don't like 
them. 
     
45. A person won't stay angry or blue long unless they keep 
themselves that way. 
     
46. I can't stand to take chances.      
47. Life is too short to spend it doing unpleasant tasks.      
48. I like to stand on my own two feet.      
49. If I had had different experiences I could be more like I 
want to be. 
     
50. Every problem has a correct solution.      
51. I find it hard to go against what others think.      
52. I enjoy activities for their own sake, no matter how good I 
am at them. 
     
53. The fear of punishment helps people be good.      
54. If things annoy me, I just ignore them.      
55. The more problems a person has, the less happy they will 
be. 
     
56. I am seldom anxious over the future.      
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57. I seldom put things off.      
58. I am the only one who can really understand and face my 
problems. 
     
59. I seldom think of past experiences as affecting me now.      
60. We live in a world of chance and probability.      
61. Although I like approval, it’s not a real need for me.      
62. It bothers me when others are better at something than 
me. 
     
63. Everyone is basically good.      
64. I do what I can to get what I want and then don't worry 
about it 
     
65. Nothing is upsetting in itself - only in the way you interpret 
it. 
     
66. I worry a lot about certain things in the future.      
67. It is difficult for me to do unpleasant chores.      
68. I dislike for others to make my decisions for me.      
69. We are slaves to our personal histories.      
70. There is seldom an ideal solution to anything.      
71. I often worry about how much people approve of and 
accept me. 
     
72. It upsets me to make mistakes.      
73. It's unfair that "the rain falls on both the just and the 
unjust". 
     
74. I am fairly easygoing about life.      
75. More people should face up to the unpleasantness of life.      
76. Sometimes I can't get a fear off my mind.      
77. A life of ease is seldom very rewarding.      
78. I find it easy to seek advice.      
79. Once something strongly affects your life, it always will.      
80. It is better to look for a practical solution than a perfect 
one. 
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81. I have considerable concern with what people are feeling 
about me. 
     
82. I often become quite annoyed over little things.      
83. I usually give someone who has wronged me a second 
chance. 
     
84. I dislike responsibility.      
85. There is never any reason to remain sorrowful for very 
long. 
     
86. I hardly ever think of such things as death or nuclear war.      
87. People are happiest when they have challenges and 
problems to overcome. 
     
88. I dislike having to depend on others.      
89. People never change basically.      
90. I feel I must handle things in the right way.      
91. It is annoying but not upsetting to be criticized.      
92. I'm not afraid to do things which I cannot do well.      
93. No one is evil, even though their deeds may be.      
94. I seldom become upset over the mistakes of others.      
95. Man makes his own hell within himself.      
96. I often find myself planning what I would do in different 
dangerous situations. 
     
97. If something is necessary. I do it even if ifs unpleasant      
98. I've learned not to expect someone else to be very 
concerned about my welfare. 
     
99. I don't look upon the past with any regrets.      
100. There is no such thing as an ideal set of circumstances.      
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 ملحق ج
 اختبار الأفكار اللاعق لانية
 الاسم
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 الكلية
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 القسم
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 الأكاديميالرقم 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
 :تعليمات
هذا الاستبيان الغرض منه الكشف عن أساليب تفكيرك في الأشياء والأحداث من حولك، وطرق إحساسك بها. فيما يلي 
بعض العبارات التي قد تميل أن تقبل بها أو ترفضها. اقرأ كل عبارة بعناية وأناة، ثم قرر ما إذا كنت ستوافق عليها 
 :ما يناسب استجاباتك لهذه العباراتأو ترفضها. اختر من المدرج الآتي 
 أرفض بشدة = 1
 = أرفض نوعا ًما 2
 = محايد 3
 أوافق نوعا ًما =  4
 = أوافق بشدة 5
 
 ليس من المهم أن تستغرق وقتا ًكثيرا ًفي التفكير في الإجابة.  
ضع علامات استجاباتك سريعاً دون أن تضيع الوقت في التفكير، ثم انتقل إلى العبارة التي تليها. فالمهم أن  
 تكون استجاباتك معبرة عن شعورك وليس عن تفكيرك. 
حاول أن تتحاشى الإجابات المحايدة ما استطعت إلى ذلك من سبيل. فقط اختر الإجابة المحايدة عندما لا تستطيع  
 الاختيار أو القرار بالموافقة أو الرفض.فعليا ً
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 5 4 3 2 1 العبارة
      يهمني أن أحظى بقبول الآخرين. .1
      أبغض الفشل في أي شئ. .2
      من يرتكب ذنبا،ً فهو جدير بما ينزل به من العقاب. .3
      من الناحية الفلسفية، أقبل ما يحدث من أحداث. .4
      السعادة تحت أي ظرف إذا أراد ذلك حقا.ًيمكن للإنسان أن يحقق  .5
      أشعر بالخوف من الأشياء التي تزعجني. .6
      عادًة ما أقوم بتأجيل القرارات المهمة. .7
      كل امرئ يحتاج إلى إنسان يعتمد عليه، ويثق به للمساعدة وإسداء النصيحة. .8
يمكن للحمار الوحشي أن يغير الخطوط التي تلون لا يمكن للمرأ أن يغير صفاته التي ولد عليها، كما لا  .9
 جسمه.
     
      لكل شئ طريقة صحيحة لإنجازه. .11
      أحب احترام الآخرين، لكني لست مضطرا ًلذلك. .11
      أتحاشى الأشياء التي لا يمكنني إنجازها على نحو جيد. .21
      الذي يستحقونه. الكثير والكثير من الأشرار يفلتون بفعالهم من العقاب .31
      لا تزعجني الإحباطات. .41
      لا ينزعج الناس بالمواقف التي يمرون بها بقدر ما ينزعجون بآرائهم عما يمرون به من مواقف. .51
      أشعر بقليل من القلق حيال المخاطر غير المتوقعة أو أحداث المستقبل التي لا يمكن التنبؤ بها. .61
      السير قدما،ً ملقيا ًخلف ظهري ما يؤرقني من مهام أو مشكلات تنشأ فجأة.أحاول أن أتقدم في  .71
      أسعى أن أستشير الكبار وأولي العلم والخبرة عندما أضطر لاتخاذ قرار مهم في حياتي. .81
      من المحال أو يقاربه أن يتخلص المرأ من ماضيه، وتأثيره. .91
      لا يوجد حل أمثل لأي مشكلة. .12
      أن يحبني كل إنسان. أريد .12
      لا أمانع أن أنافس الآخرين في المجالات التي قد يتفوقون علي فيها. .22
      من يكسب إثما ًيجز به. .32
      يجب أن تسير الأمور على نحو أفضل مما هي عليه الآن. .42
      أنا الذي يتسبب في حالتي المزاجية والنفسية، وليس أحدا ًغيري. .52
      بي ملمة، لا أستطيع أن أتمالك نفسي دون التفكير فيها باستمرار.إذا ألمت  .62
      أتحاشى دوما ًأن أواجه مشكلاتي. .72
      يحتاج المرأ إلى من يقوي عزيمته. .82
      ما أن يؤثر فيك شئ بقوة في الوقت الحالي، لا يعني أن يدوم تأثيره بقوة في المستقبل. .92
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      من مشكلات الحياة.لا توجد طريقة سهلة للتخلص  .13
      يمكنني أن أقبل نفسي، حتى وإن رفضها الآخرون. .13
      أحب النجاح في الأمور كلها، ولكني لست أشعر بأنه يجب علي تحقيق النجاح دوما.ً .23
      أي فعل لا أخلاقي يجب معاقبته بحزم. .33
      أشعر بالقلق حيال المواقف التي لا أحبها. .43
      الذين اختاروا البؤس طريق حياتهم.البؤساء هم  .53
      إذا لم أستطع أن أحول بيني وبين الشر، فلا ينبغي علي أن أقلق بصدده. .63
      عادة ما أصنع القرارات بسرعة حدوث الأحداث. .73
      يوجد أناس في حياتي أعتمد عليهم إلى حد كبير. .83
      يفرط الناس في تقييم تأثير الماضي في الحاضر. .93
      دائما ًما تعلق بي بعض المشكلات التي لا أستطيع الفكاك منها. .14
      إذا كرهني الناس، فهذه مشكلتهم، وليست مشكلتي الشخصية. .14
      من الأهمية لي أن أكون ناجحا ًفي الأمور كلها. .24
      نادرا ًما ألوم الناس بأخطائهم. .34
      كرهتها.عادة ما أقبل الأمور على علاتها، وحتى وإن   .44
      لا يمكن للمرأ أن يعتريه الغضب دوما ًإلا أن يفعلوا ذلك بأنفسهم. .54
      لا أستطيع أن أتحمل المخاطرة. .64
      الحياة أقصر من أن نقضيها في توافه الأمور وترهاتها. .74
      أحب الاعتماد على نفسي بنفسي. .84
      تغيرت على النحو الذي أحب.لو مررت بخبرات كافية في حياتي، لكانت حياتي قد  .94
      لكل مشكلة حل واحد صحيح. .15
      قد يصعب عليَّ التمرد على ما يعتقده الآخرون بصددي. .15
      أستمتع بالأحداث والأنشطة على علاتها، وليس لأنني ماهر بها. .25
      الخوف من العقاب يساعد الناس أن يكونوا صالحين. .35
      أتجاهله.الأمر الذي يضايقني  .45
      .كلما يمر المرأ بالمشكلات والحوادث، كلما ابتعد عن السعادة .55
      نادرا ًما ينتابني القلق إزاء المستقبل. .65
      نادرا ًما أؤجل عمل اليوم إلى الغد. .75
      أنا الإنسان الوحيد الذي يستطيع أن يواجه مشكلاتي ويحلها، فما حك جلدي مثل ظفري. .85
      ما أفكر بحوادث الماضي على النحو الذي يؤثر في حاضري.نادرا ً .95
      نحن نعيش في عالم من الاحتمالات والشكوك، فليس هناك أمور يقينية. .16
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      رغم أنني أحب أن يقبلني الآخرون، إلا أنني لا أشعر بضرورة قبولهم لي. .16
      لا يعجبني أن يتميز الآخرون علي في الأمور كلها. .26
      إنسان في داخله الخير.كل  .36
      أبذل الجهد كله للحصول على ما أبتغيه من أمور؛ ولا ينتابني القلق أبدا.ً .46
      لا شئ باعث على القلق في ذاته؛ فقط تفسيراتنا للأحداث هي التي تبعث فينا القلق أو تثبطه. .56
      ينتابني كثير من القلق حيال المستقبل وأحداثه. .66
      علي أن أفعل أشياء روتينية باعثة على الضجر والملل.من الصعب  .76
      أكره أن يتخذ الآخرون قراراتي بالنيابة عني. .86
      نحن عبيد ماضينا الشخصي. .96
      نادرا ًما يكون هناك حل مثالي لأية مشكلة. .17
      غالبا ًما ينتابني القلق حول مدى قبول الآخرين لي، واعترافهم بشخصي. .17
      أنزعج كثيرا ًمن ارتكاب الأخطاء. .27
      من الظلم أن ينزل الخير بالمحسن والمسئ سواء ًبسواء. .37
      أتساهل مع الحياة في الأمور كلها. .47
      يجب على الكثير من الناس أن يواجهوا فظاعات الحياة. .57
      أحيانا ًلا أستطيع التخلص من مخاوفي. .67
      تكون مجزية.حياة اليسر نادرا ًما  .77
      يسهل علي طلب النصح من الآخرين. .87
      ما أن تلم بك ملمة، فسوف تؤثر فيك مدى الحياة. .97
      من الأفضل البحث عن حلول عملية لمشكلات الحياة بدلا ًعن البحث عن حلول مثالية. .18
      ينتابني الكثير من القلق حيال الطرق التي يشعر بها الآخرون تجاهي. .18
      أغتاظ غالبا ًمن توافه الأمور. .28
      عادًة ما أعطي فرصة ثانية لمن أساء إلي. .38
      أبغض تحمل المسؤولية. .48
      لا يوجد سبب منطقي للبقاء في الحزن مدة طويلة. .58
      نادرا ًما أفكر في أشياء مثل الموت أو اندلاع حرب نووية. .68
      ما يتحدى قدراتهم من مشكلات يجب أن يتغلبوا عليها.يسعد الناس عندما يجدون في حياتهم  .78
      أكره أن أعيش عالًة على الآخرين. .88
      لا يتغير الناس من داخلهم دوما.ً .98
      أشعر وكأنه يجب علي أن أقوم بالأشياء على النحو الصحيح دوما.ً .19
      قد يضايقني النقد، ولكن لا يحزنني أبدا.ً .19
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      أفعل أشياء لا أجيدها.لا أخاف أن  .29
      ليس هناك إنسان شرير بالمرة، حتى وإن دلت أفعاله على الشر. .39
      نادرا ًما أشعر بالحزن على أخطاء الغير. .49
      الإنسان هو الذي يصنع من حياته جحيما.ً .59
      أجد نفسي غالبا ًما أخطط ما علي فعله في المواقف الخطيرة على اختلافها. .69
      إذا كان عليَّ فعل أمر ضروري، أقوم به وإن لم يكن محببا ًإلى نفسي. .79
      تعلمت ألا أتوقع من الآخرين أن يعنوا بتحقيق رفاهيتي وسعادتي الخاصة. .89
      لا أنظر إلى الماضي بعين الندم. .99
      لا يوجد شئ مثالي في الحياة. .111
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Appendix D 
 
Validity of Cognition (VoC) scale 
Is the cognition true or false?  
On a scale of 1-7, 1 is all the way false, up to 7, all the way true.  
Circle a number to show how true each statement feels right now, when you 
think about the event.  
1. It was my fault FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
2. I am helpless FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
3. I’ll never get over it FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
4. I’m a good person FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
5. I did my best FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
6. I’m okay now FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TRUE 
(VoC) scale from Shapiro, F. (1989). Efficacy of the eye movement desensitization procedure in the treatment 
of traumatic memories. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2, 199-223. 
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Appendix D (Sequel) 
 
The Subjective Units of Distress (SUD) Scale 
The subjective units of distress – or SUD – scale is a convenient way of communicating to 
other people how much distress you are experiencing at any given time. There are eleven 
points on the scale, ranging from zero (absolutely complete relaxation) up to ten 
(extreme distress). 
Rating 
Zero: Complete relaxation. Deep sleep, no distress at all. 
One: Awake but very relaxed; dosing off. Your mind wanders and drifts, similar to what 
you might feel just prior to falling asleep.  
Two: Relaxing at the beach, relaxing at home in front of a warm fire on a wintry day, or 
walking peacefully in the woods. 
Three: The amount of tension and stress needed to keep your attention from wandering, to 
keep your head erect, and so on. This tension and stress is not experienced as 
unpleasant; it is “normal.” 
Four: Mild distress such as mild feelings of bodily tension, mild worry, mild apprehension, 
mild fear, or mild anxiety. Somewhat unpleasant but easily tolerated. 
Five: Mild to moderate distress. Distinctly unpleasant but insufficient to produce many 
bodily symptoms. 
Six: Moderate distress. Very unpleasant feelings of fear, anxiety, anger, worry, 
apprehension, and/or substantial bodily tension such as a headache or upset stomach. 
Distinctly unpleasant but tolerable sensations; you’re still able to think clearly. What 
most people would describe as a “bad day,” but your ability to work, drive, converse, 
and so on is not impeded. 
Seven: Moderately high distress that makes concentration hard. Fairly intense bodily distress. 
Eight: High distress. High levels of fear, anxiety, worry, apprehension, and/or bodily 
tension. These feelings cannot be tolerated very long. Thinking and problem-solving 
is impaired. Bodily distress is substantial. Ability to work, drive, converse, and so on 
is difficult. 
Nine: High to extreme distress. Thinking is substantially impaired. 
Ten: Extreme distress, panic- and/or terror-stricken, extreme bodily tension. The maximum 
amount of fear, anxiety, and/or apprehension you can possibly imagine. 
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  د ملحق
  ةالعقلي المدركات صدق مقياس
 
 
 خاطئ؟ أم صحيح تعتقد ما هل
 أم صحيحة هي هل اللاعقلانية أفكارك عن المدركات صدق مدى حدد سباعي، ليكرت مقياس على
 خاطئة 1 حيث العقلية الفكرة صدق مدى عن ذهنيا   تدركه ما المقياس على 7ـ1 من اختر خاطئة؟
 الحدث عن بمدركاتك يتعلق فيما والخطأ الصحة بين الإدراك مستويات بينهما وما صحيحة 7و
 .القلق لك يسبب الذي
 
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ الخطأ خطأيي. .1
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ أشعر بالبؤس. .2
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ لن أتغلب على ما أمر به. .3
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ أنا شخص طيب. .4
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ سوف أبذل قصارى جهدي. .5
 صحيح 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 خطأ بي الآن!لا بأس  .6
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Appendix E 
1.1 Informed Consent 
1.1.1 Form A 
Introduction: 
This is a study exploring anxiety and irrational thinking in students diagnosed as having social anxiety 
and / or irrational thinking as determined by the KAU Psychological Counselling Centre.  
However, levels of anxiety/ irrational thinking/shyness can vary quite considerably; yet, 
this should not mean that those who are more anxious are suffering from an anxiety disorder 
unless otherwise determined by the documents of the KAU Psychological Counselling Centre. 
The purpose of the study is to determine whether rational-emotive behavioural therapy 
accompanied by restricted environmental stimulation therapy, with this latter involving reduced 
environmental stimulation, would decrease inaccurate thinking and social anxiety in participants. 
The Departments of Psychology of College of Arts and Humanities, KAU, and School of Social 
Sciences, Brunel University have approved the solicitation of participants to participate in this 
research.  
Description: 
The programme proposed for this study will involve 2- to 3-hour REST therapy group 
sessions. A participant will be expected to take about 30 minutes to complete one self-report 
measure of his beliefs and two measures of social anxiety, and to participate in a thought-listing 
procedure for the one week period prior to his REBT therapy sessions before or after his 
participation in all social situations in which he feels anxiety.  
Commitments Requiring Consent: 
I will be asked to list any and all thoughts, feelings and/or behaviours I have associated 
with the situation (or, if assessed beforehand, while waiting to interact).  
I will also be asked to rate these thoughts based on their accuracy. 
In the therapy sessions, I will be introduced to the main concepts of REST, and given the 
chance to put these concepts into practice in my daily life. This will include learning the ABC 
theory of how irrational beliefs about daily events can lead to emotional disturbance; assessing 
how my personal irrational beliefs are resulting in emotional discomfort or problems: setting 
therapeutic goals which are specific, realistic, achievable and measurable; making a commitment 
to invest the time and energy necessary to achieve these goals; and, with the support of the 
group, challenging my irrational beliefs and deciding on more appropriate and rational beliefs to 
substitute in their place.  
In between sessions, I will be given homework assignments designed to help me 
maintain my focus on, and work at changing, my irrational beliefs. Immediately following the 
last session, I will be asked to complete the self-report measure of my beliefs and two measures 
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of social anxiety as well as participate in the thought-listing procedure for a one-week period, 
and again one month later. I am free to terminate my participation in the study at any time 
without penalty to me. 
Potential benefits to this intervention include a reduction of my social anxiety.  
Although the extent of time I will be engaged in therapy will be limited to 2- to 3-hour 
sessions, I realise that whenever people engage in therapy, there may be unexpected 
consequences in their lives, and they may become aware of personal issues with which they are 
dissatisfied. A potential risk of this treatment is that I may become aware of such issues for 
myself, and I may make a decision to make changes in my life. 
I, or my next of kin, or legally authorised representative, have and will continue to have 
opportunities to ask questions and to seek further information about the procedures or the results 
of this study.  
Should the experimenters become aware of any new information that might affect my 
decision to participate in the study, they will inform me. I may choose to end my participation in 
the study at any time. 
Data obtained will be coded and maintained in a confidential file in the investigator's 
office. Confidentiality will be maintained.  
In any research reports, participants will be listed only by number code. 
Individual findings will be given to any person who agrees to participate in the study 
upon request. If during the course of the study, or subsequently, anyone wishes to discuss their 
participation in or concerns regarding the study, that person can contact Jahaz Al-Moteri via 
mobile phone (00966555558890) or leave electronic messages at his email 
(almoteri@hotmail.com). 
I am of normal health and have no history of any medical or mental condition that might 
preclude my participation in this study. The requirements have been explained to me and my 
questions have been answered. I understand I am free to ask additional questions and/or 
terminate the experiment at any time. 
I, the undersigned, have read the above consent form and agree to participate in this 
study. 
Name: ………………………………………….. 
 
Signed, ………………………………………… 
 
Date, …………………………………………… 
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1.2 Informed Consent 
1.2.1 Form B 
Introduction: 
This is a study exploring anxiety and irrational thinking in students diagnosed as having 
social anxiety and / or irrational thinking as diagnosed in the KAU Psychological Counselling 
Centre archives.  
Purpose and Description of the Experiment: 
Therefore, the purpose of the study is to determine whether reduced environmental 
stimulation (REST therapy) accompanying a REBT therapeutic intervention would decrease 
inaccurate thinking and social anxiety in participants. The Departments of Psychology of College 
of Arts and Humanities, KAU, and School of Social Sciences, Brunel University have approved 
the solicitation of participants to participate in this research Chamber Restricted Environmental 
Stimulation (REST) which involves lying on a bed in a sound attenuated chamber (3 metres x 1.7 
metres x 2.4 metres) for a period of 6 hours. 
Commitments Requiring Participant Consent: 
I will be asked to wear earplugs and blindfold goggles that resemble ski goggles. The 
chamber is equipped with a portable toilet which is situated so as to provide complete privacy. 
Low-level white noise will be used as a masking sound. I will be asked to remain on the bed and 
to minimise my movement during the session (except for toileting).  
I will be continuously monitored and I am free to terminate the session at any time. 
I will be asked to take about 30 minutes to complete one self-report measure of my 
beliefs and two measures of social anxiety, and to participate in a thought-listing procedure for 
the one week period prior to my REST session. Before or after my participation in all social 
situations in which I feel anxiety, I will be asked to list any and all thoughts, feelings and/or 
behaviours.  
I have associated with the situation (or, if assessed beforehand, while waiting to 
interact). I will also be asked to rate these thoughts based on their accuracy. 
 I will be given a full orientation to the chamber, information about the REST session and have 
the opportunity to ask questions. I will then be situated comfortably on the bed. Instructions 
reviewing the REST procedure will be read to me over the intercommunications system followed 
by relaxation instructions. Immediately following the session, I will be asked to complete the 
self-report measure of inaccurate thinking and two measures of social anxiety as well as 
participate in the thought-listing procedure for a one week period, and again one month later.  
I am of course free to terminate my participation in the study at any time without penalty to me. 
Potential benefits to this treatment include a reduction in my social anxiety. I also realise 
that, while over 1000 participants have engaged in REST in other laboratories or clinics around 
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the world with no lasting adverse effects, there is a possibility that I may find the experience 
stressful. Because of this, I will have the right to terminate the REST session at any time, and I 
will be continuously monitored for signs of stress. The monitor will terminate the session if signs 
of stress are evident, and there is counselling available to me, for any stress experienced, upon 
request. 
I, or my next of kin, or legally authorised representative, have and will continue to have 
opportunities to ask questions and to seek further information about the procedures or the results 
of this study. Should the experimenters become aware of any new information which might 
affect my decision to participate in the study, they will inform me. I may choose to end my 
participation in the study at any time. 
Data obtained will be coded and maintained in a confidential file in the investigator's 
office. Confidentiality will be maintained. In any research reports, participants will be listed only 
by number code.  
Individual findings will be given to any person who agrees to participate in the study 
upon request. If during the course of the study, or subsequently, anyone wishes to discuss their 
participation in or concerns regarding the study, that person can contact Jahaz Al-Moteri via 
mobile phone (00966555558890) or leave electronic messages at his email 
(almoteri@hotmail.com). 
I am of normal health and have no history of any medical or mental condition that might 
preclude my participation in this study. The requirements have been explained to me and my 
questions have been answered. I understand I am free to ask additional questions and/or 
terminate the experiment at any time. 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, have read the above consent form and agree to participate in this 
study. 
Name: ………………………………………….. 
Signed, ………………………………………… 
Date, …………………………………………… 
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1.3 Written Confirmation 
I, Jahaz Fahad Al-Moteri, herein confirm that the required procedural 
amendments requested with regard to the confidentiality of the experiment and 
intervention details and the revelation of findings of the study have been scrupulously 
traced; specifically, no mention will ever be made to disclose the identities of the 
participants in the experiment, specifically in the research report (here the Methodology 
and Results chapters), except that the participants' personal information are retained in 
the Counselling Psychology Centre's registers as part of formalities of seeking 
psychological counselling at this centre. But to this point, the Counselling Psychology 
Centre of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities’ Psychology Department has a staunchly 
adhered to privacy protocol that resists any leakage of information in this respect. I also 
confirm that it is permissible, upon request, for parents or next of kin, who signed the 
consent forms, to be informed about particular findings about their children’s responses 
to the intervention in my experiment. I also confirm that all pre-experiment and post-
experiment ethical considerations earlier raised have been meticulously followed under 
the close supervision of the Department of Psychology of the Faculty of Arts and 
Humanities, King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. 
Signed by 
Jahaz Fahad Ekab Al-Moteri 
PhD Researcher, Brunel University 
Dated this Wednesday, 15 July, 2009  
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Appendix F 
REBT/REST Programme 
PRELUDE  
 Counselling Psychologist performing psychological counselling using REBT gives 
an overview of the REBT model of psychotherapy. Then, he expounds the 
educational messages implied in REBT as in the Giving a Speech model explained 
below:  
Let me begin by inviting you to join me as a participant as I go over the ‘Giving a 
Speech Model’. This model gets to the heart of REBT’s view of psychological problems. 
There are four steps in this model: 
STEP 1 
 I want you to imagine that you have been asked by your professor or boss to give a 
speech to a group of faculty and students in your college or dignitaries visiting your 
workplace if you are working (the first half of which will be before their morning coffee 
break and the second half after it) and you hold the following belief about this event: 
 I want to give a good speech, but it isn’t absolutely necessary for me to do so. If I don’t 
give a good speech, it will be bad, but it wouldn’t be the end of the world. 
 How would you feel about the possibility of not giving a good speech while holding this 
belief? 
If you think about it, you would probably feel concerned about the possibility of not giving a 
good speech, but you wouldn’t feel unduly anxious about it. 
STEP 2 
 Now in this second step, I want you to imagine again that you have been asked by your 
boss to give a speech to a group of faculty and students in your college or a group of 
visiting dignitaries in your workplace (the first half of which will be before their morning 
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coffee break and the second half after it) and you hold the following different belief 
about this event: 
 I absolutely must give a good speech and it would be truly awful if I didn’t. 
How would you feel this time about the possibility of not giving a good speech while holding 
this belief? 
If you think about it, you would probably feel very anxious about the possibility 
of not giving a good speech. 
Now I want you to focus on one important point here: 
While facing the same event, your different feelings are determined by different 
beliefs. 
STEP 3 
In the third step of the model, I want you to imagine that you still believe that you 
absolutely have to give a good speech and it would be terrible if you didn’t. You give the 
first half of your speech and at the end of it, you conclude that it has gone down well. 
Now, how would you feel about that? You would probably feel relieved or pleased. 
STEP 4 
But, still believing that you have to give a good speech and it would be awful if 
you didn’t, you suddenly stop feeling relieved or pleased and become anxious again. 
What do you think you would be anxious about? 
That’s right! You would probably be anxious about the possibility that the second 
half of your speech wouldn’t be good. 
The POINT is that all humans, black or white, rich or poor, male or female, from 
whichever culture, make themselves emotionally disturbed when they don’t get what they 
demand they must get and are vulnerable to emotional disturbance when they do get 
what they demand because the situation may change and their demands may no longer 
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be met. However, if humans stayed with their preferences and didn’t change these into 
demands, then they would still experience negative feelings when their preferences 
weren’t met, but these negative feelings would be healthy and would motivate them to 
change what can be changed and adjust constructively what can’t be changed. 
Have you ever heard the famous dictum attributed to Epictetus, the Stoic 
philosopher: ‘People are disturbed not by things, but by their views of these things’?  
The REBT view of psychological problems is very nicely summarised by a 
reformulation of this dictum exactly as below: 
People are disturbed, not by things, but by their rigid and extreme views of 
things. 
In our Muslim tradition, we have something similar. Read the Qur’an (Surah 8, 
verses 43, 44 below: 
 َو ِررَْمْلأا يِرف ُْمتْعَزاَرَنَتلَو ُْمتْلرَِشَفل اًررِيثَك ُْمهَكاََرأ َْولَو ۖ ًلاِيَلق َكِمَانَم ِيف ُ َّاللَّ ُُمهَكيُِري ِْذإ ِتاَذِرب ذميِرلَع ُهرَِّنإ إ َمَّلرَس َ َّاللَّ َّنرِك ََٰل
( ِروُد ُّصلا43 )  
And remember) when Allâh showed them to you as few in your (i.e. 
Muhammad's peace be upon him) dream; if He had shown them to you as many, you 
would surely have been discouraged, and you would surely have disputed in making a 
decision. But Allâh saved (you). Certainly, He is the All-Knower of what is in the 
breasts. 
 ًررَْمأ ُ َّاللَّ َيرِهَْقِيل ْمِِهنُريَْعأ يِرف ْمرُُكلكَلُقيَو ًلايِرَلق ْمُِكنُريَْعأ يِرف ُْمتَْيَقتْلا ِِذإ ُْمهوُمُكيُِري ِْذإَو ُعرَجُْرت ِ َّاللَّ ىَرِلإَو إ ًلاورُعْفَم َنارَك ا
( ُروُُمْلأا44)  
And (remember) when you met (the army of the disbelievers on the Day of the 
battle of Badr), He showed them to you as few in your eyes and He made you appear 
as few in their eyes, so that Allâh might accomplish a matter already ordained (in His 
Knowledge), and to Allâh return all matters (for decision). 
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It is the same philosophy; it is our views in life, real or visionary, that determine 
our beliefs, rational or irrational, which in turn, affects our motivation, determination 
and action. Therefore, listen to the following educational messages implied in the REBT 
and assured in the counselling programme: 
Educational Message 
Day-by-day you will increasingly do what you enjoy doing rather than what other 
people think you ought to do in life. It would be nice if other people approved of what 
you do, but it is not necessary to your happiness for you to be loved and approved of by 
almost everyone for almost everything you do.  
You know what it is that makes you happy, that makes life enjoyable and this is 
what you should do.  
As each day passes, you will become increasingly competent as you try to better 
your own performance. Do things because they bring you pleasure and rewards, but give 
up the notion of trying to be thoroughly competent, adequate and achieving.  
Try to do rather than do perfectly. Accept failures as undesirable but not dreadful. 
You are a worthwhile, valuable person because you exist as a human being, not because 
of how well you do something. You are worthwhile in yourself, quite apart from your 
performance. 
Day-by-day you will find it easier and easier to accept that you are a fallible 
human being and therefore likely to make mistakes. You will be able to learn from your 
mistakes and be increasingly successful as a result. Because you can accept that, as a 
human being, you are fallible, you will find it completely unnecessary to blame yourself 
for anything, for self-blame is completely unhelpful and destructive. 
When conditions are not as you would like them to be you will be able, wherever 
possible, to change them for the better. When, for the moment, things cannot be changed, 
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you will be able to accept them calmly, realizing that anger and frustration would be 
making you miserable for nothing. It would be nice if things were going the way you 
want, but if they are not, it is not terrible, horrible, or catastrophic. You will be able to 
accept the situation and determinedly work to improve it. 
Day-by-day, you will become more and more successful in feeding positive, 
happy thoughts into your mind. You will accept more and more strongly that you are 
responsible for your emotions, that you decide whether you will be happy or miserable. 
It is not external events that make you happy or sad, but the attitude you take to these 
events. Your misery is caused by your irrational thinking and the negative sentences you 
speak to yourself. 
Gradually you will find less and less need to worry about future problems and 
danger, many of which are quite imaginary. You will be able to determine the real 
dangers about the things you fear, and see what the probabilities are of their actually 
occurring. Most of the things we worry about never happen so we make ourselves 
miserable for nothing. Day-by-day, you will find yourself becoming more and more 
successful in overcoming such pointless worry. 
As each day passes, you will become increasingly able to face up to the 
difficulties and responsibilities of life. You will be able to determine for yourself what 
the truly necessary activities of life are, and no matter how unpleasant they may be, you 
will be able to perform them unrebelliously and promptly.  
As you do so, you will feel an ever-growing sense of happiness and 
accomplishment. 
With every passing day, the irrationalities of the past will influence your life less 
and less. You will reject more and more strongly the idea that the past is all important 
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and you will realise very powerfully that, just because something once strongly affected 
you, there is no reason why it should continue to do so indefinitely. 
You are a different person now from the one you were in the past and you can 
now successfully cope with things which may have previously upset you. 
With ever increasing frequency, you will be able to accept people and things as 
they are, seeing that compromise and reasonable solutions are necessary. You will be 
able to give up the notion that it is catastrophic if perfect solutions to life's problems are 
not found. 
As each day passes, you will find yourself making definite attempts to become 
vitally absorbed in some persons or things outside yourself. To make our lives happy and 
fulfilling we need a purpose, and you will be able to find such a purpose for yourself. 
 
REBT THERAPY GROUP OUTLINE 
The REBT therapy group will meet for ten 3-hour sessions approximately five 
times a week. These sessions follow the initial session of the prelude where concepts of 
REBT are presented and expounded to participants, which will be primarily educational, 
and the coming sessions will primarily involve topics developing a problem framework 
and setting goals, choosing a target problem and assessing a specific example, 
questioning beliefs, dealing with doubts, taking action, etc. In addition, each session will 
involve discussion of the results of homework assignments and supportive therapy for 
maintaining and improving progress made in the homework assignments. 
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SESSION 1: Learn how to relax! 
1. Think of the situations in which you experience social problems, e.g. speaking in 
public. 
2. Identify the theme of the problem, what it is about the situations that you specified 
that is a problem for you. You may have already expressed the theme of the 
problem in step 1, e.g. acting foolishly. 
3. Identify the one major unhealthy emotion from the list below that you experience 
when you encounter the situations or themes specified above, you may experience 
several unhealthy emotions, but select the main one, e.g. anxiety: 
Anxiety         Hurt 
Depression       Unhealthy anger 
Guilt           Unhealthy jealousy 
Shame          Unhealthy envy 
4. Identify the relevant behaviour that is related to the problem, e.g. ‘to cope with my 
anxiety, I over-prepare my material’. 
The NEXT stage is to put all the elements together in a sentence. Let me show you how to 
do this by first placing each element under its relevant heading: 
Type of situation 
 
Theme Unhealthy Negative 
Emotion 
Behaviour 
When I have to 
speak in public 
I think I might act 
foolishly 
I feel anxious To cope with my 
social anxiety, 
I over prepare 
my material. 
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Now, here is the sentence: 
When I have to speak in public, and think I might act foolishly, I feel anxious and cope 
with my social anxiety by over preparing my material. 
This then constitutes your problem. 
Now use the template in the handout (shown projected via data show) to develop your own 
list of problems: 
Figure 1. Problem List 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5. 
 
Once you have developed your problem list, the next step is for you to set 
realistic goals with respect to each of your problems. This involves the following steps: 
1. Keep the type of the situation in which you disturb yourself the same. After all, 
it is possible that you may well encounter such situations in the future. 
2. Keep the theme about which you disturbed yourself the same. Again, it is 
possible that you may well encounter situations in which the theme reflects 
reality. You will have the opportunity later to consider whether or not the theme 
is an accurate representation of reality. 
3. Change your unhealthy negative emotion to a healthy negative emotion. This 
step is important in that it helps you to deal with negative situations in a healthy, 
but realistic way. 
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4. Change your unconstructive behaviour to constructive behaviour. Again, this 
step is important in that it helps you to act constructively in the face of negative 
situations. 
Let me exemplify this goal-setting process by returning to the example problem defined 
before, i.e., giving a public speech. Let me first give the problem in sentence format: 
When I have to speak in public, and think I might act foolishly, I feel anxious and cope 
with my social anxiety by over preparing my material. 
Now let me present this problem element by element under the appropriate heading: 
Type of situation Theme Unhealthy Negative 
Emotion 
Behaviour 
When I have to 
speak in 
public 
I think I might act 
foolishly 
I feel anxious To cope with my social 
anxiety, I over prepare 
my material. 
 
If you follow the four guidelines outlined above, you will note that in specifying your 
goal, the first two elements are the same as in the defined problem: 
Type of situation Theme 
When I have to speak in public I think I might act foolishly 
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So all we have to do is to set goals with respect to emotion and behaviour. Let’s do this 
one step at a time. First let’s consider the emotional goal: 
Type of situation 
 
Theme Healthy Negative Emotion 
When I have to speak in 
public 
I think I might act 
foolishly 
I want to feel concerned  
rather than feel anxious 
Here the person has correctly realised that the healthy emotional alternative to 
anxiety is concern. Anyone of you may have now changed the negative emotion of 
anxiety to that healthy emotion of concern. Now let’s move on to the behavioural goal: 
 
Type of situation       
 
Theme 
Healthy Negative 
Emotion 
Behaviour 
When I have to 
speak in 
public 
I think I might act 
foolishly 
I want to feel concerned 
rather than feel 
anxious 
I want to prepare 
normally rather than 
over prepare my 
material 
 
Again note that your goal is to prepare normally rather than over prepare your 
material. 
Now use the format below to develop your goals vis-à-vis each of your problems: 
List the goals and rate the progress you are making towards them. Do this by choosing a 
number between 0 and 10, where 0 represents no progress and 10 presents 100% 
progress, and record the date: 
1.        
2.       
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3.       
4.       
5.       
6.       
 
SESSION 2: How Unhealthy Negative Emotions Crp Up! 
Proceedings of the previous session are summarised as an introduction to the 
present session. We have learned how to identify a specific problem, or the target 
problem for which REBT will be applied. When you have selected a specific example of 
your target problem, use the following Dryden REBT Form below to assess the target 
problem. This form can be used to assess your social anxiety problem or related 
problems by assessing the episodes of emotional disturbance that you are experiencing: 
Dryden REBT Form (DRF-2) 
1. Situation: briefly describe a specific situation in which you disturbed yourself. 
2. C (Consequence): identify your major unhealthy negative emotion in this 
episode: anxiety, depression, shame, guilt, hurt, unhealthy anger; unhealthy 
jealousy and unhealthy envy. Also specify how you acted or felt like acting in 
this situation. 
I) Emotional consequences 
ii) Behavioural consequences 
3. Critical A (Activating event): identify the aspect of the situation that you were 
most disturbed about at C 
4. B (Beliefs): identify your irrational beliefs about A and list their rational 
alternatives 
i) Demand                           i) Full preference                           
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ii) Awfulizing belief                  ii) Anti-awfulizing belief 
iii) Low frustration tolerance belief  iii) High frustration tolerance belief 
iv) Depreciation belief            iv) Acceptance belief 
 
 
Step 1: Describe the situation 
The first step in assessing your target problem for an episode of emotional 
disturbance is to describe the situation in which you feel disturbed. 
An example situation is like this: 
Whenever I am in the company of authorities, I think that they will criticise me 
and I become anxious. When this happens, I try to find an excuse to withdraw from the 
situation. 
 
1. Situation: briefly describe a specific situation in which you disturbed yourself 
E.g. I received a memo to see the academic advisor just before the exams. 
 
 
Step 2: Identify C – emotional and behavioural responses 
 The most common way that you are likely to know that you are experiencing a 
psychological problem is by the way that you feel and the way that you behave. 
Consequently, after you have described the situation in which you experienced the 
problem, the next step is to identify how you felt and/or acted or felt like acting in that 
situation: 
5.  C (Consequence): identify your major unhealthy negative emotion in this 
episode: anxiety, depression, shame, guilt, hurt, unhealthy anger; unhealthy 
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jealousy and unhealthy envy. Also specify how you acted or felt like acting in 
this situation. 
I) Emotional consequences 
ii) Behavioural consequences 
 
Identify your major unhealthy negative emotion in this episode: 
If you go back to the target problem, you will see that it contains an unhealthy 
negative emotion. Thus, this unhealthy negative emotion should also be the major 
unhealthy negative emotion that you experienced in the specific example of your target 
problem. 
Unhealthy negative emotion Healthy negative emotion 
Anxiety Concern 
Depression Sadness 
Guilt Remorse 
Shame Disappointment 
Hurt Sorrow 
Unhealthy anger Healthy anger 
Unhealthy jealousy Healthy jealousy 
Unhealthy envy Healthy envy 
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Identify major inference themes associated with your major unhealthy negative emotion 
Emotion Inferential themes 
Anxiety Threat, danger 
Depression Loss, loss of value, failure 
Guilt Public disclosure of weakness, falling very short of one’s 
ideal 
Shame Moral violation (sin of commission and omission), hurting 
others 
Hurt Others treat you badly (and you consider that you don’t 
deserve such treatment) 
Unhealthy anger Frustrated, transgressed against 
Unhealthy jealousy Threat to present relationship passed by another person 
Unhealthy envy Others experience the good fortune, which you lack and 
covet 
 
Identify the major action or tendency associated with your major unhealthy negative 
emotion. 
Identify the way you thought after you began to experience your major unhealthy 
negative emotion. 
Specify how you acted or felt like acting in this situation 
Step 3: identify the critical A 
So far, you have done the following: 
1. You have chosen a specific example of your target problem or selected an episode in 
which you disturbed yourself. 
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2. You have pinpointed your major unhealthy negative emotion and how you acted or 
felt like acting in the situation in question (these are known as emotional and 
behavioural consequences and occur at C in the ABC framework employed in REBT). 
Your next step is to identify the aspect of the situation that you were most disturbed about at 
C. This is called the ‘Critical A’ in REBT. ‘A’ stands for activating events. Only one of 
these events is a critical event. 
3.Critical A (Activating event): identify the aspect of the situation that you were most 
disturbed about at C 
 
e.g. Whenever I am in the company of authorities, I think that they will criticise me and I 
become anxious. When this happens, I try to find an excuse to withdraw from the 
situation. 
 Step 4: identify your irrational beliefs about your critical A and their rational 
alternatives 
Identify your irrational beliefs: 
B (Beliefs): identify your irrational beliefs about A and list their rational alternatives 
i) Demand                           i) Full preference                           
ii) Awfulizing belief                  ii) Anti-awfulizing belief 
iii) Low frustration tolerance belief  iii) High frustration tolerance belief 
iv) Depreciation belief            iv) Acceptance belief 
 
 
Identify your irrational beliefs about A. 
 Is it the end of the world that …… 
 Is it horrible that …… 
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Identify the rational alternatives to your irrational beliefs: 
Session 4: Select your composite unhealthy and healthy beliefs 
In step 4 of the DRF-2, I showed you how to identify the four irrational beliefs 
underpinning your emotional and behavioural responses to the critical A, and their 
irrational alternatives. In step 5, you are asked to condense these irrational beliefs into a 
composite, unhealthy belief by selecting the demand and one of the following irrational 
beliefs (awfulizing belief, LFT belief or depreciation belief) that best captured what you 
believed when you disturbed yourself in the situation of question. 
 
6. Select your demand and the one other irrational belief (from the remaining 
three) that was at the core of your emotional and / or behavioural reaction to 
A. Also select your full preference and the appropriate rational belief and 
write down both sets of beliefs which you can refer to as unhealthy and 
healthy beliefs respectively side by side in the space below: 
Demand and irrational belief     Full preference and rational belief 
(Unhealthy belief)             (Healthy belief) 
 
 
Step 6: set your emotional and behavioural goals 
The next step is for you to set your emotional and behavioural goals for the 
specific example under consideration. 
1. Ask yourself what would be a healthy emotional and behavioural response to the 
critical activating event at A. 
2. Choose responses which are both healthy and realistic and to which you can commit 
yourself. 
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3. Consult what you wrote in step 2. Select an emotional goal that is the healthy negative 
emotion that you listed in step 2. 
4. As before, only select one healthy negative emotion. 
5. Then choose a healthy behavioural goal, one that is constructive alternative to the 
behavioural consequence that you listed in step 2. 
6. Remember that this can be either an overt behaviour or an urge to act – a tendency to 
act in a specific way. 
List your emotional and behavioural goals in the form below: 
7. Emotional and behavioural goals: identify what you would have preferred 
your healthy negative emotion to have been if you had responded 
constructively to A. Choose your negative unhealthy emotion and specify how 
you would have preferred to have acted or felt like acting towards it: 
i. Emotional Goal 
ii. Behavioural Goal 
 
Step 7: list your belief goal 
This next step is for you to choose the belief (unhealthy or healthy) that you 
listed in step 5 which you consider will best help you to achieve the emotional and 
behavioural goals that you outlined in step 6. 
8. Belief Goal: which belief listed in step 5 would help you to achieve your 
emotional and behavioural goals listed above: 
Session 7: Questioning your (un)healthy, (ir)rational beliefs 
Questioning your healthy, rational beliefs and your unhealthy irrational beliefs is 
at the core of REBT. 
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I am going to show you in this session how you can question both your healthy, 
rational beliefs and your unhealthy irrational beliefs. By this point, you should ideally 
understand what both sets of beliefs are, but if you would like to refresh your memory on 
this point, try to understand why your unhealthy beliefs are unhealthy and why your 
healthy beliefs are healthy. To do this, you need to ask yourself the following questions: 
1. is it true or false? 
2. is it logical or illogical? 
3. is it helpful or unhelpful? 
8.List persuasive arguments that would help you to strengthen your conviction in the 
belief you listed in step 7 in the previous session and weaken your conviction in 
the other belief: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
 
 Developing this list, it is possible to create a grid where you can review the 
arguments that you employed in step 8 of the DRF-2 and plot which argument you 
employed with which belief. A blank grid is charted below as an example: 
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 Is it 
true/false? 
Is it 
logical/illogical? 
Is it 
helpful/unhelpful? 
Unhealthy belief (demand + 
irrational belief) 
   
Healthy belief (full preference 
+ rational belief) 
   
Demand    
Full preference    
Awfulizing belief    
Antif-awfulizing belief    
Low frustration tolerance belief    
High frustration tolerance belief    
Self-depreciation belief    
Self-acceptance belief    
 
Once you have digested these points, continue working on your specific target 
problem by completing the grid above. As you do so, do not rely too much on the 
arguments used by your peers. Use your own words in constructing your arguments. 
After you have done this, you are ready to move on to the next session.
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Session 8: Dealing with your doubts, suspicions, reservations and objections: the 
ABCDE Model 
 In the previous session, you learned how to question your beliefs and, in particular, to 
generate persuasive arguments to help you to strengthen your conviction in your healthy 
beliefs and to weaken your conviction in your unhealthy beliefs. 
 Although you may have done so successfully, you may still harbour some doubts, 
reservations, suspicions or objections that may prevent you from moving on. These 
doubts, reservations, suspicions or objections centre on the following: 
1. doubts, reservations, suspicions or objections to adopting your healthy belief and/or 
giving your unhealthy belief up; 
2. doubts, reservations, suspicions or objections to adopting your unhealthy negative 
emotion and/or giving up your unhealthy negative emotion; 
3. doubts, reservations, suspicions or objections to adopting your constructive 
behavioural goal and/or giving up your unconstructive behaviour. 
Unless you identify and deal constructively with any doubts, reservations, suspicions 
or objections to adopting your healthy belief and/or giving up your unhealthy belief, 
emotion or behaviour, then you may stop yourself overcoming your psychological 
problems.  
Dealing with doubts, reservations and objections to adopting your healthy belief and / 
or giving up your unhealthy belief: 
Consider the two major doubts, reservations and objections to adopting your healthy 
belief and/or giving up your unhealthy belief and adapt to your own situation: 
oubts, reservations and objections to adopting a full preference and giving up a 
demand: 
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Doubt 1: My demand motivates me to achieve what I want while the full preference 
doesn’t. Therefore, if I give up my demand in favour of my full preference, I’ll lose the 
motivation to do what is important to me. 
Response: If this were true, then I can understand why you would be reluctant to give 
up your demand and work towards gaining conviction in your full preference. 
However, your contention is not the case. Let me put it this way: your demand 
comprises a partial preference component (e.g. I want to do well in my upcoming test), 
and a demand component (and therefore, I must do so). Now the partial preference 
component provides you with healthy motivation in that it leads you to focus on and 
execute all the tasks necessary to fulfil your desire (e.g. organizing your study materials, 
revising these materials and testing yourself to determine your grasp of what you are to 
be tested on). The demand component, on the other hand, will either provide you with 
unhealthy motivation, sidetrack you, or lead you to freeze. 
Let me consider these effects one at a time. First, your demand will provide you with 
unhealthy motivation. Since you believe that you absolutely have to pass the test, you 
will devote all your energies to studying and neglect other important activities like sleep, 
rest and recreation that will actually help you to get the most out of your studies. 
You will likely end up too exhausted to concentrate properly and forget much of 
what you learned on the day of the test. 
Second, the demand component will sidetrack you from carrying out effective study 
and revision strategies, and will lead you to concentrate on what psychologists call task-
irrelevant thoughts. 
Thus, you may become overly concerned with the likelihood of failure, exaggerate 
the consequences of failure, and think that the responses of other people to your failure 
will be highly negative. 
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I hope that you can see that those thoughts are hardly conducive to effective study 
and test-taking behaviour. Finally, the demand component may lead you to become so 
preoccupied with failing the test that you may freeze and stop revising for the test 
altogether. 
By contrast, your full preference comprises a partial preference component (e.g. I 
want to do well in my upcoming test) and a negation of the demand component (e.g. but 
I don’t absolutely have to do so). Now, as before, the partial preference component 
provides you with healthy motivation in that it leads you to focus and execute all the 
tasks that you need to do to actualise your desire. 
The negation of the demand component (a) ensures that you don’t get obsessed with 
your desire to pass the test; (b) keeps you focused on the task by encouraging task-
relevant thinking, and (c) prevents freezing. 
Doubts, reservations, and objections to adopting an anti-awfulizing belief and to giving up an awfulizing belief: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to adopting a HFT belief and to giving up a low frustration tolerance 
belief: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to adopting an acceptance belief and to giving up a depreciation belief: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to adopting your healthy negative emotion and/or giving up your unhealthy 
negative emotion: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling concern and to stopping feeling anxious: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling sad and to stopping feeling depressed: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling disappointed and to stopping feeling ashamed: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling remorse and to stopping feeling guilt: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling sorrow and to stopping feeling hurt: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling healthy anger and to stopping feeling unhealthy anger: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling healthy jealousy and to stopping feeling unhealthy jealousy: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to feeling healthy envy and to stopping feeling unhealthy envy: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to adopting constructive behaviour and/or giving up unconstructive 
behaviour: 
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Doubts, reservations and objections to taking action to solve your psychological problems and to giving up 
procrastinating: 
Doubts, reservations and objections to asserting yourself and to giving up staying quiet. 
 Session 9: A.B.C.D.E. Model: Taking Action 
 You learned in the previous session how to bring out your doubts, reservations and 
objections.  
Now, you are in a position to take one of the most important steps of all in 
addressing your specific psychological problem – that of social anxiety, and its target 
specific related problems – i.e., taking action. The name of the approach to therapy in 
this programme is REBT – short for Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy. The word 
‘rational’ points to the fact that thinking is very important in your problems and that 
thinking rationally is a crucial component in psychological health. The word ‘emotive’ 
points to the fact that you are an emotional being and that disturbed feelings have most 
likely led you to seek help. Finally, the word ‘behaviour’ points to the fact that change 
very often does not take root unless you act in healthy ways. 
Taking action, then, is very important in the change process. At this point, you 
have gained some experience in examining your unhealthy beliefs and their healthy 
alternatives, and you have generated arguments against the former and in support of the 
latter as discussed in the previous session. 
You have also had the opportunity to identify and respond to your doubts, 
reservations and objections to moving forward with your healthy beliefs, emotions and 
behaviour, and to leaving behind your unhealthy equivalents. 
The next stage is planning to take action. This action in particular is thought to 
strengthen your conviction in developing your healthy beliefs and weakening your 
entrenched beliefs. 
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In this session, the most important of this programme, you are going to take 
assignments – specific behavioural homework assignments that are designed to help you 
act in ways that are consistent with your healthy beliefs and inconsistent with your 
unhealthy beliefs. 
Guidelines for designing and executing behavioural assignments 
The REBT therapist explains in detail the following guidelines (in Dryden 2001): 
1. Plan to face the critical A 
2. Avoid safety-seeking strategies 
3. Take appropriate risks in facing the critical A 
4. Review your healthy beliefs at appropriate points 
5. Review your healthy beliefs in different ways 
6. Use imagery to rehearse taking action 
7. Use role-play to rehearse taking action 
8. Identify and overcome blocks to taking action 
 Capitalise on change by branching out into related areas 
i. Capitalise on your gains I: same theme, similar context, different people: one 
way of capitalizing on your gains at this phase is by extending your practice 
into similar contexts or situations where different people are involved. 
ii. Capitalise on your gains II: variation on theme, similar context, different 
people: If you were anxious about being criticised about your appearance in 
public, you could review a slightly modified version of your previous healthy 
beliefs; e.g. I am not inadequate if some people don’t like the way I look or 
talk. I am the same fallible person as any other human being whether they like 
my appearance or not. 
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iii. Capitalise on your gains III: variation on theme, different context, different 
people: Similarly, if you have a problem of being anxious about being 
criticised when appearing in public, you can again review a modified version 
of your healthy beliefs and act accordingly; e.g. I can accept myself even if 
other people criticise me about my behaviour. I don’t have to have their 
approval, saying this at home better aloud – i.e. speaking up rather than 
remaining silent and thus not taking a risk. 
 
10. List homework assignments that you can do to strengthen your conviction in 
your healthy beliefs. Be specific concerning what you will do for homework, 
when you will do it, and where you will do it. The best homework 
assignments enable you to rehearse your healthy beliefs while acting in ways 
that are consistent with them: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
 
Session 10: Dealing with your core unhealthy beliefs 
 Up till now, I have mainly concentrated on helping you to identify and challenge your 
specific unhealthy beliefs as they become manifest in specific situations where your 
social anxiety is at work and you disturb yourself in some way. 
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In this session, I will show you how to identify and deal with your core unhealthy beliefs. A 
core unhealthy belief (CUB) is a general unhealthy belief that is at the seat of your social 
anxiety. It has the following features: 
1. it is general in nature; 
2. it relates to a psychological theme such as approval/disapproval; 
3. it spans situations relating to a psychological theme such as rejection by 
the others; 
4. it involves people; it relates to one person, but may also relate to a number 
of people; 
5. it affects the way you feel, how you behave and how you subsequently 
think; 
6. it has far more dysfunctional than functional consequences; 
7. it comprises a demand and at least one of the following: an awfulizing 
belief, a low frustration tolerance belief and a depreciation belief; 
8. it leads you to infer the presence of the relevant theme in the absence of 
corroborative evidence such as the belief that you have been rejected while 
it is not clear that you have been. 
Identifying your core unhealthy beliefs 
Identify disturbance-related themes 
Follow these steps: 
1. Ask yourself what you largely disturb yourself about from the following list of 
psychological themes: 
Being rejected                 losing status 
Failing                       acting poorly or foolishly in public 
Falling short of your ideals       being frustrated 
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Breaking your moral code        discomfort 
Hurting other people’s feelings    emotional pain 
Poor performance               loss 
Being criticised                injustice to oneself 
Being disapproved of            injustice to others 
Not being loved                being betrayed or let down by others 
 
2. Identify the contexts in which you experience problems related to the identified 
theme and / or relevant people involved. 
3. Add the demand and at least one other unhealthy belief from the following list: 
- anti-awfulizing belief; 
- LFT belief; 
- Depreciation belief 
e.g. I must not be criticised by authority figures at work or at college and I am 
incompetent person if I am criticised by such people. 
Monitoring your preoccupations 
Considering what you avoid in life 
Identifying your nightmare scenarios 
Listing your core unhealthy beliefs, their core healthy alternatives and the effects of 
each 
Using the Dryden Core Belief Form (DCBF) 
The Dryden Core Belief Form (DCBF) 
1. List your core unhealthy belief in a demand form and one of the following 
irrational beliefs: awfulizing belief; low frustration tolerance belief or 
depreciation belief. Then list next to it your alternative core healthy beliefs 
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in the form of a full preference and one of the following rational beliefs: 
antiawfulizing beliefs; HFT beliefs or acceptance beliefs: 
 
Core Unhealthy Beliefs (CUB)       Core Healthy Beliefs (CHB) 
 
3. Select the core belief that you wish to strengthen 
4. Explain why you wish to strengthen it: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
5. List persuasive arguments that would help you to strengthen your conviction in 
your chosen core belief and weaken your conviction in the other core belief: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
vii. 
ix. 
5. List any doubts, reservations or objections you have about adopting your 
selected core belief or giving up the other core belief. Then respond to 
each doubt, reservation or objection: 
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a) Doubt, reservation, objection 
Response 
b) Doubt, reservation, objection 
Response 
c) Doubt, reservation, objection 
Response 
d) Doubt, reservation, objection 
Response 
e) Doubt, reservation, objection 
Response 
6. List homework assignments that you can do to strengthen your conviction in 
your selected core beliefs and weaken your conviction in your other core 
belief. Choose assignments where you act and think in ways that are 
consistent with your selected core belief and inconsistent with your other core 
belief: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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REST THERAPY GROUP OUTLINE 
The REST therapy group will meet for two 3-hour sessions approximately one 
week apart. The initial session will be primarily educational, and the second session 
primarily involved discussion of the results of homework assignments and supportive 
therapy for maintaining and improving progress made in the homework assignments.  
SESSION 1 
Introduce members to the group and explain the group process: educational 
presentations, sharing of personal issues, in-group exercises, homework assignments and 
the issue of confidentiality. 
Introduce the general principle of emotional responsibility by using diagrams to 
show members that it is their beliefs about negative events in their lives that are largely 
responsible for their feelings of anxiety. Encourage recognition among members that 
people can effect change in their psychological problems by using a general argument 
that change is possible. This includes examples of people overcoming alcoholism and/or 
addictions to drugs, and comparing how easy members imagine this to be compared to 
changing their anxiety. 
Introduce the specific principle of emotional responsibility utilizing the ABC 
theory of REST and referring to the inaccurate thoughts log they had kept for the week 
prior to the session. Explain how their inaccurate thoughts are examples of their 
irrational beliefs about their anxiety, and that they can detect their irrational beliefs by 
using the same method. Explain that members need to distinguish them from their 
rational beliefs so that they can dispute them effectively. This involves explaining the 
difference between: absolute and non-absolute shoulds; unconditional and conditional 
musts; events being awful and very bad; unconditional and conditional self-acceptance; 
and help members specify their full rational belief. 
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Help members set appropriate individual goals by creating a problem list with 
respect to their anxiety, then defining their goals for specific problems within an ABC 
format. Guidelines for appropriate goals included: (a) being within members' control; (b) 
stated positively; (c) observable; (d) achievable; (e) health-promoting; and (f) ethical and 
legal. 
Elicit a commitment to change utilizing a cost-benefit analysis of their anxiety 
and their goal. This analysis covered the following points: (a) there is an alternative to 
members' problem with anxiety; (b) the problem and goal both have actual and perceived 
advantages and disadvantages; (c) these advantages/disadvantages operate both in the 
short and long term; and d) these advantages/disadvantages are relevant for both 
members and others in their lives. Members listed the short and long term advantages 
and disadvantages for both their problem as well as ifs alternative, for both themselves 
and other people. 
Explain the need to dispute irrational beliefs to change them, and describe how 
this can be done by subjecting their beliefs to the four criteria for rationality: a) are they 
flexible? b) are they realistic or consistent with reality? c) are they logical? and d) do 
they help or hinder the pursuit of the members' stated goals? 
Explain the need to internalise new rational beliefs by employing cognitive, 
behavioural and emotive methods of change. This included the following points: (a) the 
effectiveness of combining behavioural methods with cognitive methods; (b) the 
importance of emotive force in the change process; (c) emotional change often lingers 
behind behavioural and cognitive change; and (d) therapeutic progress is uneven and 
lapses and relapses are normal. 
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Negotiate homework assignments with members by explaining their importance 
and encouraging member input on what they feel would be appropriate assignments for 
them. Homework included cognitive, imagery, behavioural and/or emotive assignments. 
At the end of Session 1, the recorded educational REBT message will be played 
for members as an example of rational beliefs. 
SESSION 2 
Review information covered in Session 1; check for and correct any 
misunderstandings. The recorded educational REBT message will again be played for 
members. 
Review cost-benefit analyses to help emphasise members' commitment to 
changing their irrational beliefs. Review homework assignments, inducting: (a) what 
members learned from doing the assignments; (b) what problems they experienced doing 
the assignments; and (c) what changes are needed for them to carry out their 
assignments. This involves 1.2.3.-step process for encouraging other members to give 
feedback, support and ideas for making positive changes in future assignments. 
Close Session 2 by encouraging members to continue working on their goals and 
homework assignments. 
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Appendix G 
TABLES 26–36 – CHAPTER 3 
 
Table 26: Reliability assessment of the Irrational Beliefs Test using Alpha Co-efficient 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted             
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA1 306.1 557.1563 -0.1139 0.7737 
QA2 303.674 545.0178 0.1371 0.7697 
QA3 305.618 557.4149 -0.1064 0.7743 
QA4 305.1 538.3948 0.2563 0.7669 
QA5 304.338 549.0378 0.0706 0.7711 
QA6 305.67 542.0532 0.2088 0.7681 
QA7 304.65 535.9875 0.2775 0.7662 
QA8 303.662 542.6491 0.1995 0.7683 
QA9 304.226 548.2835 0.052 0.7723 
QA10 303.448 547.9031 0.1071 0.7703 
QA11 304.95 544.8612 0.1035 0.7709 
QA12 304.53 547.6644 0.0883 0.7708 
QA13 304.162 543.4947 0.1445 0.7696 
QA14 304.506 548.6433 0.0555 0.7719 
QA15 304.822 545.0685 0.1404 0.7696 
QA16 304.092 538.1759 0.258 0.7668 
QA17 304.23 545.0953 0.1116 0.7705 
QA18 305.524 545.6888 0.1221 0.7701 
QA19 304.934 538.7992 0.2028 0.768 
QA20 305.98 546.0758 0.1251 0.77 
QA21 303.368 547.9966 0.0997 0.7704 
QA22 303.766 550.6245 0.0408 0.7717 
QA23 304.688 545.9946 0.0928 0.7711 
QA24 305.052 556.5905 -0.0745 0.7763 
QA25 304.192 550.3278 0.0346 0.7722 
QA26 305.35 552.5887 -0.0061 0.7731 
QA27 305.316 543.948 0.1545 0.7693 
QA28 303.614 542.1012 0.2308 0.7678 
QA29 305.276 554.6852 -0.0448 0.7739 
QA30 305.086 538.4675 0.2338 0.7673 
QA31 303.988 547.054 0.0999 0.7706 
QA32 303.186 544.9934 0.2017 0.7686 
QA33 303.58 547.7631 0.1084 0.7703 
QA34 304.078 537.1743 0.3476 0.7655 
QA35 304.226 545.9548 0.1114 0.7704 
QA36 304.594 559.9451 -0.1347 0.7766 
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Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted             
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA37 304.83 538.5262 0.259 0.7669 
QA38 305.214 541.6475 0.1844 0.7686 
QA39 304.902 537.6838 0.2984 0.7661 
QA40 304.542 551.5794 0.0188 0.7722 
QA41 305.194 541.3871 0.1779 0.7687 
QA42 303.548 544.2482 0.1932 0.7686 
QA43 304.776 548.3786 0.0834 0.7708 
QA44 304.708 543.7021 0.1742 0.7689 
QA45 305.054 548.3798 0.0786 0.771 
QA46 304.78 545.4224 0.1368 0.7697 
QA47 303.928 548.5519 0.0718 0.7712 
QA48 304.378 544.2476 0.1794 0.7688 
QA49 304.116 539.9304 0.2459 0.7673 
QA50 305.27 546.1775 0.1142 0.7703 
QA51 305.17 549.929 0.0412 0.772 
QA52 304.438 536.5913 0.314 0.7657 
QA53 303.796 543.7739 0.1776 0.7688 
QA54 305.16 557.4533 -0.0969 0.775 
QA55 304.76 539.6737 0.2235 0.7676 
QA56 304.78 546.204 0.1051 0.7705 
QA57 304.896 551.4561 0.0126 0.7728 
QA58 305.376 540.1149 0.2276 0.7676 
QA59 304.846 546.6275 0.1186 0.7701 
QA60 304.832 534.136 0.295 0.7656 
QA61 304.95 543.3101 0.1453 0.7696 
QA62 304.702 538.1295 0.2543 0.7669 
QA63 304.282 540.3392 0.2264 0.7676 
QA64 304.492 532.7635 0.3596 0.7643 
QA65 304.7 532.9679 0.3831 0.7641 
QA66 304.454 532.7895 0.3568 0.7644 
QA67 304.074 544.4374 0.1645 0.7691 
QA68 305.76 545.0244 0.1385 0.7697 
QA69 304.6 538.1283 0.2756 0.7665 
QA70 305.076 538.6515 0.2366 0.7673 
QA71 304.732 536.0362 0.3139 0.7656 
QA72 303.928 538.4397 0.2891 0.7664 
QA73 305.196 539.0036 0.1633 0.7693 
QA74 304.928 538.2633 0.2649 0.7667 
QA75 304.152 546.6302 0.1256 0.7699 
QA76 304.532 537.0751 0.3156 0.7658 
QA77 304.724 540.3565 0.225 0.7677 
QA78 305.186 538.8571 0.261 0.7669 
QA79 305.264 534.4632 0.3378 0.765 
 351 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted             
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA80 303.85 545.8512 0.1284 0.7699 
QA81 304.596 536.1771 0.3107 0.7657 
QA82 304.856 534.0634 0.32 0.7652 
QA83 305.616 541.4194 0.2212 0.7678 
QA84 305.386 541.1273 0.2045 0.7681 
QA85 305.496 554.4389 -0.0435 0.7753 
QA86 304.77 545.448 0.1116 0.7704 
QA87 304.868 547.1048 0.1071 0.7703 
QA88 305.878 543.0893 0.1909 0.7685 
QA89 305.164 540.2135 0.2193 0.7677 
QA90 303.84 544.4072 0.1765 0.7689 
QA91 304.404 538.8264 0.2782 0.7666 
QA92 304.734 544.6125 0.1545 0.7693 
QA93 304.864 546.9394 0.0814 0.7713 
QA94 304.768 544.3308 0.1676 0.769 
QA95 304.392 543.4653 0.1475 0.7695 
QA96 305.664 540.6564 0.2586 0.7672 
QA97 304.296 544.2449 0.1588 0.7692 
QA98 304.882 537.0582 0.2963 0.7661 
QA99 304.852 553.1965 -0.0179 0.7734 
QA100 305.452 539.675 0.2064 0.768 
 
Reliability Coefficients N of Cases =  500.0    N of Items =100 Alpha =  .7710 
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Table 27: Reliability assessment of the Irrational Beliefs Test using the Split-half 
Method 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA1 306.1 557.1563 -0.1139 0.7737 
QA2 303.674 545.0178 0.1371 0.7697 
QA3 305.618 557.4149 -0.1064 0.7743 
QA4 305.1 538.3948 0.2563 0.7669 
QA5 304.338 549.0378 0.0706 0.7711 
QA6 305.67 542.0532 0.2088 0.7681 
QA7 304.65 535.9875 0.2775 0.7662 
QA8 303.662 542.6491 0.1995 0.7683 
QA9 304.226 548.2835 0.052 0.7723 
QA10 303.448 547.9031 0.1071 0.7703 
QA11 304.95 544.8612 0.1035 0.7709 
QA12 304.53 547.6644 0.0883 0.7708 
QA13 304.162 543.4947 0.1445 0.7696 
QA14 304.506 548.6433 0.0555 0.7719 
QA15 304.822 545.0685 0.1404 0.7696 
QA16 304.092 538.1759 0.258 0.7668 
QA17 304.23 545.0953 0.1116 0.7705 
QA18 305.524 545.6888 0.1221 0.7701 
QA19 304.934 538.7992 0.2028 0.768 
QA20 305.98 546.0758 0.1251 0.77 
QA21 303.368 547.9966 0.0997 0.7704 
QA22 303.766 550.6245 0.0408 0.7717 
QA23 304.688 545.9946 0.0928 0.7711 
QA24 305.052 556.5905 -0.0745 0.7763 
QA25 304.192 550.3278 0.0346 0.7722 
QA26 305.35 552.5887 -0.0061 0.7731 
QA27 305.316 543.948 0.1545 0.7693 
QA28 303.614 542.1012 0.2308 0.7678 
QA29 305.276 554.6852 -0.0448 0.7739 
QA30 305.086 538.4675 0.2338 0.7673 
QA31 303.988 547.054 0.0999 0.7706 
QA32 303.186 544.9934 0.2017 0.7686 
QA33 303.58 547.7631 0.1084 0.7703 
QA34 304.078 537.1743 0.3476 0.7655 
QA35 304.226 545.9548 0.1114 0.7704 
QA36 304.594 559.9451 -0.1347 0.7766 
QA37 304.83 538.5262 0.259 0.7669 
QA38 305.214 541.6475 0.1844 0.7686 
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Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA39 304.902 537.6838 0.2984 0.7661 
QA40 304.542 551.5794 0.0188 0.7722 
QA41 305.194 541.3871 0.1779 0.7687 
QA42 303.548 544.2482 0.1932 0.7686 
QA43 304.776 548.3786 0.0834 0.7708 
QA44 304.708 543.7021 0.1742 0.7689 
QA45 305.054 548.3798 0.0786 0.771 
QA46 304.78 545.4224 0.1368 0.7697 
QA47 303.928 548.5519 0.0718 0.7712 
QA48 304.378 544.2476 0.1794 0.7688 
QA49 304.116 539.9304 0.2459 0.7673 
QA50 305.27 546.1775 0.1142 0.7703 
QA51 305.17 549.929 0.0412 0.772 
QA52 304.438 536.5913 0.314 0.7657 
QA53 303.796 543.7739 0.1776 0.7688 
QA54 305.16 557.4533 -0.0969 0.775 
QA55 304.76 539.6737 0.2235 0.7676 
QA56 304.78 546.204 0.1051 0.7705 
QA57 304.896 551.4561 0.0126 0.7728 
QA58 305.376 540.1149 0.2276 0.7676 
QA59 304.846 546.6275 0.1186 0.7701 
QA60 304.832 534.136 0.295 0.7656 
QA61 304.95 543.3101 0.1453 0.7696 
QA62 304.702 538.1295 0.2543 0.7669 
QA63 304.282 540.3392 0.2264 0.7676 
QA64 304.492 532.7635 0.3596 0.7643 
QA65 304.7 532.9679 0.3831 0.7641 
QA66 304.454 532.7895 0.3568 0.7644 
QA67 304.074 544.4374 0.1645 0.7691 
QA68 305.76 545.0244 0.1385 0.7697 
QA69 304.6 538.1283 0.2756 0.7665 
QA70 305.076 538.6515 0.2366 0.7673 
QA71 304.732 536.0362 0.3139 0.7656 
QA72 303.928 538.4397 0.2891 0.7664 
QA73 305.196 539.0036 0.1633 0.7693 
QA74 304.928 538.2633 0.2649 0.7667 
QA75 304.152 546.6302 0.1256 0.7699 
QA76 304.532 537.0751 0.3156 0.7658 
QA77 304.724 540.3565 0.225 0.7677 
QA78 305.186 538.8571 0.261 0.7669 
QA79 305.264 534.4632 0.3378 0.765 
QA80 303.85 545.8512 0.1284 0.7699 
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Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA81 304.596 536.1771 0.3107 0.7657 
QA82 304.856 534.0634 0.32 0.7652 
QA83 305.616 541.4194 0.2212 0.7678 
QA84 305.386 541.1273 0.2045 0.7681 
QA85 305.496 554.4389 -0.0435 0.7753 
QA86 304.77 545.448 0.1116 0.7704 
QA87 304.868 547.1048 0.1071 0.7703 
QA88 305.878 543.0893 0.1909 0.7685 
QA89 305.164 540.2135 0.2193 0.7677 
QA90 303.84 544.4072 0.1765 0.7689 
QA91 304.404 538.8264 0.2782 0.7666 
QA92 304.734 544.6125 0.1545 0.7693 
QA93 304.864 546.9394 0.0814 0.7713 
QA94 304.768 544.3308 0.1676 0.769 
QA95 304.392 543.4653 0.1475 0.7695 
QA96 305.664 540.6564 0.2586 0.7672 
QA97 304.296 544.2449 0.1588 0.7692 
QA98 304.882 537.0582 0.2963 0.7661 
QA99 304.852 553.1965 -0.0179 0.7734 
 
Reliability Coefficients 
N of Cases =  500.0          N of Items =100 
Correlation between forms =  .5482  Equal-length Spearman-Brown =  .7082 
Guttman Split-half =     .6887  Unequal-length Spearman-Brown = .7082 
 50 Items in part 1           50 Items in part 2 
Alpha for part 1 =      .5132  Alpha for part 2 =        .7290 
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Table 28: Reliability assessment of the Irrational Beliefs Test using Guttman’s Co-
efficient 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA1 306.1 557.1563 -0.1139 0.2917 0.7737 
QA2 303.674 545.0178 0.1371 0.3198 0.7697 
QA3 305.618 557.4149 -0.1064 0.2737 0.7743 
QA4 305.1 538.3948 0.2563 0.3608 0.7669 
QA5 304.338 549.0378 0.0706 0.364 0.7711 
QA6 305.67 542.0532 0.2088 0.256 0.7681 
QA7 304.65 535.9875 0.2775 0.4387 0.7662 
QA8 303.662 542.6491 0.1995 0.3215 0.7683 
QA9 304.226 548.2835 0.052 0.2055 0.7723 
QA10 303.448 547.9031 0.1071 0.3358 0.7703 
QA11 304.95 544.8612 0.1035 0.2209 0.7709 
QA12 304.53 547.6644 0.0883 0.27 0.7708 
QA13 304.162 543.4947 0.1445 0.2524 0.7696 
QA14 304.506 548.6433 0.0555 0.3294 0.7719 
QA15 304.822 545.0685 0.1404 0.2418 0.7696 
QA16 304.092 538.1759 0.258 0.3371 0.7668 
QA17 304.23 545.0953 0.1116 0.2987 0.7705 
QA18 305.524 545.6888 0.1221 0.3343 0.7701 
QA19 304.934 538.7992 0.2028 0.2926 0.768 
QA20 305.98 546.0758 0.1251 0.3951 0.77 
QA21 303.368 547.9966 0.0997 0.3274 0.7704 
QA22 303.766 550.6245 0.0408 0.3124 0.7717 
QA23 304.688 545.9946 0.0928 0.3996 0.7711 
QA24 305.052 556.5905 -0.0745 0.4317 0.7763 
QA25 304.192 550.3278 0.0346 0.315 0.7722 
QA26 305.35 552.5887 -0.0061 0.2643 0.7731 
QA27 305.316 543.948 0.1545 0.3063 0.7693 
QA28 303.614 542.1012 0.2308 0.3395 0.7678 
QA29 305.276 554.6852 -0.0448 0.2871 0.7739 
QA30 305.086 538.4675 0.2338 0.3627 0.7673 
QA31 303.988 547.054 0.0999 0.3807 0.7706 
QA32 303.186 544.9934 0.2017 0.4027 0.7686 
QA33 303.58 547.7631 0.1084 0.3281 0.7703 
QA34 304.078 537.1743 0.3476 0.4116 0.7655 
QA35 304.226 545.9548 0.1114 0.3296 0.7704 
QA36 304.594 559.9451 -0.1347 0.2873 0.7766 
QA37 304.83 538.5262 0.259 0.3667 0.7669 
QA38 305.214 541.6475 0.1844 0.3916 0.7686 
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Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA39 304.902 537.6838 0.2984 0.3792 0.7661 
QA40 304.542 551.5794 0.0188 0.4032 0.7722 
QA41 305.194 541.3871 0.1779 0.3988 0.7687 
QA42 303.548 544.2482 0.1932 0.364 0.7686 
QA43 304.776 548.3786 0.0834 0.2575 0.7708 
QA44 304.708 543.7021 0.1742 0.259 0.7689 
QA45 305.054 548.3798 0.0786 0.2695 0.771 
QA46 304.78 545.4224 0.1368 0.3678 0.7697 
QA47 303.928 548.5519 0.0718 0.3547 0.7712 
QA48 304.378 544.2476 0.1794 0.3339 0.7688 
QA49 304.116 539.9304 0.2459 0.3071 0.7673 
QA50 305.27 546.1775 0.1142 0.2659 0.7703 
QA51 305.17 549.929 0.0412 0.4008 0.772 
QA52 304.438 536.5913 0.314 0.3458 0.7657 
QA53 303.796 543.7739 0.1776 0.3201 0.7688 
QA54 305.16 557.4533 -0.0969 0.2801 0.775 
QA55 304.76 539.6737 0.2235 0.2994 0.7676 
QA56 304.78 546.204 0.1051 0.3197 0.7705 
QA57 304.896 551.4561 0.0126 0.3175 0.7728 
QA58 305.376 540.1149 0.2276 0.3028 0.7676 
QA59 304.846 3 546.6275 0.1186 0.2552 0.7701 
QA60 304.832 534.136 0.295 0.3762 0.7656 
QA61 304.95 543.3101 0.1453 0.3395 0.7696 
QA62 304.702 538.1295 0.2543 0.3035 0.7669 
QA63 304.282 540.3392 0.2264 0.3585 0.7676 
QA64 304.492 532.7635 0.3596 0.3785 0.7643 
QA65 304.7 532.9679 0.3831 0.4184 0.7641 
QA66 304.454 532.7895 0.3568 0.49 0.7644 
QA67 304.074 544.4374 0.1645 0.3111 0.7691 
QA68 305.76 545.0244 0.1385 0.3285 0.7697 
QA69 304.6 538.1283 0.2756 0.3939 0.7665 
QA70 305.076 538.6515 0.2366 0.3481 0.7673 
QA71 304.732 536.0362 0.3139 0.3504 0.7656 
QA72 303.928 538.4397 0.2891 0.3931 0.7664 
QA73 305.196 539.0036 0.1633 0.2113 0.7693 
QA74 304.928 538.2633 0.2649 0.3529 0.7667 
QA75 304.152 546.6302 0.1256 0.2885 0.7699 
QA76 304.532 537.0751 0.3156 0.3502 0.7658 
QA77 304.724 540.3565 0.225 0.3059 0.7677 
QA78 305.186 538.8571 0.261 0.4003 0.7669 
QA79 305.264 534.4632 0.3378 0.4204 0.765 
QA80 303.85 545.8512 0.1284 0.5127 0.7699 
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Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QA81 304.596 536.1771 0.3107 0.4867 0.7657 
QA82 304.856 534.0634 0.32 0.3253 0.7652 
QA83 305.616 541.4194 0.2212 0.4202 0.7678 
QA85 305.496 554.4389 -0.0435 0.3112 0.7753 
QA86 304.77 545.448 0.1116 0.2485 0.7704 
QA87 304.868 547.1048 0.1071 0.2726 0.7703 
QA88 305.878 543.0893 0.1909 0.4294 0.7685 
QA89 305.164 540.2135 0.2193 0.3318 0.7677 
QA90 303.84 544.4072 0.1765 0.381 0.7689 
QA91 304.404 538.8264 0.2782 0.3748 0.7666 
QA92 304.734 544.6125 0.1545 0.327 0.7693 
QA93 304.864 546.9394 0.0814 0.2692 0.7713 
QA94 304.768 544.3308 0.1676 0.2572 0.769 
QA95 304.392 543.4653 0.1475 0.3064 0.7695 
QA96 305.664 540.6564 0.2586 0.3439 0.7672 
QA97 304.296 544.2449 0.1588 0.2989 0.7692 
QA98 304.882 537.0582 0.2963 0.2919 0.7661 
QA99 304.852 553.1965 -0.0179 0.3418 0.7734 
QA100 305.452 539.675 0.2064 0.4453 0.768 
 
Reliability Coefficients 100 items 
 Lambda 1 = .7633  Lambda 2 = .7840  Lambda 3 = .7710 
 Lambda 4 = .6887  Lambda 5 = .7699  Lambda 6 = .8425 
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Table 29: Reliability assessment of the shyness scale using Alpha Co-efficient 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QB1 34.26 70.2208 0.514 0.7243 
QB2 33.61 70.0941 0.4552 0.7284 
QB3 34.234 78.0914 0.076 0.765 
QB4 34.72 72.7631 0.3894 0.7357 
QB5 34.592 71.6649 0.3965 0.7344 
QB6 33.848 78.6261 0.0562 0.7664 
QB7 34.406 69.6765 0.5017 0.7244 
QB8 34.418 72.4963 0.3643 0.7375 
QB9 34.094 69.897 0.3892 0.7349 
QB10 34.104 73.7567 0.3034 0.7431 
QB11 33.942 69.6219 0.4622 0.7275 
QB12 33.628 71.7812 0.3111 0.7436 
QB13 34.486 70.8194 0.4726 0.7279 
QB14 33.836 69.8488 0.4886 0.7255 
QB15 33.774 75.6382 0.1983 0.753 
 
Reliability CoefficientsN of Cases =  500.0          N of Items = 15 
 Alpha =  .7517 
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Table 30: Reliability assessment of the shyness scale using Spearman Co-efficient 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QB1 34.26 70.2208 0.514 0.7243 
QB2 33.61 70.0941 0.4552 0.7284 
QB3 34.234 78.0914 0.076 0.765 
QB4 34.72 72.7631 0.3894 0.7357 
QB5 34.592 71.6649 0.3965 0.7344 
QB6 33.848 78.6261 0.0562 0.7664 
QB7 34.406 69.6765 0.5017 0.7244 
QB8 34.418 72.4963 0.3643 0.7375 
QB9 34.094 69.897 0.3892 0.7349 
QB10 34.104 73.7567 0.3034 0.7431 
QB11 33.942 69.6219 0.4622 0.7275 
QB12 33.628 71.7812 0.3111 0.7436 
QB13 34.486 70.8194 0.4726 0.7279 
QB14 33.836 69.8488 0.4886 0.7255 
QB15 33.774 75.6382 0.1983 0.753 
Reliability Coefficients N of Cases =  500.0          N of Items = 15 
Correlation between forms =  .5016  Equal-length Spearman-Brown =  .6680 
Guttman Split-half =     .6680  Unequal-length Spearman-Brown = .6688 
 8 Items in part 1            7 Items in part 2 
Alpha for part 1 =      .6236  Alpha for part 2 =        .6512 
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Table 31: Reliability Assessment of the Shyness Scale Using the Covariance Matrix 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QB1 34.26 70.2208 0.514 0.3179 0.7243 
QB2 33.61 70.0941 0.4552 0.2682 0.7284 
QB3 34.234 78.0914 0.076 0.0508 0.765 
QB4 34.72 72.7631 0.3894 0.2465 0.7357 
QB5 34.592 71.6649 0.3965 0.209 0.7344 
QB6 33.848 78.6261 0.0562 0.0888 0.7664 
QB7 34.406 69.6765 0.5017 0.3025 0.7244 
QB8 34.418 72.4963 0.3643 0.1726 0.7375 
QB9 34.094 69.897 0.3892 0.1829 0.7349 
QB10 34.104 73.7567 0.3034 0.1113 0.7431 
QB11 33.942 69.6219 0.4622 0.3287 0.7275 
QB12 33.628 71.7812 0.3111 0.2026 0.7436 
QB13 34.486 70.8194 0.4726 0.2853 0.7279 
QB14 33.836 69.8488 0.4886 0.3171 0.7255 
QB15 33.774 75.6382 0.1983 0.0517 0.753 
 
Reliability Coefficients  15 items 
 Lambda 1 = .7016  Lambda 2 = .7620  Lambda 3 = .7517 
 Lambda 4 = .6680  Lambda 5 = .7412  Lambda 6 = .7631 
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Table 32: Reliability assessment of the s Interaction Anxiousness Scale using the Alpha 
Coefficient 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QC1 27.874 36.2707 0.3332 0.5709 
QC2 28.954 37.4388 0.3815 0.5681 
QC3 26.934 40.4145 0.0506 0.6288 
QC4 28.448 35.4702 0.3943 0.5581 
QC5 28.65 36.1197 0.4169 0.5576 
QC6 27.782 41.0245 0.0173 0.6345 
QC7 27.64 36.0024 0.3373 0.5696 
QC8 27.72 34.9315 0.4138 0.5529 
QC9 27.838 38.8895 0.1698 0.6035 
QC10 28.304 36.192 0.3372 0.57 
QC11 28.422 35.5911 0.3995 0.5578 
QC12 27.462 41.1148 -0.0018 0.6418 
Reliability Coefficients N of Cases =  500.0          N of Items = 12 
Alpha =  .6072 
Table 33: Reliability assessment of the s Interaction Anxiousness Scale using the Split-
half Method 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QC1 27.874 36.2707 0.3332 0.5709 
QC2 28.954 37.4388 0.3815 0.5681 
QC3 26.934 40.4145 0.0506 0.6288 
QC4 28.448 35.4702 0.3943 0.5581 
QC5 28.65 36.1197 0.4169 0.5576 
QC6 27.782 41.0245 0.0173 0.6345 
QC7 27.64 36.0024 0.3373 0.5696 
QC8 27.72 34.9315 0.4138 0.5529 
QC9 27.838 38.8895 0.1698 0.6035 
QC10 28.304 36.192 0.3372 0.57 
QC11 28.422 35.5911 0.3995 0.5578 
QC12 27.462 41.1148 -0.0018 0.6418 
Reliability Coefficients N of Cases =  500.0          N of Items = 12 
Correlation between forms =  .5252  Equal-length Spearman-Brown =  .6887 
Guttman Split-half =     .6868  Unequal-length Spearman-Brown = .6887 
 6 Items in part 1            6 Items in part 2 
Alpha for part 1 =      .3607  Alpha for part 2 =        .4138 
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Table 34: Reliability assessment of the s Interaction Anxiousness Scale using the 
Covariance Matrix 
 
Question Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
QC1 27.874 36.2707 0.3332 0.2462 0.5709 
QC2 28.954 37.4388 0.3815 0.2855 0.5681 
QC3 26.934 40.4145 0.0506 0.1422 0.6288 
QC4 28.448 35.4702 0.3943 0.308 0.5581 
QC5 28.65 36.1197 0.4169 0.4497 0.5576 
QC6 27.782 41.0245 0.0173 0.1721 0.6345 
QC7 27.64 36.0024 0.3373 0.2086 0.5696 
QC8 27.72 34.9315 0.4138 0.2586 0.5529 
QC9 27.838 38.8895 0.1698 0.0668 0.6035 
QC10 28.304 36.192 0.3372 0.2205 0.57 
QC11 28.422 35.5911 0.3995 0.3061 0.5578 
QC12 27.462 41.1148 -0.0018 0.2664 0.6418 
 
Reliability Coefficients  12 items 
 Lambda 1 = .5566  Lambda 2 = .6527  Lambda 3 = .6072 
 Lambda 4 = .6868  Lambda 5 = .6251  Lambda 6 = .6624 
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Table 35: Factor Analysis of the Validity of the Irrational Beliefs 
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
  
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Varia
nce 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varia
nce 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Varia
nce 
Cumulative 
% 
1 6.455 6.455 6.455 6.455 6.455 6.455 4.114 4.114 4.114 
2 5.178 5.178 11.632 5.178 5.178 11.632 2.397 2.397 6.511 
3 3.806 3.806 15.438 3.806 3.806 15.438 2.200 2.200 8.711 
4 2.150 2.150 17.588 2.150 2.150 17.588 2.100 2.100 10.811 
5 2.087 2.087 19.675 2.087 2.087 19.675 1.940 1.940 12.751 
6 2.014 2.014 21.688 2.014 2.014 21.688 1.926 1.926 14.677 
7 1.933 1.933 23.622 1.933 1.933 23.622 1.925 1.925 16.601 
8 1.831 1.831 25.453 1.831 1.831 25.453 1.920 1.920 18.522 
9 1.795 1.795 27.248 1.795 1.795 27.248 1.784 1.784 20.306 
10 1.763 1.763 29.012 1.763 1.763 29.012 1.781 1.781 22.087 
11 1.697 1.697 30.709 1.697 1.697 30.709 1.762 1.762 23.848 
12 1.641 1.641 32.350 1.641 1.641 32.350 1.758 1.758 25.606 
13 1.624 1.624 33.974 1.624 1.624 33.974 1.733 1.733 27.340 
14 1.580 1.580 35.554 1.580 1.580 35.554 1.699 1.699 29.039 
15 1.547 1.547 37.101 1.547 1.547 37.101 1.687 1.687 30.726 
16 1.488 1.488 38.589 1.488 1.488 38.589 1.684 1.684 32.410 
17 1.428 1.428 40.017 1.428 1.428 40.017 1.679 1.679 34.089 
18 1.393 1.393 41.409 1.393 1.393 41.409 1.664 1.664 35.753 
19 1.377 1.377 42.786 1.377 1.377 42.786 1.633 1.633 37.386 
20 1.360 1.360 44.146 1.360 1.360 44.146 1.631 1.631 39.018 
21 1.337 1.337 45.483 1.337 1.337 45.483 1.620 1.620 40.638 
22 1.324 1.324 46.807 1.324 1.324 46.807 1.611 1.611 42.249 
23 1.281 1.281 48.087 1.281 1.281 48.087 1.584 1.584 43.833 
24 1.256 1.256 49.343 1.256 1.256 49.343 1.580 1.580 45.413 
25 1.240 1.240 50.583 1.240 1.240 50.583 1.535 1.535 46.948 
26 1.212 1.212 51.794 1.212 1.212 51.794 1.527 1.527 48.476 
27 1.178 1.178 52.972 1.178 1.178 52.972 1.522 1.522 49.997 
28 1.163 1.163 54.135 1.163 1.163 54.135 1.518 1.518 51.516 
29 1.126 1.126 55.262 1.126 1.126 55.262 1.498 1.498 53.014 
30 1.113 1.113 56.375 1.113 1.113 56.375 1.467 1.467 54.480 
31 1.092 1.092 57.466 1.092 1.092 57.466 1.463 1.463 55.943 
32 1.089 1.089 58.556 1.089 1.089 58.556 1.447 1.447 57.391 
33 1.038 1.038 59.594 1.038 1.038 59.594 1.432 1.432 58.823 
34 1.028 1.028 60.622 1.028 1.028 60.622 1.412 1.412 60.235 
35 1.021 1.021 61.643 1.021 1.021 61.643 1.407 1.407 61.643 
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Table 36: Comparison of Extraction and Rotation Methods (N = 500) for All Scales 
 
Component Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
1.  9.656 7.603 7.603 
2.  5.536 4.359 11.962 
3.  4.117 3.242 15.204 
4.  3.214 2.531 17.735 
5.  2.337 1.840 19.575 
6.  2.265 1.784 21.359 
7.  2.199 1.731 23.090 
8.  2.168 1.707 24.797 
9.  1.972 1.553 26.350 
10.  1.930 1.520 27.870 
11.  1.854 1.460 29.330 
12.  1.816 1.430 30.760 
13.  1.802 1.419 32.179 
14.  1.765 1.390 33.569 
15.  1.720 1.354 34.923 
16.  1.685 1.327 36.250 
17.  1.613 1.270 37.520 
18.  1.568 1.234 38.754 
19.  1.536 1.210 39.964 
20.  1.490 1.174 41.138 
21.  1.474 1.160 42.298 
22.  1.459 1.149 43.447 
23.  1.431 1.126 44.573 
24.  1.426 1.123 45.696 
25.  1.408 1.109 46.805 
26.  1.367 1.076 47.881 
27.  1.349 1.062 48.943 
28.  1.331 1.048 49.991 
29.  1.309 1.031 51.022 
30.  1.272 1.002 52.024 
31.  1.233 .971 52.994 
32.  1.224 .964 53.958 
33.  1.205 .949 54.907 
34.  1.179 .929 55.836 
35.  1.176 .926 56.762 
36.  1.157 .911 57.673 
37.  1.136 .895 58.568 
38.  1.108 .873 59.441 
39.  1.094 .861 60.302 
40.  1.069 .842 61.144 
41.  1.052 .829 61.972 
42.  1.043 .821 62.794 
43.  1.012 .797 63.590 
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